The second piece of news, on the other hand, was the saving of it; and that second piece of news was the information that Sir John French had in front of him not one German army corps, and possibly part or even the whole of a second, but at least three. As the matter turned out, the British contingent was really dealing first and last with four army corps, and the essential part of the news conveyed was that the extreme western portion of this large German force _was attempting to turn the flank of the whole army_.
It was not only attempting to do so, it was in number sufficient to do so; and unless prompt measures were taken, what was now discovered to be the general German plan would succeed, and the campaign in the West would be in two days decided adversely to the Allies--the same s.p.a.ce of time in which the campaign of 1815 was decided adversely to Napoleon in just these same country-sides.
It is here necessary to describe what this German plan was.
The reader has already seen, when the general principles of the open strategic square were described on a previous page, that everything depends upon the fate of the operative corner. This operative corner in the present campaign had turned out to be the two French armies, the 4th and the 5th, upon the Lower Sambre and the Meuse, and the British contingent lying to the left of the 5th on the Upper Sambre and by Mons.
If the operative corner of a strategic open square is annihilated as a military force, or so seriously defeated that it can offer no effective opposition for some days, then the whole plan of a strategic square breaks to pieces, and the last position of the inferior forces which have adopted it is worse than if they had not relied upon the manoeuvre at all, but had simply spread out in line to await defeat in bulk at the hands of their superior enemy.
Now there are two ways in which a military force can be disposed of by its opponent. There are two ways in which it can be--to use the rather exaggerated language of military history--"annihilated."
The first is this: You can break up its cohesion by a smashing blow delivered somewhere along its line, and preferably near its centre.
But if you do that, the results will never be quite complete, and may be incomplete in any degree according to the violence and success of your blow.
The second way is to get round the enemy with your superior numbers, to get past his flank, to the back of him, and so envelop him. If that manoeuvre is carried out successfully, you bag his forces entire. It is to this second manoeuvre that modern Prussian strategy and tactics are particularly attached. It is obvious that its fruits are far more complete than those of the first manoeuvre, when, or if, it is wholly successful. For to get round your enemy and bag him whole is a larger result than merely to break him up and leave _some_ of him able to re-form and perhaps fight again. Two things needful to such success are (_a_) superior numbers, save in case of gross error upon the part of the opponents; (_b_) great rapidity of action on the part of the outflanking body, coupled, if possible, with surprise. That rapidity of action is necessary is obvious; for the party on the flank has got to go much farther than the rest of the army. It has to go all the length of the arrow (1), and an element of surprise is usually necessary. For if the army AA which BB was trying to outflank learned of the manoeuvre in time he only has to retreat upon his left by the shorter arrow (2) to escape from the threatened clutch.
[Ill.u.s.tration: Sketch 45.]
Now, von Kluck with his five army corps, four of which were in operation against Sir John French, was well able to count on all these elements. He had highly superior numbers, his superiority had not been discovered until it was almost too late, and for rapidity of action he had excellent railways and a vast equipment of petrol vehicles.
What he proposed to do was, while engaging the British contingent of less than two army corps with three full army corps of his own, to swing his extreme western army corps right round, west through Tournai, and so turn the British line. If he succeeded in doing that, he had at the same time succeeded in turning the whole of the Franco-British forces on the Sambre and Meuse. In other words, he was in a fair way to accomplishing the destruction of the operative corner of the great square, and consequently, as a last result, the destruction of the whole Allied force in the West.
The thing may be represented on a sketch map in this form.
Of von Kluck"s five corps, 1 is operating against the junction of the English and French lines beyond Binche, 2, 3, and 4 are ma.s.sing against the rather more than one and a half of Sir John French at AA, and 5, after the capture of Tournai, is going to take a big sweep round in the direction of the arrow towards Cambrai, and so to turn the whole line. Meanwhile, the cavalry, still farther west, acting independently, is to sweep the country right out to Arras and beyond.
[Ill.u.s.tration: Sketch 46.]
The particular t.i.tles of corps are of no great value in following the leading main lines of a military movement; but it may be worth remembering that this "number 5," to which von Kluck had allotted the turning movement, was the _Second_ German Corps. With its cavalry it numbered alone (and apart from all the other forces of von Kluck which were engaging the British line directly) quite three-quarters as many men as all that British line for the moment mustered.
It was not possible, from local circ.u.mstances which the full history of the war, when it is written, will explain, for the British contingent to fall back in the remaining hours of daylight upon that Sunday.
Belated by at the most twelve hours, as the news of the French retirement had been, the British retirement followed it fully twenty hours after. It was not until daylight of Monday, the 24th, that all the organizations for this retirement were completed, the plans drawn up, and the first retrograde movements made.
To permit a retirement before such a great superiority of the enemy to be made without disaster, it was necessary to counter-attack not only at this inception of the movement, but throughout all the terrible strain of the ensuing eight days.
Here it may be necessary to explain why, in any retirement, continual counter-attacks on the pursuing enemy are necessary.
It is obvious that, under equal conditions, the pursuing enemy can advance as fast as can your own troops which are retreating before him. If, therefore, a retreat, once contact has been established, consisted in merely walking away from the enemy, that enemy would be able to maintain a ceaseless activity against one portion of your united force--its rear--which activity would be exercised against bodies on the march, and incapable of defence. To take but one example out of a hundred: his guns would be always unlimbering, shooting at you, then limbering up again to continue the pursuit; unlimbering again, shooting again--and so forth; while your guns would never reply, being occupied in an unbroken retirement, and therefore continually limbered up and useless behind their teams.
A retiring force, therefore, of whatever size--from a company to an army--can only safely effect its retirement by detaching one fraction from its total which shall hold up the pursuit for a time while the main body gets away.
When this detached fraction is wearied or imperilled, another fraction relieves it, taking up the same task in its turn; the first fraction, which had hitherto been checking the pursuit, falls back rapidly on to the main body, under cover of the new rearguard"s fire as it turns to face the enemy. And the process is kept up, first one, then another portion of the whole force being devoted to it, until the retirement of the whole body has been successfully effected, and it is well ahead of its pursuers and secure.
[Ill.u.s.tration: Sketch 47.]
For example: two White army corps, I., II., as in the annexed diagram, each of two divisions, 1, 2, and 3, 4, have to retire before a greatly superior Black force, _abcde_. They succeed in retiring by the action expressed in the following diagram. White corps No. I. first undertakes to hold up the enemy while No. II. makes off. No. I.
detaches one division for the work (Division 2), and for a short time it checks the movement of _a_, _b_, and _c_, at least, of the enemy.
Now _d_ and _e_ press on. But they cannot press on at any pace they choose, for an army must keep together, and the check to _a_, _b_, and _c_ somewhat r.e.t.a.r.ds _d_ and _e_. They advance, say, to the positions de.
[Ill.u.s.tration: Sketch 48.]
Next, White corps No. II. stops, puts out one of its divisions (say 4) to check _d_ and _e_, while its other division either helps or falls back, according to the severity of the pressure, and White corps No.
I. makes off as fast as it can. _a_, _b_, _c_, no longer checked by a White rearguard, are nevertheless r.e.t.a.r.ded from two causes--first, the delay already inflicted on them; secondly, that they must not, if the army is to keep together, get too far ahead of their colleagues, _d_ and _e_, which White corps II. is holding up.
[Ill.u.s.tration: Sketch 49.]
Thus, on the second or third day the retreat of White is being secured by an increasing gap between pursued and pursuers. The process is continued. Every succeeding day--if that process is successful--should further widen the gap until White can feel free from immediate pressure.
Such is the principle--modified indefinitely in practice by variations of ground and numbers--under which a retirement must be conducted if it is to have any hope of ultimate success in saving the pursued.
But it is clear that the process must always be a perilous one. Unless the most careful co-ordination is maintained between the moving parts of the retreat; unless the rearguard in each action falls back only _just upon_ and not a _little while after_ the precise moment when it can last safely do so; unless the new rearguard comes into play in time, etc., etc.--the pursuers may get right in among the pursued and break their cohesion; or they may get round them, cut them off, and compel them to surrender. In either case the retreating force ceases to exist as an army.
In proportion as the pursuers are numerous (mobility being equal) compared with the pursued, in that proportion is the peril. And with the best luck in the world some units are sure to be cut off, many guns lost, all stragglers and nearly all wounded abandoned in the course of a pressed retreat, and, above all, there will be the increasing discouragement and bewilderment of the men as the strain, the losses, and the ceaseless giving way before the enemy continue day after day with c.u.mulative effect.
The accomplishment of such a task, the maintenance of the "operative corner" in being during its ordeal of retreat before vastly superior numbers, and in particular the exceedingly perilous retirement of the British contingent at what was, during the first part of the strain, the extreme of the line, are what we are now about to follow.
The initial counter-attack, then, on this Monday, the first day of the retreat, was undertaken by the 2nd British Division from the region of Harmignies, which advanced as though with the object of retaking Binche. The demonstration was supported by all the artillery of the 1st Army Corps, while the 1st Division, lying near Peissant, supported this action of the 2nd. While that demonstration was in full activity, the 2nd Corps to the west or left (not all of it was yet in the field) retired on to the line Dour-Frameries, pa.s.sing through Quaregnon. It suffered some loss in this operation from the ma.s.ses of the enemy, which were pressing forward from Mons. When the 2nd Corps had thus halted on the line Dour-Frameries, the 1st Corps, which had been making the demonstration, took the opportunity to retire in its turn, and fell back before the evening to a line stretching from Bavai to Maubeuge.
[Ill.u.s.tration: Sketch 50.]
The 2nd Corps had entrenched itself, while the 1st Corps was thus falling back upon its right; and when it came to the turn of the 2nd Corps to play the part of rearguard in these alternate movements, the effort proved to be one of grave peril.
[Ill.u.s.tration: Sketch 51.]
Since the whole movement of the enemy was an outflanking movement, the pressure upon this left and extreme end of the line was particularly severe. The German advance in such highly superior numbers overlapped the two British corps to _their_ left or west, which was at this moment the extreme end of the Allied Franco-British line. They overlapped them as these pursuing Black units overlap the lesser retiring White units. It is evident that in such a case the last unit in the line at A will be suffering the chief burden of the attack. An attempt was made to relieve that burden by sending the and Cavalry Brigade in this direction to ride round the enemy"s outlying body; but the move failed, with considerable loss to the 9th Lancers and the 18th Hussars, which came upon wire entanglements five hundred yards from the enemy"s position. There did arrive in aid of the imperilled end of the line reinforcement in the shape of a new body.
One infantry brigade, the 19th, which had hitherto been upon the line of communications, reached the army on this its central left near Quarouble and a little behind that village before the morning was spent. It was in line before evening. This reinforcement lent some strength to the sorely tried 2nd Corps, but it had against it still double its own strength in front, and half as much again upon its exposed left or western flank, and it suffered heavily.
By the night of that Monday, the 24th of August, however, the whole of the British Army was again in line, and stretched from Maubeuge, which protected its right, through Bavai, on to the fields between the villages of Jenlain and Bry, where the fresh 19th Infantry Brigade had newly arrived before the evening, while beyond this extreme left again was the cavalry.
The whole operation, then, of that perilous Monday, the first day of the retreat, may be planned in general as in Sketch 52. At the beginning, at daybreak, you have the three German army corps lying as the shaded bodies are given opposite to the unshaded, which represent the British contingent of not quite two full army corps. By nightfall the British contingent, including now the 19th Brigade of infantry, lay in the positions from Maubeuge westward, with the 1st Corps next to Maubeuge, the 2nd Corps beyond Bavai, the 1st being commanded by Sir Douglas Haig, the 2nd by Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien; while the Germans lay more or less as the dotted shaded markings are.
The fortress of Maubeuge was, under these circ.u.mstances, clearly a lure. An army in the field in danger of envelopment will always be tempted to make for the nearest fortified zone in order to save itself. The British commander was well advised in his judgment to avoid this opportunity, and that for two reasons. First, that the locking up of any considerable portion of the Anglo-French force in its retirement would have jeopardized the chance of that counter-offensive which the French hoped sooner or later to initiate; secondly, that, as will be seen later, the works of Maubeuge were quite insufficient to resist for more than a few days a modern siege train.
[Ill.u.s.tration: Sketch 52.]
This point of Maubeuge and of its fall must be discussed later; for the moment all we need note is that the fortress afforded for a few hours--that is, during the night of Monday to Tuesday, the 24th-25th August--support to the British line during its first halt upon the rapid and perilous retirement from Mons.
Meanwhile the whole of the French 5th Army had been falling back with equal rapidity, and upon its right the 4th Army had followed soon; and as this French retirement had preceded the retirement of the British, its general line lay farther south.
On the other hand, from the nature of the topography in this section of the Franco-Belgian border, the units of the French command had to fall back farther and more rapidly in proportion as they stretched eastward. The attack of the enemy in forces of rather more than two to one had come, as we have seen, not only from across the line of the Sambre, but, once Namur had fallen, from across the line of the Meuse at right angles to the line of the Sambre. Therefore the 5th and the 4th Armies, contained within the triangle bounded by the Sambre and Meuse, retiring from blows struck from the direction of the arrows 1-5 over all that hilly and wooded country known as the Thierache, were, as to the extreme salient of them at A, compelled to a very rapid retirement indeed; and on this Sunday night the French line was deflected southward, not without heavy losses, until either on that night or on the Monday morning it joined up with the forces which stretched northward through and from Mezieres. An attempt to counter-attack through the precipitous ravines and deep woods on to the valley of the Semois had failed, and the line as a whole ran, upon this night between the Sunday and the Monday, much as is indicated upon the accompanying sketch.
[Ill.u.s.tration: Sketch 53.]
From this it will be seen that the British contingent away upon the extreme left was in very grave peril, not only because the turning movement was wholly directed round their exposed flank, but also because, their retirement having come late, they stood too far forward in the general scheme at this moment, and therefore more exposed to the enemy"s blow than the rest of the line. With this it must be remembered Tournai had already fallen. It was very imperfectly held by a French Territorial brigade, accompanied by one battery of English guns; and the entering German force, in a superiority of anything you like--two, three, or four to one--easily swept away the resistance proffered in this quarter.
These German forces from Tournai had not yet, by the nightfall of Monday, come up eastward against the British, but they were on the way, and they might appear at any moment. The corps next to them, the 4th of von Kluck"s five, was already operating upon that flank, and the next day, Wednesday, 26th of August, was to be the chief day of trial for this exposed British wing of the army.