They have done admirable work, and I wish them all good luck for to-morrow."
From the Corps Commander--"Well done 6th Division. So glad casualties so light, considering what Division has accomplished."
Almost before the final objective had been captured an order was received from the Corps for the Division to take over a portion of the 30th American Division front on the left, hand over some ground to 46th Division on the right, and attack at dawn on the 9th behind a barrage. Though very tired, and though it was a pitch dark night, the 71st and 16th Infantry Brigades somehow managed to carry out these almost impossible orders, and advanced splendidly at zero hour--the artillery putting down an accurate barrage. The attack progressed successfully, the first objectives being gained by both brigades without much difficulty, but the enemy was able to delay our advance from the Railway Line, where after stiff fighting the 1st Leicesters, by a turning movement, captured some prisoners and machine-guns. The 9th Norfolk Regiment on the left worked round by the north, and during the night captured Bohain, where some 4,000 inhabitants were liberated, and vast quant.i.ties of war material fell into our hands.
During this phase of the operations the 5th Cavalry Brigade was attached to the Division, but circ.u.mstances did not allow of much cavalry activity.
We were now in a different country to that in which the operations since 1914 had been conducted. The country had seen no war, houses were intact, inhabitants looking starved and downtrodden were delighted to see the British troops. To stop our advance all roads in Bohain had been cratered at their exits from the village, and delay-action mines on the railways were constantly going up. As an example, D.H.Q. was in Brancucourt Farm, in a main road which had been cratered just outside the farm. A railway bridge just opposite had been blown down and the line cratered. The Canadian Engineers repairing the line had removed a great many bombs, but about three days after the arrival of D.H.Q. a delay-action mine went off on the railway at 7.30 p.m., and two days later again at 7 a.m. Fortunately on both occasions no men were working on the line, and D.H.Q.
suffered no worse harm than some injuries to staff cars from falling debris. The total captures by the Division since the 8th October now amounted to 45 officers, 1,839 other ranks, 15 guns, 20 trench-mortars, and 266 machine-guns.
On 10th October the advance was continued--the 30th American Division on the left, the 6th Division in the centre, and the 46th Division on the right next to the French, who were again some distance in rear.
The 71st Infantry Brigade (1st Leicesters and 2nd Sherwood Foresters), pa.s.sing through the 9th Norfolks, gained most of its objective, which was the high ground about 2,000 yards east of Bohain, but the 40th Division was held up by machine-gun fire in Riqueval Wood. An attempted advance by the 71st Infantry Brigade, a.s.sisted by two tanks, on 11th instant was brought to a standstill by machine-gun fire, after a small advance.
On the night of the 11/12th October the 18th Infantry Brigade, which had been in Divisional Reserve, relieved the 71st Infantry Brigade, and at 4.30 p.m. on the 12th October carried out a minor operation, simultaneously with the left brigade of the 46th Division, in order to push its left flank forward to the line of the Americans, who were reported to be in possession of Vaux Andigny--some one and a half miles ahead. The attack on the right failed, with about 100 casualties, owing to machine-gun fire from Regnicourt, and the 46th Division was also held up. The left made a little ground. This attack and a low aeroplane reconnaissance disclosed the fact that the Germans had dug a series of new trenches on the high ground immediately in front, and that there was a considerable amount of wire. The maps of this area were most indifferent, and many copses existed which were not shown. It was now evident that the enemy intended to stand on the high ground east of Selle River and its continuation to Riqueval Wood.
Failing to make any progress by a frontal attack, the G.O.C., IX Corps, undertook a very pretty tactical move, which produced the attack of 17th October. The 6th and 46th Divisions were moved to the north flank, and attacked south-east and east instead of north-east. By this manoeuvre a great deal of enfilade fire was brought to bear both from guns and machine-guns. The task allotted to the 6th Division was a difficult one. It had to issue fan-wise from the village of Vaux Andigny on a 1,500 yards front, advancing 2,500-3,000 yards to a front of 5,000 yards. The 1st Division was to pa.s.s through it and push on towards the Sambre Ca.n.a.l. The attack was to be made under a barrage of eight brigades of Field Artillery and eighty machine-guns. The IX Corps employed on this occasion 172 60-pounders and heavy howitzers.
In the evening of 16th October Brig.-Gen. H. A. Walker, commanding 16th Infantry Brigade, which was to attack on the left the next morning, most unfortunately lost his left arm by a sh.e.l.l, which blew it off so cleanly that his wrist watch was recovered by his orderly and was still going. Brig.-Gen. P. W. Brown, commanding 71st Infantry Brigade, then in reserve, took command until the arrival of Brig.-Gen.
W. G. Braithwaite.
During the night 16/17th October the enemy poured gas sh.e.l.ls into Vaux Andigny, causing considerable casualties both to the troops forming up just outside and to those who had to pa.s.s through a little later. Zero was at 5.20 a.m., and the attack commenced in a dense fog, which in the fan-shaped advance caused a good deal of loss of direction, although the 18th Infantry Brigade on the left had laid out long direction tapes to give the troops the initial direction.
The latter brigade was held up at the start by uncut wire, which caused it to lose its barrage. It also encountered a good deal of opposition on Bellevue Ridge. It was, however, carried forward by the oncoming waves of the 1st Division, which were to pa.s.s through to a further objective, and together the troops of the two divisions made good the objective of the 18th Infantry Brigade. The fog was so dense that all direction was lost, although the 11th Ess.e.x Regiment took the unusual precaution of sending its men forward arm-in-arm.
Notwithstanding every precaution troops of the 11th Ess.e.x eventually fetched up at Regnicourt, which was on the right of the objective allotted to the 46th Division, who attacked on our right. Troops of all three divisions also reached Andigny les Fermes, which was in the objective of the 46th Division. The 16th Infantry Brigade was more fortunate, and was a.s.sisted in maintaining its direction by the railway, with the result that it gained its whole objective in good time and with very little trouble. The day"s captures were 26 officers, 599 other ranks, 5 trench-mortars, and 82 machine-guns.
The 1st Division having pa.s.sed through, the 6th Division was now withdrawn from the line to the neighbourhood of Bohain for a day or two.
On the night of the 20th/21st October the Division was again put in, relieving the 27th American Division and a part of the 25th Division on the front from Bazuel to a short way north of Mazinghien, with a view to the attack planned for the 23rd October. There now occurred a sudden change in the type of country. Instead of open rolling downs, there was a multiplicity of small fields, divided by high thick-set hedges trained on wire which proved formidable obstacles. The enemy had good positions for his artillery in the Bois l"Eveque, and on the east bank of the Ca.n.a.l de la Sambre, protected from the danger of being rushed by that obstacle, and it was evident that he intended to put up a determined fight on the strong position thus afforded. The hostile artillery fire was more than had been encountered since the fighting about St. Quentin, and throughout the few days preceding the attack the sh.e.l.ling of roads, farms and villages in our rear area and of artillery positions was continuous. On the night of the attack the a.s.sembly positions of the a.s.saulting brigades were subjected to heavy counter-preparation, including a great deal of gas-sh.e.l.ling, and the a.s.sembly units suffered considerable casualties. The attack was delivered at 1.20 a.m. on 23rd October in a dense fog; the 1st Division being on the right and the 25th Division on the left. Three sections of 301st American Tank Company were allotted to the Division, and did excellent work in smashing fences and destroying machine-gun nests, though, owing to the fog, the infantry lost touch with them almost at once.
On the right the 18th Infantry Brigade, which attacked with the 2nd D.L.I. on the right and the 1st West Yorkshire Regiment on the left, had a less difficult task than the 71st Infantry Brigade, but were delayed in crossing the gas-sh.e.l.led valley in their immediate front, and met with opposition from various farms. However, they fought their way steadily forward during the day, and by the late afternoon their right battalion had reached its objective and had pushed its patrols down to the ca.n.a.l, and the left battalion, having reached its first objective, was struggling forward to its second.
The 71st Infantry Brigade on the left attacked with the 9th Norfolk Regiment and the 1st Leicestershire Regiment. Its attack soon became disorganized in the very enclosed country, was unable to keep pace with its barrage, lost touch with its tanks in the fog, and was soon held up on a line not more than about 400 yards beyond that from which it had started. Fighting continued throughout the day, and finally, taking advantage of the progress made by the 25th Division on its left, the 71st Infantry Brigade was able by night to reach a line about half-way through the Bois l"Eveque.
During the night this brigade was relieved by the 16th Infantry Brigade (Brig.-Gen. W. G. Braithwaite), which resumed the attack on the morning of the 24th October. Opposition had by this time decreased, and better progress was made, so that by noon the right battalion, the 2nd York and Lancaster Regiment, held the line of the objective laid down for the previous day"s attack, and the left battalion of the 18th Infantry Brigade had also completed the capture of its objective. Some further progress was made during the day by the 16th Infantry Brigade.
During the period 20th to 24th October, Brig.-Gen. E. F. Delaforce, C.R.A., 6th Division, had under his orders the Divisional Artillery of the 3rd, 4th and 5th Australian Divisions, though the 5th Australian Divisional Artillery was withdrawn on the eve of the attack of 24th October. Their fire was most accurate and prompt, and gave the attacking infantry every confidence. The 6th D.A. on this occasion was in Corps Reserve.
During the 26th, 27th and 28th the patrols of the 16th Infantry Brigade continued to work their way slowly forward, and the village of Ors was evacuated of its inhabitants under the protection of patrols of the 18th Infantry Brigade. The latter established a bridge-head across the ca.n.a.l at Ors, and posts on the west side commanding the ca.n.a.l on the whole brigade front.
On the 29th orders were received for the relief of the Division. In order to be able to hand over to the relieving Division a satisfactory position from which to launch the attack on the line of the ca.n.a.l, a further small operation was planned by the 16th Infantry Brigade, and brilliantly carried out by the 1st The Buffs on the 30th October. Two companies attacked and captured an important farm and spur overlooking the ca.n.a.l, were counter-attacked in the afternoon and turned out of the farm, but retook it at once with the bayonet, inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy and capturing five more machine-guns.
On the night of the 30th/31st October the relief of the Division (less artillery) was completed, and it withdrew to billets in Fresnoy le Grand, whence it moved some days later to Bohain.
The captures during the fighting from the 19th to the 31st October numbered 9 officers and 431 other ranks, 13 guns (including two 5.9-in.
howitzers), 12 trench-mortars, and 61 machine-guns.
The total captures during a period of between six and seven weeks, in which the Division had seen much stiff fighting, and had suffered over 6,000 casualties, amounted to 96 officers, 3,505 other ranks, 32 guns, 52 trench-mortars, and 527 machine-guns counted.
The infantry of the Division saw no more fighting, but its artillery remained in till the end, finishing up in the neighbourhood of Avesnes.
Among the many casualties which the artillery suffered must be mentioned Major W. S. Ironside, D.S.O., M.C., commanding 112th Battery, R.F.A., who was killed east of Le Cateau on 2nd November. He was among the then much reduced number of those who had landed originally with the Division in France in 1914, being then a sergeant.
Very little mention has been made of the services of the Royal Engineers during this period. Exceptionally heavy work was thrown on the signal sections, owing to the frequent changes of headquarters, but they were untiring in their devotion and met each emergency with resource. To the Field Companies fell the dangerous task of taping out the jumping-off lines for the attacks, but they invariably achieved this difficult task to the complete satisfaction of the brigadier-generals and units concerned in the operations.
It is inevitable in a short History like this that the services of the administrative branches should not receive the same notice as those of the purely fighting portions of the Division, but the History would be incomplete without some reference to them.
The Field Ambulances showed throughout the high devotion to duty which has always characterized the Royal Army Medical Corps. The work of the bearer sections during actions always elicited the admiration of the infantry, while the tent sections were frequently under sh.e.l.l fire, which, however, in no way interfered with their care of the wounded. Both at advanced dressing stations and tent sections many of the chaplains rendered most valuable a.s.sistance in carrying and helping wounded men, while during trench warfare they were frequently to be found with their men in the forward trenches.
In the action of 18th September 1918, Lt.-Col. Collins, D.S.O., and Major German, both of the R.A.M.C., and also Father FitzGibbons, were killed by sh.e.l.ling at a tent advanced dressing station.
The work of our Army Service Corps has always been the envy and admiration of our Allies, and that of the 6th Divisional Train was up to the highest standard of the British Army. The acknowledged excellence of the horses and mules of the Division is a tribute to the efficiency of the Veterinary Section and of the horsemasters attached to the artillery, as well as to the mounted branches.
In spite of the amusing comments of "The Fancies," the life of the Military Police was not all beer and skittles. The control of the traffic at some of the cross-roads, favoured by the Boche heavy gunners, was nerve-racking in ordinary times, and tenfold more so during an action, and several awards were given to the Divisional Military Police for gallant conduct under these conditions.
Very few officers or men served throughout with the Division. Perhaps the two most notable were Lt.-Col. J. A. C. Forsyth, D.S.O., commanding 24th Brigade, R.F.A., who came out as a Captain, and Staff-Sergt.-Major Woollard, who was Chief Clerk of the Division for some time before mobilization.
CHAPTER XII
THE MARCH TO THE RHINE AND OCCUPATION OF GERMANY
1918-19
Armistice Day--11th November--found the Division in billets in Bohain area, training for possible future operations. The news of the cessation of hostilities was received with calm satisfaction that we had beaten the Germans, and of relief that now we could sleep peacefully at nights and that lights need not be screened.
Early in November the 1st and 32nd Divisions of the IX Corps had forced the crossings of the Sambre Ca.n.a.l at Catillon and Ors after heavy fighting, and had driven the enemy back towards Avesnes. On 11th November a mixed force, under Major-Gen. Beth.e.l.l, was pushing the disorganized Germans over the Belgian frontier near Beaumont.
The IX Corps was now transferred to the Second Army, under Gen. Sir H.
Plumer, to whom was a.s.signed the command of the British Army of Occupation in Germany.
On leaving the Fourth Army the following letter, addressed personally to the Divisional Commander, was received from Gen. Sir Henry Rawlinson:--
"Now that the 6th Division is pa.s.sing to the command of another Army, I desire to place on record my sincere appreciation and warm thanks for the valuable services rendered by you since you joined the Fourth Army in September last.
"The Division has pa.s.sed through strenuous times and has seen some heavy fighting, especially in September between Holnon Wood and the Ca.n.a.l, and at Bohain and Vaux Andigny in October, where the gallantry and determination of all ranks filled me with admiration.
"I congratulate most heartily you all on the victories you have won, and trust that at some future time I may again find the Division under my command."
The Division spent the period 14th to 19th November in a march, via Catillon and Avesnes, to the area round Solre le Chateau and Sars Poteries, where it was to a.s.semble for the March to the Rhine. For this it was organized in three Infantry Brigade Groups and a Divisional Troops Group under the C.R.A. The 16th Army R.H.A. Brigade (Chestnut Troop, "Q" and "U" Batteries) was attached to the Division, and formed part of the 18th Infantry Brigade Group. The 2nd Brigade, R.F.A., marched with the Divisional Troops Column, the 24th Brigade, R.F.A., with the 71st Infantry Brigade, and the Divisional Ammunition Column with the 16th Infantry Brigade. Each Infantry Brigade had a Field Company and Field Ambulance.
The march resembled the progression of a snake, the rear group moving forward at each advance to the area occupied the previous day by the leading group. Commencing officially on the 20th November there were long halts up to 2nd December, owing to the difficulty of feeding the leading Divisions (cavalry and infantry), caused by the destruction done by the Germans to the railways, and also owing to the withdrawal of the Germans not being carried out in accordance with programme.
Sometimes groups did not move, or only made minor adjustments to obtain more comfortable quarters.
Both branches of the staff had long days of reconnaissance in cars ahead of the Division, made to avoid moving troops farther off the main roads than necessary, while the R.E. and Pioneers were often pushed ahead to see about water supplies and mend roads. Up to the Belgian frontier roads had been cratered and bridges blown down, and these caused defiles and impeded the march. Once across the frontier the roads were splendid, the inhabitants most hospitable and enthusiastic, and the advance only held up until it could be pushed through continuously.
However, it was no hardship to be delayed in such charming surroundings, though the weather was for the most part vile. The march from the neighbourhood of Dinant across the Ardennes, and along the lovely valley of the River Ambleve, will always stand out as a most delightful reminiscence. All ranks worked hard at their equipment, and the transport was so smart as to be thought by the Belgians to be new.