_The Battle of the Yalu_
Twenty-eight years elapsed after Lissa before the next significant naval action, the Battle of the Yalu, between fleets of China and j.a.pan. Yet the two engagements may well be taken together, since at the Yalu types and tactics were still transitional, and the initial situation at Lissa was duplicated--line abreast against line ahead. The result, however, was reversed, for the j.a.panese in line ahead took the initiative, used their superior speed to conduct the battle on their own terms, and won the day.
Trouble arose in the Far East over the dissolution of the decrepit monarchy of Korea, upon which both j.a.pan and China cast covetous eyes. As nominal suzerain, China in the spring of 1894 sent 2000 troops to Korea to suppress an insurrection, without observing certain treaty stipulations which required her to notify j.a.pan. The latter nation despatched 5000 men to Chemulpo in June. Hostilities broke out on July 25, when four fast j.a.panese cruisers, including the _Naniwa Kan_ under the future Admiral Togo, fell upon the Chinese cruiser _Tsi-yuen_ and two smaller vessels, captured the latter and battered the cruiser badly before she got away, and then to complete the day"s work sank a Chinese troop transport, saving only the European officers on board.
After this affair the Chinese Admiral Ting, a former cavalry officer but with some naval experience, favored taking the offensive, since control of the sea by China would at once decide the war. But the Chinese Foreign Council gave him orders not to cruise east of a line from Shantung to the mouth of the Yalu. Reverses on land soon forced him to give all his time to troop transportation, and this occupied both navies throughout the summer.
On September 16, the day before the Battle of the Yalu, the Chinese battleships escorted transports with 5000 troops to the mouth of the Yalu, and on the following morning they were anch.o.r.ed quietly outside the river. "For weeks," writes an American naval officer who was in command of one of the Chinese battleships, "we had antic.i.p.ated an engagement, and had had daily exercise at general quarters, etc., and little remained to be done.... The fleet went into action as well prepared as it was humanly possible for it to be with the same officers and men, handicapped as they were by official corruption and treachery ash.o.r.e."[1] As the midday meal was in preparation, columns of black smoke appeared to southwestward. The squadron at once weighed anchor, cleared for action, and put on forced draft, while "dark-skinned men, with queues tightly coiled around their heads, and with arms bare to the elbow, cl.u.s.tered along the decks in groups at the guns, waiting to kill or be killed." Out of the smoke soon emerged 12 enemy cruisers which, with information of the Chinese movements, had entered the Gulf intent on battle.
[Footnote 1: Commander P. N. McGiffin, THE BATTLE OF THE YALU, _Century Magazine_, August, 1895, pp. 585-604.]
The forces about to engage included the best ships of both nations.
There were 12 on each side, excluding 4 Chinese torpedo boats, and 10 actually in each battle line. The main strength of the Chinese was concentrated in two second-cla.s.s battleships, the _Ting-yuen_ and the _Chen-yuen_, Stettin-built in 1882, each of 7430 tons, with 14-inch armor over half its length, four 12-inch Krupp guns in two barbettes, and 6-inch rifles at bow and stern. The two barbettes were _en echelon_ (the starboard just ahead of the port), in such a way that while all four guns could fire dead ahead only two could bear on the port quarter or the starboard bow. These ships were designed for fighting head-on; and hence to use them to best advantage Admiral Ting formed his squadron in line abreast, with the _Ting-yuen_ and _Chen-yuen_ in the center. The rest of the line were a "scratch lot" of much smaller vessels--two armored cruisers (_Lai-yuen_ and _King-yuen_) with 8 to 9-inch armored belts; three protected cruisers (_Tsi-yuen, Chi-yuen_, and _Kw.a.n.g-ping_) with 2 to 4-inch armored decks; on the left flank the old corvette _Kw.a.n.g-chia_; and opposite her two other "lame ducks" of only 1300 tons, the _Chao-yung_ and _Yang-wei_. Ting had properly strengthened his center, but had left his flanks fatally weak. On board the flagship _Ting-yuen_ was Major von Hannekin, China"s military adviser, and an ex-petty officer of the British navy named Nichols. Philo N.
McGiffin, a graduate of the United States Naval Academy, commanded the _Chen-yuen_.
The j.a.panese advanced in column, or line ahead, in two divisions.
The first, or "flying squadron," was led by Rear Admiral Tsuboi in the _Yoshino_, and consisted of four fast protected cruisers.
Four similar ships, headed by Vice Admiral Ito in the _Matsushima_, formed the chief units of the main squadron, followed by the older and slower ironclads, _Fuso_ and _Hiyei_. The little gunboat _Akagi_ and the converted steamer _Saikio Maru_ had orders not to engage, but nevertheless pushed in on the left of the line.
Aside from their two battleships, the Chinese had nothing to compare with these eight new and well-armed cruisers, the slowest of which could make 17-1/2 knots.
In armament the j.a.panese also had a marked advantage, as the following table, from Wilsan"s _Ironclads in Action_, will show:
--------------------------------------------------------------- |SHIPS | GUNS |SHOTS IN 10 MINUTES |------|-----------------------------|------------------- | | | Large |Small q. f.| | Weight of |Number|6-inch|quick fire|and machine|Number | metal ------|------|------|----------|-----------|-------|----------- China | 12 | 40 | 2 | 130 | 33 | 4,885 j.a.pan | 10 | 34 | 66 | 154 | 185 | 11,706 ---------------------------------------------------------------
The smaller quick-fire and machine guns proved of slight value on either side, but the large j.a.panese quick-firers searched all unprotected parts of the enemy ships with a terrific storm of sh.e.l.ls.
After the experience of July 25, the Chinese had discarded much of their woodwork and top hamper, including boats, thin steel gun-shields, rails, needless rigging, etc., and used coal and sand bags an the upper decks; but the unarmored ships nevertheless suffered severely. From the table it is evident that the j.a.panese could pour in six times as great a volume of fire. The Chinese had a slight advantage in heavier guns, and their marksmanship, it is claimed, was equally accurate (possibly 10% hits on each side), but their ammunition was defective and consisted mostly of non-bursting projectiles. They had only 15 rounds of sh.e.l.l for each gun.
During the approach the j.a.panese steered at first for the enemy center, thus concealing their precise objective, and then swung to port, with the aim of attacking on the weaker side of the Chinese battleships (owing to their barbette arrangement) and on the weaker flank of the line. In the meantime the Chinese steamed forward at about 6 knots and turned somewhat to keep head-on, thus forcing the j.a.panese to file across their bows. At 12.20 p.m. the _Chen-yuen_ and _Ting-yuen_ opened at 5800 yards on Tsuboi"s squadron, which held its fire until at 3000 yards or closer it swung around the Chinese right wing.
The main squadron followed. Admiral Ito has been criticized for thus drawing his line across the enemy"s advance, instead of attacking their left flank. But he was previously committed to the movement, and executed it rapidly and for the most part at long range. Had the Chinese pressed forward at best speed, Lissa might have been repeated. As it was, they cut off only the _Hiyei_. To avoid ramming, this old ironclad plunged boldly between the _Chen-yuen_ and _Ting-yuen_. She was. .h.i.t 22 times and had 56 killed and wounded, but managed to pull through.
Before this time the _Chao-yung_ and _Yang-wei_ on the right flank of the Chinese line had crumpled under a heavy cross-fire from the flying squadron. These ships had wooden cabins on deck outboard, and the whole superstructure soon became roaring ma.s.ses of flames. Both dropped out of line and burned to the water"s edge.
The two ships on the opposite flank had seized an early opportunity to withdraw astern of the line, and were now off for Port Arthur under full steam, "followed," writes McGiffin, "by a string of Chinese anathemas from our men at the guns."
[Ill.u.s.tration: BATTLE OF THE YALU, SEPT. 17, 1894]
The j.a.panese van turned to port and was thus for some time out of action. The main division turned to starboard and circled the Chinese rear. Of the 6 Chinese ships left in the line, the four smaller seem now to have moved on to southward, while both j.a.panese divisions concentrated on the two battleships _Chen-yuen_ and _Ting-yuen_. These did their best to keep head to the enemy, and stood up doggedly, returning slowly the fire of the circling cruisers. Tsuboi soon turned away to engage the lighter vessels.
Finally, at 3.26, as the _Matsushima_ closed to about 2000 yards, the _Chen-yuen_ hit her fairly with a last remaining 12-inch sh.e.l.l.
This one blow put Ito"s flagship out of action, exploding some ammunition, killing or wounding 50 or more men, and starting a dangerous fire. The j.a.panese hauled off, while according to Chinese accounts the battleships actually followed, but at 4.30 came again under a severe fire. About 5.30, when the Chinese were practically out of ammunition, Ito finally withdrew and recalled his van.
Of the other Chinese ships, the _Chi-yuen_ made a desperate attempt to approach the j.a.panese van and went down at 3.30 with screws racing in the air. The _King-yuen_, already on fire, was shot to pieces and sunk an hour later by the _Yoshino"s_ quick-firers.
As the sun went down, the _Lai-yuen_ and _Kw.a.n.g-ping_, with two ships from the river mouth, fell in behind the battleships and staggered off towards Port Arthur, unpursued. The losses on the two armored ships had been relatively slight--56 killed and wounded. The j.a.panese lost altogether 90 killed and 204 wounded, chiefly on the _Matsushima_ and _Hiyei_.
Though China saved her best ships from the battle, her fighting spirit was done for. The battleships were later destroyed by j.a.panese torpedo operations after the fall of Wei-hai-wei. Her crews had on the whole fought bravely, handicapped as they were by their poor materials and lack of skill. For instance, when McGiffin called for volunteers to extinguish a fire on the _Chen-yuen"s_ forecastle, swept by enemy sh.e.l.ls, "men responded heartily and went to what seemed to them certain death." It was at this time that the commander himself, leading the party, was knocked over by a sh.e.l.l explosion and then barely escaped the blast of one of his own 12-inch guns by rolling through an open hatch and falling 8 feet to a pile of debris below.
In the way of lessons, aside from the obvious ones as to the value of training and expert leadership and the necessity of eliminating inflammables in ship construction, the battle revealed on the one hand the great resisting qualities of the armored ship, and on the other hand the offensive value of superior gunfire. Admiral Mahan said at the time that "The rapid fire gun has just now fairly established its position as the greatest offensive weapon in naval warfare."[1] Another authority has noted that, both at Lissa and the Yalu, "The winning fleet was worked in divisions, as was the British fleet in the Dutch wars and at Trafalgar, and the j.a.panese fleet afterwards at Tsushima." Remarking that experiments with this method were made by the British Channel Fleet in 1904, the writer continues: "The conception grew out of a study of Nelson"s Memorandum. Its essence was to make the fleet flexible in the hands of the admiral, and to enable any part to be moved by the shortest line to the position where it was most required."[2]
[Footnote 1: LESSONS FROM THE YALU FIGHT, _Century Magazine_, August, 1895, p. 630.]
[Footnote 2: Custance, THE SHIP OF THE LINE IN BATTLE, p. 103.]
By the Treaty of Shimonoseki (April 17, 1895) which closed the war, j.a.pan won Port Arthur and the Liao-tung Peninsula, the Pescadores Islands and Formosa, and China"s withdrawal from Korea. But just as she was about to lay hands on these generous fruits of victory, they were s.n.a.t.c.hed out of her grasp by the European powers, which began exploiting China for themselves. j.a.pan had to acquiesce and bide her time, using her war indemnity and foreign loans to build up her fleet. The Yalu thus not only marks the rise of j.a.pan as a formidable force in international affairs, but brings us to a period of intensified colonial and commercial rivalry in the Far East and elsewhere which gave added significance to naval power and led to the war of 1914.
REFERENCES
Aside from those already cited see: ROBERT FULTON, ENGINEER AND ARTIST, H. W. d.i.c.kinson, 1913.
THE STORY OF THE GUNS, J. E. Tennant, 1864.
THE BRITISH NAVY, Sir Thomas Bra.s.sey, 1884.
CLOWES" HISTORY OF THE ROYAL NAVY, Vol. VII (p. 20, bibliography).
NAVAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE 19TH CENTURY, N. Barnaby, 1904.
THE TORPEDO IN PEACE AND WAR, F. T. Jane, 1898.
SUBMARINE WARFARE, H. C. Fyfe, 1902.
THE SUBMARINE IN WAR AND PEACE, Simon Lake, 1918.
FOUR MODERN NAVAL CAMPAIGNS, Lissa, W. L. Clowes, 1902.
THE AUSTRO-ITALIAN NAVAL WAR, Journal of the United Service Inst.i.tution, Vol. XI, pp. 104ff.
CHAPTER XV
RIVALRY FOR WORLD POWER
Even more significant in its relation to sea power than the revolution in armaments during the 19th century was the extraordinary growth of ocean commerce. The total value of the world"s import and export trade in 1800 amounted in round numbers to 1-1/2 billion dollars, in 1850 to 4 billion, and in 1900 to nearly 24 billion. In other words, during a period in which the population of the world was not more than tripled, its international exchange of commodities was increased 16-fold. This growth was of course made possible largely by progress in manufacturing, increased use of steam navigation, and vastly greater output of coal and iron.[1] At the end of the Napoleonic wars England was the only great commercial and industrial state. At the close of the century, though with her colonies she still controlled one-fourth of the world"s foreign trade, she faced aggressive rivals in the field. The United States after her Civil War, and Germany after her unification and the Franco-Prussian War, had achieved an immense industrial development, opening up resources in coal and iron that made them formidable compet.i.tors.
Germany in particular, a late comer in the colonial field, felt that her future lay upon the seas, as a means of securing access on favorable terms to world markets and raw materials. Other nations also realized that their continued growth and prosperity would depend upon commercial expansion. This might be accomplished in a measure by cheaper production and superior business organization, but could be greatly aided by political means--by colonial activity, by securing control or special privileges in unexploited areas and backward states, by building up a merchant fleet under the national flag. Obviously, since the seas join the continents and form the great highways of trade, this commercial and political expansion would give increased importance to naval power.
[Footnote 1: Coal production increased during the century from 11.6 million tons to 610 million, and pig iron from half a million tons to 37 million. Figures from Day, HISTORY OF COMMERCE, Ch.
XXVIII.]
Admiral Mahan, an acute political observer as well as strategist, summed up the international situation in 1895 and again in 1897 as "an equilibrium on the [European] Continent, and, in connection with the calm thus resulting, an immense colonizing movement in which all the great powers were concerned."[1] Later, in 1911, he noted that colonial rivalries had again been superseded by rivalries within Europe, but pointed out that the European tension was itself largely the product of activities and ambitions in more distant spheres. In fact the international developments of recent times, whether in the form of colonial enterprises, armament compet.i.tion, or actual warfare, find a common origin in economic and commercial interests. Commerce and quick communications have drawn the world into closer unity, yet by a kind of paradox have increased the possibilities of conflict. Both by their common origin and by their far-reaching consequences, it is thus possible to connect the story of naval events from the Spanish-American to the World War, and to gather them up under the general t.i.tle, "rivalry for world power."
1. THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR
To this rivalry the United States could hardly hope or desire to remain always a pa.s.sive spectator, yet, aside from trying to stabilize the western hemisphere by the Monroe Doctrine, she cherished down to the year 1898 a policy of isolation from world affairs. During the first half of the 19th century, it is true, her interests were directed outward by a flourishing merchant marine. In 1860 the American merchant fleet of 2,500,000 tons was second only to Great Britain"s and nearly equal to that of all other nations combined.
But its decay had already begun, and continued rapidly. The change from wood to iron construction enabled England to build cheaper ships; and American shipping suffered also from lack of government patronage, diversion of capital into mare profitable projects of Western development, and loss of a third of its tonnage by destruction or shift to foreign register during the Civil War. At the outbreak of that war 72 per cent of American exports were carried in American bottoms; only 9 per cent in 1913. Thus the United States had reached the unsatisfactory condition of a nation with a large and rapidly growing foreign commerce and an almost non-existent merchant marine.
[Footnote 1: NAVAL STRATEGY, p. 104.]
This was the situation when the nation was thrust suddenly and half unwillingly into the main stream of international events by the Spanish-American War. Though this war made the United States a world power, commercial or political aggrandizement played no part in her entry into the struggle. It arose solely from the intolerable conditions created by Spanish misrule in Cuba, and intensified by armed rebellion since 1895. Whatever slight hope or justification for non-intervention remained was destroyed by the blowing up of the _U. S. S. Maine_ in Havana harbor, February 15, 1898, with the loss of 260 of her complement of 354 officers and men. Thereafter the United States pushed her preparations for war; but the resolution of Congress, April 19, 1898, authorizing the President to begin hostilities expressly stated that the United States disclaimed any intention to exercise sovereignty over Cuba, and after its pacification would "leave the government and control of the island to its people."
It was at once recognized that the conflict would be primarily naval, and would be won by the nation that secured control of the sea. The paper strength of the two navies left little to choose, and led even competent critics like Admiral Colomb in England to prophesy a stalemate--a "desultory war." Against five new American battleships, the _Iowa, Indiana, Ma.s.sachusetts, Oregon_ and _Texas_, the first four of 10,000 tons, and the armored cruisers _Brooklyn_ and _New York_ of 9000 and 8000 tans, Spain could oppose the battleship _Pelayo_, a little better than the _Texas_ and five armored cruisers, the _Carlos V, Infanta Maria Teresa, Almirante Oquendo_, and _Vizcaya_, each of about 7000 tons, and the somewhat larger and very able former Italian cruiser _Cristobal Colon_.
Figures and statistics, however, give no idea of the actual weakness of the Spanish navy, handicapped by shiftless naval administration, by dependence on foreign sources of supply, and by the incompetence and lack of training of personnel. Of the squadron that came to Cuba under Admiral Cervera, the _Colon_ lacked two 10-inch guns for her barbettes, and the _Vizcaya_ was so foul under water that with a trial speed of 18-1/2 knots she never made above 13--Cervera called her a "buoy." There was no settled plan of campaign; to Cervera"s requests for instructions came the ministerial reply that "in these moments of international crisis no definite plans can be formulated."[1] The despairing letters of the Spanish Admiral and his subordinates reveal how feeble was the reed upon which Spain had to depend for the preservation of her colonial empire.
The four cruisers and two destroyers that sailed from the Cape Verde Islands on April 29 were Spain"s total force available. The _Pelayo_ and the _Carlos V_, not yet ready, were the only ships of value left behind.
[Footnote 1: Bermejo to Cervera, April 4, 1898.]
On the American naval list, in addition to the main units already mentioned, there were six monitors of heavy armament but indifferent fighting value, a considerable force of small cruisers, four converted liners for scouts, and a large number of gunboats, converted yachts, etc., which proved useful in the Cuban blockade. Of these forces the majority were a.s.sembled in the Atlantic theater of war. The _Oregon_ was on the West Coast, and made her famous voyage of 14,700 miles around Cape Horn in 79 days, at an average speed of 11.6 knots, leaving Puget Sound on March 6 and touching at Barbados in the West Indies an May 18, just as the Spanish fleet was steaming across the Caribbean. The cruise effectively demonstrated the danger of a divided navy and the need of an Isthmian ca.n.a.l. Under Commodore Dewey in the Far East were two gunboats and four small cruisers, the best of them the fast and heavily armed flagship _Olympia_, of 5800 tons.
_The Battle of Manila Bay_