When we proceed to inquire after the characteristics of human volition, we bring in the idea of right and wrong; we look at the relations of the reason and the sensitivity. But when we inquire _why_ the will now obeys reason, and now pa.s.sion; and why this pa.s.sion, or that pa.s.sion; we must either represent the will as necessitated, and take all the consequences of a necessitated will, or we must stop short here likewise, with the will itself as a first cause, not necessary, but contingent, which, in explaining its own volitions, neither requires nor admits of any explanation itself, other than as a finite and dependent will it requires to be referred to the infinite will in order to account for the fact of its existence.
Edwards, while he burdens the question of the will"s determination with monstrous consequences, relieves it of no one difficulty. He lays down, indeed, a uniform law of determination; but there is a last inquiry which he does not presume to answer. The determination of the will, or the volition, is always as the most agreeable, and is the sense of the most agreeable. But while the will is granted to be one simple power or capacity, there arise from it an indefinite variety of volitions; and volitions at one time directly opposed to volitions at another time. The question now arises, how this one simple capacity of volition comes to produce such various volitions? It is said in reply, that whatever may be the volition, it is at the time the sense of the most agreeable: but that it is always the sense of the most agreeable, respects only its relation to the will itself; the volition, intrinsically considered, is at one time right, at another wrong; at one time rational, at another foolish. The volition really varies, although, relatively to the will, it always puts on the characteristic of the most agreeable. The question therefore returns, how this simple capacity determines such a variety of volitions, always however representing them to itself as the most agreeable? There are three ways of answering this. _First_, we may suppose the _state_ of the will or sensitivity to remain unchanged, and the different volitions to be effected by the different arrangements and conditions of the objects relatively to it. _Secondly_, we may suppose the arrangements and conditions of the objects to remain unchanged, and the different volitions to be effected by changes in the _state_ of the sensitivity, or will, relatively to the objects. Or, _thirdly_, we may suppose both the state of the will, and the arrangements and conditions of the objects to be subject to changes, singly and mutually, and thus giving rise to the different volitions. But our questionings are not yet at an end. On the first supposition, the question comes up, how the different arrangements and conditions of the objects are brought about?
On the second supposition, how the changes in the state of the sensitivity are effected? On the third supposition, how the changes in both, singly and mutually, are effected? If it could be said, that the sensitivity changes itself relatively to the objects, then we should ask again, why the sensitivity chooses at one time, as most agreeable to itself, that which is right and rational, and at another time, that which is wrong and foolish? Or, if it could be said, that the objects have the power of changing their own arrangements and conditions, then also we must ask, why at one time the objects arrange themselves to make the right and rational appear most agreeable, and at another time, the wrong and foolish.
These last questions are the very questions which Edwards does not presume to answer. The motive by which he accounts for the existence of the volition, is formed of the correlation of the state of the will, and the nature and circ.u.mstances of the object. But when the correlation is such as to give the volition in the direction of the right and the rational, in opposition to the wrong and the foolish,--we ask _why_ does the correlation give the volition in this direction. If it be said that the volition in this direction appears most agreeable, the answer is a mere repet.i.tion of the question; for the question amounts simply to this:--why the correlation is such as to make the one agreeable rather than the other? The volition which is itself only the sense of the most agreeable, cannot be explained by affirming that it is always as the most agreeable. The point to be explained is, why the mind changes its state in relation to the objects; or why the objects change their relations to the mind, so as to produce this sense of the most agreeable in one direction rather than in another? The difficulty is precisely of the same nature which is supposed to exist in the case of a contingent will. The will now goes in the direction of reason, and now in the direction of pa.s.sion,--but why? We say, because as will, it has the power of thus varying its movement. The change is accounted for by merely referring to the will.
According to Edwards, the correlation of will and its objects, now gives the sense of the most agreeable, or volition, in the direction of the reason; and now in the direction of pa.s.sion--but why?--Why does the reason _now_ appear most agreeable,--and now the indulgences of impure desire? I choose this because it is most agreeable, says Edwards, which is equivalent to saying,--I have the sense of the most agreeable in reference to this, because it is most agreeable; but how do you know it is the most agreeable? because I choose it, or have the sense of the most agreeable in reference to it. It is plain, therefore, that on Edwards"s system, as well as on that opposed to it, the particular direction of volition, and the constant changes of volition, must be referred simply to the cause of volition, without giving any other explanation of the different determinations of this cause, except referring them to the nature of the cause itself. It is possible, indeed, to refer the changes in the correlation to some cause which governs the correlation of the will and its objects; but then the question must arise in relation to this cause, why it determines the correlation in one direction at one time, and in another direction at another time? And this could be answered only by referring it to itself as having the capacity of these various determinations as a power to do or not to do, and a power to determine in a given direction, or in the opposite direction; or by referring it to still another antecedent cause. Now let us suppose this last antecedent to be the infinite will: then the question would be, why the infinite will determines the sensitivity, or will of his creatures at one time to wisdom, and at another to folly? And what answer could be given? Shall it be said that it seems most agreeable to him? But why does it seem most agreeable to him? Is it because the particular determination is the most reasonable, that it seems most agreeable? But why does he determine always according to the most reasonable? Is it because to determine according to the most reasonable, seems most agreeable? Now, inasmuch as according to Edwards, the volition and the sense of the most agreeable are the same; to say that G.o.d wills as he does will, because it is most agreeable to him, is to say that he wills because he wills; and to say that he wills as he does will, because it seems most reasonable to him, amounts to the same thing, because he wills according to the most reasonable only because it is the most agreeable.
To represent the volitions, or choices, either in the human or divine will, as determined by motives, removes therefore no difficulty which is supposed to pertain to contingent self-determination.
Let us compare the two theories particularly, although at the hazard of some repet.i.tion.
Contingent self-determination represents the will as a cause making its _nisus_ or volitions of itself, and determining their direction of itself--now obeying reason, and now obeying pa.s.sion. If it be asked why it determines in a particular direction?--if this particular direction in which it determines be that of the reason?--then it may be said, that it determines in this direction because it is reasonable;--if this particular direction be that of pa.s.sion, as opposed to reason, then it may be said that it determines in this direction, because it is pleasing. But if it be asked why the will goes in the direction of reason, rather than in that of pa.s.sion, as opposed to reason?--we cannot say that it is most reasonable to obey reason and not pa.s.sion; because the one is all reason, and the other is all pa.s.sion, and of course they cannot be compared under the reasonable; and no more can they be compared under the pleasing,--when, by the pleasing, we understand, the gratification of desire, as opposed to reason. To obey reason because it is reasonable, is nothing more than the statement of the fact that the will does obey reason. To obey desire because it is desirable, is nothing more than the statement of the fact that the will does obey desire. The will goes in one direction rather than in another by an act of self-determination, which neither admits of, nor indeed requires any other explanation than this, that the will has power to do one or the other, and in the exercise of this power, it does one rather than the other.
To this stands contrasted the system of Edwards; and what is this system? That the will is determined by the strongest motive;--and what is the strongest motive? The greatest apparent good, or the most agreeable:--what const.i.tutes the greatest apparent good, or the most agreeable? The correlation of will or sensitivity and the object. But why does the correlation make one object appear more agreeable than another; or make the same object at one time appear agreeable, at another time disagreeable? Now this question is equivalent to the question,--why does the will go in the direction of one object rather than of another; or go in the direction of a given object at one time, and in opposition to it at another time? For the will to determine itself toward an object in one system, answers to the will having the sense of the most agreeable towards an object in Edwards"s system. If Edwards should attempt to give an answer without going beyond the motive, he could only say that the sensitivity has the power of being affected with the sense of the most agreeable or of the most disagreeable; and that in the exercise of this power it is affected with the one rather than with the other. He could not say that to obey reason appears more agreeable than to obey pa.s.sion as opposed to reason, for the obedience of the will on his system, is nothing more than a sense of the most agreeable. Nor could he say it is more reasonable to obey reason, for reason cannot be compared with its opposite, under the idea of itself; and if he could say this, it amounts to no more than this, on his system, that it is most agreeable to obey the reasonable;--that is, the reasonable is obeyed only as the most agreeable: but obedience of will being nothing more than the sense of the most agreeable, to say it is obeyed because most agreeable, is merely to say that it awakens the sense of the most agreeable; that is, it is obeyed, because it is obeyed.
To refer the motive to the divine determination makes volition necessary to the man, and throws the difficulty in question, if it is to be considered a difficulty, only farther back.
If G.o.d"s will determines in the direction of the reasonable because it is most agreeable, then we ask, why is it the most agreeable? If the reply be, because it is most reasonable, then we are only moving in a circle; but if the agreeable be taken as an ultimate fact, then inasmuch as to will is only to have the sense of the most agreeable, it follows that G.o.d has the sense of the most agreeable towards an object only because it is most agreeable to him, or awakens this sense in him; and thus the question why G.o.d wills in one direction rather than in another, or what is the cause of his determination, is not answered by Edwards, unless he says with us that the will in itself as a power to do or not to do, or to do one thing, or its opposite, is a sufficient explanation, and the only possible explanation;--or unless he refers the divine will to an antecedent cause, and this again to another antecedent cause, in an endless series--and thus introduce the two-fold error of an endless series, and an absolute necessity.
All possible volitions, according to the scheme of psychology I have above given, must be either in the direction of the reason or of the sensitivity, or in the indifferency of both. If the volition be in the direction of the reason, it takes the characteristics of rational, good, &c. If in the direction of the sensitivity, it takes its characteristic from the nature of the particular desire which it obeys:--it is generous, benevolent, kind, &c.--or it is malicious, envious, unkind, vicious, &c. What moves the will to go in the direction of the reason?
Nothing moves it; it is a cause _per se_; it goes in that direction because it has power to go in that direction. What moves the will to go in the direction of the sensitivity? Nothing moves it; it is a cause _per se_; it goes in that direction because it has power to go in that direction.
There are in the intelligence or reason, as united with the will in the const.i.tution of the mind, necessary convictions of the true, the just, the right. There are in the sensitivity, as united in the same const.i.tution, necessary affections of the agreeable and the disagreeable in reference to various objects. The will as the power which by its _nisus_ produces changes or phenomena, is conscious of ability to go in either of these directions, or in opposition to both. Now when it makes its _nisus_ or volition in reference to the true, the just, the good; should we attempt to explain this _nisus_ by saying that the true, the just, the good, affect the sensitivity agreeably, this would only amount to saying that the _nisus_ is made towards the true, not as the true, but only as the agreeable; and then we would introduce the law that the _nisus_ is always made in the direction of the agreeable. But then again we might seek to explain why the _nisus_ is always made in the direction of the agreeable. Is it of an antecedent necessity? Then we have an absolute and universal necessity. Is it because to go in the direction of the agreeable seems most rational? Then it follows that the _nisus_ is made towards the agreeable not as the agreeable, but only as the rational; and then we would introduce the law that the _nisus_ is always made in the direction of the rational. But then again we might seek to explain why this _nisus_ is always made in the direction of the rational. Is it of an antecedent necessity? Then here likewise we have an absolute and universal necessity. Is it because to go in the direction of the rational seems most agreeable? Then we are winding back in a circle to our first position.
How shall we escape from these difficulties? Shall we adopt the psychology of Edwards, and make the will and the sensitivity one? Then as the volition is always the strongest affection of the agreeable, if the sensitivity be necessary, volitions are necessary, and we are plunged headlong again into an absolute and universal necessity. If the sensitivity be not necessary, then we have shown fully, above, that we have to account for its various determinations just as we are supposed to be called upon to account for the various determinations of the will when considered as a power distinct from the sensitivity:--we are met with the questions, why does the sensitivity represent this object as more agreeable than that object?--or the same object as agreeable at one time, and disagreeable at another? Or if these various determinations are resolved into an antecedent necessity comprehending them, then we go up to the antecedent cause in which this necessity resides, and question it in like manner.
But one thing remains, and that is to consider the will as primary cause, contingent in opposition to being necessitated--a cause having in itself the power of making these various volitions or _nisus_, and neither asking nor allowing of any explanation of its acts, or their particular direction, save its own peculiarity and energy as will.
The question respecting the indifferency of will must now be considered.
The term _indifferency_ comes up in consequence of considering the will as distinct from the sensitivity. It is not desire or feeling--it is a power indifferent to the agreeableness or disagreeableness of objects.
It is also a power distinct from the reason; it is not conviction or belief--it is a power indifferent to the true and the right, to the false and the wrong, in the sense that it is not necessarily determined by conviction and belief, by the true and the right, or by the false and the wrong. The conception of will in its utmost simplicity is the conception of pure power, self-moving, and self-conscious--containing within itself the ground and the possibility of creation and of modification. In G.o.d it is infinite, eternal, uncreated power; and every _nisus_ in his will is really creative or modifying, according to its self-directed aim. In man it is const.i.tuted, dependent, limited, and accountable.
Now in direct connexion with power, we have the conception of law or rule, or what power _ought_ to do. This law or rule is revealed in the reason. In man as pure, and we conclude in G.o.d likewise, as the archetype of all spirit, there is given a sensitivity or a capacity to be affected agreeably by, and to be drawn towards the objects approved and commanded by the reason. If this sensitivity does not move in harmony with the reason, it is corrupted. Now will is placed in a triunity with these two other powers. We can distinguish but not separate it from them. A will without reason would be a power without eyes, or light. A will without sensitivity would be a power stern and isolated;--just as a reason and sensitivity without will, would be without efficiency, or capacity of giving real manifestations.
The completeness and perfection of each, lies in a union with all; but then each in its proper movements is in some sense independent and free of the others. The convictions, beliefs, or perceptions of reason are not made, nor can they be unmade by the energy of the will. Nor has the will any direct command over the sensitivity. And yet the will can excite and direct both the reason and the sensitivity, by calling up objects and occasions. The sensitivity does not govern the reason, and yet it supplies conditions which are necessary to its manifestations.
The reason does not govern the sensitivity, and yet the latter would have no definite perception, and of course its highest sensibilities would lie dormant without the reason.
So also the reason and the sensitivity do not determine the acts of the will. The will has efficiency, or creative and modifying power in itself--self-moved, self-directed. But then without reason and sensitivity, the will would be without objects, without designs, without rules,--a solitary power, conscious of ability to do, but not knowing what to do.
It addition to the above, the will has this high and distinguishing peculiarity. That it alone is free--that it alone is opposed to necessity. Reason _must_ perceive, _must_ believe. Sensitivity _must_ feel when its objects are presented; but will, when the reason has given its light and uttered its commands, and when the sensitivity has awakened all its pa.s.sions and emotions, is not compelled to obey. It is as conscious of power not to do, as of power to do. It may be called a power arbitrary and contingent; but this means only that it is a power which absolutely puts forth its own _nisus_, and is free.
It follows from this, that the will can act irrespective of both reason and sensitivity, if an object of action, bearing no relation to reason or sensitivity, be possible. It is plain that an object bearing no such relation, must be very trifling. If a case in ill.u.s.tration could not be called up, it would not argue anything against the indifferency of will;--it would only prove that all objects of action actually existing, bear some relation to reason and sensitivity. There is a case, however, frequently called up, and much disputed, which deserves some attention, and which it appears to me, offers the ill.u.s.tration required. Let it be required to select one of the squares of the chess-board. In selecting one of the squares, does the will act irrespective of reason and sensitivity, or not? Those who hold that the will is necessarily determined, must make out some connexion between the act of selection, and the reason and sensitivity. It is affirmed that there is a general motive which determines the whole process, viz: the aim or desire to ill.u.s.trate, if possible, the question in dispute. The motive is, to prove that the will can act without a motive.
I reply to this, that this is undoubtedly the motive of bringing the chess-board before the eye, and in making all the preparations for a selection;--but now the last question is, which square shall I select?
The ill.u.s.tration will have the same force whichever square is selected, and there is no motive that can be drawn either from the reason or the sensitivity for taking one square in preference to the other: under the absence of all such motives, and affording each time the same attempt at ill.u.s.tration, I can vary the selection sixty-four times: in making this selection, therefore, it appears to me, there is an entire indifferency as to which particular square is selected;--there is no command of the reason directing to one square rather than another;--there is no affection of the sensitivity towards one square rather than another, as most agreeable and yet the will does select one of the squares.
It will be proper, in this place, to consider the following argument of Edwards against indifferency of will: "Choice may be immediately _after_ a state of indifference, but cannot co-exist with it: even the very beginning of it is not in a state of indifference. And, therefore, if this be liberty, no act of the will, in any degree, is ever performed in a state of liberty, or in the time of liberty. Volition and liberty are so far from agreeing together, and being essential one to another, that they are contrary one to another, and one excludes and destroys the other, as much as motion and rest, light and darkness, or life and death." (p. 73.)
Edwards reasons according to his own psychology: If the will and the sensitivity are one, the will cannot well be conceived of as in a state of indifference, and if it could be conceived of as in a state of indifference before it exercises volition, inasmuch as, according to his system again, volition is the sense of the most agreeable, the moment volition begins, indifference ceases; and hence, if liberty consist in indifference, liberty must cease when volition takes place, just as rest ceases with motion.
But according to the system of psychology, which we adopt, and which I shall verify hereafter, the will is not one with the sensitivity, but is clearly distinguishable from it:--the sensitivity is the capacity of feeling; the will is the causality of the soul:--a movement of the sensitivity, under the quality of indifference, is self-contradictory; and a movement of the will being a mere _nisus_ of cause, under the quality of any sense and feeling whatever, would be self-contradictory likewise; it would be confounding that which we had already distinguished. From Edwards"s very definition of will it cannot be indifferent; from our very definition of will it cannot be otherwise than indifferent. When it determines exclusively of both reason and sensitivity, it of course must retain, in the action, the indifference which it possessed before the action; but this is no less true when it determines in the direction either of reason or sensitivity. When the determination is in the direction of the reason, there is an exercise of reason in connexion with the act, and all the interest of the reason is wakened up, but the will considered in its entire simplicity, knows only the _nisus_ of power. When the determination is in the direction of the sensitivity, there is a play of emotions and pa.s.sions, but the will again knows only the _nisus_ of power which carries it in this direction.
In the unity of the soul these powers are generally found acting together. It may be difficult to distinguish them, and this, in connexion with the constantly observed fact of the fixed correlation between physical causes and the ma.s.ses which they operate upon, may lead to the conclusion that there is a fixed correlation likewise between the will and its objects, regarding the will as the sensitivity; or at least, that there is a fixed connexion between the will and the sensitivity, so that the former is invariably governed by the latter. We have already shown, that to identify sensitivity and will does not relieve us from the difficulties of a self-determined and contingent will, unless we plunge into absolute necessity; and that to make the sensitivity govern the will, is only transferring to the sensitivity the difficulties which we suppose, to encompa.s.s the will. In our psychological investigations it will appear how clearly distinguishable those powers are, and also how clearly independent and sovereign will is, inasmuch as it does actually determine at one time, in opposition to the most agreeable; at another, in opposition to reason; and at another, in opposition to both conjoined. In the unity of our being, however, we perceive that will is designed to obey the reason, and as subordinated to reason, to move within the delights of the sensitivity; and we know that we are acting _unreasonably_ and _senselessly_ when we act otherwise; but yet _unreasonably_ and _senselessly_ do we often act. But when we do obey reason, although we characterize the act from its direction, will does not lose its simplicity and become reason; and when we do obey the sensitivity, will does not become sensitivity--will is still simply cause, and its act the _nisus_ of power: thought, and conviction, and design, hold their place in the reason alone: emotion and pa.s.sion their place in the sensitivity alone.
ARGUMENT
FROM
THE DIVINE PRESCIENCE.
Edwards"s argument against a contingent, self-determining will, drawn from the divine prescience, remains to be considered.
The argument is introduced as follows: "That the acts of the wills of moral agents are not contingent events, in such a sense as to be without all necessity, appears by G.o.d"s certain foreknowledge of such events."
(sec. xi. p. 98.) Edwards devotes this section to "the evidence of G.o.d"s certain foreknowledge of the volitions of moral agents." In the following section, (sec. xii. p. 114,) he proceeds formally with his argument. Before examining this argument, let us look at the consequences of his position.
G.o.d foresees all volitions; that he foresees them makes their existence necessary. If their existence were not necessary, he could not foresee them; or, to express it still more generally, foreknowledge extends to all events, and foreknowledge proves the necessary existence of everything to which it extends. It follows from this, that all events exist with an absolute necessity, all physical phenomena, all volitions, and moral, phenomena, whether good or evil, and all the divine volitions, for G.o.d cannot but foresee his own volitions. In no part of his work, does Edwards lay down more summarily and decidedly, the doctrine of absolute and universal necessity. We have already, in part II. of this treatise, deduced the consequences of this doctrine. If then we are placed upon the alternative of denying the divine prescience of volitions, or of acknowledging the doctrine of necessity, it would practically be most desirable and wisest to take the first part of the alternative. "If it could be demonstrated," remarks Dugald Stewart, (vol. 5. app. sec. viii.) "which in my opinion has not yet been done, that the prescience of the volitions of moral agents is incompatible with the free agency of man, the logical inference would be, _not_ in favour of the scheme of necessity, but that there are some events, the foreknowledge of which implies an impossibility. Shall we venture to affirm, that it exceeds the power of G.o.d to permit such a train of contingent events to take place, as his own foreknowledge shall not extend to? Does not such a proposition detract from the omnipotence of G.o.d, in the same proportion in which it aims to exalt his omniscience?"
If the divine foreknowledge goes to establish the doctrine of necessity, there is nothing left that it is worth while to contend for; all moral and theological interests vanish away. But let us examine the argument of Edwards.
This argument consists of three parts; we shall consider them in order.
I. Edwards lays down, that a past event is necessary, "having already made sure of existence;" but divine foreknowledge is such an event, and is therefore necessary. This is equivalent to the axiom, that whatever is, is. He next affirms, that whatever is "indissolubly connected with other things that are necessary, are themselves necessary;" but events infallibly foreknown, have an indissoluble connexion with the foreknowledge. Hence, the volitions infallibly foreknown by G.o.d, have an indissoluble connexion with his foreknowledge, and are therefore necessary.
The force of this reasoning turns upon the connexion between foreknowledge and the events foreknown. This connexion is affirmed to be "indissoluble;" that is, the foreknowledge is certainly connected with the event. But this only amounts to the certainty of divine foreknowledge, and proves nothing as to the nature of the existence foreknown. We may certainly know a past or present event, but our knowledge of its existence defines nothing as to the manner in which it came to exist. I look out of my window, and I see a man walking in a certain direction: I have a positive knowledge of this event, and it cannot but be that the man is walking; but then my knowledge of his walking has no influence upon his walking, as cause or necessary antecedent; and the question whether his walking be contingent or necessary is entirely distinct, and relates to the cause of walking. I looked out of my window yesterday, and saw a man walking; and the knowledge of that event I now retain, so that it cannot but be that the man walked yesterday: but this again leaves the question respecting the mode of existence untouched:--Did the man walk of necessity, or was it a contingent event? Now let me suppose myself endowed with the faculty of prescience, sufficiently to know the events of to-morrow; then by this faculty I may see a man walking in the time called to-morrow, just as by the faculty of memory I see a man walking in the time called yesterday.
The knowledge, whether it relate to past, present, or future, as a knowledge in relation to myself, is always a present knowledge; but the object known may stand in various relations of time, place, &c. Now in relation to the future, no more than in relation to the past and present, does the act of knowledge on my part, explain anything in relation to the mode of the existence of the object of knowledge.
Edwards remarks, (p. 121.) "All certain knowledge, whether it be foreknowledge, or after-knowledge, or concomitant knowledge, proves the thing known now to be necessary, by some means or other; or proves that it is impossible that it should now be otherwise than true."
Edwards does not distinguish between the certainty of the mere _fact_ of existence, and the necessity by which anything comes to exist.
Foreknowledge, after-knowledge, and concomitant knowledge,--that is, the present knowledge of events, future, past, or present,--proves of course the reality of the events; that they will be, have been, or are: or, more strictly speaking, the knowledge of an event, in any relation of time, is the affirmation of its existence in that relation; but the knowledge of the event neither proves nor affirms the necessity of its existence. If the knowledge of the event were the _cause_ of the event, or if it _generically_ comprehended it in its own existence, then, upon strict logical principles, the necessity affirmed of the knowledge would be affirmed of the event likewise.
That G.o.d foreknows all volitions is granted; that as he foreknows them, they will be, is also granted; his foreknowledge of them is the positive affirmation of their reality in time future; but by supposition, G.o.d"s foreknowledge is not their cause, and does not generically comprehend them; they are caused by wills acting in the future. Hence G.o.d"s foreseeing how the wills acting in the time future, will put forth or determine their volitions, does not take away from these wills the contingency and freedom belonging to them, any more than our witnessing how wills act in the time present, takes away from them their contingency and freedom. G.o.d in his prescience, _is the spectator of the future, as really as we are the spectators of the present_.
Edwards"s reasoning is a sort of puzzle, like that employed sometimes for exercising the student of logic in the detection of fallacies: for example, a man in a given place, must _necessarily_ either stay in that place, or go away from that place; therefore, whether he stays or goes away, he acts necessarily. Now it is necessary, in the nature of things, that a man as well as any other body should be in some place, but then it does not follow from this, that his determination, whether to stay or go, is a necessary determination. His necessary condition as a body, is entirely distinct from the question respecting the necessity or contingency of his volitions. And so also in respect of the divine foreknowledge: all human volitions as events occurring in time, are subject to the necessary condition of being foreknown by that Being, "who inhabiteth eternity:" but this necessary condition of their existence neither proves nor disproves the necessity or the contingency of their particular causation.
II. The second proposition in Edwards"s argument is, "No future event can be certainly foreknown, whose existence is contingent, and without all necessity." His reasoning in support of this is as follows: 1. "It is impossible for a thing to be certainly known to any intellect without _evidence_." 2. A contingent future event is without evidence. 3.
Therefore, a contingent future event is not a possible object of knowledge. I dispute both premises: That which is known by _evidence_ or _proof_ is _mediate_ knowledge,--that is, we know it through something which is immediate, standing between the faculty of knowledge and the object of knowledge in question. That which is known _intuitively_ is known without proof, and this is _immediate_ knowledge. In this way all axioms or first truths and all facts of the senses are known. Indeed evidence itself implies immediate knowledge, for the evidence by which anything is known is itself immediate knowledge. To a Being, therefore, whose knowledge fills duration, future and past events may be as immediately known as present events. Indeed, can we conceive of G.o.d otherwise than immediately knowing all things? An Infinite and Eternal Intelligence cannot be thought of under relations of time and s.p.a.ce, or as arriving at knowledge through _media_ of proof or demonstration. So much for the first premise. The second is equally untenable: "_A contingent future event is without evidence_." We grant with Edwards that it is not _self-evident_; implying by that the evidence arising from "the necessity of its nature," as for example, 2 x 2 = 4. What is self-evident, as we have already shown, does not require any evidence or proof, but is known immediately; and a future contingent event may be self-evident as a fact lying before the divine mind, reaching into futurity, although it cannot be self-evident from "the necessity of its nature."
But Edwards affirms, that "neither is there any _proof_ or evidence in _anything else_, or evidence of connexion with something else that is evident; for this is also contrary to the supposition. It is supposed that there is now nothing existent with which the future existence of the _contingent_ event is connected. For such a connexion destroys its contingency and supposes necessity." (p. 116.) He ill.u.s.trates his meaning by the following example: "Suppose that five thousand seven hundred and sixty years ago, there was no other being but the Divine Being,--and then this world, or some particular body or spirit, all at once starts out of nothing into being, and takes on itself a particular nature and form--all in _absolute contingence_,--without any concern of G.o.d, or any other cause in the matter,--without any manner of ground or reason of its existence, or any dependence upon, or connexion at all with anything foregoing;--I say that if this be supposed, there was no evidence of that event beforehand. There was no evidence of it to be seen in the thing itself; for the thing itself as yet was not; and there was no evidence of it to be seen in _any thing else;_ for _evidence_ in something else; is _connexion_ with something else; but such connexion is contrary to the supposition." (p. 116.)
The amount of this reasoning is this: That inasmuch as a contingent event exists "_without any concern of G.o.d, or any other cause in the matter,--without any manner of ground or reason of its existence,--or any dependence upon or connexion with anything foregoing_,"--there is really nothing by which it can be proved beforehand. If Edwards be right in this definition of a contingent event, viz.: that it is an event without any cause or ground of its existence, and "that there is nothing now existent with which the future existence of the contingent event is connected," then this reasoning must be allowed to be conclusive. But I do not accede to the definition: Contingence I repeat again, is not opposed to cause but to necessity. The world may have sprung into being by _absolute contingence_ more than five thousand years ago, and yet have sprung into being at the command of G.o.d himself, and its existence have been foreseen by him from all eternity. The contingence expresses only the freedom of the divine will, creating the world by sovereign choice, and at the moment of creation, conscious of power to withhold the creative _nibus_,--creating in the light of his infinite wisdom, but from no compulsion or necessity of motive therein found. Under this view to foresee creation was nothing different from foreseeing his own volitions.
The ground on which human volitions can be foreseen, is no less plain and reasonable. In the first place, future contingent volitions are never without a cause and sufficient ground of their existence, the individual will being always taken as the cause and sufficient ground of the individual volitions. G.o.d has therefore provided for the possible existence of volitions other than his own, in the creation and const.i.tution of finite free will. Now, in relation to him, it is not required to conceive of _media_ by which all the particular volitions may be made known or proved to his mind, previous to their actual existence. Whatever he knows, he knows by direct and infinite intuition; he cannot be dependent upon any media for his knowledge. It is enough, as I have already shown, to a.s.sign him prescience, in order to bring within his positive knowledge all future contingent volitions. He knows all the variety and the full extent of the possible, and amid the possible he foresees the actual; and he foresees not only that cla.s.s of the actual which, as decreed and determined by himself, is relatively necessary, but also that cla.s.s of the actual which is to spring up under the characteristic of contingency.
And herein, I would remark, lies the superiority of the divine prescience over human forecast,--in that the former penetrates the contingent as accurately as the necessary. With the latter it is far otherwise. Human forecast or calculation can foresee the motions of the planets, eclipses of the sun and moon, and even the flight of the comets, because they are governed by necessary laws; but the volitions of the human will form the subject of only _probable_ calculations.
But if human volitions, as contingent, form the subject of probable calculations, there must be in opposition to Edwards something "that is evident" and "now existent, with which the future existence of the _contingent_ event is connected."