That the Author should be ignorant of what Guards were necessary, perhaps may not be look"d upon as a Thing very extraordinary; I shall, however, give here a Detail of them.
The City being garrison"d by at least 3500 Men; it was found necessary to post an advanc"d Guard of 500 Men at a large House upon the Road leading to it. The Picket-Guard consisted of 500 more, from whence was detached a Captain"s Guard to the right of the Camp, where there was a Path leading towards the City. There were the Quarter-Guards, the Generals-Guard, those on the Ammunition, Provisions, and a Captain and fifty Men at the Convent; amounting in the whole to about 1300 Men, besides extraordinary Parties; and 600 _American_ Soldiers, who were set apart to be ready to a.s.sist in landing Stores, cutting Fascines, or in any other Work, as occasion should require. Whether fewer Guards could have been employed in our Circ.u.mstances, or if 4350 Men, (the most which were landed, and those hourly diminishing by Death and Sickness) could afford sufficient Reliefs for the Guards abovementioned, I submit to any Judge of military Operations at Land to determine.
Had the Author"s Curiosity led him to reconnoitre the Enemy"s Guards, he might have observed a Body of 300 Men posted at the Foot of the Hill, on which is the Fort St. _Lazar_, and another of about fifty Men, advanced 300 Paces further, under some Cocoa-trees, which might easily have been sustained by the whole Garrison.]
[Footnote 26: The princ.i.p.al Engineer Mr. _Armstrong_, (_vide_ Note in the Pamphlet Letter (_f_) page 40) made a judicious and clear Report, of the Number of Men, and of the Time which would be wanting to erect a Battery: An Undertaking which he, and every intelligent Person, who was acquainted with the then Circ.u.mstances of the Troops on Sh.o.r.e, must foresee would be attended with insuperable Difficulties; he could not therefore honestly advise it.]
[Footnote 27: Of the nine Officers on the Council of War (_vide_ note (_c_) in the Pamphlet page 39.) only two were against the Attack, without having first erected a Battery; nor was the least Objection made to it, on the Account of its not having been well reconnoitred, the contrary being very apparent; the Guides were Deserters (and no other could be had) who for their Security had been sent on Board the Admiral"s Ships, and were by him, at the General"s Desire, ordered on Sh.o.r.e, the Evening before the Attack.]
[Footnote 28: After having taken into Consideration (_vide_ Pamphlet Note (_g_) page 40) what Hour would be the most proper for surprising the Enemy, and carefully weighed the Reports of Deserters, _&c._ it was resolved by the Council of War, that the Attack should be made a little before break of Day, a Time which has ever been look"d upon as the most proper for Surprizes, the Guards being then fatigued by their Watching, during the Night, and then most likely to be fallen asleep.
The Author of the Pamphlet, is here pleased to condemn the General for not attacking at two in the Morning; _because the Guards at that Hour returned to their respective Homes, and went to Bed, where having composed themselves to Sleep, they could not easily be rouz"d to Fight_.
These extraordinary Guards being therefore (as the Author supposes) safely lodged in their Beds; with regard to them, it must have been matter of Indifference, whether the Attack was made at two, or five in the Morning. That these Arguments (if any such were used) were of no force with the General, I entirely agree with the Author: For surely no Man in his right Senses could imagine that the Patrols round an advanced Post, hourly in Danger of being insulted, should be suffered to retire at two in the Morning.
Colonel _Grant_ was so far from having enter"d the Enemy"s Trenches at the Foot of the Castle (as the Author alledges) with a Party of Grenadiers, and being there cut off from the Want of being sustained, that he received his Wound the Instant he reach"d the Top of the Hill.
The Guide having been killed about the same time, was probably the Occasion, that Lieutenant-Colonel _Hamon_ (who was the next in Command) advanced no farther, but remained on the Side of the Hill; where (when the Day broke) the Troops were exposed both to the Enemy"s great and small Shot; which Misfortune ought not surely to be attributed to any Defect in the Disposition, but to unavoidable Accidents, by which in War the best concerted Schemes are frequently disappointed.
That the Grenado Sh.e.l.ls were carried in Boxes in the Rear, and no lighted Match provided, will appear to be a palpable Falsehood from the Testimony of the Gentlemen of the Train, who delivered them out, and are still living. What might possibly give some Colour for this a.s.sertion, was, the Grenadiers not carrying their Pouches in that excessive hot Climate; it was found necessary, that a Party of _American_ Soldiers should receive the Grenados in Bags, and attend the Grenadiers with them to the Foot of the Hill; which was accordingly ordered, but in the dark, the Party, which had the Charge of the Sh.e.l.ls, fell back into the Rear, and did not come up with them till after the Attack was begun.
As the Scaling Ladders could not be brought to the Foot of the Walls, nor the Wool Packs and working Tools be made use of, till we were in Possession of the Breast-work, they were carried in the Rear of the Troops, who were ordered to force it.
The Scaling Ladders were called for on the Right, and some of them got up the Hill; but Colonel _Grant_ met his Fate too soon to be able to advance so far as to have the least Occasion for them on the Left; nor could the Officer the next in Command even have tried to make use of them, as the _American_ Soldiers, who had the Charge of them (notwithstanding the utmost Endeavours of their Officers to prevent it) call them down, and either took up Firelocks, or put themselves under Cover from the Shot of the Enemy.
I cannot but add in Justice to the _American_ Soldiers, who were commanded with Arms on that Occasion, that they were in no wise wanting to their Duty.
That the Admiral was neither by Letter, nor Message (as the Author boldly a.s.serts) acquainted of the Resolution of the Council of War to attack the Fort the next Morning; the Admiral himself (to whom I appeal) knows to be absolutely false: It is certain, that the General was that Day too much employ"d to write a Letter in Form; but several Messages were carry"d by Capt. _Knowles_, and Mr. _Macpherson_, in Consequence of which Messages, two Guides were sent by the Admiral"s own Order, and from his own Ship, to conduct the Forces to the Attack of the Fort the next Morning.
The Admiral had actually pressed the Attack, without making the least Offer of any a.s.sistance from the Fleet, and appeared to be so far from thinking any such a.s.sistance necessary, that he had not only declared the Troops on Sh.o.r.e to be more than sufficient for the Service they were upon; but had sent from the Fleet a Number of Soldiers, less by 650 than were required to be landed by the Council of War. Whence to me it is evident (contrary to what the Author affirms) that there was never any real Intention to sustain the Attack by a Body of Sailors: Otherwise so experienced a Commander, as is Admiral _Vernon_, could not have failed of giving timely Notice of such his Intention to the General. It is true, that at Break of Day, when the Troops were mounting the Hill, a Signal was made for manning the Boats, and for landing, which could at that time have answered no other End, but giving a Pretext for ascribing to the Sailors, a Share in the Honour of the Success, in Case the Castle had been taken.
There were kill"d at the Attack of Fort St. _Lazar_ 179, (commissioned, Non-commissioned Officers and Soldiers) and 459 wounded, of whom many afterwards died; 16 were taken Prisoners, of which all (excepting six) had fallen wounded on the Top of the Hill; amongst whom were three Officers, who, tho" treated by the _Spaniards_ with great Humanity, died in two or three Days.
I cannot but observe, what a pompous (but false) Account, the Author gives of our Loss; he roundly affirms, "_That Numbers of Drums and Colours were left behind in the Retreat_," of which there was not in Fact One; some few Firelocks belonging to the Soldiers, who fell upon the Top of the Hill, could not be brought off; and most of the Scaling Ladders, _&c._ which had been intrusted to the Care of the _American_ Soldiers, remained upon the Ground. What Use the Enemy might make of them, I cannot say; but we, who could distinctly see with the naked Eye, what pa.s.sed on the Hill of St. _Lazar_, could perceive nothing of what the Author mentions. It was never before alledged, that the Guide, who return"d, complained of his not having been followed by the Troops the Way he would have led them; but it is certain, that both the Officers and the Engineer, who were in the Front, complained of their having been mislead by the Guide. Had the contrary appeared, the Offenders could scarcely have escaped Censure; for the Instant before the Troops advanced to the Attack, the General in Person gave Directions to two of the princ.i.p.al Officers, who were to lead on the Grenadiers, to mount the Hill upon the Right, and to push at once into the Enemy"s Works.
What the Author insinuates, that the Retreat was too long delayed, is without any Grounds whatsoever. The Moment it appeared there was no room to hope for Success, the Troops were directed to retire, which was done in so good Order, that the Enemy did not think it adviseable to advance one Step to give them the least Disturbance.
I cannot finish my Observations upon this long Note (_g_) without remarking that what palpable Falsehoods, and gross Misrepresentations, the Author herein aggravates our Loss at St. _Lazar_; such as the generous _Spaniard_ (tho" as an Enemy authorized to do it by Custom) would be ashamed of; but in an _Englishman_ it is a Crime, for which Language has not yet found a Name, and which nothing but the highest innate Malevolence, and the strongest Inveteracy against his Majesty"s Land Forces, _there employed_, could have produced.]
[Footnote 29: I do not know what might be the Opinion of the Officers employed by the Admiral (_Vide_ Note (_h_) page 44) to sound: But I am well a.s.sured, that experienced Pilots, who have sounded the whole Harbour of _Carthagena_ in open Day-Light, do affirm, that large Ships can approach so near to the Walls, as easily to batter the Town; of which the _Spaniards_ seem very sensible, from their having lately erected a Battery of forty Pieces of large Cannon, which commands the Bason, where the Galleons usually lie at Anchor.
The _Galicia_"s being sent in had a quite contrary Effect from what the Author suggests; for not only the General, but every unprejudiced Man, both in the Army, and in the Fleet, was thereby convinced, that our large Ships could have got in near enough to batter the Town. For the _Galicia_ being deeply loaden, by the Cases filled with Sand (which served no other End, but to blind the Men, when the Enemy"s Shot took place) drew some Feet more Water, than our eighty Gun Ships, and yet lay near enough to the Walls of the Town to fire with very good Effect, tho"
she had no more Guns mounted, than twelve eighteen Pounders, and four twelve Pounders.
I submit it to the Reader, tho" he be neither Soldier nor Sailor, to judge with what Prospect of Success a Vessel so armed, could be sent in singly to stand the Fire of all the Guns on that Side of the Town, of which the Event sufficiently proved to Absurdity, "For the enemy had demolished her so in two or three Hours, that she would have sunk in half an Hour more, if she had not been drawn off:" But if, instead of _Galicia_, some of his Majesty"s eighty Gun Ships had been ordered in; there are (and those very good Judges) who affirm, that they could have approach"d near enough to have done effectual Service.]
[Footnote 30: The Author of the Pamphlet (in his Note _i_, page 45.) affirms, that from _Thursday_ Morning to _Friday_ Night, by the Accounts delivered in, and by the General"s Report, the Troops on Sh.o.r.e had dwindled from 6645, to 3200. A base and palpable Falsehood! as it will evidently appear by the Return given in (_April_ the 12th) by Mr.
_Wallis_, Agent to the Transports, to Vice-Admiral _Vernon_, of the whole Number then victualled on Board, and on Sh.o.r.e, amounting at that time to 6645, in which Number were included all the Sick, the Women, the Negroes, and Men left in _Boca-Chica_ and _Castillo Grande_, the Officers, with their Servants, and People of all Denominations belonging to the Land Forces, who received the King"s Provisions, whether they were on Board, or on Sh.o.r.e.
The Adjutant"s Books will shew, that the highest Number of Men landed at _La Quinta_ never exceeded 4340 Rank and File, tho" repeated Demands were made from the General, and from the Council of War, for their Troops on Sh.o.r.e being compleated from the Fleet to 5000 Men, Rank and File. At the time of holding the General Council of War, they were, by Sickness, and the late Loss, reduced to 3569, feeble, and scarcely fit for the ordinary Duty; including 1140 _American_ Soldiers, of whom 600 were employed upon no other Service, but on working Parties.]
[Footnote 31: It was raised 2600 Yards from the Fort, which is the utmost Distance those Mortars can throw a Sh.e.l.l, when their Chambers are quite filled with Powder; an Allowance only given for Proof, and never upon Service. Tho" appriz"d of this Circ.u.mstance by the Colonel of the Train, the Captain could not be prevailed upon to advance his Battery nearer, but (as it was expected) wasted above two hundred Sh.e.l.ls, to little or no Purpose whatsoever.
_N.B._ This Battery was begun upon the 8th, but did not Fire before the 14th.]
[Footnote 32: The imbarking the Troops, (_vide k_) in the cool of the Evening, was not only approved by the General, but by the Council of War; who had but too justly deserved Censure, should they have unnecessarily exposed the Men, not only to the violent Heat of the Sun, but to the Enemy"s Cannon, which commanded one of the Places of Imbarkation.
Had the Author"s Apprehensions suffered him to go on Sh.o.r.e at the time of the Retreat, he might have observed that it was made without any Precipitation, and that neither Tents, Arms, working Tools, nor Baggage were left behind.
The General in Person brought up the Rear with his Guard, and having perceived, after the Troops had begun their March, that five Tents belonging to one of the _American_ Battalions were left standing (for which their Lieutenant Colonel had undergone a severe Censure, if his Death had not prevented it) and likewise that some Arms and working Tools remained upon the Ground, he ordered them to be carried off by the Serjeant"s Guard which came from _La Popa_, to which Lieutenant _Forest_, at the General"s Request, added some Sailors, so that the whole Ground might be carefully searched to prevent any thing whatsoever from falling into the Hands of the Enemy. We having lost no Tents, none could (as the Author alledges) be pitched by the Enemy on the top of the Hill.
The Admiral having, (when a Flag of Truce was to be sent into the Vice-Roy) refused to admit of a particular Messenger from the General, I cannot say what idle Expressions might be then made use of to the Disadvantage of the Land Forces. If there were any such, possibly they did not loose in the Report; but if what the Enemy might throw out deserves repeating, it is well known that they frequently expressed their Astonishment, that so fine a Fleet should lie unactive within their very Harbour; and it was affirmed by Persons of Credit, that a _Spanish_ Officer of Rank, who served in _Carthagena_, declared that they only waited for the coming in of our great Ships, to have surrendered.]