There is something almost pathetic in the history of these efforts which were made during the progress of secession, to avert, if possible, the coming shock. The great peace conference, a.s.sembled by the action of Virginia, belongs to these painful and wasted endeavours. On February 4, the day that delegates from six cotton States a.s.sembled at Montgomery to form a Southern confederacy, one hundred and thirty-three commissioners, representing twenty-one States, of which fourteen were non-slave-holding, met at Washington and continued in session, sitting with closed doors, until the 27th.
It was a body of great dignity--a "fossil convention," the _Tribune_ called it--whose proceedings, because of the desire in the public mind to avoid civil war, attracted wide attention. David Dudley Field represented New York on the committee on resolutions, which proposed an amendment of seven sections to the Const.i.tution. On February 26, these were taken up in their order for pa.s.sage. The first section provided for the restoration of the Missouri Compromise line under the then existing conditions, provided that whenever a new State was formed north or south of that line it should be admitted with or without slavery, as its const.i.tution might declare. This was the important concession; but, though it was less favourable to the South than the Crittenden compromise, it failed to satisfy the radical Republicans, who had from the first opposed the convention.
Accordingly, the vote, taken by States, stood eight to eleven against it, New York being included among the noes. The next morning, however, after agreeing to a reconsideration of the question, the convention pa.s.sed the section by a vote of nine to eight, New York, divided by the absence of David Dudley Field, being without a voice in its determination. Field never fully recovered from this apparent breach of trust.[654] In committee, he had earnestly opposed the proposed amendment, talking almost incessantly for three weeks, but, at the supreme moment, when the report came up for pa.s.sage, he withdrew from the convention, without explanation, thus depriving his State of a vote upon all the sections save one, because of an evenly divided delegation.
[Footnote 654: See New York _Tribune_, March 23, 1861, for Field"s statement in defence of his action. Also _Tribune_, March 7, for John A. King"s charges.]
The convention, however, was doomed to failure before Field left it.
Very early in its life the eloquent New Yorker, a.s.sisting to rob it of any power for good, declared his opposition to any amendment to the Const.i.tution. "The Union," he said, "is indissoluble, and no State can secede. I will lay down my life for it.... We must have the arbitration of reason, or the arbitrament of the sword." Amaziah B.
James, another New Yorker, possessed the same plainness of speech.
"The North will not enter upon war until the South forces it to do so," he said, mildly. "But when you begin it, the government will carry it on until the Union is restored and its enemies put down."[655] If any stronger Union sentiment were needed, the remarks of Salmon P. Chase of Ohio, in disclosing the att.i.tude of his party, supplied it. "The election of Lincoln," he said, "must be regarded as the triumph of principles cherished in the hearts of the people of the free States. Chief among these principles is the restriction of slavery within State limits; not war upon slavery within those limits, but fixed opposition to its extension beyond them. By a fair and unquestionable majority we have secured that triumph. Do you think we, who represent this majority, will throw it away? Do you think the people would sustain us if we undertook to throw it away?"[656]
[Footnote 655: Lucius E. Chittenden, _Report of Proceedings of Peace Conference_, pp. 157, 170, 303, 428.]
[Footnote 656: Lucius E. Chittenden, _Report of Proceedings of Peace Conference_, p. 304.]
After three weeks of such talk, even Virginia, whose share in forming the Union exceeded that of any other State, manifested its discouragement by repudiating the proposed amendment as an insufficient guarantee for bringing back the cotton States or holding the border States. When, finally, on March 4, the result of the conference was offered in the United States Senate, only seven votes were cast in its favour. So faded and died the last great effort for compromise and peace. For months it must have been apparent to every one that the party of Lincoln would not yield the cornerstone of its principles. It desired peace, was quick to co-operate, and ready to conciliate, but its purpose to preserve free territory for free labour remained fixed and unalterable.
CHAPTER XXVII
WEED"S REVENGE UPON GREELEY
1861
In the winter of 1860-61, while the country was drifting into civil war, a desperate struggle was going on at Albany to elect a United States senator in place of William H. Seward, whose term expired on the fourth of March. After the defeat of the Senator at Chicago, sentiment settled upon his return to Washington; but when Lincoln offered him the position of secretary of state, Thurlow Weed announced William M. Evarts as his candidate for the United States Senate.
Evarts was now forty-three years of age. Born in Boston, a graduate of Yale, and of the Harvard law school, he had been a successful lawyer at the New York bar for twenty years. Union College had conferred upon him, in 1857, the degree of Doctor of Laws, and the rare ability and marvellous persistence manifested in the Lemmon slave case, in which he was opposed by Charles O"Conor, had given abundant evidence of the great intellectual powers that subsequently distinguished him. He had, also, other claims to recognition. The wit and great learning that made him the most charming of conversationalists increased his popularity, while his love of books, his excellent taste, and good manners made him welcome in the club and the social circle. Indeed, he seems to have possessed almost every gift and grace that nature and fortune could bestow, giving him high place among his contemporaries.
Evarts had not then held office. The places that O"Conor and Brady had accepted presented no attractions for him; nor did he seem to desire the varied political careers that had distinguished other brilliant young members of the New York bar. But he had taken pleasure in bringing to his party a wisdom in council which was only equalled by his power in debate. If this service were insufficient to establish his right to the exalted preferment he now sought, his recent valuable work at the Chicago convention was enough to satisfy Thurlow Weed, at least, that generous a.s.sistance of such surpa.s.sing value should be richly rewarded.
Up to this time, Weed"s authority in his party in the State had been supreme. He failed to have his way in 1846 when John Young seized the nomination for governor, and some confusion existed as to his influence in the convention that selected Myron Clark in 1854; but for all practical purposes Weed had controlled the Whig and Republican parties since their formation, almost without dissent. Circ.u.mstances sometimes favoured him. The hard times of 1837 made possible Seward"s election as governor; the split in the Democratic party over the ca.n.a.l, and later over the Wilmot Proviso, secured Seward a seat in the United States Senate; and the sudden and wholly unexpected repeal of the Missouri Compromise defeated the Silver-Grays and aided in rapidly reducing the strength of the Know-Nothings; but these changes in the political situation, although letting Weed"s party into power, burdened his leadership with serious problems. It required a master hand safely to guide a party between the Radical and Abolition factions on one side and the Conservatives on the other, and his signal success commended him to President Lincoln, who frequently counselled with him, often inviting him to Washington by telegram during the darkest days of civil war.
But the defection of Greeley, supplemented by William Cullen Bryant and the union of radical leaders who came from the Democratic party, finally blossomed into successful rebellion at Chicago. This encouraged Greeley to lead one at Albany. The Legislature had one hundred and sixteen Republican members, requiring fifty-nine to nominate in caucus. Evarts could count on forty-two and Greeley upon about as many. In his effort to secure the remaining seventeen, Weed discovered that Ira Harris had a considerable following, who were indisposed to affiliate with Evarts, while several a.s.semblymen indicated a preference for other candidates. This precipitated a battle royal. Greeley did not personally appear in Albany, but he scorned none of the ordinary crafts of party management. Charles A.
Dana, then of the _Tribune_, represented him, and local leaders from various parts of the State rallied to his standard and industriously prosecuted his canva.s.s. Their slogan was "down with the Dictator." It mattered not that they had approved Weed"s management in the past, their fight now proposed to end the one-man power, and every place-hunter who could not secure patronage under Lincoln"s administration if Evarts went to the Senate, ranged himself against Weed. On the side of the _Tribune"s_ editor, also, stood the independent, whose dislike of a party boss always encourages him to strike whenever the way is open to deal an effective blow. This was Greeley"s great strength. It marshalled itself.
Weed summoned all his hosts. Moses H. Grinnell, Simeon Draper, and A.
Oakey Hall led the charge, flanked by a cloud of state and county officials, and an army of politicians who filled the hotels and crowded the lobbies of the capitol. The _Tribune_ estimated Evarts"
backers at not less than one thousand.[657] For two weeks the battle raged with all the characteristics of an intense personal conflict.
Greeley declared it "a conflict which was to determine whether a dynasty was to stand and give law to its subjects, or be overthrown and annihilated. Fully appreciating this, not Richmond at Bosworth Field, Charles at Naseby, nor Napoleon at Waterloo made a more desperate fight for empire than did the one-man power at Albany to retain the sceptre it has wielded for so many years over the politics and placemen of this State."[658] In their desperation both sides appealed to the President-elect, who refused to be drawn into the struggle. "Justice to all" was his answer to Weed. "I have said nothing more particular to any one."[659]
[Footnote 657: New York _Tribune_, February 5, 1861.]
[Footnote 658: _Ibid._, February 5, 1861.]
[Footnote 659: Thurlow Weed Barnes, _Life of Thurlow Weed_, Vol. 2, p.
324.]
As the canva.s.s grew older, it became known that several of Harris"
supporters would go to Greeley whenever their a.s.sistance would nominate him. This sacrifice, however, was not to be made so long as Harris held the balance of power; and since Weed"s desire to defeat Greeley was well understood, Harris counted with some degree of certainty upon Evarts" supporters whenever a serious break threatened.
Weed"s relations with Harris were not cordial. For years they had lived in Albany, and as early as 1846 their ways began to diverge; but Harris" character for wisdom, learning, and integrity compelled respect. He had been an a.s.semblyman in 1844 and 1845, a state senator in 1846, a delegate to the const.i.tutional convention of 1846, and a justice of the Supreme Court from 1847 to 1859. His name was familiar throughout the State. From the time he took up the cause of the Anti-Renters in 1846 he had possessed the confidence of the common people, and his great fairness and courtesy upon the bench had added largely to his reputation. He was without any pretence to oratory. The gifts that made Evarts a leader of the New York bar for three decades did not belong to him; but everybody knew that in the United States Senate he would do as much as Evarts to uphold President Lincoln.
The caucus convened on the evening of February 4. Only one member was absent. Weed and Evarts sat with Governor Morgan in the executive chamber--Harris in the rooms of Lieutenant-Governor Campbell at Congress Hall. The first ballot gave Evarts 42, Greeley 40, Harris 20, with 13 scattering. Bets had been made that Evarts would get 50, and some over-sanguine ones fixed it at 60. What Weed expected does not appear; but the second ballot, which reduced Evarts to 39 and raised Greeley to 42, did not please Speaker Littlejohn, who carried orders between the executive and a.s.sembly chambers. It seemed to doom Evarts to ultimate defeat. The chamber grew dark with the gloomy frowns of men who had failed to move their stubborn representatives. The next four ballots, quickly taken, showed little progress, but the seventh raised Greeley to 47 and dropped Harris to 19, while Evarts held on at 39. An a.s.surance that the object of their labours would be reached with the a.s.sistance of some of Harris" votes on the next ballot, made the friends of Greeley jubilant. It was equally apparent to the astonished followers of the grim manager who was smoking vehemently in the executive chamber, that Evarts would be unable to weather another ballot. A crisis, therefore, was inevitable, but it was the crisis for which Weed had been waiting and watching, and without hesitation he sent word to elect Harris.[660] This settled it. Greeley received 49, Harris 60, with 6 scattering. Weed did not get all he wanted, but he got revenge.
[Footnote 660: "Pale as ashes, Weed sat smoking a cigar within earshot of the bustle in the crowded a.s.sembly room where the caucus sat.
Littlejohn stalked over the heads of the spectators and reported to Weed. Unmindful of the fact that he had a cigar in his mouth, Weed lighted another and put it in, then rose in great excitement and said to Littlejohn, "Tell the Evarts men to go right over to Harris--to _Harris_--to HARRIS!" The order was given in the caucus. They wheeled into line like Napoleon"s Old Guard, and Harris was nominated."--H.B.
Stanton, _Random Recollections_, p. 218.]
There were reasons other than revenge, however, that induced men vigorously opposed to secession to resent the candidacy of Horace Greeley.[661] The editor of the _Tribune_ certainly did not want the Southern States to secede, nor did he favour secession, as has often been charged, but his peculiar treatment of the question immediately after the November election gave the would-be secessionists comfort, if it did not absolutely invite and encourage the South to believe in the possibility of peaceable secession.
[Footnote 661: "It is quite possible that the _Tribune"s_ articles of November, 1860, cost Greeley the senatorship."--James F. Rhodes, _History of the United States_, Vol. 3, p. 142.]
Greeley seems to have taken failure with apparent serenity. He professed to regard it as the downfall of Weed rather than the defeat of himself. His friends who knew of the antagonistic relations long existing between Harris and Weed, said the _Tribune_, exultingly, were willing to see Harris nominated, since "he would become an agent for the accomplishment of their main purpose--the overthrow of the dictatorship, and the establishment upon its ruins of the principle of political independence in thought and action."[662] But whatever its influence upon Weed, the nomination of Harris was a bitter disappointment to Greeley. He was extraordinarily ambitious for public preferment. The character or duties of the office seemed to make little difference to him. Congressman, senator, governor, lieutenant-governor, comptroller of state, and President of the United States, at one time or another greatly attracted him, and to gain any one of them he willingly lent his name or gave up his time; but never did he come so near reaching the goal of his ambition as in February, 1861. The promise of Harris" supporters to transfer their votes encouraged a confidence that was not misplaced. The Greeley men were elated, the more ardent entertaining no doubt that the eighth ballot would bring victory; and, had Weed delayed a moment longer, Greeley must have been a United States senator. But Weed did not delay, and Greeley closed his life with an office-holding record of ninety days in Congress. Like George Borrow, he seemed never to realise that his simple, clear, vigorous English was to be the crown of an undying fame.[663]
[Footnote 662: New York _Tribune_, February 5, 1861.]
[Footnote 663: "It is one of the curiosities of human nature that Greeley, who exceeded in influence many of our Presidents, should have hankered so constantly for office. It is strange enough that the man who wrote as a dictator of public opinion in the _Tribune_ on the 9th of November could write two days later the letter to Seward, dissolving the political firm of Seward, Weed, and Greeley. In that letter the petulance of the office-seeker is shown, and the grievous disappointment that he did not get the nomination for lieutenant-governor, which went to Raymond, stands out plainly."--James F. Rhodes, _History of the United States_, Vol. 2, p. 72.]
CHAPTER XXVIII
LINCOLN, SEWARD, AND THE UNION
1860-1861
As the day approached for the opening of Congress on Monday, December 3, 1860, William H. Seward left Auburn for Washington. At this time he possessed the most powerful influence of any one in the Republican party. While other leaders, his rivals in eloquence and his peers in ability, exercised great authority, the wisdom of no one was more widely appreciated, or more frequently drawn upon. "Sumner, Trumbull, and Wade," says McClure, speaking from personal acquaintance, "had intellectual force, but Trumbull was a judge rather than a politician, Wade was oppressively blunt, and Sumner cultivated an ideal statesmanship that placed him outside the line of practical politics.
Fessenden was more nearly a copy of Seward in temperament and discretion, but readily conceded the masterly ability of his colleague. Seward was not magnetic like Clay or Blaine, but he knew how to make all welcome who came within range of his presence."[664]
[Footnote 664: Alex. K. McClure, _Recollections of Half a Century_, pp. 213, 214.]
Thus far, since the election, Seward had remained silent upon the issues that now began to disturb the nation. Writing to Thurlow Weed on November 18, 1860, he declared he was "without schemes or plans, hopes, desires, or fears for the future, that need trouble anybody so far as I am concerned."[665] Nevertheless, he had scarcely reached the capital before he discovered that he was charged with being the author of Weed"s compromise policy. "Here"s a muss," he wrote, on December 3. "Republican members stopped at the _Tribune_ office on their way, and when they all lamented your articles, Dana told them they were not yours but mine; that I "wanted to make a great compromise like Clay and Webster.""[666]
[Footnote 665: F.W. Seward, _Life of W.H. Seward_, Vol. 2, p. 478.]
[Footnote 666: Thurlow Weed Barnes, _Life of Thurlow Weed_, Vol. 2, p.
308.]
To Republicans it did not seem possible that Weed"s plan of conciliation, so carefully and ably presented, could be published without the a.s.sistance, or, at least, the approval of his warm personal and political friend,--an impression that gained readier credence because of the prompt acquiescence of the New York _Times_ and the _Courier_. Seward, however, quickly punctured Charles A.
Dana"s misinformation, and continued to keep his own counsels. "I talk very little, and nothing in detail," he wrote his wife, on December 2; "but I am engaged busily in studying and gathering my thoughts for the Union."[667] To Weed, on the same day, he gave the political situation. "South Carolina is committed. Georgia will debate, but she probably follows South Carolina. Mississippi and Alabama likely to follow.... Members are coming in, all in confusion. Nothing can be agreed on in advance, but silence for the present, which I have insisted must not be _sullen_, as last year, but respectful and fraternal."[668]
[Footnote 667: F.W. Seward, _Life of W.H. Seward_, Vol. 2, p. 479.]
[Footnote 668: Thurlow Weed Barnes, _Life of Thurlow Weed_, Vol. 2, pp. 307, 308.]
Seward, who had now been in Washington several days, had not broken silence even to his Republican colleagues in the Senate, and "to smoke him out," as one of them expressed it, a caucus was called. But it failed of its purpose. "Its real object," he wrote Weed, "was to find out whether I authorised the _Evening Journal_, _Times_, and _Courier_ articles. I told them they would know what I think and what I propose when I do myself. The Republican party to-day is as uncompromising as the secessionists in South Carolina. A month hence each may come to think that moderation is wiser."[669]