Polignac would take a loyal view if he durst.
I cannot see the Duke till Monday, as he does not return to London till Sunday evening.
I saw Hardinge and had a long talk with him about Batta, &c.
_October 24._
Chairs at 11.
The Chairs say the Court have the matter entirely in their hands as to Batta. They wish to have the opinion of the Cabinet, and to be governed by that. I have written to the Duke to tell him so.
I am glad there is to be a Cabinet, because I think a Cabinet will take a more popular view of the question than the Duke, and, as I think, a juster view. I am for standing firm.
The Duke"s letter on Persian affairs arrived while I was with the Chairs. I read it to them. The Duke suggests that McDonald should raise his escort in Persia--an excellent idea. He objects to Major Hart having an a.s.signment of land. He thinks Willock may be recalled. The officers not; but if the prince will pay them, so much the better. I think the Duke may be right as to the a.s.signments of land. Upon all the other points I entirely agree with him. Read last night a letter of Lushington"s, or rather a minute, which shows he is determined to remain.
Cabinet room. Cunningham came in and showed me a draft of Aberdeen"s to our Minister in Spain on the recognition by Spain of Don Miguel--finding excuses for Spain, and saying we cannot do it. What I saw was the _brouillon_ which had been sent to the Duke. It had his observations in pencil, and it seems Aberdeen sends all his proposed despatches to him and alters them at his suggestion. Certainly Aberdeen, left to himself, would be a very incautious writer.
_October 26._
Office early. Saw Captain Hanchett on the subject of the navigation of the Red Sea. He was there two years and a half. He says in going in you should make Aden and wait there for a wind. Water can be had there. Avoid Mocha, where the anchorage is dangerous and the water bad, and go to the Island of Cameran, then straight up in mid channel. All the dangers are visible, and in the mid channel there are none. Cosseir a good little harbour, the danger is going up to Suez; but that easy for a steamer. He worked with topgallant sails against the north-west monsoon. There is a breeze along sh.o.r.e at all times. The danger has been occasioned by the timid sailing of the Arabs, who always hug the sh.o.r.e, and anchor at night.
_October 27._
I omitted yesterday to mention that at the Foreign Office I saw some despatches just received from Sir R. Gordon. I think the date of the first was October 2. He had the day before at last got the Turks to ratify the treaty, but it seems there was a hitch, and until the ratification the officers did not set off to stop hostilities in Asia. A Pasha had advanced on Philippopoli and General Geismar on Sophia. Dieb.i.t.c.h threatened to advance on Constantinople. However, the day after he wrote his threatening letter he must have received the ratifications. The Sultan is very anxious to get the Egyptian fleet to Constantinople, probably as a pledge for the allegiance of the Pasha, and to show his greatest va.s.sal obeys him. The Turks say it is the moral effect of the presence of the fleet on their own subjects that they want, that they have no idea of not acting faithfully.
Sir R. Gordon a.s.sures me they mean to preserve the peace and must.
He has written the representation the Turkish amba.s.sador is to present to the Emperor. It would be a good remonstrance for us, but it is not a good one for the Turks. It is very well written, but it is quite European in its style, and the Russians will at once know, as I did, the author.
The Turks intended to send a splendid emba.s.sy to Petersburg, and Halil Pasha, once the slave of the Seraskier, now the Sultan"s son-in-law, was to have been the amba.s.sador. He is their least officer. However, Dieb.i.t.c.h tells them they must not send it till they have the Emperor"s consent. The Turks have ready the first 100,000 ducats, to get the Russians out of Adrianople.
I should say from these despatches that things do not look peaceful.
_October 28._
Had a letter yesterday from Mr. Elphinstone on Nazarre. It appears to be a fine on descents, &c., of Jaghire lands. I think his opinion will be different from Sir J. Malcolm"s--the latter wishing to make the Jaghires hereditary, or rather to give a fee simple interest to the actual proprietor. Mr. Elphinstone, on the contrary, thinking they should be resumed on death without heirs.
_October 29._
Read a work just published by Colonel de Lacy Evans, on the practicability of a Russian invasion of India. The route would be first to China, across a desert from the sh.o.r.es of the Caspian--from China by water up the Oxus, to within 550 miles of Attock. The great difficulty is between the end of the river, and the southern side of the Hindoo Koosh. This difficulty, however, has been often surmounted, and the road is constantly travelled by caravans.
I think it is clear that the invasion of India could not be attempted till the third year; but when should we begin to take precautions? A Government wholly Asiatic would not be still if the Russians took possession of China; but ours, chained by European politics, would hardly move if they entered Cabul.
We ought to have full information as to Cabul, Bokhara, and China.
My letter of last year directed the attaining of information; but I dare say nothing has been done.
_October 30._
Received a Memorial from Mr. Fullerton, asking some remuneration beyond his salary for past services. He has a claim _if we were rich_. I think he should have 10,000 dollars. I dare say he thinks 20,000. Thoughtless extravagance is the destruction of generosity and even of justice.
Upon the subject of the invasion of India my idea is that the thing is not only practicable, but easy, unless we determine to act as an Asiatic Power.
On the acquisition of Khiva by the Russians we should occupy Lah.o.r.e and Cabul.[Footnote: It may be remembered that Lord Ellenborough strongly disapproved of any occupation of Afghanistan, or interference with its internal affairs, in 1840-42. At that time Russia had not advanced to Khiva. It is clear that he would not have held the same opinion as to our policy towards Afghanistan after the events of 1873-74.] It is not on the Indus that an enemy is to be met. If we do not meet him in Cabul, at the foot of the Hindoo Koosh, or in its pa.s.ses, we had better remain in the Sutlege. If the Russians once occupy Cabul they may remain there with the Indus in their front, till they have organised insurrection in our rear, and completely equipped their army. I fear there are pa.s.ses from Balkh upon Peshawur. If these could be closed and the enemy poured upon Cabul we should know where to meet him. Now we, being at Cabul, might be cut off from its resources by the descent of the enemy upon Peshawur.
There is some road from Roondorg through Cashmere, but I do not fear that.
The road an enemy would choose would be that by the Valley of the Cachgu.
We know nothing of these pa.s.ses, nothing of the country beyond them, nothing of the course of the Indus--but we should have full information so as to be able to crush an advancing enemy, by making the whole country hostile, which money would do.
To meet an invasion we must raise every regiment to 1,000 men.
168 Regiments 360 "
----- 1,008 504 ------ 60,480 Men, besides Artillery.
4,000 King"s Inf. raised to 1,000 each Reg.
1,000 Do. four Regiments of Cavalry.
4,000 Four new Regiments.
2,000 Two new Cavalry.
Besides King"s Artillery.
------ 71,480
Besides the increase which would take place in the Irregular Corps, particularly in Skinner"s.
A smaller increase than this would not be sufficient; for we should require 20,000 men at Delhi, 20,000 in Lah.o.r.e, and 60,000 in Cabul. I speak of enrolled, not effectives--but with these augmentations the Regular Army would only be
148,000 N.I.
24,000 King"s.
------- 172,000 20,000 Native Cavalry.
6,000 King"s.
------- 198,000
The out provisional battalions, local corps, &c., of 198,000, I do not think above 100,000 could possibly be disposable, and there would not be 70,000 effectives. The Artillery must be very numerous. I omitted the Company"s English Regiments, about 3,000 men.
Of all nations the Russians are the least adapted for an enterprise of this nature. They have neither medical staff nor commissariat, and the men are without resource. A French army would be the best. I doubt the possibility of Russia bringing more than 20,000 men to Cabul, and these could not descend the mountains till the third year, if Cabul was occupied. What I fear is an occupation of Khiva unknown to us. No preparation on our part-- no marching forward--so that in three or four months from leaving Khiva the enemy might be at Cabul. I am sure we can defeat the enterprise. We ought to defeat it before the enemy reaches the Indus. If 20,000 Russians should reach the Indus, it will be a sharp fight.
_November 1, 1829._
A letter from the Duke. He returned the papers I sent him. He has doubts as to the expediency of making the Commissary-General of Stores I proposed; but he seems to have supposed I wished to do away with the Military Board.
I have explained what I meant.
He approves of my suggestions as to correspondence, but thinks every paper must be sent home, and the collections formed here. I have explained that I always intended every paper should be sent home, and I have told him that I had the opinion of the clerks I consulted that the collections might be framed in India, with a saving of time, and without diminishing the check on the local Governments.
_November 4._