Its being made up of atoms conditioned as above is again only true in the sense that the collocation has been shaped as a jug and not as a pot and so on. Thus proceeding in a similar manner the Jains say that all affirmations are true of a thing only in a certain limited sense. All things (_vastu_) thus possess an infinite number of qualities ([email protected] vastu_), each of which can only be affirmed in a particular sense. Such an ordinary thing as a jug will be found to be the object of an infinite number of affirmations and the possessor of an infinite number of qualities from infinite points of view, which are all true in certain restricted senses and not absolutely [Footnote ref l]. Thus in the positive relation riches cannot be affirmed of poverty but in the negative relation such an affirmation is possible as when we say "the poor man has no riches." The poor man possesses riches not in a positive but in a negative way. Thus in some relation or other anything may be affirmed of any other thing, and again in other relations the very same thing cannot be affirmed of it. The different standpoints from which things (though possessed of infinite determinations) can be spoken of as possessing this or that quality or as appearing in relation to this or that, are technically called _naya_ [Footnote ref 2].
The Doctrine of Nayas.
In framing judgments about things there are two ways open to us, firstly we may notice the manifold qualities and characteristics of anything but view them as unified in the thing; thus when we say "this is a book" we do not look at its characteristic qualities as being different from it, but rather the qualities or characteristics are perceived as having no separate existence from
[Footnote 1: See [email protected] on Jainamata in [email protected]@ddarsanasamuccaya_, pp.
211. etc., and also _Tattvarthadhigamasutra_.]
[Footnote 2: See _Tattvarthadhigamasutra_, and [email protected] [email protected]_, pp. 895-923.]
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the thing. Secondly we may notice the qualities separately and regard the thing as a mere non-existent fiction (cf. the Buddhist view); thus I may speak of the different qualities of the book separately and hold that the qualities of things are alone perceptible and the book apart from these cannot be found. These two points of view are respectively called _dravyanaya_ and _paryayanaya_ [Footnote ref 1]. The dravyanaya again shows itself in three forms, and paryayanaya in four forms, of which the first form only is important for our purposes, the other three being important rather from the point of view of grammar and language had better be omitted here. The three nayas under dravyanaya are called naigama-naya, [email protected] and vyavahara-naya.
When we speak of a thing from a purely common sense point of view, we do not make our ideas clear or precise. Thus I may hold a book in my hand and when asked whether my hands are empty, I may say, no, I have something in my hand, or I may say, I have a book in my hand. It is evident that in the first answer I looked at the book from the widest and most general point of view as a "thing," whereas in the second I looked at it in its special existence as a book. Again I may be reading a page of a book, and I may say I am reading a book, but in reality I was reading only one of the pages of the book. I may be scribbling on loose sheets, and may say this is my book on Jaina philosophy, whereas in reality there were no books but merely some loose sheets. This looking at things from the loose common sense view, in which we do not consider them from the point of view of their most general characteristic as "being" or as any of their special characteristics, but simply as they appear at first sight, is technically called the naigama standpoint. This empirical view probably proceeds on the a.s.sumption that a thing possesses the most general as well as the most special qualities, and hence we may lay stress on any one of these at any time and ignore the other ones. This is the point of view from which according to the Jains the Nyaya and [email protected] schools interpret experience.
[email protected] is the looking at things merely from the most general point of view. Thus we may speak of all individual things from their most general and fundamental aspect as "being."
This according to the Jains is the Vedanta way of looking at things.
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[Footnote 1: [email protected]_, pp. 171-173.]
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The vyavahara-naya standpoint holds that the real essence of things is to be regarded from the point of view of actual practical experience of the thing, which unifies within it some general as well as some special traits, which has been existing from past times and remain in the future, but yet suffer trifling changes all the while, changes which are serviceable to us in a thousand ways. Thus a "book" has no doubt some general traits, shared by all books, but it has some special traits as well. Its atoms are continually suffering some displacement and rearrangement, but yet it has been existing as a book for some time past and will exist for some time in the future as well. All these characteristics, go to make up the essence of the "book" of our everyday experience, and none of these can be separated and held up as being the concept of a "book." This according to the Jains is the [email protected] way of looking at things.
The first view of paryaya-naya called [email protected]_ is the Buddhist view which does not believe in the existence of the thing in the past or in the future, but holds that a thing is a mere conglomeration of characteristics which may be said to produce effects at any given moment. At each new moment there are new collocations of new qualities and it is these which may be regarded as the true essence of our notion of things [Footnote ref 1].
The nayas as we have already said are but points of view, or aspects of looking at things, and as such are infinite in number.
The above four represent only a broad cla.s.sification of these. The Jains hold that the [email protected], the Vedanta, the [email protected], and the Buddhist, have each tried to interpret and systematize experience from one of the above four points of view, and each regards the interpretation from his point of view as being absolutely true to the exclusion of all other points of view. This is their error (_nayabhasa_), for each standpoint represents only one of the many points of view from which a thing can be looked at. The affirmations from any point of view are thus true in a limited sense and under limited conditions. Infinite numbers of affirmations may be made of things from infinite points of view. Affirmations or judgments according to any naya or standpoint cannot therefore be absolute, for even contrary affirmations of the very selfsame
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[Footnote 1: The other standpoints of paryaya-naya, which represent grammatical and linguistic points of view, are _s"abda-naya, [email protected]_, and _evambhula-naya_. See [email protected]"yaka [email protected]_, pp. 895-923.]
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things may be held to be true from other points of view. The truth of each affirmation is thus only conditional, and inconceivable from the absolute point of view. To guarantee correctness therefore each affirmation should be preceded by the phrase _syat_ (may be). This will indicate that the affirmation is only relative, made somehow, from some point of view and under some reservations and not in any sense absolute. There is no judgment which is absolutely true, and no judgment which is absolutely false. All judgments are true in some sense and false in another.
This brings us to the famous Jaina doctrine of Syadvada [Footnote ref 1].
The Doctrine of Syadvada.
The doctrine of Syadvada holds that since the most contrary characteristics of infinite variety may be a.s.sociated with a thing, affirmation made from whatever standpoint (_naya_) cannot be regarded as absolute. All affirmations are true (in some _syadasti_ or "may be it is" sense); all affirmations are false in some sense; all affirmations are indefinite or inconceivable in some sense (_syadavaktavya_); all affirmations are true as well as false in some sense (_syadasti syannasti_); all affirmations are true as well as indefinite (_syadasti cavaktavyas"ca_); all affirmations are false as well as indefinite; all affirmations are true and false and indefinite in some sense (_syadasti syannasti syadavaktavyas"ca_). Thus we may say "the jug is" or the jug has being, but it is more correct to say explicitly that "may be (syat) that the jug is," otherwise if "being" here is taken absolutely of any and every kind of being, it might also mean that there is a lump of clay or a pillar, or a cloth or any other thing. The existence here is limited and defined by the form of the jug. "The jug is" does not mean absolute existence but a limited kind of existence as determined by the form of the jug, "The jug is" thus means that a limited kind of existence, namely the jug-existence is affirmed and not existence in general in the absolute or unlimited sense, for then the sentence "the jug is" might as well mean "the clay is," "the tree is," "the cloth is," etc. Again the existence of the jug is determined by the negation of all other things in the world; each quality or characteristic (such as red colour) of the jug is apprehended and defined by the negation of all the infinite varieties (such as black, blue, golden), etc., of its cla.s.s, and it is by the combined negation of all
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[Footnote 1: See [email protected]"yaka [email protected]_, pp. 895, etc., and _Syadvadamanjari_, pp. 170, etc.]
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the infinite number of characteristics or qualities other than those const.i.tuting the jug that a jug may be apprehended or defined.
What we call the being of the jug is thus the non-being of all the rest except itself. Thus though looked at from one point of view the judgment "the jug is" may mean affirmation of being, looked at from another point of view it means an affirmation of non-being (of all other objects). Thus of the judgment "the jug is" one may say, may be it is an affirmation of being (_syadasti_), may be it is a negation of being (_syannasti_); or I may proceed in quite another way and say that "the jug is" means "this jug is here," which naturally indicates that "this jug is not there" and thus the judgment "the jug is" (i.e. is here) also means that "the jug is not there," and so we see that the affirmation of the being of the jug is true only of this place and false of another, and this justifies us in saying that "may be that in some sense the jug is," and "may be in some sense that the jug is not." Combining these two aspects we may say that in some sense "may be that the jug is,"
and in some sense "may be that the jug is not." We understood here that if we put emphasis on the side of the characteristics const.i.tuting being, we may say "the jug is," but if we put emphasis on the other side, we may as well say "the jug is not." Both the affirmations hold good of the jug according as the emphasis is put on either side. But if without emphasis on either side we try to comprehend the two opposite and contradictory judgments regarding the jug, we see that the nature of the jug or of the existence of the jug is indefinite, unspeakable and inconceivable--_avaktavya,_ for how can we affirm both being and non-being of the same thing, and yet such is the nature of things that we cannot but do it. Thus all affirmations are true, are not true, are both true and untrue, and are thus unspeakable, inconceivable, and indefinite. Combining these four again we derive another three, (1) that in some sense it may be that the jug is, and (2) is yet unspeakable, or (3) that the jug is not and is unspeakable, or finally that the jug is, is not, and is unspeakable.
Thus the Jains hold that no affirmation, or judgment, is absolute in its nature, each is true in its own limited sense only, and for each one of them any of the above seven alternatives (technically called [email protected]_ holds good [Footnote ref 1]. The Jains say that other Indian systems each from its own point of view a.s.serts itself to be the absolute and the only
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[Footnote 1: See _Syadvadamanjari_, with Hemacandra"s commentary, pp. 166, etc.]
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point of view. They do not perceive that the nature of reality is such that the truth of any a.s.sertion is merely conditional, and holds good only in certain conditions, circ.u.mstances, or senses (_upadhi_). It is thus impossible to make any affirmation which is universally and absolutely valid. For a contrary or contradictory affirmation will always be found to hold good of any judgment in some sense or other. As all reality is partly permanent and partly exposed to change of the form of losing and gaining old and new qualities, and is thus relatively permanent and changeful, so all our affirmations regarding truth are also only relatively valid and invalid. Being, non-being and indefinite, the three categories of logic, are all equally available in some sense or other in all their permutations for any and every kind of judgment. There is no universal and absolute position or negation, and all judgments are valid only conditionally. The relation of the naya doctrine with the syadvada doctrine is therefore this, that for any judgment according to any and every naya there are as many alternatives as are indicated by syadvada. The validity of such a judgment is therefore only conditional. If this is borne in mind when making any judgment according to any naya, the naya is rightly used. If, however, the judgments are made absolutely according to any particular naya without any reference to other nayas as required by the syadvada doctrine the nayas are wrongly used as in the case of other systems, and then such judgments are false and should therefore be called false nayas (_nayabhasa_) [Footnote ref 1].
Knowledge, its value for us.
The Buddhist Dharmottara in his commentary on _Nyayabindu_ says that people who are anxious to fulfil some purpose or end in which they are interested, value the knowledge which helps them to attain that purpose. It is because knowledge is thus found to be useful and sought by men that philosophy takes upon it the task of examining the nature of true knowledge (_samyagjnana_ or [email protected]_). The main test of true knowledge is that it helps us to attain our purpose. The Jains also are in general agreement with the above view of knowledge of the Buddhists [Footnote ref 2]. They also
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[Footnote 1: The earliest mention of the doctrine of syadvada and [email protected] probably occurs in Bhadrabahu"s (433-357 B.C.) commentary [email protected]_.
[Footnote 2: See [email protected]@mkara_ (Benares), p. 16; also [email protected]@rtti_ (Asiatic Society), ch. I.]
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say that knowledge is not to be valued for its own sake. The validity ([email protected]_) of anything consists in this, that it directly helps us to get what is good for us and to avoid what is bad for us. Knowledge alone has this capacity, for by it we can adapt ourselves to our environments and try to acquire what is good for us and avoid what is bad [Footnote ref 1]. The conditions that lead to the production of such knowledge (such as the presence of full light and proximity to the eye in the case of seeing an object by visual perception) have but little relevancy in this connection.
For we are not concerned with how a cognition is produced, as it can be of no help to us in serving our purposes.
It is enough for us to know that external objects under certain conditions a.s.sume such a special fitness (_yogyata_) that we can have knowledge of them. We have no guarantee that they generate knowledge in us, for we are only aware that under certain conditions we know a thing, whereas under other conditions we do not know it [Footnote ref 2]. The enquiry as to the nature of the special fitness of things which makes knowledge of them possible does not concern us. Those conditions which confer such a special fitness on things as to render them perceivable have but little to do with us; for our purposes which consist only in the acquirement of good and avoidance of evil, can only be served by knowledge and not by those conditions of external objects.
Knowledge reveals our own self as a knowing subject as well as the objects that are known by us. We have no reason to suppose (like the Buddhists) that all knowledge by perception of external objects is in the first instance indefinite and indeterminate, and that all our determinate notions of form, colour, size and other characteristics of the thing are not directly given in our perceptual experience, but are derived only by imagination ([email protected]_), and that therefore true perceptual knowledge only certifies the validity of the indefinite and indeterminate crude sense data (_nirvikalpa jnana_). Experience shows that true knowledge on the one hand reveals us as subjects or knowers, and on the other hand gives a correct sketch of the external objects in all the diversity of their characteristics. It is for this reason that knowledge is our immediate and most prominent means of serving our purposes.
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[Footnote 1: [email protected]@mkara,_ p. 26.]
[Footnote 2: See [email protected],_ II. 9, and its [email protected], and also the concluding [email protected] of ch. II.]
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Of course knowledge cannot directly and immediately bring to us the good we want, but since it faithfully communicates to us the nature of the objects around us, it renders our actions for the attainment of good and the avoidance of evil, possible; for if knowledge did not possess these functions, this would have been impossible. The validity of knowledge thus consists in this, that it is the most direct, immediate, and indispensable means for serving our purposes. So long as any knowledge is uncontradicted it should be held as true. False knowledge is that which represents things in relations in which they do not exist. When a rope in a badly lighted place gives rise to the illusion of a snake, the illusion consists in taking the rope to be a snake, i.e. perceiving a snake where it does not exist. Snakes exist and ropes also exist, there is no untruth in that [Footnote ref 1]. The error thus consists in this, that the snake is perceived where the rope exists. The perception of a snake under relations and environments in which it was not then existing is what is meant by error here. What was at first perceived as a snake was later on contradicted and thus found false. Falsehood therefore consists in the misrepresentation of objective facts in experience. True knowledge therefore is that which gives such a correct and faithful representation of its object as is never afterwards found to be contradicted. Thus knowledge when imparted directly in a.s.sociation with the organs in sense-perception is very clear, vivid, and distinct, and is called perceptional ([email protected]_); when attained otherwise the knowledge is not so clear and vivid and is then called non-perceptional ([email protected]_ [Footnote ref 2]).