Its inconvenience is, the exposure of its flanks to attack, or to enfilade. Therefore, when such a position is adopted, its flanks must be protected by natural obstacles or by artificial defences.
2. Batteries, or parts of batteries, should be at supporting distances from each other; that is, not over six hundred yards apart, so as to effectually cover the whole ground between them, in case of need, with grape and canister. When rifled guns are used, this distance may be increased.
3. A long line of guns in our line of battle is objectionable; for, if it should become necessary to withdraw them, they would leave a dangerous interval.
4. It is dangerous to collect a great many pieces in one battery, especially in the beginning of an action, when the enemy is fresh, for it strongly tempts him to capture it. When used, such a battery should have powerful supports to protect it, or should be sheltered by a village, a defile, or other cover, occupied beforehand.
5. Although, to be used offensively, guns should be in strong ma.s.ses, in order to strike a decisive blow on some single point; this is by no means the case when used defensively; for,
(1.) It is only when guns are more or less scattered over different parts of the field, that they can be made to give a cross-fire on the enemy"s advancing columns, or on any part of his line.
(2.) If the position where they are ma.s.sed does not happen to be attacked, they become useless, while stripping the rest of the line.
(3.) If they are captured, all the artillery is lost at once, as happened to the Austrians at the battle of Leuthen, causing their defeat.
6. A certain number of pieces of horse-artillery must always be kept in reserve, so that, if an artillery fire at any point should be suddenly wanted, it may be furnished with the least possible delay.
7. Guns of various calibres should never be in the same battery, to prevent confusion as to the respective ranges, and in the supply of their ammunition.
8. An independent section or battery should never consist of howitzers alone, for the proper fire of these pieces is too slow to be effective in repulsing an attack on them.
9. There should always be wide intervals between the pieces; otherwise the battery would offer too good a mark to the enemy.
V.-How used.
First, Generally.
Secondly, In Offensive Combat.
Thirdly, In Defensive Combat.
Fourthly, Against Infantry.
Fifthly, Against Cavalry.
Lastly, Against Artillery.
A. Generally.
1. So far as is possible, guns should be kept hidden from the enemy till the moment of opening on him. They may be masked by the ground, or other cover, natural or artificial, or by troops placed in front of them. The surprise will add much to their effect. Moreover, concealed, they will be less exposed to be taken. Nothing discourages troops more than the loss of a battery at the beginning of an action.
2. A desultory and indiscriminate artillery fire will accomplish nothing. To effect any thing important, it must be concentrated on some object; and the fire must be persevered in till the desired effect has been produced.
3. It is a general principle that artillery should not reply to the enemy"s batteries, unless compelled to by their effect on our own troops. To obtain the most decisive effects from artillery fire, it should be directed on the enemy"s troops, instead of his guns.
4. If it should become advisable to silence one of his batteries, it will be done more promptly and effectually by the employment, for this purpose, of two of our own batteries, than of a single one.
5. There is usually great advantage in keeping our batteries constantly shifting their position; for then-
(1.) They have the effect of a surprise, by opening on the enemy at some unexpected point.
(2.) They make the enemy believe our guns to be more numerous than they really are.
(3.) They are in less danger of being captured.
But these changes of position are attended with this inconvenience, that they expose the horses to be taken in flank by the enemy"s batteries and sharpshooters.
6. The movements of a battery in the field should be as rapid as possible; for, while moving, it is helpless and exposed.
Moreover, celerity of movement and accuracy of fire will often more than compensate for inferiority in the number of guns; as was the case at the battle of Palo Alto, in the Mexican War, where the enemy"s guns outnumbered ours two to one.
B. In Offensive Combat.
1. When used to prepare for an attack of infantry or cavalry, artillery concentrates as much fire as possible on the point where the attack is to be made, in order to overcome the resistance there, and thus make success easy.
2. When there are several points on which our fire should be directed, we must not batter them all at once, but concentrate our whole fire on them in succession.
3. In attack, artillery should not be split up among different brigades or divisions; else no decisive result can be expected from it. Whole batteries, used together, will have a more telling effect than if scattered over the field in separate sections.
In no case should less than two pieces be used together; for, while one piece is being loaded, the piece and its gunners need the protection of another one ready to be discharged.
4. Pieces in support of an infantry column of attack should never be in its rear, but on its flanks, near its head, in which position it will best encourage the infantry. But if a battery have already a position from which it can afford to the attack effective a.s.sistance, it should remain in it; sending a few pieces to accompany the infantry, which always greatly values artillery support.
5. Powerful effects may be produced by the sudden a.s.semblage of a great number of guns on some particular point. This was a favorite manuvre of Napoleon; who, by his rapid concentration of immense batteries of light artillery on the important point, usually obtained the most decisive results. At Wagram, for instance, when Macdonald"s column was ready to make its great charge on the Austrian centre, Napoleon suddenly ma.s.sed one hundred guns in front of his own centre, and made it advance in double column at a trot, then deploy into line on the leading section, and concentrate its fire on the villages forming the keys to the enemy"s position, in front of his right and left wings respectively; each battery opening its fire on arriving at half-range distance. The effect was overwhelming.
6. The nearer artillery delivers its fire, the more powerful, of course, are its effects. Horse artillery, in sufficient strength, attacking the enemy at short grape-shot distance, say within three hundred or four hundred yards, may lose half its pieces, but with the other half it will probably decide the battle at that point.
At Palo Alto, Duncan"s rapid closing with his guns to less than half range, drove back the Mexican right wing, which could not stand the destructive fire.
7. Horse artillery does not usually attempt to follow up cavalry in its attack; but takes a position to cover its retreat, if repulsed, or to push forward in support, in case of success.
8. When cavalry has to debouch from a defile, horse artillery may render it most effectual a.s.sistance, by taking a position that will enable the cavalry to form without fear of being charged and destroyed while forming.
C. In Defensive Combat.
1. Artillery should always reserve its fire till the enemy"s real attack.
2. It should play on that portion of the hostile force that threatens us most.
3. It should wait till the enemy has come within destructive distance, and then open on his columns with a concentrated fire.
4. It should protect our troops while manuvring, and accompany them in retreat.
5. We must subdivide our batteries whenever we wish to obtain cross-fires on a debouche, or on the head of an advancing column, or on the ground in front of a weak part of our line. By so doing, we compel the enemy to divide his own artillery in order to reply to our fire.
6. A sudden concentration of a great number of guns at some particular point may be used with the same decisive effect in a defensive, as in an offensive battle; though in this case, artillery plays, for the time being, a part strictly offensive.
At the battle of Friedland, where the French were attacked by the Russians in overwhelming numbers, Ney"s corps was driven back by a terrific concentrated fire, in front and in flank, from the Russian batteries on the opposite side of the river; its own artillery being too feeble to stand before them. Seeing this, Napoleon instantly ordered all the guns of the different divisions of the corps next to Ney"s, on the left, to be united and thrown in one ma.s.s in front of Ney"s corps. Taking post at some hundred paces in front, these batteries, by their powerful fire, soon silenced the Russian batteries; then advancing on the Russian troops that had crossed the river to within grape-shot range, they made frightful havoc in their deep ma.s.ses. The French infantry, profiting by this, rushed forward and captured the village of Friedland, driving the enemy in their front over the bridges, which they then burned. This was decisive of the battle; for the whole Russian army was then driven into the river.
So, at the battle of Kunersdorff, in 1759, after Frederick"s left and centre had driven the Russians, and captured seventy guns and many prisoners, Soltikoff promptly ma.s.sed the whole artillery of his right wing at a single point behind a ravine, which, by its concentrated fire, swept away the flower of the Prussian army in their efforts to force its pa.s.sage; and Frederick was badly defeated.
7. When compelled to retreat, guns should retire successively, in echelons of batteries, half-batteries, or sections, in order that the fire of one may cover the limbering up and retreat of another.
Besides the mutual support thereby afforded, these successive face-abouts of artillery have a powerful moral effect on the pursuing enemy, already more or less disorganized by success.