On 12th September attacks by the 56th Division on the south and the Guards on the north reduced the neck of the horseshoe, or pocket, to about 500 yards, but could not close it. The situation within the horseshoe was undefined, and the exact positions of the Quadrilateral and other trenches were not known, owing to the bad flying weather.
Even our own positions were in doubt, as almost every vestige of roads, railways and even villages had disappeared under the continuous bombardments.
On night 11/12th September the 71st Infantry Brigade (Brig.-Gen. J. F.
Edwards) relieved part of the Guards Division and the 16th Infantry Brigade (Brig.-Gen. W. L. Osborn), part of the 56th Division, with orders on the 13th September to straighten the line by capturing the Quadrilateral. The 71st Infantry Brigade attacked with the Foresters north of the railway and 9th Suffolk Regiment south of the railway, while the 8th Bedford Regiment, who were close to the Quadrilateral on the north-east of the Leuze Wood, co-operated by bombing up the trench towards it. The artillery co-operation was weak, observation being difficult, and though the troops advanced with the greatest gallantry the northern attack could only make 500 yards, and the southern attack of the 71st Infantry Brigade still less, while casualties from the enemy artillery and machine-gun fire were very large.
A second attack at 6 p.m. the same day succeeded in bringing our line to about 250 yards from the Strong Point, and in getting touch on the right with the 16th Infantry Brigade.
Preparations were now made to include the Quadrilateral in the general attack of the 15th September instead of making it a subsidiary operation--a situation which recurred two years later almost to a day in the attack on Holnon Village, and which had similar results.
The British objective for the 15th September was Gueudecourt-Flers-Lesboeufs-Morval--the XIV Corps (Guards and 6th Division) to capture the two latter. It was the first occasion on which tanks were employed, and as far as the Division was concerned was a failure, for of the three allotted to the 6th Division two broke down before starting, and the third, moving off in accordance with orders long before the infantry, had its periscope shot off, its peep-holes blinded, was riddled by armour-piercing bullets, and had to come back without achieving anything. This again found a parallel in the attack on the Quadrilateral, near St. Quentin, on 18th September 1918, when the tanks were ineffective.
To facilitate the movement of the tanks a gap of about 200 yards had been left in the creeping barrage. This gap unfortunately coincided with the strongest point of the Quadrilateral. The barrage, moreover, had pa.s.sed over the German trenches by the time the infantry advanced; the latter had, consequently, to attack up the glacis-like slopes without any artillery support except the bombardment. This, owing to the enemy"s trenches not having been accurately located, was ineffective.
The 16th Infantry Brigade attacked on a battalion front--one company of the Bedfords bombing up the trench from Leuze Wood, and the remainder over the open to the north against the south-west face. The Buffs and York and Lancasters supported the attack, but in spite of the greatest gallantry could not take the Strong Point.
The 1st Leicesters and the Norfolks, pa.s.sing through the entrenched Foresters and Suffolks, attacked the Quadrilateral from the north-west with equal drive, but they too failed. Some ground, however, was made, and by 10 a.m. the 16th Infantry Brigade on the south, and the 71st Infantry Brigade on the north, were digging in close to the enemy"s wire and trenches.
During the day constant reports arrived that the Guards had gained their objectives, and that tanks and cheering men were moving through Lesboeufs. It was not until the following morning that this report was proved to be incorrect, and that it was Flers which had been captured. In the meantime it appeared to the Divisional G.O.C.
(General Ross) that the prospect of a break-through on a large scale was prejudiced solely by the repulse of the 6th Division. He therefore ordered a night attack on the flanks of the Quadrilateral to be executed by two battalions of the 18th Infantry Brigade (Brig.-Gen. R.
J. Bridgford). These battalions, the 2nd Durham Light Infantry and the 11th Ess.e.x, moved round after dark and attacked; the former from the north, the latter from the south-east to the left of the 16th Infantry Brigade. The 11th Ess.e.x lost direction, while the 2nd D.L.I. bombed down a trench only to find that it did not lead into the Strong Point.
Except on the 6th Divisional front and at High Wood, which was captured during the night, the whole line had advanced, and it was a bitter blow to the Division to think that their sacrifices had been in vain.
On the night of the 16/17th September the 18th Infantry Brigade relieved the sorely-tried 71st Infantry Brigade, and fresh preparations were made for an attack, on the 18th, of the Quadrilateral, which had been strongly reinforced by the enemy through the sunken road.
The K.S.L.I. dug themselves in with their left on the railway, so as to a.s.sault the south-west face of the Strong Point. The weather having cleared, the trenches were now carefully located from the air and heavily bombarded, and on the 18th September, under both a stationary and creeping barrage, and with the York and Lancasters bombing up the trench from Leuze Wood, and the 18th Infantry Brigade (West Yorks and 14th Durham Light Infantry) attacking the north-west face and the trench running north from the Quadrilateral, this redoubtable Strong Point was at last captured with comparatively small loss after what must be conceded as a magnificent defence, and which had cost the Division upwards of 3,500 casualties. Nine machine-guns and 160 unwounded prisoners were taken in the Quadrilateral and many Germans killed.
The Quadrilateral once captured, the advance was carried forward for 1,000 yards to within half a mile of Morval and Lesboeufs. These, which were the original objectives on the 13th September, were now to be attacked on the 25th September. Relieved for rest on the 16th, the Division came in again on 21st September, and dug good a.s.sembly trenches. The most forward portion of the line taken over by the Division consisted of 250 yards of one of the main German trenches, which was held by the Germans on both flanks for some distance.
Fortunately we were in possession of the communication trench leading up to it, and during the three nights after taking over considerable excitement and amus.e.m.e.nt were caused by the occasional arrival of German ration parties at our part of the trench, having failed to hit off the part occupied by their own troops. Uttering many guttural oaths these fled for their lives, speeded up by our machine and Lewis guns. A few prisoners were captured in this way, and some valuable information obtained. Spurred on apparently by the loss of their rations, the Germans attacked on the 24th September both flanks of this trench under cover of a mist, but were driven back without reaching it, except on the extreme right. Here they entered a bombing post, but were ejected, leaving one officer and twelve other ranks dead and an unwounded prisoner, while our casualties were practically nil.
The objective allotted to the Division for the 25th September was the ground between the north end of Morval (attacked by 5th Division) and the road which pa.s.ses through the centre of Lesboeufs. At 12.35 p.m. the attack was launched--the 16th Infantry Brigade on the right gaining the first objective with the Buffs, and the final objective with K.S.L.I. and the Y. and L. On the left the 2nd D.L.I. and the Ess.e.x captured the first objective, and the West Yorks and two companies 14th D.L.I. the final objective. This was one of the most successful battles on the Somme--thanks to good weather and observation, a carefully arranged creeping barrage, and a sound preliminary bombardment.
The Division captured over 500 prisoners, 6 machine-guns, and 4 heavy trench-mortars. Tanks were not used. We here turned the tables on the 52nd Division, 26th Reserve Corps, our old opponents at Ypres, where the ground was all in their favour and where they had proved troublesome antagonists.
After consolidating its ground the Division was relieved by the 20th Division on 30th September, and the long struggle began for the possession of the high ground overlooking the Bapaume-Le Transloy Road.
On 7th October the XIV Corps (20th and 56th Divisions) attacked with only partial success, and the 6th Division was brought in again on night 8/9th October for a general attack on the 12th October. The enemy had dug a series of trenches named by us Rainbow--Cloudy--Misty--Zenith, etc., a portion of which had been captured by us, making a somewhat p.r.o.nounced salient. All three brigades were in the line, with one battalion in front trenches, the 71st Infantry Brigade (Brig.-Gen. E. Feetham) being in the salient, with the 16th Infantry Brigade on the right and the 18th Infantry Brigade on the left. The objective of the attack of the 12th October was the line of trenches running north from Le Transloy.
At 2.5 p.m. the flank brigades attacked, but with only partial success. The failure to make ground, which was general all along the British front, was attributed to want of surprise, as we had bombarded the position for two days, and always attacked in the early afternoon. Further, the ground was very heavy and observation extremely bad. The Germans were fresh troops, and fought well. Perhaps more than anything it was due to the effect of their machine-gun fire.
Taught by our creeping barrage that machine-guns in the front line were useless, the enemy had drawn them across the valley towards the road, and caught our advance over the brow of the rise with accurate distant machine-gun fire.
Changing the time of zero, the attack was renewed at 5.35 a.m. on the 15th October, the 18th Infantry Brigade on the left (2nd D.L.I. and 11th Ess.e.x) attempting to seize those portions of Cloudy and Mild trenches still held by the enemy, while the Sherwood Foresters on their right attacked some gun pits which lay about 200 yards in front of their line. This latter attack succeeded, but with the great loss of Colonel Hobbs, O.C. The Foresters, who died of his wounds. The left attack made a little ground. A final attempt to push forward the line was made on the 18th October by the 9th Norfolks, but was only partially successful.
On 20th October the Division (less artillery) was relieved and moved to the First Army, going into Corps Reserve of the I Corps, with Divisional Headquarters at Bethune and the units in the town and surrounding area.
The artillery of the Division (Brig.-Gen. E. S. Cleeve, C.R.A.) had first come into action on the Somme on the 3rd September, supporting the attack of the 16th Division on Guillemont. It was grouped and re-grouped in accordance with the requirements of the situation, but never as a whole covered the operations of the Division.
On the 9th November it was withdrawn and marched to First Army area, where for about a month it covered the 56th Division, XI Corps, with 6th D.A.H.Q. at La Gorgue, rejoining the Division in I Corps in December. Brig.-Gen. E. F. Delaforce replaced Brig.-Gen. Cleeve as C.R.A. on 25th October.
The Division had taken part as a whole in three general attacks on the Somme (15th and 25th September and 12th October), and had also carried out subordinate operations on 13th and 18th September and 18th October.
It had suffered casualties amounting to 277 officers and 6,640 other ranks, and had well earned a rest.
CHAPTER VII
LOOS SALIENT
1916-17
On 25th November the Division took over the La Ba.s.see sector, which included the famous Givenchy Ridge and Cuinchy Brickstacks. After about a month it side-stepped to the Cambrin-Hohenzollern Quarries front of about 5,500 yards, where it remained until the 28th February 1917. All this front had a most evil repute, but so exhausted was the enemy by the Somme fighting that this four months" trench sojourn proved the quietest the Division ever experienced, except before the storm of March 1918, and the casualties would have been far fewer had it not been for several raids carried out by us.
The machine-guns of the Division were strengthened on 15th December by the arrival of the 192nd M.G. Company, and on 2nd January 1917 Lt.-Col. G. F. B. Goldney, D.S.O., succeeded Lt.-Col. H. R. S.
Christie as C.R.E., the latter having been nearly a year with the Division.
On the 1st March the Division took over a 11,000 yards" front extending north from the Double Cra.s.sier at Loos with sectors Loos--14bis--Hulluch--Hohenzollern, all three brigades being in line and a brigade of the 21st Division also which came under the command of G.O.C., 6th Division.
March and the first portion of April were notable for raids and counter-raids, and for considerable artillery and trench-mortar activity, which gave place to more or less continuous fighting consequent on the withdrawal of the enemy opposite the right of the Division after the successful attack by the Canadians at Vimy.
Notice was received on the morning of the 13th April that a withdrawal was contemplated by the enemy opposite part of the Divisional front. The right section of the front was at that time held by the 16th Infantry Brigade, with the 2nd York and Lancaster Regiment on its right. On the 13th April the withdrawal commenced, the enemy being so closely followed up by the York and Lancaster Regiment that by 6.20 p.m. the brigade was able to report the Railway Triangle in our occupation, and the whole of the battalion in the enemy"s trenches. Our troops were into the enemy"s dug-outs before the candles left by them had burnt out.
The policy laid down for the Division was that the enemy was to be closely followed up wherever he fell back, but that our troops were not to be committed to a serious engagement. In accordance with these instructions the enemy"s trenches were subjected to heavy bombardment, with pauses during which patrols were sent forward and occupied as much ground as they could. This policy was maintained for four days, during which the 16th Infantry Brigade pressed the enemy with such vigour, within the limits allowed to it, that he was evidently rushed rather farther back than had been his intention, and began to become apprehensive as to his hold on Hill 70. The opposition stiffened on the 15th April, and on the 16th a counter-attack drove the 1st The Buffs back slightly, but was unsuccessful against the 8th Bedfordshire Regiment on the right. An advanced post of the latter battalion put up a very fine defence and maintained its position. A further attack on this battalion on the following day again failed to shake the defence.
On the 16th April a systematic bombardment of the trenches on Hill 70 was commenced, and authority was given for a slightly greater employment of force. Attacks on the 18th and 19th April, by the 1st K.S.L.I. and the 8th Bedfordshire Regiment, gained some ground and gave us between forty and fifty prisoners.
By this time continuous fighting, under very trying weather conditions, had exhausted the 16th Infantry Brigade. In order to maintain the pressure it became necessary to withdraw battalions from the front of the other brigades and to put them straight in on the offensive front, replacing them by the battalions withdrawn from that front.
An attack by the 14th D.L.I. on the 21st April in conjunction with the left of the 46th Division, who by this time had relieved the 24th on the right of the 6th Division, yielded thirty-five prisoners and two machine-guns, and disposed of a strong machine-gun nest on the Double Cra.s.sier Railway which had been holding up our right. Two counter-attacks were repelled, and on the 22nd April the 14th D.L.I.
and the 11th Ess.e.x Regiment delivered a combined attack. The 14th D.L.I. secured the whole of their objective, with forty-six prisoners and three machine-guns, but the 11th Ess.e.x Regiment was unable to gain any ground. The 46th Division had been prevented by uncut wire from co-operating in the attack, with the result that the 14th D.L.I., after enduring a very heavy bombardment with exemplary determination, were eventually sniped and machine-gunned out of the captured line from the houses on their right. Eventually the position stabilized itself, with the enemy in possession of Nash Alley.
During ten days the Division had been engaged in continuous fighting on the front of one brigade, whilst holding with the other two a front of approximately 7,000 yards. Four battalions from other brigades, in addition to its own four, had pa.s.sed through the hands of the 16th Infantry Brigade which was conducting the fighting. Battalions relieved from the fighting front one night were put straight into the line elsewhere on the following night, and battalions which had already done a long continuous tour in the trenches were relieved one night, put into the fighting front on the following night, and twenty-four hours later had to deliver an attack. The enemy, concerned about the fate of Hill 70, concentrated a very formidable artillery on the narrow front involved, and the bombardments and barrages on the front of attack were of exceptional severity. The extent to which the Division was stretched on the rest of its front is exemplified by two incidents. On one occasion an enemy raid penetrated both our front and support lines without being detected or meeting anyone, and came upon our reserve line by chance at the only place on the front of the brigade concerned where there was one company in that line. At another part of the front it was found, when normal conditions were restored, that in an abandoned part of our front line between two posts, the enemy had actually made himself so much at home that he had established a small dump of rations and bombs.
For the manner in which the Division had followed up and pressed the enemy withdrawal it received the thanks of the Commander-in-Chief.
On the 26th June 1917 the 46th Division was engaged on our right in active operations in the outskirts of Lens. The 2nd Sherwood Foresters and the 9th Norfolk Regiment were placed at the disposal of the 46th Division for these operations. The 9th Norfolk Regiment was not actively engaged, but the 2nd Sherwood Foresters, used in the later stages of the attack, fought with great gallantry and suffered fairly heavily.
On the 25th July the Division was relieved after a continuous tour in the Loos front of just under five months--a period of particularly bitter and severe trench warfare. Trench-mortaring was continuous on both sides on the greater part of the front held, and sh.e.l.ling heavy.
The artillery suffered no less severely than the infantry, owing to the very restricted choice of positions and the advantages of the observation enjoyed by the enemy. Raids and counter-raids were numerous. An a.n.a.lysis of the diary shows that during the six months from the end of January to the end of July the Division carried out 30 raids, of which 13 were successful in obtaining their objective and securing prisoners (total for the 13 raids: 54), 11 secured their objective but failed to yield any prisoners, and only 6 definitely failed. During the same period the enemy attempted 21 raids, of which only 4 succeeded in taking prisoners, 5 entered our trenches without securing any prisoners, and 12 were entire failures. Three of the enemy"s attempted raids yielded us prisoners, and 4 yielded identifications. The low average of prisoners taken by us in successful raids is attributable to two causes--first the extraordinary precautions taken by the enemy in the latter part of the period to avoid losing prisoners by evacuating his trenches on the slightest alarm or remaining in his dug-outs, and secondly the fierceness engendered in our troops by the severity of the bombardment, and particularly of the trench-mortaring to which they were normally subjected.
A very successful battalion raid by the 1st The Buffs on the 24th June, which yielded 15 prisoners, might have made a better showing if it had not followed closely on the receipt of the mail containing accounts of an enemy bombing raid on Folkestone.
It is invidious to differentiate among so many carefully prepared and gallantly executed enterprises, but a reference to the successful battalion raid of the 11th Ess.e.x Regiment on the 24th March, to the raid carried out by the 14th D.L.I. on the 15th June, in the early morning which caught the Germans at breakfast, and particularly to the combined raid by the 2nd D.L.I. and the 11th Ess.e.x Regiment on the 28th June, will perhaps be forgiven. The latter was an exceptionally fine performance. It was carried out in connection with the operations of the 46th Division already referred to, by one company from each of the two battalions. Everything possible had been done beforehand to induce the enemy to expect attack on the front of the Division, yet these two companies succeeded in establishing and maintaining themselves for one hour in the enemy"s line, though constantly counter-attacked. They inflicted very heavy casualties on the enemy, who counter-attacked both over the open and by bombing along the trenches. It was on this occasion that 2/Lieut. F. B. Wearne, late 11th Ess.e.x Regiment, won the V.C. Mention ought also to be made of the very gallant repulse of an enemy raid by the 1st K.S.L.I. and the 1st The Buffs on the 7th July. In one post of the 1st K.S.L.I. one wounded Lewis gunner, the only survivor of his post from the enemy bombardment, kept his gun in action and beat off the raiders.
On the 25th July the Division was relieved by the Canadians, with a view to an attack by the latter on Hill 70, and withdrew into rest in the Monchy Breton area with Divisional Headquarters at Ourton.
A feature of this period of rest was the very successful two-day rifle meeting, held on the Monchy-Breton Range.