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[Footnote 1:_Siddhantamuktavali_ on _Karika_ 63 and 64. We must remember that [email protected]"a discarded the definition of perception as given in the _Nyaya sutra_ which we have discussed above, and held that perception should be defined as that cognition which has the special cla.s.s-character of direct apprehension. He thinks that the old definition of perception as the cognition generated by sense-contact involves a vicious circle ([email protected]_, pp. 538-546). Sense-contact is still regarded by him as the cause of perception, but it should not be included in the definition. He agrees to the six kinds of contact described first by Udyotakara as mentioned above.]
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and this may happen to be true. This is called pratibhanajnana, which is also to be regarded as a [email protected] directly by the mind. This is of course different from the other form of perception called [email protected], by which memories of past perceptions by other senses are a.s.sociated with a percept visualized at the present moment; thus we see a rose and perceive that it is fragrant; the fragrance is not perceived by the eye, but the manas perceives it directly and a.s.sociates the visual percept with it. According to Vedanta this acquired perception is only a case of inference. The [email protected] however is that which is with reference to the happening of a future event.
When a cognition is produced, it is produced only as an objective cognition, e.g. This is a pot, but after this it is again related to the self by the mind as "I know this pot." This is effected by the mind again coming in contact for reperception of the cognition which had already been generated in the soul. This second reperception is called anuvyavasaya, and all practical work can proceed as a result of this anuvyavasaya [Footnote ref. l].
Inference.
Inference (_anumana_) is the second means of proof ([email protected]) and the most valuable contribution that Nyaya has made has been on this subject. It consists in making an a.s.sertion about a thing on the strength of the mark or linga which is a.s.sociated with it, as when finding smoke rising from a hill we remember that since smoke cannot be without fire, there must also be fire in yonder hill. In an example like this smoke is technically called linga, or hetu. That about which the a.s.sertion has been made (the hill in this example) is called [email protected], and the term "fire" is called sadhya. To make a correct inference it is necessary that the hetu or linga must be present in the [email protected],
[email protected]__
[Footnote 1: This later Nyaya doctrine that the cognition of self in a.s.sociation with cognition is produced at a later moment must be contrasted with the [email protected]_ doctrine of Prabhakara, which holds that the object, knower and knowledge are all given simultaneously in knowledge. Vyavasaya (determinate cognition), according to [email protected]"a, gives us only the cognition of the object, but the cognition that I am aware of this object or cognition is a different functioning succeeding the former one and is called anu (after) vyavasaya (cognition), "[email protected] janamiti vyavasaye na bhasate [email protected] [email protected]@[email protected]@tasya jnanasya [email protected] bhasate; na ca svaprakas"e vyavasaya [email protected][email protected] svasya [email protected]@[email protected] bhasitumarhati, [email protected] [email protected]@nasya tasyajnanat, [email protected] janamiti na [email protected] kintu anuvyavasayah." [email protected]_, p. 795.]
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and in all other known objects similar to the [email protected] in having the sadhya in it ([email protected]), i.e., which are known to possess the sadhya (possessing fire in the present example). The linga must not be present in any such object as does not possess the sadhya ([email protected]@rtti_ absent from [email protected] or that which does not possess the sadhya). The inferred a.s.sertion should not be such that it is invalidated by direct perception [email protected]_) or the testimony of the s"astra ([email protected]_). The linga should not be such that by it an inference in the opposite way could also be possible ([email protected]_). The violation of any one of these conditions would spoil the cert.i.tude of the hetu as determining the inference, and thus would only make the hetu fallacious, or what is technically called hetvabhasa or seeming hetu by which no correct inference could be made.
Thus the inference that sound is eternal because it is visible is fallacious, for visibility is a quality which sound (here the [email protected]) does not possess [Footnote ref l]. This hetvabhasa is technically called _asiddha-hetu_. Again, hetvabhasa of the second type, technically called _viruddha-hetu_, may be exemplified in the case that sound is eternal, since it is created; the hetu "being created" is present in the opposite of sadhya [email protected]_), namely non-eternality, for we know that non-eternality is a quality which belongs to all created things. A fallacy of the third type, technically called _anaikantika-hetu_, is found in the case that sound is eternal, since it is an object of knowledge. Now "being an object of knowledge" (_prameyatva_) is here the hetu, but it is present in things eternal (i.e. things possessing sadhya), as well as in things that are not eternal (i.e. which do not possess the sadhya), and therefore the concomitance of the hetu with the sadhya is not absolute (_anaikantika_). A fallacy of the fourth type, technically called [email protected]@ta_, may be found in the example--fire is not hot, since it is created like a jug, etc.
Here [email protected] shows that fire is hot, and hence the hetu is fallacious. The fifth fallacy, called [email protected]_, is to be found in cases where opposite hetus are available at the same time for opposite conclusions, e.g. sound like a jug is non-eternal,
[Footnote 1: It should be borne in mind that Nyaya did not believe in the doctrine of the eternality of sound, which the [email protected] did. Eternality of sound meant with [email protected] the theory that sounds existed as eternal indestructible ent.i.ties, and they were only manifested in our ears under certain conditions, e.g. the stroke of a drum or a particular kind of movement of the vocal muscles.]
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since no eternal qualities are found in it, and sound like akas"a is eternal, since no non-eternal qualities are found in it.
The Buddhists held in answer to the objections raised against inference by the Carvakas, that inferential arguments are valid, because they are arguments on the principle of the uniformity of nature in two relations, viz. _tadatmya_ (essential ident.i.ty) and _tadutpatti_ (succession in a relation of cause and effect). Tadatmya is a relation of genus and species and not of causation; thus we know that all pines are trees, and infer that this is a tree since it is a pine; tree and pine are related to each other as genus and species, and the co-inherence of the generic qualities of a tree with the specific characters of a pine tree may be viewed as a relation of essential ident.i.ty (_tadatmya_). The relation of tadutpatti is that of uniformity of succession of cause and effect, e.g. of smoke to fire.
Nyaya holds that inference is made because of the invariable a.s.sociation (_niyama_) of the [email protected] or hetu (the concomitance of which with the sadhya has been safeguarded by the five conditions noted above) with the sadhya, and not because of such specific relations as tadatmya or tadutpatti. If it is held that the inference that it is a tree because it is a pine is due to the essential ident.i.ty of tree and pine, then the opposite argument that it is a pine because it is a tree ought to be valid as well; for if it were a case of ident.i.ty it ought to be the same both ways. If in answer to this it is said that the characteristics of a pine are a.s.sociated with those of a tree and not those of a tree with those of a pine, then certainly the argument is not due to essential ident.i.ty, but to the invariable a.s.sociation of the [email protected] (mark) with the [email protected] (the possessor of [email protected]), otherwise called niyama.
The argument from tadutpatti (a.s.sociation as cause and effect) is also really due to invariable a.s.sociation, for it explains the case of the inference of the type of cause and effect as well as of other types of inference, where the a.s.sociation as cause and effect is not available (e.g. from sunset the rise of stars is inferred). Thus it is that the invariable concomitance of the [email protected] with the [email protected], as safeguarded by the conditions noted above, is what leads us to make a valid inference [Footnote ref l].
We perceived in many cases that a [email protected] (e.g. smoke) was a.s.sociated with a [email protected] (fire), and had thence formed the notion
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[Footnote 1: See _Nyayamanjari_ on anumana.]
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that wherever there was smoke there was fire. Now when we perceived that there was smoke in yonder hill, we remembered the concomitance (_vyapti_) of smoke and fire which we had observed before, and then since there was smoke in the hill, which was known to us to be inseparably connected with fire, we concluded that there was fire in the hill. The discovery of the [email protected] (smoke) in the hill as a.s.sociated with the memory of its concomitance with fire ([email protected]@nga-paramars"a) is thus the cause ([email protected]_ or _anumana_) of the inference (_anumiti_). The concomitance of smoke with fire is technically called _vyapti._ When this refers to the concomitance of cases containing smoke with those having fire, it is called _bahirvyapti_; and when it refers to the conviction of the concomitance of smoke with fire, without any relation to the circ.u.mstances under which the concomitance was observed, it is called _antarvyapti._ The Buddhists since they did not admit the notions of generality, etc. preferred antarvyapti view of concomitance to bahirvyapti as a means of inference [Footnote ref 1].
Now the question arises that since the validity of an inference will depend mainly on the validity of the concomitance of sign (_hetu_) with the signate (_sadhya_), how are we to a.s.sure ourselves in each case that the process of ascertaining the concomitance (_vyaptigraha_) had been correct, and the observation of concomitance had been valid. The [email protected] school held, as we shall see in the next chapter, that if we had no knowledge of any such case in which there was smoke but no fire, and if in all the cases I knew I had perceived that wherever there was smoke there was fire, I could enunciate the concomitance of smoke with fire.
But Nyaya holds that it is not enough that in all cases where there is smoke there should be fire, but it is necessary that in all those cases where there is no fire there should not be any smoke, i.e. not only every case of the existence of smoke should be a case of the existence of fire, but every case of absence of fire should be a case of absence of smoke. The former is technically called _anvayavyapti_ and the latter _vyatirekavyapti._ But even this is not enough. Thus there may have been an a.s.s sitting, in a hundred cases where I had seen smoke, and there might have been a hundred cases where there was neither a.s.s nor smoke, but it cannot be a.s.serted from it that there is any relation of concomitance,
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[Footnote 1: See _Antarvyaptisamarthana,_ by Ratnakaras"anti in the _Six Buddhist Nyaya Tracts, Bibliotheca Indica_, 1910.]
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or of cause and effect between the a.s.s and the smoke. It may be that one might never have observed smoke without an antecedent a.s.s, or an a.s.s without the smoke following it, but even that is not enough. If it were such that we had so experienced in a very large number of cases that the introduction of the a.s.s produced the smoke, and that even when all the antecedents remained the same, the disappearance of the a.s.s was immediately followed by the disappearance of smoke (_yasmin sati bhavanam yato vina na bhavanam iti [email protected], Nyayamanjari,_ p. 122), then only could we say that there was any relation of concomitance (_vyapti_} between the a.s.s and the smoke [Footnote ref 1]. But of course it might be that what we concluded to be the hetu by the above observations of anvaya-vyatireka might not be a real hetu, and there might be some other condition (_upadhi_) a.s.sociated with the hetu which was the real hetu. Thus we know that fire in green wood (_ardrendhana_) produced smoke, but one might doubt that it was not the fire in the green wood that produced smoke, but there was some hidden demon who did it.
But there would be no end of such doubts, and if we indulged in them, all our work endeavour and practical activities would have to be dispensed with (_vyaghata_). Thus such doubts as lead us to the suspension of all work should not disturb or unsettle the notion of vyapti or concomitance at which we had arrived by careful observation and consideration [Footnote ref 2]. The Buddhists and the naiyayikas generally agreed as to the method of forming the notion of concomitance or vyapti (_vyaptigraha_), but the former tried to a.s.sert that the validity of such a concomitance always depended on a relation of cause and effect or of ident.i.ty of essence, whereas Nyaya held that neither the relations of cause and effect, nor that of essential ident.i.ty of genus and species, exhausted the field of inference, and there was quite a number of other types of inference which could not be brought under either of them (e.g. the rise of the moon and the tide of the ocean). A natural fixed order that certain things happening other things would happen could certainly exist, even without the supposition of an ident.i.ty of essence.
But sometimes it happens that different kinds of causes often have the same kind of effect, and in such cases it is difficult to
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[Footnote 1: See [email protected]_ on anumana and vyaptigraha.]
[Footnote 2: [email protected]_ on vyaptigraha, and [email protected]_ of [email protected]"a on vyaptigraha.]
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infer the particular cause from the effect. Nyaya holds however that though different causes are often found to produce the same effect, yet there must be some difference between one effect and another. If each effect is taken by itself with its other attendant circ.u.mstances and peculiarities, it will be found that it may then be possible to distinguish it from similar other effects. Thus a flood in the street may be due either to a heavy downpour of rain immediately before, or to the rise in the water of the river close by, but if observed carefully the flooding of the street due to rain will be found to have such special traits that it could be distinguished from a similar flooding due to the rise of water in the river. Thus from the flooding of the street of a special type, as demonstrated by its other attendant circ.u.mstances, the special manner in which the water flows by small rivulets or in sheets, will enable us to infer that the flood was due to rains and not to the rise of water in the river. Thus we see that Nyaya relied on empirical induction based on uniform and uninterrupted agreement in nature, whereas the Buddhists a.s.sumed _a priori_ principles of causality or ident.i.ty of essence.
It may not be out of place here to mention that in later Nyaya works great emphasis is laid on the necessity of getting ourselves a.s.sured that there was no such upadhi (condition) a.s.sociated with the hetu on account of which the concomitance happened, but that the hetu was unconditionally a.s.sociated with the sadhya in a relation of inseparable concomitance. Thus all fire does not produce smoke; fire must be a.s.sociated with green wood in order to produce smoke. Green wood is thus the necessary condition (_upadhi_) without which, no smoke could be produced. It is on account of this condition that fire is a.s.sociated with smoke; and so we cannot say that there is smoke because there is fire. But in the concomitance of smoke with fire there is no condition, and so in every case of smoke there is fire. In order to be a.s.sured of the validity of vyapti, it is necessary that we must be a.s.sured that there should be nothing a.s.sociated with the hetu which conditioned the concomitance, and this must be settled by wide experience (_bhuyodars"ana_).
Pras"astapada in defining inference as the "knowledge of that (e.g. fire) a.s.sociated with the reason (e.g. smoke) by the sight of the reason" described a valid reason ([email protected]_) as that which is connected with the object of inference (_anumeya_) and which exists wherever the object of inference exists and is absent in all cases
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where it does not exist. This is indeed the same as the Nyaya qualifications of [email protected], [email protected] and [email protected]_ of a valid reason (hetu). Pras"astapada further quotes a verse to say that this is the same as what Kas"yapa (believed to be the family name of [email protected]) said. [email protected] says that we can infer a cause from the effect, the effect from the cause, or we can infer one thing by another when they are mutually connected, or in opposition or in a relation of inherence (IX. ii. 1 and III. i. 9). We can infer by a reason because it is duly a.s.sociated (_prasiddhipurvakatva_) with the object of inference. What this a.s.sociation was according to [email protected] can also be understood for he tells us (III. i. 15) that where there is no proper a.s.sociation, the reason (hetu) is either non-existent in the object to be inferred or it has no concomitance with it (_aprasiddha_) or it has a doubtful existence _sandigdha_). Thus if I say this a.s.s is a horse because it has horns it is fallacious, for neither the horse nor the a.s.s has horns.
Again if I say it is a cow because it has horns, it is fallacious, for there is no concomitance between horns and a cow, and though a cow may have a horn, all that have horns are not cows. The first fallacy is a combination of [email protected] and [email protected], for not only the present [email protected] (the a.s.s) had no horns, but no horses had any horns, and the second is a case of [email protected], for those which are not cows (e.g. buffaloes) have also horns. Thus, it seems that when Pras"astapada says that he is giving us the view of [email protected] he is faithful to it. Pras"astapada says that wherever there is smoke there is fire, if there is no fire there is no smoke.
When one knows this concomitance and unerringly perceives the smoke, he remembers the concomitance and feels certain that there is fire. But with regard to [email protected]"s enumeration of types of inference such as "a cause is inferred from its effect, or an effect from the cause," etc., Pras"astapada holds that these are not the only types of inference, but are only some examples for showing the general nature of inference. Inference merely shows a connection such that from this that can be inferred. He then divides inference into two cla.s.ses, [email protected]@[email protected] (from the experienced characteristics of one member of a cla.s.s to another member of the same cla.s.s), and samanyato [email protected]@[email protected] [email protected]@[email protected] (perceived resemblance) is that where the previously known case and the inferred case is exactly of the same cla.s.s. Thus as an example of it we can point out that by perceiving that only a cow has a hanging ma.s.s of flesh on its neck (_sasna_), I can whenever I see the same hanging
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ma.s.s of flesh at the neck of an animal infer that it is a cow. But when on the strength of a common quality the inference is extended to a different cla.s.s of objects, it is called samanyato [email protected]@[email protected]
Thus on perceiving that the work of the peasants is rewarded with a good harvest I may infer that the work of the priests, namely the performance of sacrifices, will also be rewarded with the objects for which they are performed (i.e. the attainment of heaven). When the conclusion, to which one has arrived (_svanis"citartha_) is expressed in five premisses for convincing others who are either in doubt, or in error or are simply ignorant, then the inference is called pararthanumana. We know that the distinction of svarthanumana (inference for oneself) and pararthanumana (inference for others) was made by the Jains and Buddhists.
Pras"astapada does not make a sharp distinction of two cla.s.ses of inference, but he seems to mean that what one infers, it can be conveyed to others by means of five premisses in which case it is called pararthanumana. But this need not be considered as an entirely new innovation of Pras"astapada, for in IX. 2, [email protected] himself definitely alludes to this distinction ([email protected] [email protected]