Anarchy, State and Utopia

Renew：Part 11
Author：Robert Nozick
Update：08-15-2023
Tags：Entertainment Humor
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Chapter List

Chapter 8 easier than Chapter 7.) Part II closes with a hypothetical description of how a more extensive state might arise, a tale designed to make such a state quite unattractive. Even if the minimal state is the uniquely justifiable one, it may seem pale and unexciting, hardly something to inspire one or to present a goal worth fighting for. To a.s.sess this, I turn to that preeminently inspiring tradition of social thought, utopian theory, and argue that what can be saved from this tradition is precisely the structure of the minimal state. The argument involves a comparison of different methods of shaping a society, design devices and filter devices, and the presentation of a model which invites application of the mathematical economist"s notion of the core of an economy.
Chapter 2
Chapter 5, we argued that a territory with a dominant protective agency contains a state. Would Locke agree that in such a territory there was a state or civil society? If so, would he say it had been created by a social compact? Clients of the same protective agency are in a state of civil society with respect to each other; clients and independents have exactly the same rights vis-a-vis each other as any two persons in a state of nature, and hence are in a state of nature with respect to each other (Two Treatises of Government, II, sect. 87). But does the fact that the independents yield before the superior power of the dominant protective agency and II, sect. 87). But does the fact that the independents yield before the superior power of the dominant protective agency and don"t don"t act as executioners of the law of nature against its clients (despite having a right to) mean that they are not in a Lockean state of nature with respect to the clients? Should one say they are in a act as executioners of the law of nature against its clients (despite having a right to) mean that they are not in a Lockean state of nature with respect to the clients? Should one say they are in a de jure de jure state of nature but not a state of nature but not a de facto de facto one? Would Locke use some notion of political or civil society under which there could be a civil society in an area even if not one? Would Locke use some notion of political or civil society under which there could be a civil society in an area even if not every every two people in that area stood in a civil-society relationship with respect to each other? One also would want this notion to be of political interest; if merely two of the many individuals in an area stand in a civil-society relationship with respect to each other, this should be insufficient for there to be civil society in that area. two people in that area stood in a civil-society relationship with respect to each other? One also would want this notion to be of political interest; if merely two of the many individuals in an area stand in a civil-society relationship with respect to each other, this should be insufficient for there to be civil society in that area.8 We have described a process whereby individuals in an area separately sign up for personal protection with different business enterprises which provide protective services, all but one of the agencies being extinguished or all coming to some modus vivendi, modus vivendi, and so on. To what degree, if any, does this process fit what Locke envisioned as individuals "agreeing with other men to join and unite into a community," consenting "to make one community or government" (sect. 95), compacting to make up a commonwealth (sect. 99)? The process looks nothing like unanimous joint agreement to create a government or state. No one, as they buy protective services from their local protective agency, has in mind anything so grand. But perhaps joint agreement where each has in mind that the others will agree and each intends to bring about the end result of this is not necessary for a Lockean compact. and so on. To what degree, if any, does this process fit what Locke envisioned as individuals "agreeing with other men to join and unite into a community," consenting "to make one community or government" (sect. 95), compacting to make up a commonwealth (sect. 99)? The process looks nothing like unanimous joint agreement to create a government or state. No one, as they buy protective services from their local protective agency, has in mind anything so grand. But perhaps joint agreement where each has in mind that the others will agree and each intends to bring about the end result of this is not necessary for a Lockean compact.9 I myself see little point to stretching the notion of "compact" so that each pattern or state of affairs that arises from the disparate voluntary actions of separately acting individuals is viewed as arising from a I myself see little point to stretching the notion of "compact" so that each pattern or state of affairs that arises from the disparate voluntary actions of separately acting individuals is viewed as arising from a social compact, social compact, even though no one had the pattern in mind or was acting to achieve it. Or, if the notion is so stretched, this should be made clear so that others are not misled as to its import. It should be made clear that the notion is such that each of the following arises from a social compact: the total state of affairs const.i.tuted by who is married to, or living with, whom; the distribution on a given evening in a given city of who is in what movie theater, sitting where; the particular traffic pattern on a state"s highways on a given day; the set of customers of a given grocery store on a given day and the particular pattern of purchases they make, and so on. Far be it from me to claim that this wider notion is of no interest; that a state can arise by a process that fits this wider notion (without fitting the narrower one) is of very great interest indeed! even though no one had the pattern in mind or was acting to achieve it. Or, if the notion is so stretched, this should be made clear so that others are not misled as to its import. It should be made clear that the notion is such that each of the following arises from a social compact: the total state of affairs const.i.tuted by who is married to, or living with, whom; the distribution on a given evening in a given city of who is in what movie theater, sitting where; the particular traffic pattern on a state"s highways on a given day; the set of customers of a given grocery store on a given day and the particular pattern of purchases they make, and so on. Far be it from me to claim that this wider notion is of no interest; that a state can arise by a process that fits this wider notion (without fitting the narrower one) is of very great interest indeed!
Chapter 4
Chapter 5
Chapter 6
Chapter 2, would be avoided by the Lockean proviso of Chapter 7.) Since I do not see my way clearly through these issues, I raise them here only to leave them. percent of his income to the needy during the year, on the grounds that they find it offensive to look at someone not wearing this badge (not having contributed)? And whence this emergent right of the majority to decide? Or are there to be no "public" place or ways? (Some dangers of this, noted in Chapter 2, would be avoided by the Lockean proviso of Chapter 7.) Since I do not see my way clearly through these issues, I raise them here only to leave them.
Chapter 2. might incline one to think that our situation does contain a compact, though note that Locke uses "consent" in these sections rather than "compact." Other sections, and the main thrust of the work, incline one in the opposite direction and have so inclined Locke"s commentators. One might also, in considering Locke"s discussion of money (sects. 36, 37, 47, 48, 50, 184), play down phrases like "invention of money," "agreed that a little piece of yellow metal ... should be worth," "by mutual consent," "phantastical imaginary value," and so on, and instead emphasize "tacit agreement," so as to try to get Locke"s description to fit the story we have told in Chapter 2.
Chapter I, Section I, page 48. Part I, Chapter I, Section I, page 48.
Chapter 10
Chapter 11