5. In covering an attack, our guns should keep up their fire till the moment it would begin to endanger our advancing columns.
6. By a ricochet fire, artillery is said to increase its effect, from one-fourth to one-half. It is especially effective in enfilading a line of troops, a battery, or the face of a work taken in flank.
Ricochet shots have also great moral effect.
7. When used against breastworks of rails or logs of wood, guns should be fired with moderate or shattering charges; so as more surely to demolish them, and, at the same time, to increase the destructive effect of the fire by scattering the splinters.
In view of the frequent necessity of battering such defences, and of using a ricochet fire, which also requires small charges of powder, it would be an improvement in our artillery service to make a certain proportion of the ammunition in each gun limber to consist of cartridges of half the usual size.
8. In bombarding a village during a battle, if our object be to set fire to and destroy it, this will be best accomplished with sh.e.l.ls. If we wish merely to drive the enemy from it, solid shot from heavy calibres will be necessary, which will more surely reach and destroy his troops, wherever they may show themselves.
9. The moral effect, both of solid shot and of sh.e.l.ls, is much greater than that of grape or other case-shot, from their more fearful effects on the human frame, and from the great number of men that a single ball or sh.e.l.l will kill or fatally wound. One twelve-pound solid shot has been known to kill forty-two men, who happened to be exactly in its range.
10. Ball and sh.e.l.l should be used-
(1.) When the enemy is at a distance.
(2.) When he is in ma.s.s.
(3.) When he is in several lines.
(4.) When his line may be enfiladed.
11. In silencing a battery, our fire should be concentrated on one piece at a time, while some of our guns throw spherical case, from a raking position, if possible, on the gunners.
12. Though grape has a much less range than ball, yet within four hundred yards, on account of its scattering, its effect is superior to it.
The fire of guns double shotted with ball and a stand of grape, is fearfully destructive when used at a short distance to repel a charge.
13. It is artillerymen"s point of honor not to abandon their pieces till the last extremity. They should always remember that when the enemy is closing on them, the last discharge will be the most destructive of all, and may suffice to repulse the attack and turn the tide of battle.
In our attack on Quebec, in our War of Independence, on the near approach of our a.s.saulting column, the British gunners fled from their pieces; but the one who fled last, before leaving, discharged his gun, which was loaded with grape. The discharge killed and wounded several of our men; among them the brave General Montgomery, who was leading the column in person. The effect was decisive. The a.s.sailants fell back, panic-struck at the loss of their commander; and our attack failed.
14. To prevent our own captured pieces from being turned on us by the enemy, it is the artillerymen"s last duty, when it has become evident that the guns cannot be saved, to spike them. The operation requiring but a few moments, it can rarely be omitted without disgrace.
VII.-Its Supports.
1. Artillery must always be protected from the melee, in which it is helpless whether against infantry or cavalry; and should therefore have a strong support.
2. A portion, at least, of every artillery support, should consist of sharpshooters, whose fire will be the most effective in driving off skirmishers sent forward to threaten or attack the guns, or to pick off the gunners.
3. Batteries must be secured on both flanks, and their supports will be posted with that view; on one or on both flanks, according to circ.u.mstances, and more or less retired.
4. A support should never be directly in rear of the battery, where it would be in danger, not only of receiving the shots aimed at the battery, but also of killing the gunners belonging to it, as has repeatedly happened during the late war.
5. A battery and its support owe each other mutual protection. Therefore, when an infantry support, after holding the enemy in check, to enable the battery to limber up and retire, is obliged, in its turn, to retreat, the battery should take such a position as will enable it to cover the retreat by its fire.
6. A battery consisting of any considerable number of pieces may be able, sometimes, to dispense with a support.
During the battle of Ucles, in Spain, in 1809, the French artillery, under General Senarmont, had been left behind, owing to the badness of the roads. The Spaniards came down upon it in large force. On their approach, the guns were formed in square, and, by their fire on every side, defended themselves successfully, and finally repulsed the enemy.
So, at Leipsic, in 1813, when the grand battery of the Guard, which had been left temporarily without a support, was charged by the Russian hussars and Cossacks, Drouot, its commander, rapidly drew back its flanks till they nearly met; and the cavalry were soon repulsed by its fire.
7. At the battle of Hanau, in 1813, Drouot"s eighty guns were charged by the Allied cavalry. Having no supports, he placed his gunners in front of them with their carbines. This checked the cavalry, who were then covered with grape, which drove them back to their lines.
Ought not our gunners also to have carbines slung on their backs for such emergencies? Against infantry, our guns would often need no other support. The carbines could be used to reply to the enemy"s skirmishers; and the example just cited shows that, thus equipped, artillerymen may sometimes successfully defend their pieces even against cavalry.
TACTICAL USE OF CAVALRY.
We shall consider-
-Its Formations.
-Its Strong and its Weak Points.
-How it is Posted.
-Its Supports.
-How it is Used.
-How it Fights.
-Its Charge.
-Its Attack on Infantry.
-General Remarks.
I.-Its Formations.
1. The formations of cavalry for battle are either-
(1.) In deployed lines.
(2.) Lines of regiments, in columns of attack doubled on the centre.
(3.) A mixed formation of lines and columns.
(4.) Echelons of lines or columns; or- (5.) Deep columns.
2. Deployed lines are not objectionable in principle. They are often not advisable; but are sometimes necessary.
But long, continuous lines should always be avoided; being unfavorable to rapid manuvring, which cavalry is constantly called upon to execute in the field.
3. Cavalry has, in its horses, an unreasoning element, which is not controllable, like men; and is therefore much more easily thrown into disorder than infantry. For this reason, when deployed, it should always be in two lines; the second behind the first; the first line deployed, and the second in columns of squadrons by platoons. There should be also a reserve at a few hundred paces behind the second line.
The second line should be near enough to the first to be able to support it, if checked; but not so near as to partake in its disorder, if repulsed.
4. Cavalry should be always in column when expecting to manuvre, or to be called on to make any rapid movement; this being the formation best adapted for celerity.
5. Cavalry deploys in lines-
(1.) When preparing for a charge in line.
(2.) When preparing for any attack requiring the utmost possible width of front; as where the enemy is to be suddenly surrounded.
(3.) When it becomes necessary in order to prevent our troops from being outflanked by the enemy"s.
(4.) When exposed to continued artillery fire, which is much less destructive on a line than on a column.
6. Cavalry should always present a front at least equal to the enemy"s; otherwise, its flank, which is cavalry"s weak point, will be exposed to attack. When inferior in numbers, we may extend our line by leaving intervals, more or less wide, between its different corps. Any hostile squadrons that may attempt to pa.s.s through these intervals to take the line in rear, could be taken care of by the second line.
7. The best formation in respect to mobility is a line of regiments in columns by squadrons, doubled on the centre; corresponding to infantry double columns.