Chase had relieved the tension temporarily by inducing Cisco to withdraw his resignation, but after getting the President"s second letter, cleverly intimating that Field"s appointment might necessitate the removal of Barney, the Secretary promptly tendered his resignation. If the President was surprised, the Secretary, after reading Lincoln"s reply, was not less so. "Your resignation of the office of secretary of the treasury, sent me yesterday, is accepted,"
said the brief note. "Of all I have said in commendation of your ability and fidelity I have nothing to unsay, and yet you and I have reached a point of mutual embarra.s.sment in our official relation which it seems cannot be overcome or longer sustained consistently with the public service."[966] Secretary Blaine"s hasty resignation in 1892, and President Harrison"s quick acceptance of it, were not more dramatic, except that Blaine"s was tendered on the eve of a national nominating convention. It is more than doubtful if Chase intended to resign. He meant it to be as in previous years the beginning of a correspondence, expecting to receive from the President a soothing letter with concessions. But Lincoln"s stock of patience, if not of sedatives, was exhausted.
[Footnote 966: Nicolay-Hay, _Abraham Lincoln_, Vol. 9, p. 95.]
A few weeks later, after William Pitt Fessenden"s appointment to succeed Chase, Simeon Draper became collector of customs. He was one of Weed"s oldest friends and in 1858 had been his first choice for governor.[967] But just now Abraham Wakeman was his first choice for collector. Possibly in selecting Draper instead of Wakeman, Lincoln remembered Weed"s failure to secure a legislative endors.e.m.e.nt of his renomination, a work specially a.s.signed to him. At all events the anti-Weed faction accepted Draper as a decided triumph.
[Footnote 967: "Simeon Draper was impulsive and demonstrative. With the advantages of a fine person, good conversational powers, and ready wit, his genial presence and cheerful voice imparted life and spirit to the numerous social circles in which he was ever a welcome guest."
_Weed"s Reminiscences_, T.W. Barnes, _Life of Thurlow Weed_, Vol. 2, p. 483.]
CHAPTER VIII
SEYMOUR"S PRESIDENTIAL FEVER
1864
"I shall not attempt to retract or modify the Emanc.i.p.ation Proclamation," said the President at the opening of Congress in December, 1863; "nor shall I return to slavery any person who is free by the terms of that proclamation, or by any of the acts of Congress."
But in submitting a plan for the restoration of the Confederate States he offered amnesty, with rights of property except as to slaves, to all persons[968] who agreed to obey the Const.i.tution, the laws, and the Executive proclamations, and proposed that whenever such persons numbered one-tenth of the qualified voters of a State they "shall be recognized as the true government of such State."[969] A week later the Thirteenth Amendment, forever abolishing slavery, was introduced into Congress. Thus the purpose of the radical Republicans became plain.
[Footnote 968: Except certain ones specifically exempted.]
[Footnote 969: Lincoln, _Complete Works_, Vol. 2, p. 443.]
In January, 1864, Governor Seymour, then the acknowledged head of his party, made his message to the Legislature a manifesto to the Democrats of the country. With measured rhetoric he traced the usurpations of the President and the acknowledged policy that was in future to guide the Administration. He courageously admitted that a majority of the people and both branches of Congress sustained the policy of the President, but such a policy, he declared, subordinating the laws, the courts, and the people themselves to military power, destroyed the rights of States and abrogated cherished principles of government. The past, however, with its enormous debt, its depreciated currency, its suspension of the writ of _habeas corpus_, and its abolition of free speech and a free press, did not mean such irretrievable ruin as the national bankruptcy which now threatened to overwhelm the nation. "The problem with which we have to grapple is,"
he said, "how can we bring this war to a conclusion before such disasters overwhelm us." Two antagonistic theories, he continued, are now before us--one, consecrating the energies of war and the policy of government to the restoration of the Union as it was and the Const.i.tution as it is; the other, preventing by the creation of a new political system the return of the revolted States, though willing to lay down their arms. This alternative will enable an administration to perpetuate its power. It is a doctrine of national bankruptcy and national ruin; it is a measure for continued military despotism over one-third of our country, which will be the basis for military despotism over the whole land.
Every measure to convert the war against armed rebellion into one against private property and personal rights at the South, he continued, has been accompanied by claims to exercise military power in the North. The proclamation of emanc.i.p.ation at the South, and the suspension of the writ of _habeas corpus_ at the North; the confiscation of private property in the seceding States, and the arbitrary arrests, imprisonment, and banishment of the citizens of loyal States; the claim to destroy political organization at the South, and the armed interference by Government in local elections at the North, have been contemporaneous events. We now find that as the strength of rebellion is broken, new claims to arbitrary power are put forth. More prerogatives are a.s.serted in the hour of triumph than were claimed in days of disaster. The war is not to be brought to an end by the submission of States to the Const.i.tution and their return to the Union, but to be prolonged until the South is subjugated and accepts such terms as may be dictated. This theory designs a sweeping revolution and the creation of a new political system. There is but one course, he concluded, which will now save us from such national ruin--we must use every influence of wise statesmanship to bring back the States which now reject their const.i.tutional obligations. The triumphs won by the soldiers in the field should be followed up by the peacemaking policy of the statesmen in the Cabinet. In no other way can we save our Union.[970]
[Footnote 970: _Public Record of Horatio Seymour_, pp. 198-212.]
Seymour"s claims and portents were in amazing contrast to his proposed measures of safety. Nevertheless he did his work well. It was his intention clearly to develop the ultimate tendencies of the war, and, in a paper of great power and interest, without invective or acerbity, he did not hesitate to alarm the people respecting the jeopardy of their own liberties. Indeed, his message had the twofold purpose of drawing the line distinctly between Administration and anti-Administration forces, and of concentrating public attention upon himself as a suitable candidate for President.[971] Seymour was never without ambition, for he loved politics and public affairs, and the Presidency captivated him. With deepest interest he watched the play at Charleston and at Baltimore in 1860, and had the nomination come to him, Lincoln"s election, depending as it did upon New York, must have given Republicans increased solicitude. Developments during the war had stimulated this ambition. The cost of blood and treasure, blended with arbitrary measures deemed necessary by the Government, pained and finally exasperated him until he longed to possess the power of an Executive to make peace. He believed that a compromise, presented in a spirit of patriotic clemency, with slavery undisturbed, would quickly terminate hostilities, and although he made the mistake of surrounding himself with men whose influence sometimes betrayed him into weak and extreme positions, his ability to present his views in a scholarly and patriotic manner, backed by a graceful and gracious bearing, kept him in close touch with a party that resented methods which made peace dependent upon the abolition of slavery. He never provoked the criticism of those whom he led, nor indulged in levity and flippancy.
But he was unsparing in his lectures to the Administration, admonishing it to adopt the principles of government which prevailed when happiness and peace characterised the country"s condition, and prophesying the ruin of the Union unless it took his advice. While, therefore, his eulogy of the flag, the soldiers, the Union, and the sacrifices of the people won him reputation for patriotic conservatism, his condemnation of the Government brought him credit for supporting and promoting all manner of disturbing factions and revolutionary movements.
[Footnote 971: Horace Greeley, _History of the Rebellion_, Vol. 2, p.
667.]
The Regency understood the Governor"s ambition, and the Democratic State convention, a.s.sembling at Albany on February 24 to designate delegates to Chicago, opened the way for him as widely as possible. It promulgated no issues; it mentioned no candidate; it refused to accept Fernando Wood and his brother as delegates because of their p.r.o.nounced advocacy of a dishonourable peace; and it placed Seymour at the head of a strong delegation, backed by Dean Richmond and August Belmont, and controlled by the unit rule. It was a remarkable coincidence, too, that the New York _Herald_, which had pursued the Governor for more than a year with bitter criticism, suddenly lapsed into silence.
Indeed, the only shadow falling upon his pathway in the Empire State reflected the temporary anger of Tammany, which seceded from the convention because the McKeon delegation, an insignificant coterie of advocates of peace-on-any-conditions, had been admitted on terms of equality.
As the summer advanced political conditions seemed to favour Seymour.
During the gloomy days of July and August the people prayed for a cessation of hostilities. "The mercantile cla.s.ses are longing for peace," wrote James Russell Lowell,[972] and Horace Greeley, in a letter of perfervid vehemence, pictured to the President the unhappy condition. "Our bleeding, bankrupt, almost dying country," he said, "longs for peace, shudders at the prospect of fresh conscriptions, or further wholesale devastations, and of new rivers of human blood."[973] The President, also yearning for peace and willing to accept almost any proposition if it included the abolition of slavery, waited for a communication from some agent of the Confederacy authorised to treat with him; but such an one had not appeared, although several persons, safely sheltered in Canada, claimed authority. One of these, calling himself William C. Jewett of Colorado, finally convinced Horace Greeley that Clement C. Clay of Alabama and Jacob Thompson of Mississippi, two amba.s.sadors of Jefferson Davis, were ready at Niagara Falls to meet the President whenever protection was afforded them. Upon being informed by Greeley of their presence, Lincoln replied (July 9): "If you can find any person, anywhere, professing to have any proposition of Jefferson Davis in writing for peace, embracing the restoration of the Union and abandonment of slavery, whatever else it embraces, say to him he may come to me with you."[974]
[Footnote 972: Motley"s _Letters_, Vol. 2, p. 168.]
[Footnote 973: Nicolay-Hay, _Abraham Lincoln_, Vol. 9, p. 186.]
[Footnote 974: _Ibid._, pp. 187-188.]
While Greeley, hesitating to undertake the mission himself, indulged in further correspondence with the President, James P. Jaquess, a Methodist clergyman and colonel of an Illinois regiment, with the knowledge of Lincoln, but without official authority except to pa.s.s the Union lines, obtained (July 17) an audience with Jefferson Davis, to whom he made overtures of peace. In the interview Davis declared that "we are not fighting for slavery. We are fighting for independence, and that or extermination we will have. We will be free.
We will govern ourselves. We will do it if we have to see every Southern plantation sacked and every Southern city in flames.... Say to Mr. Lincoln from me that I shall at any time be pleased to receive proposals for peace on the basis of our independence. It will be useless to approach me with any other."[975] It is known now that Jaquess" report was substantially correct, but at the time the peace advocate defiantly challenged its truth and the conservative was incredulous.
[Footnote 975: J.R. Gilmore (Kirke), _Down in Tennessee_, pp.
272-280.]
Meantime Greeley (July 16) proceeded to Niagara Falls. Thompson was not there and Clay had no authority to act. When the famous editor asked fresh instructions Lincoln sent John Hay, his private secretary, with the historic paper of July 18, which stopped further negotiations.[976] In this well-meant effort the President desired to convince his own party of the hopelessness of any satisfactory peace until the surrender of Lee"s and Johnston"s armies; but to the people, grieved by the death of loved ones, or oppressed by constant anxiety, his brief ultimatum seemed maladroit, while the men who favoured peace simply on condition of the restoration of the Union, without the abolition of slavery, resented his course as arbitrary and needlessly cruel.
[Footnote 976: "To whom it may concern: Any proposition which embraces the restoration of peace, the integrity of the whole Union, and the abandonment of slavery, and which comes by and with an authority that can control the armies now at war against the United States will be received and considered by the executive government of the United States and will be met by liberal terms on other substantial and collateral points, and the bearer or bearers thereof shall have safe conduct both ways. Abraham Lincoln."--Horace Greeley, _The American Conflict_, Vol. 2, p. 665; Appleton"s _Cyclopaedia_, 1864, p. 780; Nicolay-Hay, _Abraham Lincoln_, Vol. 9, p. 192.]
Lincoln"s unpopularity touched bottom at this moment. The dissatisfaction found expression in a secret call for a second national convention, to be held at Cincinnati on September 28, to nominate, if necessary, a new candidate for President.[977] This movement, vigorously promoted in Ohio by Salmon P. Chase, received cordial support in New York City. George Opd.y.k.e directed it, Horace Greeley heartily endorsed it, Daniel S. d.i.c.kinson favoured it, and Lucius Robinson and David Dudley Field sympathised with it.[978] Parke G.o.dwin and William Curtis Noyes, if unwilling to go as far as Opd.y.k.e and Greeley, would have welcomed Lincoln"s withdrawal.[979] Roscoe Conkling, being advised of the scheme, promptly rejected it. "I do not approve of the call or of the movement," he wrote, "and cannot sign it. For that reason it would not be proper or agreeable that I should be present at the conference you speak of."[980]
[Footnote 977: "The undersigned, citizens of the State of New York and unconditional supporters of the national government, convinced that a union of all loyal citizens of the United States upon the basis of a common patriotism is essential to the safety and honour of the country in this crisis of its affairs; that the present distraction and apathy which depress the friends of the Union threaten to throw the Government into the hands of its enemies; and that a convention of the people should be a.s.sembled to consider the state of the nation and to concentrate the union strength on some one candidate, who commands the confidence of the country, even by a new nomination if necessary; do therefore invite their fellow citizens ... to send delegates ... to a convention at Cincinnati on Wednesday, September 28, for friendly consultation, with the purpose above stated."--New York _Sun_, June 30, 1889.]
[Footnote 978: Under date of Aug. 18, 1864, Greeley wrote Opd.y.k.e: "I must go out of town to-morrow and cannot attend the meeting at your house. Allow me to say a word. Mr. Lincoln is already beaten. He cannot be elected. We must have another ticket to save us from utter overthrow. And such a ticket we ought to have anyhow, with or without a convention."--_Ibid._
On August 26, d.i.c.kinson declared that "the cry for a change, whether wise or ill founded, should be both heard and heeded."--_Ibid._
On August 29, Lucius Robinson regretted "that it will be impossible for me to be present at the meeting at Mr. Field"s to-morrow evening.... McClellan will be the next President unless Lincoln is at once withdrawn."--_Ibid._]
[Footnote 979: Nicolay-Hay, _Abraham Lincoln_, Vol. 9, p. 366.]
[Footnote 980: New York _Sun_, June 30, 1889.]
It is doubtful if Lincoln knew of this conspiracy, but his friends informed him of the critical condition of affairs. "When, ten days ago, I told Mr. Lincoln that his re-election was an impossibility,"
Weed wrote Seward on August 22, "I told him the information would also come through other channels. It has doubtless reached him ere this. At any rate n.o.body here doubts it, nor do I see anybody from other States who authorises the slightest hope of success. The people are wild for peace. They are told the President will only listen to terms of peace on condition that slavery be abandoned."[981] Weed"s "other channels" meant a report from the Republican National Executive Committee, which Raymond, then its chairman, submitted to Lincoln on August 22. "The tide is setting strongly against us," he wrote. "Hon.
E.B. Washburn writes that "were an election to be held now in Illinois we should be beaten." Mr. Cameron says that Pennsylvania is against us. Governor Morton writes that nothing but the most strenuous efforts can carry Indiana. This State, according to the best information I can get, would go 50,000 against us to-morrow. And so of the rest. Two special causes are a.s.signed for this great reaction in public sentiment--the want of military successes, and the impression in some minds, the fear and suspicion in others, that we are not to have peace in any event under this Administration until slavery is abandoned. In some way or other the suspicion is widely diffused that we can have peace with Union if we would. It is idle to reason with this belief--still more idle to denounce it. It can only be expelled by some authoritative act at once bold enough to fix attention, and distinct enough to defy incredulity and challenge respect."[982]
[Footnote 981: Nicolay-Hay, _Abraham Lincoln_, Vol. 9, p. 250.]
[Footnote 982: _Ibid._, p. 218.]
In December, 1860, in the presence of threatened war Lincoln refused to yield to a compromise that would extend slavery into free territory; now, in the presence of failure at the polls, he insisted upon a peace that would abolish slavery. In 1860 he was flushed with victory; in 1864 he was depressed by the absence of military achievement. But he did not weaken. He telegraphed Grant to "hold on with a bulldog grip, _and chew and choke as much as possible_,"[983]
and then, in the silence of early morning, with Raymond"s starless letter on the table before him, he showed how coolly and magnanimously a determined patriot could face political overthrow. "This morning, as for some days past," he wrote, "it seems exceedingly probable that this Administration will not be re-elected. Then it will be my duty to so cooperate with the President-elect as to save the Union between the election and the inauguration, as he will have secured his election on such ground that he cannot possibly save it afterwards."[984]
[Footnote 983: _Lincoln"s Complete Works_, Vol. 2, p. 563.]
[Footnote 984: Nicolay-Hay, _Abraham Lincoln_, Vol. 9, p. 251.]
The influence of this popular discouragement exhibited itself in a ma.s.s peace convention, called by Fernando Wood and held at Syracuse on August 18. Its great attraction was Clement L. Vallandigham of Ohio, its platform favoured an armistice and a convention of States, and its purpose was the selection of a delegation to Chicago, which should adequately represent the peace faction of the State. The absence of military achievement and the loud cries for peace, it was claimed, had changed the conditions since the adjournment of the Democratic State convention in February, and the necessity for a third party was conceded should the existing peace sentiment be ignored in the formulation of a platform and the selection of candidates at Chicago.
Although the a.s.sembly indicated no preference for President, its known partiality for Seymour added to its strength. Through the manipulation of Richmond and the Regency, Wood failed to secure the appointment of delegates, but he claimed, with much show of truth, that the meeting represented the sentiment of a great majority of the party. Wood had become intolerable to Dean Richmond and the conservative Democracy, whose withering opposition to his candidacy for the United States Senate in the preceding February had made him ridiculous; but he could not be muzzled, and although his influence rarely disturbed the party in the up-State counties, he was destined to continue in Congress the rest of his life, which ended in 1881.
The Democratic national convention had been called for July 4, but the popular depression, promising greater advantage later in the summer, led to its postponement until August 29. Thus it convened when gloom and despondency filled the land, making Horatio Seymour"s journey to Chicago an ovation. At every stop, especially at Detroit, crowds, cheers, speeches, and salvos of firearms greeted him. The convention city recognised him as its most distinguished visitor, and the opponents of a war policy, voicing the party"s sentiment for peace, publicly proclaimed him their favourite.
Before Seymour left Albany the _Argus_ announced that he would not be a candidate;[985] but now, flattered by attention, and encouraged by the peace-faction"s strategic movement, he declined to indicate his position. Political conditions had made a profound impression upon him. Moreover, deep in his heart Seymour did not fancy McClellan. His public life had been brief, and his accomplishment little either as a soldier or civilian. Besides, his arrest of the Maryland Legislature, and his indifference to the sacredness of the writ of _habeas corpus_, cla.s.sing him among those whom the Governor had bitterly denounced, tended to destroy the latter"s strongest argument against the Lincoln administration.
[Footnote 985: "The announcement in the Albany _Argus_ that Governor Seymour was not a candidate was written by Seymour himself, and taken to the _Argus_ by his private secretary. It is now announced that it was intended as a feeler. The whole force of the opposition to McClellan is centred in this move for Seymour."--New York _Herald_ (Chicago despatch), August 28, 1864.]