The authorities looked almost hourly for the announcement of two preliminary movements which had been preparing for many days: one, to attack rebel batteries on the Virginia sh.o.r.e of the Potomac; the other to throw bridges--one of pontoons, the second a permanent bridge of ca.n.a.l-boats--across the river at Harper"s Ferry, and an advance by Banks"s division on Winchester to protect the opening of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad and reestablish transportation to and from the West over that important route.
On the evening of February 27, Secretary Stanton came to the President, and, after locking the door to prevent interruption, opened and read two despatches from McClellan, who had gone personally to superintend the crossing. The first despatch from the general described the fine spirits of the troops, and the splendid throwing of the pontoon bridge by Captain Duane and his three lieutenants, for whom he at once recommended brevets, and the immediate crossing of eighty-five hundred infantry.
This despatch was dated at ten o"clock the previous night. "The next is not so good," remarked the Secretary of War. It stated that the lift lock was too small to permit the ca.n.a.l-boats to enter the river, so that it was impossible to construct the permanent bridge. He would therefore be obliged to fall back upon the safe and slow plan of merely covering the reconstruction of the railroad, which would be tedious and make it impossible to seize Winchester.
"What does this mean?" asked the President, in amazement.
"It means," said the Secretary of War, "that it is a d.a.m.ned fizzle. It means that he doesn"t intend to do anything."
The President"s indignation was intense; and when, a little later, General Marcy, McClellan"s father-in-law and chief of staff, came in, Lincoln"s criticism of the affair was in sharper language than was his usual habit.
"Why, in the name of common sense," said he, excitedly, "couldn"t the general have known whether ca.n.a.l-boats would go through that lock before he spent a million dollars getting them there? I am almost despairing at these results. Everything seems to fail. The impression is daily gaining ground that the general does not intend to do anything. By a failure like this we lose all the prestige gained by the capture of Fort Donelson."
The prediction of the Secretary of War proved correct. That same night, McClellan revoked Hooker"s authority to cross the lower Potomac and demolish the rebel batteries about the Occoquan River. It was doubtless this Harper"s Ferry incident which finally convinced the President that he could no longer leave McClellan intrusted with the sole and unrestricted exercise of military affairs. Yet that general had shown such decided ability in certain lines of his profession, and had plainly in so large a degree won the confidence of the Army of the Potomac itself, that he did not wish entirely to lose the benefit of his services. He still hoped that, once actively started in the field, he might yet develop valuable qualities of leadership. He had substantially decided to let him have his own way in his proposed campaign against Richmond by water, and orders to a.s.semble the necessary vessels had been given before the Harper"s Ferry failure was known.
Early on the morning of March 8, the President made one more effort to convert McClellan to a direct movement against Mana.s.sas, but without success. On the contrary, the general convened twelve of his division commanders in a council, who voted eight to four for the water route.
This finally decided the question in the President"s mind, but he carefully qualified the decision by two additional war orders of his own, written without consultation. President"s General War Order No. 2 directed that the Army of the Potomac should be immediately organized into four army corps, to be respectively commanded by McDowell, Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes, and a fifth under Banks. It is noteworthy that the first three of these had always earnestly advocated the Mana.s.sas movement. President"s General War Order No. 3 directed, in substance: _First_. An immediate effort to capture the Potomac batteries. _Second_.
That until that was accomplished not more than two army corps should be started on the Chesapeake campaign toward Richmond _Third_. That any Chesapeake movement should begin in ten days; and--_Fourth_. That no such movement should be ordered without leaving Washington entirely secure.
Even while the President was completing the drafting and copying of these important orders, events were transpiring which once more put a new face upon the proposed campaign against Richmond. During the forenoon of the next day, March 9, a despatch was received from Fortress Monroe, reporting the appearance of the rebel ironclad _Merrimac_, and the havoc she had wrought the previous afternoon--the _c.u.mberland_ sunk, the _Congress_ surrendered and burned, the _Minnesota_ aground and about to be attacked. There was a quick gathering of officials at the Executive Mansion--Secretaries Stanton, Seward, Welles, Generals McClellan, Meigs, Totten, Commodore Smith, and Captain Dahlgren--and a scene of excitement ensued, unequaled by any other in the President"s office during the war. Stanton walked up and down like a caged lion, and eager discussion animated cabinet and military officers. Two other despatches soon came, one from the captain of a vessel at Baltimore, who had left Fortress Monroe on the evening of the eighth, and a copy of a telegram to the "New York Tribune," giving more details.
President Lincoln was the coolest man in the whole gathering, carefully a.n.a.lyzing the language of the telegrams, to give their somewhat confused statements intelligible coherence. Wild suggestions flew from speaker to speaker about possible danger to be apprehended from the new marine terror--whether she might not be able to go to New York or Philadelphia and levy tribute, to Baltimore or Annapolis to destroy the transports gathered for McClellan"s movement, or even to come up the Potomac and burn Washington; and all sorts of prudential measures and safeguards were proposed.
In the afternoon, however, apprehension was greatly quieted. That very day a cable was laid across the bay, giving direct telegraphic communication with Fortress Monroe, and Captain Fox, who happened to be on the spot, concisely reported at about 4 P.M. the dramatic sequel--the timely arrival of the _Monitor_, the interesting naval battle between the two ironclads, and that at noon the _Merrimac_ had withdrawn from the conflict, and with her three small consorts steamed back into Elizabeth River.
Scarcely had the excitement over the _Monitor_ and _Merrimac_ news begun to subside, when, on the same afternoon, a new surprise burst upon the military authorities in a report that the whole Confederate army had evacuated its stronghold at Mana.s.sas and the batteries on the Potomac, and had retired southward to a new line behind the Rappahannock. General McClellan hastened across the river, and, finding the news to be correct, issued orders during the night for a general movement of the army next morning to the vacated rebel camps. The march was promptly accomplished, notwithstanding the bad roads, and the troops had the meager satisfaction of hoisting the Union flag over the deserted rebel earthworks.
For two weeks the enemy had been preparing for this retreat; and, beginning their evacuation on the seventh, their whole retrograde movement was completed by March 11, by which date they were secure in their new line of defense, "prepared for such an emergency--the south bank of the Rappahannock strengthened by field-works, and provided with a depot of food," writes General Johnston. No further comment is needed to show McClellan"s utter incapacity or neglect, than that for full two months he had commanded an army of one hundred and ninety thousand, present for duty, within two days" march of the forty-seven thousand Confederates, present for duty, whom he thus permitted to march away to their new strongholds without a gun fired or even a meditated attack.
General McClellan had not only lost the chance of an easy and brilliant victory near Washington, but also the possibility of his favorite plan to move by water to Urbana on the lower Rappahannock, and from there by a land march _via_ West Point toward Richmond. On that route the enemy was now in his way. He therefore, on March 13, hastily called a council of his corps commanders, who decided that under the new conditions it would be best to proceed by water to Fortress Monroe, and from there move up the Peninsula toward Richmond. To this new plan, adopted in the stress of excitement and haste, the President answered through the Secretary of War on the same day:
"_First_. Leave such force at Mana.s.sas Junction as shall make it entirely certain that the enemy shall not repossess himself of that position and line of communication."
"_Second_. Leave Washington entirely secure."
"_Third_. Move the remainder of the force down the Potomac, choosing a new base at Fort Monroe, or anywhere between here and there; or, at all events, move such remainder of the army at once in pursuit of the enemy by some route."
Two days before, the President had also announced a step which he had doubtless had in contemplation for many days, if not many weeks, namely, that--
"Major-General McClellan having personally taken the field at the head of the Army of the Potomac, until otherwise ordered, he is relieved from the command of the other military departments, he retaining command of the Department of the Potomac."
This order of March 11 included also the already mentioned consolidation of the western departments under Halleck; and out of the region lying between Halleck"s command and McClellan"s command it created the Mountain Department, the command of which he gave to General Fremont, whose reinstatement had been loudly clamored for by many prominent and enthusiastic followers.
As the preparations for a movement by water had been in progress since February 27, there was little delay in starting the Army of the Potomac on its new campaign. The troops began their embarkation on March 17, and by April 5 over one hundred thousand men, with all their material of war, had been transported to Fortress Monroe, where General McClellan himself arrived on the second of the month, and issued orders to begin his march on the fourth.
Unfortunately, right at the outset of this new campaign, General McClellan"s incapacity and want of candor once more became sharply evident. In the plan formulated by the four corps commanders, and approved by himself, as well as emphatically repeated by the President"s instructions, was the essential requirement that Washington should be left entirely secure. Learning that the general had neglected this positive injunction, the President ordered McDowell"s corps to remain for the protection of the capital; and when the general complained of this, Mr. Lincoln wrote him on April 9:
"After you left I ascertained that less than twenty thousand unorganized men, without a single field-battery, were all you designed to be left for the defense of Washington and Mana.s.sas Junction; and part of this, even, was to go to General Hooker"s old position. General Banks"s corps, once designed for Mana.s.sas Junction, was divided and tied up on the line of Winchester and Strasburg, and could not leave it without again exposing the upper Potomac and the Baltimore and Ohio railroad. This presented (or would present when McDowell and Sumner should be gone) a great temptation to the enemy to turn back from the Rappahannock and sack Washington. My explicit order that Washington should, by the judgment of all the commanders of corps, be left entirely secure, had been neglected. It was precisely this that drove me to detain McDowell.
"I do not forget that I was satisfied with your arrangement to leave Banks at Mana.s.sas Junction; but when that arrangement was broken up and nothing was subst.i.tuted for it, of course I was not satisfied. I was constrained to subst.i.tute something for it myself."
"And now allow me to ask, do you really think I should permit the line from Richmond _via_ Mana.s.sas Junction to this city to be entirely open, except what resistance could be presented by less than twenty thousand unorganized troops? This is a question which the country will not allow me to evade...."
"By delay, the enemy will relatively gain upon you--that is, he will gain faster by fortifications and reinforcements than you can by reinforcements alone. And once more let me tell you it is indispensable to you that you strike a blow. I am powerless to help this. You will do me the justice to remember I always insisted that going down the bay in search of a field, instead of fighting at or near Mana.s.sas, was only shifting and not surmounting a difficulty; that we would find the same enemy and the same or equal intrenchments at either place. The country will not fail to note--is noting now--that the present hesitation to move upon an intrenched enemy is but the story of Mana.s.sas repeated."
General McClellan"s expectations in coming to the Peninsula, first, that he would find few or no rebel intrenchments, and, second, that he would be able to make rapid movements, at once signally failed. On the afternoon of the second day"s march he came to the first line of the enemy"s defenses, heavy fortifications at Yorktown on the York River, and a strong line of intrenchments and dams flooding the Warwick River, extending to an impa.s.sable inlet from James River. But the situation was not yet desperate. Magruder, the Confederate commander, had only eleven thousand men to defend Yorktown and the thirteen-mile line of the Warwick. McClellan, on the contrary, had fifty thousand at hand, and as many more within call, with which to break the Confederate line and continue his proposed "rapid movements." But now, without any adequate reconnaissance or other vigorous effort, he at once gave up his thoughts of rapid movement, one of the main advantages he had always claimed for the water route, and adopted the slow expedient of a siege of Yorktown.
Not alone was his original plan of campaign demonstrated to be faulty, but by this change in the method of its execution it became fatal.
It would be weary and exasperating to recount in detail the remaining princ.i.p.al episodes of McClellan"s operations to gain possession of the Confederate capital. The whole campaign is a record of hesitation, delay, and mistakes in the chief command, brilliantly relieved by the heroic fighting and endurance of the troops and subordinate officers, gathering honor out of defeat, and shedding the l.u.s.ter of renown over a result of barren failure. McClellan wasted a month raising siege-works to bombard Yorktown, when he might have turned the place by two or three days" operations with his superior numbers of four to one. By his failure to give instructions after Yorktown was evacuated, he allowed a single division of his advance-guard to be beaten back at Williamsburg, when thirty thousand of their comrades were within reach, but without orders. He wrote to the President that he would have to fight double numbers intrenched, when his own army was actually twice as strong as that of his antagonist. Placing his army astride the Chickahominy, he afforded that antagonist, General Johnston, the opportunity, at a sudden rise of the river, to fall on one portion of his divided forces at Fair Oaks with overwhelming numbers. Finally, when he was within four miles of Richmond and was attacked by General Lee, he began a retreat to the James River, and after his corps commanders held the attacking enemy at bay by a successful battle on each of six successive days, he day after day gave up each field won or held by the valor and blood of his heroic soldiers. On July 1, the collected Union army made a stand at the battle of Malvern Hill, inflicting a defeat on the enemy which practically shattered the Confederate army, and in the course of a week caused it to retire within the fortifications of Richmond. During all this magnificent fighting, however, McClellan was oppressed by the apprehension of impending defeat; and even after the brilliant victory of Malvern Hill, continued his retreat to Harrison"s Landing, where the Union gunboats on the James River a.s.sured him of safety and supplies.
It must be borne in mind that this Peninsula campaign, from the landing at Fortress Monroe to the battle at Malvern Hill, occupied three full months, and that during the first half of that period the government, yielding to McClellan"s constant faultfinding and clamor for reinforcements, sent him forty thousand additional men; also that in the opinion of competent critics, both Union and Confederate, he had, after the battle of Fair Oaks, and twice during the seven days" battles, a brilliant opportunity to take advantage of Confederate mistakes, and by a vigorous offensive to capture Richmond. But const.i.tutional indecision unfitted him to seize the fleeting chances of war. His hope of victory was always overawed by his fear of defeat. While he commanded during a large part of the campaign double, and always superior, numbers to the enemy, his imagination led him continually to double their strength in his reports. This delusion so wrought upon him that on the night of June 27 he sent the Secretary of War an almost despairing and insubordinate despatch, containing these inexcusable phrases:
"Had I twenty thousand or even ten thousand fresh troops to use to-morrow, I could take Richmond; but I have not a man in reserve, and shall be glad to cover my retreat and save the material and personnel of the army.... If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or to any other persons in Washington. You have done your best to sacrifice this army."
Under almost any other ruler such language would have been quickly followed by trial and dismissal, if not by much severer punishment. But while Mr. Lincoln was shocked by McClellan"s disrespect, he was yet more startled by the implied portent of the despatch. It indicated a loss of confidence and a perturbation of mind which rendered possible even a surrender of the whole army. The President, therefore, with his habitual freedom from pa.s.sion, merely sent an unmoved and kind reply:
"Save your army at all events. Will send reinforcements as fast as we can. Of course they cannot reach you to-day, to-morrow, or next day. I have not said you were ungenerous for saying you needed reinforcements.
I thought you were ungenerous in a.s.suming that I did not send them as fast as I could. I feel any misfortune to you and your army quite as keenly as you feel it yourself. If you have had a drawn battle or a repulse, it is the price we pay for the enemy not being in Washington."
XXII
Jackson"s Valley Campaign--Lincoln"s Visit to Scott--Pope a.s.signed to Command--Lee"s Attack on McClellan--Retreat to Harrison"s Landing--Seward Sent to New York--Lincoln"s Letter to Seward--Lincoln"s Letter to McClellan--Lincoln"s Visit to McClellan--Halleck made General-in-Chief--Halleck"s Visit to McClellan--Withdrawal from Harrison"s Landing--Pope a.s.sumes Command--Second Battle of Bull Run--The Cabinet Protest--McClellan Ordered to Defend Washington--The Maryland Campaign--Battle of Antietam--Lincoln Visits Antietam--Lincoln"s Letter to McClellan--McClellan Removed from Command
During the month of May, while General McClellan was slowly working his way across the Chickahominy by bridge-building and intrenching, there occurred the episode of Stonewall Jackson"s valley campaign, in which that eccentric and daring Confederate commander made a rapid and victorious march up the Shenandoah valley nearly to Harper"s Ferry. Its princ.i.p.al effect upon the Richmond campaign was to turn back McDowell, who had been started on a land march to unite with the right wing of McClellan"s army, under instructions, however, always to be in readiness to interpose his force against any attempt of the enemy to march upon Washington. This campaign of Stonewall Jackson"s has been much lauded by military writers; but its temporary success resulted from good luck rather than military ability. Rationally considered, it was an imprudent and even reckless adventure that courted and would have resulted in destruction or capture had the junction of forces under McDowell, Shields, and Fremont, ordered by President Lincoln, not been thwarted by the mistake and delay of Fremont. It was an episode that signally demonstrated the wisdom of the President in having retained McDowell"s corps for the protection of the national capital.
That, however, was not the only precaution to which the President had devoted his serious attention. During the whole of McClellan"s Richmond campaign he had continually borne in mind the possibility of his defeat, and the eventualities it might create. Little by little, that general"s hesitation, constant complaints, and exaggerated reports of the enemy"s strength changed the President"s apprehensions from possibility to probability; and he took prompt measures to be prepared as far as possible, should a new disaster arise. On June 24 he made a hurried visit to the veteran General Scott at West Point, for consultation on the existing military conditions, and on his return to Washington called General Pope from the West, and, by an order dated June 26, specially a.s.signed him to the command of the combined forces under Fremont, Banks, and McDowell, to be called the Army of Virginia, whose duty it should be to guard the Shenandoah valley and Washington city, and, as far as might be, render aid to McClellan"s campaign against Richmond.
The very day on which the President made this order proved to be the crisis of McClellan"s campaign. That was the day he had fixed upon for a general advance; but so far from realizing this hope, it turned out, also, to be the day on which General Lee began his attack on the Army of the Potomac, which formed the beginning of the seven days" battles, and changed McClellan"s intended advance against Richmond to a retreat to the James River. It was after midnight of the next day that McClellan sent Stanton his despairing and insubordinate despatch indicating the possibility of losing his entire army.
Upon the receipt of this alarming piece of news, President Lincoln instantly took additional measures of safety. He sent a telegram to General Burnside in North Carolina to come with all the reinforcements he could spare to McClellan"s help. Through the Secretary of War he instructed General Halleck at Corinth to send twenty-five thousand infantry to McClellan by way of Baltimore and Washington. His most important action was to begin the formation of a new army. On the same day he sent Secretary of State Seward to New York with a letter to be confidentially shown to such of the governors of States as could be hurriedly called together, setting forth his view of the present condition of the war, and his own determination in regard to its prosecution. After outlining the reverse at Richmond and the new problems it created, the letter continued:
"What should be done is to hold what we have in the West, open the Mississippi, and take Chattanooga and East Tennessee without more. A reasonable force should in every event be kept about Washington for its protection. Then let the country give us a hundred thousand new troops in the shortest possible time, which, added to McClellan directly or indirectly, will take Richmond without endangering any other place which we now hold, and will substantially end the war. I expect to maintain this contest until successful, or till I die, or am conquered, or my term expires, or Congress or the country forsake me; and I would publicly appeal to the country for this new force were it not that I fear a general panic and stampede would follow, so hard it is to have a thing understood as it really is."
Meanwhile, by the news of the victory of Malvern Hill and the secure position to which McClellan had retired at Harrison"s Landing, the President learned that the condition of the Army of the Potomac was not as desperate as at first had seemed. The result of Seward"s visit to New York is shown in the President"s letter of July 2, answering McClellan"s urgent call for heavy reinforcements:
"The idea of sending you fifty thousand, or any other considerable force, promptly, is simply absurd. If, in your frequent mention of responsibility, you have the impression that I blame you for not doing more than you can, please be relieved of such impression. I only beg that in like manner you will not ask impossibilities of me. If you think you are not strong enough to take Richmond just now, I do not ask you to try just now. Save the army, material and personnel, and I will strengthen it for the offensive again as fast as I can. The governors of eighteen States offer me a new levy of three hundred thousand, which I accept."
And in another letter, two days later:
"To reinforce you so as to enable you to resume the offensive within a month, or even six weeks, is impossible.... Under these circ.u.mstances, the defensive for the present must be your only care. Save the army--first, where you are, if you can; secondly, by removal, if you must."
To satisfy himself more fully about the actual situation, the President made a visit to Harrison"s Landing on July 8 and 9, and held personal interviews with McClellan and his leading generals. While the question of removing the army underwent considerable discussion, the President left it undecided for the present; but on July 11, soon after his return to Washington, he issued an order:
"That Major-General Henry W. Halleck be a.s.signed to command the whole land forces of the United States, as general-in-chief, and that he repair to this capital so soon as he can with safety to the positions and operations within the department now under his charge."
Though General Halleck was loath to leave his command in the West, he made the necessary dispositions there, and in obedience to the President"s order reached Washington on July 23, and a.s.sumed command of all the armies as general-in-chief. On the day following he proceeded to General McClellan"s headquarters at Harrison"s Landing, and after two days" consultation reached the same conclusion at which the President had already arrived, that the Army of the Potomac must be withdrawn.