In all these cases there is not really any inference; there is in the conclusion no new truth, nothing but what was already a.s.serted in the premises, and obvious to whoever apprehends them. The fact a.s.serted in the conclusion is either the very same fact, or part of the fact a.s.serted in the original proposition. This follows from our previous a.n.a.lysis of the Import of Propositions. When we say, for example, that some lawful sovereigns are tyrants, what is the meaning of the a.s.sertion? That the attributes connoted by the term "lawful sovereign,"
and the attributes connoted by the term "tyrant," sometimes coexist in the same individual. Now this is also precisely what we mean, when we say that some tyrants are lawful sovereigns; which, therefore, is not a second proposition inferred from the first, any more than the English translation of Euclid"s Elements is a collection of theorems different from, and consequences of, those contained in the Greek original. Again, if we a.s.sert that no great general is a rash man, we mean that the attributes connoted by "great general," and those connoted by "rash,"
never coexist in the same subject; which is also the exact meaning which would be expressed by saying, that no rash man is a great general. When we say that all quadrupeds are warm-blooded, we a.s.sert, not only that the attributes connoted by "quadruped" and those connoted by "warm-blooded" sometimes coexist, but that the former never exist without the latter: now the proposition, Some warm-blooded creatures are quadrupeds, expresses the first half of this meaning, dropping the latter half; and therefore has been already affirmed in the antecedent proposition, All quadrupeds are warm-blooded. But that _all_ warm-blooded creatures are quadrupeds, or, in other words, that the attributes connoted by "warm-blooded" never exist without those connoted by "quadruped," has not been a.s.serted, and cannot be inferred. In order to rea.s.sert, in an inverted form, the whole of what was affirmed in the proposition, All quadrupeds are warm-blooded, we must convert it by contraposition, thus, Nothing which is not warm-blooded is a quadruped.
This proposition, and the one from which it is derived, are exactly equivalent, and either of them may be subst.i.tuted for the other; for, to say that when the attributes of a quadruped are present, those of a warm-blooded creature are present, is to say that when the latter are absent the former are absent.
In a manual for young students, it would be proper to dwell at greater length on the conversion and quipollency of propositions. For, though that cannot be called reasoning or inference which is a mere rea.s.sertion in different words of what had been a.s.serted before, there is no more important intellectual habit, nor any the cultivation of which falls more strictly within the province of the art of logic, than that of discerning rapidly and surely the ident.i.ty of an a.s.sertion when disguised under diversity of language. That important chapter in logical treatises which relates to the Opposition of Propositions, and the excellent technical language which logic provides for distinguishing the different kinds or modes of opposition, are of use chiefly for this purpose. Such considerations as these, that contrary propositions may both be false, but cannot both be true; that subcontrary propositions may both be true, but cannot both be false; that of two contradictory propositions one must be true and the other false; that of two subalternate propositions the truth of the universal proves the truth of the particular, and the falsity of the particular proves the falsity of the universal, but not _vice vers_;[2] are apt to appear, at first sight, very technical and mysterious, but when explained, seem almost too obvious to require so formal a statement, since the same amount of explanation which is necessary to make the principles intelligible, would enable the truths which they convey to be apprehended in any particular case which can occur. In this respect, however, these axioms of logic are on a level with those of mathematics. That things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one another, is as obvious in any particular case as it is in the general statement: and if no such general maxim had ever been laid down, the demonstrations in Euclid would never have halted for any difficulty in stepping across the gap which this axiom at present serves to bridge over. Yet no one has ever censured writers on geometry, for placing a list of these elementary generalizations at the head of their treatises, as a first exercise to the learner of the faculty which will be required in him at every step, that of apprehending a _general_ truth. And the student of logic, in the discussion even of such truths as we have cited above, acquires habits of circ.u.mspect interpretation of words, and of exactly measuring the length and breadth of his a.s.sertions, which are among the most indispensable conditions of any considerable mental attainment, and which it is one of the primary objects of logical discipline to cultivate.
3. Having noticed, in order to exclude from the province of Reasoning or Inference properly so called, the cases in which the progression from one truth to another is only apparent, the logical consequent being a mere repet.i.tion of the logical antecedent; we now pa.s.s to those which are cases of inference in the proper acceptation of the term, those in which we set out from known truths, to arrive at others really distinct from them.
Reasoning, in the extended sense in which I use the term, and in which it is synonymous with Inference, is popularly said to be of two kinds: reasoning from particulars to generals, and reasoning from generals to particulars; the former being called Induction, the latter Ratiocination or Syllogism. It will presently be shown that there is a third species of reasoning, which falls under neither of these descriptions, and which, nevertheless, is not only valid, but is the foundation of both the others.
It is necessary to observe, that the expressions, reasoning from particulars to generals, and reasoning from generals to particulars, are recommended by brevity rather than by precision, and do not adequately mark, without the aid of a commentary, the distinction between Induction (in the sense now adverted to) and Ratiocination. The meaning intended by these expressions is, that Induction is inferring a proposition from propositions _less general_ than itself, and Ratiocination is inferring a proposition from propositions _equally_ or _more_ general. When, from the observation of a number of individual instances, we ascend to a general proposition, or when, by combining a number of general propositions, we conclude from them another proposition still more general, the process, which is substantially the same in both instances, is called Induction. When from a general proposition, not alone (for from a single proposition nothing can be concluded which is not involved in the terms), but by combining it with other propositions, we infer a proposition of the same degree of generality with itself, or a less general proposition, or a proposition merely individual, the process is Ratiocination. When, in short, the conclusion is more general than the largest of the premises, the argument is commonly called Induction; when less general, or equally general, it is Ratiocination.
As all experience begins with individual cases, and proceeds from them to generals, it might seem most conformable to the natural order of thought that Induction should be treated of before we touch upon Ratiocination. It will, however, be advantageous, in a science which aims at tracing our acquired knowledge to its sources, that the inquirer should commence with the latter rather than with the earlier stages of the process of constructing our knowledge; and should trace derivative truths backward to the truths from which they are deduced, and on which they depend for their evidence, before attempting to point out the original spring from which both ultimately take their rise. The advantages of this order of proceeding in the present instance will manifest themselves as we advance, in a manner superseding the necessity of any further justification or explanation.
Of Induction, therefore, we shall say no more at present, than that it at least is, without doubt, a process of real inference. The conclusion in an induction embraces more than is contained in the premises. The principle or law collected from particular instances, the general proposition in which we embody the result of our experience, covers a much larger extent of ground than the individual experiments which form its basis. A principle ascertained by experience, is more than a mere summing up of what has been specifically observed in the individual cases which have been examined; it is a generalization grounded on those cases, and expressive of our belief, that what we there found true is true in an indefinite number of cases which we have not examined, and are never likely to examine. The nature and grounds of this inference, and the conditions necessary to make it legitimate, will be the subject of discussion in the Third Book: but that such inference really takes place is not susceptible of question. In every induction we proceed from truths which we knew, to truths which we did not know; from facts certified by observation, to facts which we have not observed, and even to facts not capable of being now observed; future facts, for example; but which we do not hesitate to believe on the sole evidence of the induction itself.
Induction, then, is a real process of Reasoning or Inference. Whether, and in what sense, as much can be said of the Syllogism, remains to be determined by the examination into which we are about to enter.
CHAPTER II.
OF RATIOCINATION, OR SYLLOGISM.
1. The a.n.a.lysis of the Syllogism has been so accurately and fully performed in the common manuals of Logic, that in the present work, which is not designed as a manual, it is sufficient to recapitulate, _memori caus_, the leading results of that a.n.a.lysis, as a foundation for the remarks to be afterwards made on the functions of the syllogism, and the place which it holds in science.
To a legitimate syllogism it is essential that there should be three, and no more than three, propositions, namely, the conclusion, or proposition to be proved, and two other propositions which together prove it, and which are called the premises. It is essential that there should be three, and no more than three, terms, namely, the subject and predicate of the conclusion, and another called the middleterm, which must be found in both premises, since it is by means of it that the other two terms are to be connected together. The predicate of the conclusion is called the major term of the syllogism; the subject of the conclusion is called the minor term. As there can be but three terms, the major and minor terms must each be found in one, and only one, of the premises, together with the middleterm which is in them both. The premise which contains the middleterm and the major term is called the major premise; that which contains the middleterm and the minor term is called the minor premise.
Syllogisms are divided by some logicians into three _figures_, by others into four, according to the position of the middleterm, which may either be the subject in both premises, the predicate in both, or the subject in one and the predicate in the other. The most common case is that in which the middleterm is the subject of the major premise and the predicate of the minor. This is reckoned as the first figure. When the middleterm is the predicate in both premises, the syllogism belongs to the second figure; when it is the subject in both, to the third. In the fourth figure the middleterm is the subject of the minor premise and the predicate of the major. Those writers who reckon no more than three figures, include this case in the first.
Each figure is divided into _moods_, according to what are called the _quant.i.ty_ and _quality_ of the propositions, that is, according as they are universal or particular, affirmative or negative. The following are examples of all the legitimate moods, that is, all those in which the conclusion correctly follows from the premises. A is the minor term, C the major, B the middleterm.
FIRST FIGURE.
All B is C No B is C All B is C No B is C All A is B All A is B Some A is B Some A is B therefore therefore therefore therefore All A is C No A is C Some A is C Some A is not C
SECOND FIGURE.
No C is B All C is B No C is B All C is B All A is B No A is B Some A is B Some A is not B therefore therefore therefore therefore No A is C No A is C Some A is not C Some A is not C
THIRD FIGURE.
All B is C No B is C Some B is C All B is C Some B No B is C is not C All B is A All B is A All B is A Some B is A All B is A Some B is A therefore therefore therefore therefore therefore therefore Some A is C Some A Some A is C Some A is C Some A Some A is not C is not C is not C
FOURTH FIGURE.
All C is B All C is B Some C is B No C is B No C is B All B is A No B is A All B is A All B is A Some B is A therefore therefore therefore therefore therefore Some A is C Some A is not C Some A is C Some A is not C Some A is not C
In these exemplars, or blank forms for making syllogisms, no place is a.s.signed to _singular_ propositions; not, of course, because such propositions are not used in ratiocination, but because, their predicate being affirmed or denied of the whole of the subject, they are ranked, for the purposes of the syllogism, with universal propositions. Thus, these two syllogisms--
All men are mortal, All men are mortal, All kings are men, Socrates is a man, therefore therefore All kings are mortal, Socrates is mortal,
are arguments precisely similar, and are both ranked in the first mood of the first figure.
The reasons why syllogisms in any of the above forms are legitimate, that is, why, if the premises are true, the conclusion must inevitably be so, and why this is not the case in any other possible mood, (that is, in any other combination of universal and particular, affirmative and negative propositions,) any person taking interest in these inquiries may be presumed to have either learned from the common school books of the syllogistic logic, or to be capable of discovering for himself. The reader may, however, be referred, for every needful explanation, to Archbishop Whately"s _Elements of Logic_, where he will find stated with philosophical precision, and explained with remarkable perspicuity, the whole of the common doctrine of the syllogism.
All valid ratiocination; all reasoning by which, from general propositions previously admitted, other propositions equally or less general are inferred; may be exhibited in some of the above forms. The whole of Euclid, for example, might be thrown without difficulty into a series of syllogisms, regular in mood and figure.
Though a syllogism framed according to any of these formul is a valid argument, all correct ratiocination admits of being stated in syllogisms of the first figure alone. The rules for throwing an argument in any of the other figures into the first figure, are called rules for the _reduction_ of syllogisms. It is done by the _conversion_ of one or other, or both, of the premises. Thus an argument in the first mood of the second figure, as--
No C is B All A is B therefore No A is C,
may be reduced as follows. The proposition, No C is B, being an universal negative, admits of simple conversion, and may be changed into No B is C, which, as we showed, is the very same a.s.sertion in other words--the same fact differently expressed. This transformation having been effected, the argument a.s.sumes the following form:--
No B is C All A is B therefore No A is C,
which is a good syllogism in the second mood of the first figure. Again, an argument in the first mood of the third figure must resemble the following:--
All B is C All B is A therefore Some A is C,
where the minor premise, All B is A, conformably to what was laid down in the last chapter respecting universal affirmatives, does not admit of simple conversion, but may be converted _per accidens_, thus, Some A is B; which, though it does not express the whole of what is a.s.serted in the proposition All B is A, expresses, as was formerly shown, part of it, and must therefore be true if the whole is true. We have, then, as the result of the reduction, the following syllogism in the third mood of the first figure:--
All B is C Some A is B,
from which it obviously follows, that
Some A is C.
In the same manner, or in a manner on which after these examples it is not necessary to enlarge, every mood of the second, third, and fourth figures may be reduced to some one of the four moods of the first. In other words, every conclusion which can be proved in any of the last three figures, may be proved in the first figure from the same premises, with a slight alteration in the mere manner of expressing them. Every valid ratiocination, therefore, may be stated in the first figure, that is, in one of the following forms:--
Every B is C No B is C All A } is B, All A } is B, Some A } Some A } therefore therefore All A } is C. No A is } C.
Some A } Some A is not }
Or if more significant symbols are preferred:--
To prove an affirmative, the argument must admit of being stated in this form:--
All animals are mortal; All men } Some men } are animals; Socrates } therefore All men } Some men } are mortal.
Socrates }
To prove a negative, the argument must be capable of being expressed in this form:--
No one who is capable of self-control is necessarily vicious; All negroes } Some negroes } are capable of self-control; Mr. A"s negro } therefore No negroes are } Some negroes are not } necessarily vicious.
Mr. A"s negro is not }