CHAPTER XVI
THE WORLD WAR: THE FIRST YEAR (1914-1915)
The Russo-j.a.panese war greatly weakened Russia"s position in Europe, and left the Dual Alliance of France and Russia overweighted by the military strength of the Teutonic Empires, Germany and Austria, whether or not Italy should adhere to the Triple Alliance with these nations. To Great Britain, such a disturbance of the European balance was ever a matter of grave concern, and an abandonment of her policy of isolation was in this instance virtually forced upon her by Germany"s rivalry in her own special sphere of commerce and sea power.
The disturbing effect of Germany"s naval growth during the two decades prior to 1914 affords in fact an excellent ill.u.s.tration of the influence of naval strength in peace as well as in war.
Under Bismarck Germany had pushed vigorously though tardily into the colonial field, securing vast areas of rather doubtful value in East and West Africa, and the Bismarck Archipelago, Marshall Islands, and part of New Guinea in the Pacific. With the accession of William II in 1888 and the dropping of the pilot, Bismarck, two years later, she embarked definitely upon her quest for world power. The young Kaiser read eagerly Mahan"s _Influence of Sea Power Upon History_ (1890), distributed it among the ships of his still embryonic navy, and fed his ambition on the doctrines of this epoch-making work.
Naval development found further stimulus and justification in the rapid economic growth of Germany. In 1912 her industrial production attained a value of three billion dollars, as compared with slightly over four billion for England and seven billion for the United States. Since 1893 her merchant marine had tripled in size and taken second place to that of England with a total of over five million tons. During the same period she surpa.s.sed France and the United States in volume of foreign commerce, and in this respect also reached a position second to Great Britain, with a more rapid rate of increase. An emigration of 220,000 a year in the early eighties was cut down to 22,000 in 1900.[1] To a.s.sure markets for her manufactures, and continued growth in population and industry, Germany felt that she must strive to extend her political power.
[Footnote 1: Figures from Priest, GERMANY SINCE 1840, p. 150 ff.]
Though Germany"s commercial expansion met slight opposition even in areas under British control, it undoubtedly justified measures of political and naval protection; and it was this motive that was advanced in the preface to the German Naval Bill of 1900, which declared that, "To protect her sea trade and colonies ... Germany must have a fleet so strong that a war, even with the greatest naval power, would involve such risks as to jeopardize the position of that power."[2] Furthermore, Germany"s quest for colonies and points of vantage such as Kiao-chau, her scheme for a Berlin-Bagdad railroad with domination of the territories on the route, had parallel in the activities of other nations. Unfortunately, however, Germany"s ambitions grew even more rapidly than her commerce, until her true aim appeared to be destruction of rivals and domination of the world.
[Footnote 2: Hurd and Castle, GERMAN SEA POWER, Appendix II.]
The seizure of Kiao-chau in 1897-98 coincided with the appointment of Admiral von Tirpitz as Imperial Minister of Marine. Under his administration, the Naval Bill of 1900, pa.s.sed in a heat of anglophobia aroused by the Boer War, doubled the program of 1898, and contained ingenious provisions by which the Reichstag was bound to steady increases covering a long period of years, and by which the Navy Department was empowered to replace worthless old craft, after 20 or 25 years" service, with new ships of the largest size. As the armament race grew keener, this act was amended in the direction of further increases, but its program was never cut down.
International crises and realignments marked the growing tension of these years. In 1905 England extended for ten years her understanding with j.a.pan. By the _Entente Cordiale_ with France in 1904 and a later settlement of outstanding difficulties with Russia, she also practically changed the Dual Alliance into a Triple Entente, though without positively binding herself to a.s.sistance in war. To the agreement of 1904 by which England and France a.s.sured each other a free hand in Egypt and Morocco, respectively, the Kaiser raised strenuous objections, and forced the resignation of the anglophile French Foreign Minister, Delca.s.se; but at the Algeciras Convention of 1906, a.s.sembled to settle the Morocco question, Germany and Austria stood virtually alone. Even the American delegates, sent by President Roosevelt at the Kaiser"s invitation, voted generally with the Western Powers. When Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1909, the Kaiser shook the mailed fist to better effect than at Algeciras, with the result that Russia had to accept this extension of Austro-German influence in the Balkan sphere. Still again two years later, when the German cruiser _Panther_ made moves to establish a base at Agadir on the Atlantic coast of Morocco, Europe approached the verge of war; but Germany found the financial situation against her, backed down, and eventually took a strip of land on the Congo in liquidation of her Morocco claims.
For all her resolute saber-rattling in these years, Germany found herself checkmated in almost every move. The Monroe Doctrine, for which the United States showed willingness to fight in the Venezuela affair of 1902, balked her schemes in the New World. In the Far East she faced j.a.pan; in Africa, British sea power. A "_Drang nach Osten_," through the Balkans and Turkey toward Asia Minor, offered on the whole the best promise; and it was in this quarter that Austria"s violent demands upon Serbia aroused Russia and precipitated the World War.
Great Britain"s foreign agreements, already noted, had as a primary aim the concentration of her fleet in home waters. Naval predominance in the Far East she turned over to j.a.pan; in the western Atlantic, to the United States (at least by acceptance of the Monroe Doctrine and surrender of treaty rights to share in the construction of the Panama Ca.n.a.l); and in the Mediterranean, to France, though England still kept a strong cruiser force in this field. The old policy of showing the flag all over the world was abandoned, 160 old ships were sent to the sc.r.a.p heap as unable "either to fight or to run away," and 88% of the fleet was concentrated at home, so quietly that it "was found out only by accident by Admiral Mahan."[1]
[Footnote 1: Admiral Fisher, MEMORIES, p. 185.]
These and other changes were carried out under the energetic regime of Admiral Fisher, First Sea Lord from 1904 to 1910. The British _Dreadnought_ of 1906, completed in 10 months, and the battle cruisers of 1908--_Indefatigable, Invincible_ and _Indomitable_--came as an unpleasant surprise to Germany, necessitating construction of similar types and enlargement of the Kiel Ca.n.a.l. Reforms in naval gunnery urged by Admiral Sir Percy Scott were taken up, and plans were made for new bases in the Humber, in the Forth at Rosyth, and in the Orkneys, necessitated by the shift of front from the Channel to the North Sea. But against the technical skill, painstaking organization, and definitely aggressive purpose of Germany, even more radical measures were needed to put the tradition-ridden British navy in readiness for war.
Naval preparedness was vital, for the conflict was fundamentally, like the Napoleonic Wars, a struggle between land power predominant on the Continent and naval power supreme on the seas. As compared with France in the earlier struggle, Germany was more dependent on foreign commerce, and in a long war would feel more keenly the pressure of blockade. On the other hand, while the naval preponderance of England and her allies was probably greater than 100 years before, England had to throw larger armies into the field and more of her shipping into naval service, and found her commerce not augmented but cut down.
Indeed, Germany was not without advantage in the naval war. As she fully expected, her direct sea trade was soon shut off, and her shipping was driven to cover or destroyed. But Germany was perhaps 80% self-supporting, was well supplied with minerals and munitions, and could count on trade through neutral states on her frontiers. Her shallow, well-protected North Sea coast-line gave her immunity from naval attack and opportunity to choose the moment in which to throw her utmost strength into a sortie. So long as her fleet remained intact, it controlled the Baltic by virtue of an interior line through the Kiel Ca.n.a.l, thus providing a strangle hold on Russia and free access to northern neutrals. Only by dangerous division of forces, or by leaving the road to England and the Atlantic open, could the British fleet enter the Baltic Sea. England it is true had a superior navy (perhaps less superior than was commonly thought), and a position of singular advantage between Germany and the overseas world. But for her the maintenance of naval superiority was absolutely essential. An effective interference with her sea communications would quickly put her out of the war.
The importance (for Germany as well as for England) of preserving their main fighting fleets, may explain the wariness with which they were employed. Instead of risking them desperately, both sides turned to commerce warfare--the Western Powers resorting to blockade and the Germans to submarines. Each of these forms of warfare played a highly important part in the war, and the submarine campaign in particular, calling for new methods and new instruments, seems almost to have monopolized the naval genius and energies of the two groups of belligerents. It may be noted, however, that but for the cover given by the High Seas Fleet, the submarine campaign could hardly have been undertaken; and but for the Grand Fleet, it would have been unnecessary.
The naval strength of the various belligerents in July, 1914, appears in the table on the following page.[1]
[Footnote 1: From table prepared by U. S. Office of Naval Intelligence, July 1, 1916.]
--------------------------------------------------------------------- | Great |Ger-| U.S. | | | | | |Britain|many|(1916)|France|j.a.pan|Russia|Italy|Austria ---------------|-------|----|------|------|-----|------|-----|------- Dreadnoughts | 20 | 13 | 12 | 4 | 2 | .. | 3 | 3 ---------------|-------|----|------|------|-----|------|-----|------- Pre-dreadn"ts | 40 | 20 | 21 | 18 | 13 | 7 | 8 | 6 ---------------|-------|----|------|------|-----|------|-----|------- Battle Cruisers| 9 | 4 | .. | .. | 2 | .. | .. | ..
---------------|-------|----|------|------|-----|------|-----|------- Armored Cr"s | 34 | 9 | 10 | 20 | 13 | 6 | 9 | 2 ---------------|-------|----|------|------|-----|------|-----|------- Cruisers | 74 | 41 | 14 | 9 | 13 | 9 | 6 | 5 ---------------|-------|----|------|------|-----|------|-----|------- Destroyers | 167 |130 | 54 | 84 | 50 | 91 | 36 | 18 ---------------|-------|----|------|------|-----|------|-----|------- Submarines | 78 | 30 | 44 | 64 | 13 | 30 | 19 | 6 ---------------------------------------------------------------------
Owing to new construction, these figures underwent rapid change.
Thus England added 4 dreadnoughts (2 built for Turkey) in August, 1914; the battle cruiser _Tiger_ in November; the dreadnought _Canada_ and 5 _Queen Elizabeths_ in 1915; and 5 _Royal Sovereigns_ in 1915-1916. In comparisons, full account is not always taken of the naval support of England"s allies; it is true, however, that the necessity of protecting coasts, troop convoys, and commerce prevented her from throwing her full strength into the North Sea.
Her capital ships were in two main divisions--the 1st or Grand Fleet in the Orkneys, and the 2d fleet, consisting at first of 16 pre-dreadnoughts, in the Channel. Admiral Jellico[1] gives the strength of the Grand Fleet and the German High Seas Fleet, on August 4, 1914, as follows:
[Footnote 1: THE GRAND FLEET, p. 31.]
-------------------------------------------------------------------- | | Pre- | | | | | |Dread- |Dread- | Battle | Light |Destroyers| Air-|Cruisers |noughts|noughts|cruisers|cruisers| |ships| -------|-------|-------|--------|--------|----------|-----|--------- British| 20 | 8 | 4 | 12 | 42 | .. | 9 German | 13 | 16 | 3 | 15 | 88 | 1 | 2 --------------------------------------------------------------------
Of submarines, according to the same authority, England had 17 of the D and E cla.s.ses fit for distant operations, and 37 fit only for coast defense, while Germany had 28 U boats, all but two or three of which were able to cruise overseas. The British admiral"s account of the inferiority of the British navy in submarines, aircraft, mines, destroyers, director firing (installed in only 8 ships in 1914), armor-piercing sh.e.l.ls, and protection of bases, seems to justify the caution of British operations, but is a severe indictment of the manner in which money appropriated for the navy was used.
To open a war with England by surprise naval attack was no doubt an element in German plans; but in 1914 this was negatived by the forewarning of events on the Continent, by Germany"s persistent delusion that England would stay neutral, and by the timely mobilization of the British fleet. This had been announced the winter before as a practical exercise, was carried out according to schedule from July 16 to July 23 (the date of Austria"s ultimatum to Serbia), and was then extended until July 29, at which date the Grand Fleet sailed for Scapa Flow.
At midnight of August 4 the British ultimatum to Germany expired and hostilities began. During the same night the Grand Fleet swept the northern exit of the North Sea to prevent the escape of enemy raiders, only one of which, the _Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse_, actually reached the Atlantic in this first stage of the war. On a similar sweep further south, the Harwich light cruiser and destroyer force under Commodore Tyrwhitt sank by gunfire the mine layer _Konigin Luise_, which a trawler had reported "throwing things overboard"; but the next morning, August 6, the cruiser _Amphion_, returning near the same position, was destroyed by two mines laid by her victim of the day before. On the same date five cables were cut leading from Germany overseas. From August 10 to 23 all British forces were busy covering the transit of the first troops sent to the Continent. Such, in brief summary, and omitting more distant activities for the present, were the opening naval events of the war.
_The Heligoland Bight Action_
On the morning of August 28 occurred a lively action in Heligoland Bight, which cost Germany 3 light cruisers and a destroyer, and seemed to promise further aggressive action off the German sh.o.r.es.
The British plan called for a destroyer and light cruiser sweep southward to a point about 12 miles west of Heligoland, and thence westward, with submarines disposed off Heligoland as decoys, the object being to cut off German destroyers and patrols. Commodore Tyrwhitt"s force which was to execute the raid consisted of the 1st and 3rd flotillas of 16 destroyers each, led by the new light cruiser _Arethusa_, flagship (28.5 knots, two 6", six 4" guns), and the _Fearless_ (25-4 knots, ten 4" guns). These were to be supported about 50 miles to westward by two battle cruisers from the Humber. This supporting force was at the last moment joined by three battle cruisers under Admiral Beatty and 6 cruisers under Commodore Goodenough from the Grand Fleet; but news of the accession never reached Commodore Keyes of the British submarines, who was hence puzzled later by the appearance of Goodenough"s cruisers on the scene.
[Ill.u.s.tration: HELIGOLAND BIGHT ACTION, AUG. 28, 1914]
The Germans, it appears, had got wind of the enemy plan, and arranged a somewhat similar counter-stroke. As Commodore Tyrwhitt"s flotillas swept southward, they engaged and chased 10 German destroyers straight down upon Heligoland. Here the _Arethusa_ and the _Fearless_ were sharply engaged with two German light cruisers, the _Stettin_, and the _Frauenlob_ (ten 4.1" guns each), until actually in sight of the island. Both sides suffered, the _Frauenlob_ withdrawing to Wilhelmshaven with 50 casualties, and the _Arethusa_ having her speed cut down and nearly every gun put temporarily out of commission.
Whipping around to westward, the flotillas caught the German destroyer _V 187_, which at 9.10, after an obstinate resistance, was reduced to a complete wreck enveloped in smoke and steam. As British destroyers picked up survivors, they were driven off by the _Stettin_; but two boats with British crews and German prisoners were rescued later by the British submarine _E 4_, which had been lurking nearby.
Extraordinary confusion now developed from the fact that Commodore Keyes in his submarine flotilla leader _Lurcher_ sighted through the mist two of Goodenough"s cruisers (which had chased a destroyer eastward), and reported them as enemies. The call was picked up by Goodenough himself, who brought his remaining four ships to Keyes" a.s.sistance; but when these appeared, Keyes thought that he had to deal with four enemies more! Tyrwhitt was also drawn backward by the alarm. Luckily the situation was cleared up without serious consequences.
German cruisers, darting out of the Ems and the Jade, were now entering the fray. At 10.55 the _Fearless_ and the _Arethusa_ with their flotillas were attacked by the _Stralsund_, which under a heavy fire made off toward Heligoland. Then at 11.15 the _Stettin_ engaged once more, and five minutes later the _Mainz_. Just as this last ship was being finished up by destroyer attack, and the _Stettin_ and two fresh cruisers, _Koln_ and _Ariadne_, were rushing to her a.s.sistance, Beatty"s five battle cruisers appeared to westward and rose swiftly out of the haze.
Admiral Beatty"s opportune dash into action at this time, from his position 40 miles away, was in response to an urgent call from Tyrwhitt at 11.15, coupled with the fact that, as the Admiral states in his report, "The flotillas had advanced only 2 miles since 8 a.m., and were only about 25 miles from two enemy bases." "Our high speed," the report continues, "made submarine attack difficult, and the smoothness of the sea made their detection fairly easy. I considered that we were powerful enough to deal with any sortie except by a battle squadron, which was unlikely to come out in time, provided our stroke was sufficiently rapid."
The _Stettin_ broke backward just in the nick of time. The _Koln_ flagship of the German commodore, was soon staggering off in a blaze, and was later sunk with her total complement of 380 officers and men. The _Ariadne_, steaming at high speed across the bows of the British flagship _Lion_, was put out of action by two well-placed salvos. At 1.10 the _Lion_ gave the general signal "Retire."
[Ill.u.s.tration: HELIGOLAND BIGHT ACTION, FINAL PHASE, 12:30-1:40 From 20 to 40 miles slightly S. of W. from Heligoland.]
Though the German cruisers had fought hard and with remarkable accuracy of fire, their movements had been tardy and not well concerted.
The British losses amounted altogether to only 33 killed and 40 wounded; while the enemy lost in killed, wounded, and prisoners over 1000 men. Very satisfactory, from the British standpoint, was the effect of the victory upon their own and upon enemy morale.
Encouragement of this kind was desirable, for German submarines and mines were already beginning to take their toll. Off the Forth on September 5, a single torpedo sank the light cruiser _Pathfinder_ with nearly all hands. This loss was avenged when a week later the _E 9_, under Lieut. Commander Max Harton, struck down the German cruiser _Hela_ within 6 miles of Heligoland. But on September 22, at 6.30 a.m., a single old-type German craft, the _U 9_, dealt a staggering blow. With a total of 6 torpedoes Commander Weddigen sank first the _Aboukir_, and then in quick succession the _Hogue_ and the _Cressy_, both dead in the water at the work of rescue.
The loss of these rather antiquated vessels was less serious than that of over 1400 trained officers and men. A shock to British traditions came with the new order that ships must abandon injured consorts and make all speed away.
In the bases at Rosyth and Scapa Flow, which at the outbreak of war were totally unprotected against submarines and thought to be beyond their reach, the Grand Fleet felt less secure than when cruising on the open sea. Safer refuges were sought temporarily on the west coast of Scotland and at Lough Sw.i.l.l.y in the north of Ireland, but even off this latter base on October 27, the big dreadnought _Audacious_ was sunk by mines laid by the German auxiliary cruiser _Berlin_. In view of the impending Turkish crisis, the loss was not admitted by the Admiralty, though since pictures of the sinking ship had actually been taken by pa.s.sengers on the White Star liner _Olympic_, it could not long remain concealed. Mines and submarines had seemingly put the British navy on the defensive, even if consolation could be drawn from the fact that troops and supplies were crossing safely to France, the enemy had been held up at the Marne, the German surface fleet was pa.s.sive, and the blockade was closing down.
_Escape of the "Goben" and the "Breslau"_
In distant waters Germany at the outbreak of the war had only ten cruisers--_Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Emden, Nurnberg_, and _Leipzig_ in the Pacific, _Konigsberg_ on the east coast of Africa, _Karlsruhe_ and _Dresden_ in the West Indies, and _Goben_ and _Breslau_ in the Mediterranean. Within six months" time, these, together with a few auxiliary cruisers fitted out abroad, were either destroyed or forced to intern in neutral ports. Modern wireless communication, difficulties of coaling and supply, and the overwhelming naval strength of the Allies made the task of surface raiders far more difficult than in previous wars. They were nevertheless skillfully handled, and, operating in the wide ocean areas, created a troublesome problem for the Western Powers.
The battle cruiser _Goben_ and the light cruiser _Breslau_ alone, operating under Admiral Souchon in Mediterranean waters, accomplished ultimate results which would have easily justified the sacrifice of ten times the number of ships lost by Germany in distant seas. To hunt down these two vessels, and at the same time contain the Austrian Navy, the Entente had in the Mediterranean not only the bulk of the French fleet but also 3 battle cruisers, 4 armored cruisers, and 4 light cruisers of Great Britain. Early on August 4, as he was about to bombard the French bases of Bona and Philippeville in Algiers, Admiral Souchon received wireless orders to make for the Dardanelles. Germany and England were then on the very verge of war. Knowing the British ships to be concentrated near Malta, and actually pa.s.sing the _Indomitable_ and the _Invincible_ in sullen silence as he turned eastward, the German commander decided to put in at Messina, Sicily.
At the end of the 24 hours granted in this port, the prospects for the German ships appeared so desperate that the officers, it is said, made their final testaments before again putting to sea.
Slipping eastward through the Straits of Messina at twilight of the 6th, they were sighted by the British scout _Gloucester_, which stuck close at their heels all that night and until 4.40 p.m. the next day. Then, under orders to turn back, and after boldly engaging the _Breslau_ to check the flight, Captain Kelly of the _Gloucester_ gave up the pursuit as the enemy rounded the Morea and entered the Greek Archipelago.
The escape thus apparently so easy was the outcome of lack of coordination between French and British, slow and poor information from the British Admiralty, and questionable disposition of the British forces on the basis of information actually at hand. Prior to hostilities, it was perhaps unavoidable that the British commander, Admiral Milne, should be ignorant of French plans; but even on August 5 and 6 he still kept all his battle cruisers west and north of Sicily to protect the French troop transports, though by this time he might have felt a.s.sured that the French fleet was at sea. At the time of the escape Admiral Troubridge with 4 armored cruisers and a destroyer force barred the Adriatic; though he caught the _Gloucester"s_ calls, he was justified in not moving far from his station without orders, in view of his inferior strength and speed.
Not until August 10 did British forces enter the aegean; and at 5 p.m. that day the two German ships steamed uninvited up the Dardanelles. Since the Turkish situation was still somewhat dubious, Admiral Souchon had been ordered to delay his entrance; but on the 10th, hearing British wireless signals steadily approaching his position in the Greek islands, he took the decision into his own hands. Germany had "captured Turkey," as an Allied diplomat remarked upon seeing the ships in the Golden Horn.