It is improper, according to this, to say that a man cannot do a thing, when nothing is wanting but an act of volition; for that is within our power, as far as it can be within our power, which is within the reach of our volition.
It is still more improper to say that a man is unable to exert the acts of the will themselves, or unable to produce volitions. To say that a man has power to produce volitions, would imply that he has power to will volitions; but this would make one volition the cause of another, which is absurd. But, as it is absurd to represent the will as the cause of its own volitions, and of course to say that the man has ability to produce his volitions, it must be absurd likewise to represent the man as _unable_, in any particular case, to produce volitions, for this would imply that in other cases he is able. Nay, the very language is self-contradictory. If a man produce volitions, he must produce them by volitions; and if in any case he is affirmed to be unable to produce volitions; then this inability must arise from a want of connexion between the volition by which the required volition is aimed to be produced, and the required volition itself. So that to affirm that he is unable to will is equivalent to saying, that he cannot will _if he will_--a proposition which grants the very point it a.s.sumes to deny.
"The very willing is the doing," which is required.
Edwards adopts what he calls the "original" and "proper," meaning of power, and ability, as applied to human agents, and appearing, "in the ordinary use of language," as the legitimate and true meaning. In this use, power, as we have seen, relates only to the connexion of volition with its consequents, and not to its connexion with its antecedents or motives. Hence, in reference to the human agent, "to ascribe a non-performance to the want of power or ability," or to the want of motives, (for this is plainly his meaning,) "is not just," "because the thing wanting," that is, immediately wanting, and wanting so far as the agent himself can be the subject of remark in respect of it, "is not a being _able_," that is, a having the requisite motives, or the moral ability, "but a being _willing_, or the act of volition, itself. To the act of volition, or the fact of "being willing,"" there is no facility of mind or capacity of nature wanting, but only a disposition or state of mind adapted to the act; but with this, the individual can have no concern in reference to his action, because he has all the ability which can be predicated of him legitimately, when he can do the act, if he will to do it. It is evident that there may be an utter moral inability to do a thing--that is the motive may be wanting which causes the volition, which is the immediate antecedent of the thing to be done; but still if it is true that there is such a connexion between the volition and the thing to be done, that the moment the volition takes place the thing is done; then, according to Edwards, the man may be affirmed to be able to do it with the only ability that can be affirmed of him.
We can exert power only by exerting will, that is by putting forth volitions by choosing; of course we cannot exert power over those motives which are themselves the causes of our volitions. We are not _unable_ to do anything in the proper and original and legitimate use of the word when, for the want of motive, we are not the subjects of the volition required as the immediate antecedent of the thing to be done; but we are _unable_ in this use when, although the volition be made; still, through some impediment, the thing is not done. We are conscious of power, or of the want of power only in the connexion between our actual volitions and their objects.
"Sec. V. Concerning the Notion of Liberty, and of moral Agency."
What is liberty? "The plain and obvious meaning of the words _freedom_ and _liberty_, in common speech, is _power, opportunity, or advantage that any one has to do as he pleases_. Or, in other words, his being free from hinderance, or impediment in the way of doing, or conducting in any way as he wills. And the _contrary_ to liberty, whatever name we call it by, is a person"s being hindered or unable to conduct as he will, or being, necessitated to do otherwise." (p. 38.) Again, "That power and opportunity for one to do and conduct as he will, or according to his choice, is all that is meant by it; without taking into the meaning of the word, anything of the _cause_ of that choice, or at all considering how the person came to have such a volition; whether it was caused by some external motive, or internal habitual bias; whether it was determined by some internal antecedent volition, or whether it happened without a cause; whether it was necessarily connected with something foregoing, or not connected. Let the person come by his choice any how, yet if he is able, and there is nothing in the way to hinder his pursuing and executing his will, the man is perfectly free, according to the primary and common notion of freedom." (p. 39.)
This is Edwards"s definition of liberty, and he has given it with a clearness, a precision, and, at the same time, an amplification, which renders it impossible to mistake his meaning.
Liberty has nothing to do with the connexion between volition and its cause or motive. Liberty relates solely to the connexion between the volition and its objects. He is free in the only true and proper sense, who, when he wills, finds no impediment between the volition and the object, who wills and it is done. He wills to walk, and his legs obey: he wills to talk, and his intellect and tongue obey, and frame and express sentences. If his legs were bound, he would not be free. If his tongue were tied with a thong, or his mouth gagged, he would not be free; or if his intellect were paralysed or disordered, he would not be free. If there should be anything preventing the volition from taking effect, he would not be free.
_Of what can the attribute of Liberty be affirmed?_
From the definition thus given Edwards remarks, "It will follow, that in propriety of speech, neither liberty, nor its contrary, can properly be ascribed to any being or thing, but that which has such a faculty, power, or property, as is called will. For that which is possessed of no _will_, cannot have any power or opportunity of doing _according to its will_, nor be necessitated to act contrary to its will, nor be restrained from acting agreeable to it. And therefore to talk of liberty, or the contrary, as belonging to the _very will itself_, is not to speak good sense; for the _will itself_, is not an agent that has _a will_. The power of choosing itself, has not a power of choosing. That which has the power of volition is the man, or the soul, and not the power of volition itself. And he that has the liberty, is the agent who is possessed of the will; and not the will which he is possessed of."
(p. 38.)
Liberty is the attribute of the agent, because the agent is the spiritual essence or being who is the subject of the power or capacity of choice, and his liberty consists as we have seen in the unimpeded connexion between the volitions produced in him and the objects of those volitions. Hence, _free will_ is an objectionable phrase. _Free agent_ is the proper phrase, that is, an agent having the power of choice and whose choice reaches effects.
_Moral Agent._
"A _moral agent_ is a being that is capable of those actions that have a _moral_ quality, and which can properly be denominated good or evil in a moral sense, virtuous or vicious, commendable or faulty." (p. 39.)
In what lies the capability of actions having a moral quality?
"To moral agency belongs a _moral faculty_, or sense of moral good and evil, or of such a thing as desert or worthiness, of praise or blame, reward or punishment; and a capacity which an agent has of being influenced in his actions by moral inducements or motives, exhibited to the view of the understanding or reason, to engage to a conduct agreeable to moral faculty." (p. 40.)
A moral agent is a being who can perform moral actions, or actions which are subject to praise or blame. Now the same action may be committed by a man or by a brute--and the man alone will be guilty: why is the man guilty? Because he has a moral sense or perception by which he distinguishes right and wrong: the brute has no such sense or perception. The man having thus the power of perceiving the right and wrong of actions--actions and their moral qualities may be so correlated to him as to produce the sense of the most agreeable or choice. Or, we may say generally, moral agency consists in the possession of a reason and conscience to distinguish right and wrong, and the capacity of having the right and wrong so correlated to the mind as to form motives and produce volitions. We might define a man of taste in the fine arts in a similar way; thus,--a man of taste is an agent who has the power of distinguishing beauty and ugliness, and whose mind is so correlated to beauty that the sense of the most agreeable or choice is produced. The only difference between the two cases is this: that, in the latter, the sense of the most agreeable is always produced by the beauty perceived; while in the former, the right perceived does not always produce this sense; on the contrary, the sense of the most agreeable is often produced by the wrong, in opposition to the decisions of reason and conscience.
I have now completed the statement of Edwards"s system, nearly in his own words, as contained in part I. of his work. The remarks and explanations which have been thrown in, I hope will serve to make him more perfectly understood. This end will be still more fully attained by presenting on the basis of the foregoing investigation and statement, a compend of his psychological system, independently of the order there pursued, and without largely introducing quotations, which have already been abundantly made.
COMPEND OF EDWARDS"S PSYCHOLOGICAL SYSTEM.
I. There are two cardinal faculties of the mind. 1. The intellectual--called reason or understanding. 2. The active and feeling--called will or affections.
II. The relation of these to each other. The first precedes the second in the order of exercise. The first perceives and knows objects in their qualities, circ.u.mstances, and relations. The second experiences emotions and pa.s.sions, or desires and choices, in relation to the objects perceived.
III. Perception is necessary. When the understanding and its objects are brought together, perception takes place according to the const.i.tuted laws of the intelligence.
IV. The acts of will or the affections are necessary. When this faculty of our being and its objects are brought together, volition or choice, emotions, pa.s.sions, or desires take place, according to the const.i.tuted nature and laws of this faculty.
The objects and this faculty are correlates. In relation to the object, we may call this faculty subject. When subject and object are suited to each other, that is, are agreeable, affections are produced which we call pleasant; when they are not suited, that is, are disagreeable, affections take place which are unpleasant or painful. Every object in relation to subject, is agreeable or disagreeable, and produces accordingly, in general, affections pleasant or painful.
In the perfection and harmony of our being, this correspondence is universal; that is, what is known to be agreeable is felt to be pleasant;--what is known to be disagreeable is felt to be painful. But, in the corruption of our being, this is reversed in respect of moral objects. Although what is right is known to be agreeable, that is, suited to us, it is felt to be painful. But the wrong which is known to be unsuited, is felt to be pleasant. It must be remarked here, that pleasant and agreeable, are used by Edwards and others, as synonymous terms. The distinction I have here made is at least convenient in describing the same objects as presented to the understanding and to the will.
V. The emotions and pa.s.sions, volitions or choices, are thus produced in the correlation of subject, that is the will, and the object. In a.s.signing the causes of these affections, we may refer to the nature of the will, which is such, as to receive such and such affections when in the presence of such and such objects: or, we may refer to the objects, and say their nature and circ.u.mstances are such as to produce such and such affections in the will: or, we may refer to both at once, and say that the affections arise from the state of the mind, and from the nature and circ.u.mstances of the object.
VI. The affections of the will stand connected with changes or effects in other parts of our being, as stated antecedents. First, they stand thus connected with muscular action,--as walking, talking, striking, resisting, &c. Secondly, they stand thus connected with mental operations,--as fixing the attention upon any subject of thought and investigation, or upon any imagination, or any idea of the memory.
VII. The affections of the will, when thus connected with effects in other parts of our being, have a peculiar and striking characteristic.
It is this: that the effect contemplated takes place at the moment it appears the most agreeable,--the greatest apparent good; which, as Edwards uses these phrases, means, that at the moment the effect contemplated produces the most pleasant affection,--the most intense sense of the agreeable,--it takes place. Thus, when walking seems most pleasant, we walk; when talking, we talk; when thinking on a particular subject, then we think on that subject. Such is the const.i.tution and law of our being. The play of the different parts is reciprocal. Perception must bring up the objects, and the affections of will immediately follow. The most agreeable are dwelt upon by the mind, and perception again takes place particularly with regard to these; and according as objects affect the will, do all the activities of our being come forth.
VIII. Various terms and phrases in common use can be easily explained by this system:--_Choice_ is the sense or the affection of the most pleasant and agreeable. _Preference_ is its synonyme, with scarcely a shade of difference. They both have respect to the _act of selection_.
_Volition_ is another name for this affection of will, and is used more particularly in relation to effects or changes following the affection.
_Desire_ is a nascent choice. The strongest desire, at a given moment, is choice. _Emotion_ is an affection, pleasant or painful, according to the quality of the object, but not ripened into desire. It is the first sudden affection arising from an object presented; and with respect to certain objects, it expresses all the enjoyment possible in relation to them,--for example, the emotion of sublimity, produced by an object which can hold no other relation to us. But then the sublimity of the object may be the motive which causes the choice of gazing at it; that is, it connects this act of contemplation with the sense of the most agreeable.
_Pa.s.sion_ is emotion accompanied by desire in reference to other relations with the object. Thus the emotion of beauty awakened by a flower may be accompanied by the desire of possessing it; and if this desire becomes the strongest desire at the moment, then the pa.s.sion has the characteristic which makes it choice, and some corresponding effects take place in order to possess it,--as walking towards it, stretching out the hand, &c.
_The determination of will_ is the production or causation of choice. It is used in reference to the immediate and particular choice, in opposition to all other choices.
_The will itself_ is the capacity of being affected by objects with emotion, pa.s.sion, and desire,--and with that form of pa.s.sion which we call the sense of the most agreeable or choice, and which is connected with effects or consequents as their stated antecedent.
_The motive_ is the cause of choice, and is complex. It lies in the nature and susceptibilities of the will, and in the nature and circ.u.mstances Of the object chosen.
IX. The will and reason may be opposed; that is, what reason commands may seem disagreeable to the will, and of course reason cannot be obeyed. Reason can be obeyed only when her commands produce the sense of the most agreeable.
X. The terms necessity, and freedom or liberty are opposed in reference to will. Freedom or liberty is the attribute of the man--the human soul.
The man is free when his volitions or choices are unimpeded,--when, upon choosing to walk, he walks, &c. The man is not free, or is under necessity, when his volitions or choices are impeded,--when, upon choosing to walk, he finds his legs bound or paralysed, &c. Then it is _impossible_ for him to walk,--then he has _no liberty_ to walk,--then he is under a _necessity_ of remaining in one place.
Necessity in any other use is _metaphysical_ or _philosophical_ necessity, and is applied out of the sphere of the will: as the necessity of truth, the necessity of being,--the necessary connexion of cause and effect. Hence,
The _connexion_ between volitions or choices, or the sense of the most agreeable with the motive or cause, is _necessary_ with a philosophical necessity. The necessity of volitions in reference to motives is also called _moral_ necessity. This term _moral_ is given, not in reference to the nature of the connexion, but in reference to the _terms_ connected. Volitions belonging to responsible and moral beings are thus distinguished from those phenomena which we commonly call _natural_.
XI. An agent is that which produces effects. A _natural_ agent is that which produces effects without volition. A _moral_ agent is one producing effects by volitions, accompanied with an intellectual perception of the volitions and their effects, as right or wrong, and a sense of desert, or of praiseworthiness, or blameworthiness, on account of the volitions and their effects.
_Brutes_ or irresponsible beings are agents that have volitions, but have no reason to perceive right and wrong, and consequently have no sense of desert; and as they cannot perceive right and wrong, they cannot be made the subjects of moral appeals and inducements.
XII. Moral responsibility arises first, from the possession of reason; secondly, from the capacity of choice; thirdly, from natural ability.
Natural ability exists when the effect or act commanded to be accomplished has an established connexion with volition or choice. Thus we say a man has natural ability to walk, because if he chooses to walk, he walks. Natural ability differs from freedom only in this:--The first refers to an established connexion between volitions and effects. The second refers to an absence of all impediment, or of all resisting forces from between volitions and effects.
Hence a man is _naturally unable_ to do anything when there is no established connexion between volition and that thing. A man is naturally unable to push a mountain from its seat. He has no _liberty_ to move his arm when it is bound.
_Moral inability_ is metaphysical or philosophical inability.
Philosophical inability in general refers to the impossibility of a certain effect for the want of a cause, or an adequate cause. Thus there is a philosophical inability of trans.m.u.ting metal; or of restoring the decay of old age to the freshness and vigour of youth, because we have no cause by which such effects can be produced. There is a philosophical inability also, to pry up a rock of a hundred tons weight with a pine lath, and by the hand of a single man, because we have not an adequate cause. _Moral inability_ relates to the connexion between motives and volitions in distinction from natural ability, which relates to the connexion between volitions and actions consequent upon them: but the term moral as we have seen, does not characterize the nature of the _connexion_,--it only expresses the _quality_ of _terms connected_.
Hence _moral_ inability, as philosophical inability, is the impossibility of a certain volition or choice for the want of a motive or cause, or an adequate motive. Thus there is a moral philosophical inability of Paul denying Jesus Christ, for there is plainly no motive or cause to produce a volition to such an act. There is a moral philosophical inability also, of a man selling an estate for fifty dollars which is worth fifty thousand, because the motive is not adequate to produce a volition to such an act.
Philosophical necessity and inability are absolute in respect of us, because beyond the sphere of our volition.
XIII. Praiseworthiness or virtue, blameworthiness or guilt, apply only to volitions. This indeed is not formally brought out in the part of Edwards"s work we have been examining. His discussion of it will be found in part IV. sec. I. But as it is necessary to a complete view of his system, we introduce it here.
He remarks in this part, "If the essence of virtuousness or commendableness, and of viciousness or fault, does not lie in the nature of the disposition or acts of the mind, which are said to be our virtue or our fault, but in their cause, then it is certain it lies no where at all. Thus, for instance, if the vice of a vicious act of will lies not in the nature of the act, but in the cause, so that its being of a bad nature will not make it at all our fault, unless it arises from some faulty determination of ours as its cause, or something in us that is our fault, &c." (page 190.) "Disposition of mind," or inclination, --"acts of the mind," "acts of will," here obviously mean the same thing; that is, they mean volition or choice, and are distinguished from their cause or motive. The question is not whether the cause or motive be pure or impure, but whether our virtuousness or viciousness lie in the cause of our volition, or in the volition itself.
It plainly results from Edwards"s psychology, and he has himself in the above quotation stated it, that virtuousness or viciousness lie in the volition itself. The characteristic of our personality or agency is volition. It is in and by our volitions that we are conscious of doing or forbearing to do, and therefore it is in respect of our volitions that we receive praise for well-doing, or blame for evil-doing. If these volitions are in accordance with conscience and the law of G.o.d, they are right; if not, they are wrong, and we are judged accordingly. The _metaphysical_ questions, how the volition was produced, and what is the character of the cause, is the cause praiseworthy or blameworthy, are questions which transcend the sphere of our volitions, our actions, our personality, our responsibility. We are concerned only with this:--Do _we_ do right? do _we_ do wrong? What is the _nature of our volitions?_