Again, it is said that an unjust law pa.s.sed by the Irish Parliament might be repealed by the Imperial Parliament. Doubtless the technical right would exist, as in the case of the Colonies; but no one dreams that, with "responsible" government existing in Ireland and Irish representatives at Westminster, it would in practice be used. The Imperial Government has never been known to interfere with the legislation of a self-governing colony except where Imperial interests are concerned, or where a fraud on the colony can be established;[39]
and the same rule would obtain in the case of Ireland.
Lastly, it is said that in the last resort there is the British Army.
But if the civil power in Ireland does not call in the military force, how can the latter be used to enforce the law? Are the forces to be controlled from England, and what is this but a counter revolution? It is hardly worth while to liberate Ireland from the peaceful rule of the Imperial Government in order to govern her by military force.
But in fact the so-called "safeguards" would not last. Professor Dicey[40] and Professor Morgan,[41] writing from opposite sides of the controversy, agree in holding that no colony would tolerate them for a moment; and it is incredible that Ireland, with a Parliament of her own, would submit to them for more than a few years.[42] Suppose the majority of the Irish Legislature to grow weary of the "safeguards," and to demand their repeal. The Imperial ministry might refuse, but the reply of the Irish ministry (if in command of a majority in the Irish House of Commons) would be to resign and to make the government of Ireland impossible except by force. And if Ireland were still represented in the Imperial Parliament, the new "sorrows of Ireland" would find eloquent and insistent expression there. What, then, would England do? What could she do, except, after a futile struggle, to give way? The truth is, that if you part with the executive power, all checks and "safeguards" are futile. Mr. Redmond[43] eagerly "accepts every one of them," and will accept others if desired; for he knows that they must prove ineffective.
"If," said Lord Derby in 1887, "Ireland and England are not to be one, Ireland must be treated like Canada or Australia. All between is delusion or fraud."
IRISH REPRESENTATION AT WESTMINSTER.
The hybrid form of government proposed in the Home Rule Bills of 1886 and 1893 gave rise to a further difficulty, and one which went far towards wrecking them both. Should Ireland under Home Rule be represented at Westminster by its members and representative peers?
Under a system of Gladstonian Home Rule there appear to be only three possible answers to this question. The Irish representatives may be excluded altogether, they may be retained altogether, or they may be retained in diminished numbers and with some limitation on their voting powers.
The total exclusion clause in the Bill of 1886 was one of the most unpopular parts of an unpopular Bill. It was immediately urged that this arrangement was virtually equivalent to separation, and Mr. Gladstone admitted[44] that the argument had force. Since 1886 public sentiment has advanced in the direction of a closer Imperial unity, and it is unlikely that the country will recur in 1912 to a proposal which in 1886 was admitted to be intolerable. Moreover, if the British Parliament is to retain control of the whole foreign policy of the kingdom, and--what is likely to be of enormous importance in the future--of its whole fiscal policy, it would be manifestly unjust to deny to Ireland a voice and vote in such matters. How would it be possible, for instance, to discuss the effect upon agriculture of a Tariff Reform Budget in the absence of competent representatives of the Irish farmers, or to consider the yearly grant to be made (as it is said) in aid of Irish finance without the a.s.sistance of any representatives of Ireland?
A recognition of the difficulties in the way of total exclusion led Mr.
Gladstone to propose, in 1893, what was known as the "popping-in-and-out clause," under which Irish members would have sat at Westminster, but would have voted only on Imperial measures. The best criticism of this attempt to distinguish between local and Imperial matters was supplied on another occasion by Mr. Gladstone himself:--
"I have thought much, reasoned much, and inquired much with regard to that distinction, but I have arrived at the conclusion that it cannot be drawn. I believe it pa.s.ses the wit of man."
To distinguish between matters which might and those which could not affect Ireland was impossible to the ordinary man, and the device of committing all matters of special difficulty to the decision of Mr.
Speaker had not then its present vogue. Further, it was obvious that under such a system a British Ministry might have on one day, when English or Scottish affairs were under discussion, a commanding majority; but on the next, when a vote possibly affecting the sister island was in question, might find itself labouring in the trough of the sea; while on the third day, that vote having been disposed of and the Irish members having taken their leave, it might rise once more on the crest of the wave. The proposal was too ludicrous to be long defended.
The sense of humour of the House prevailed over Mr. Gladstone"s earnestness, and he fell back on inclusion for all purposes.
But inclusion for all purposes had its own difficulties. Under the Gladstonian system the Imperial Parliament would have considered, not only matters affecting the whole kingdom, but also purely English or purely Scottish affairs; and to give to the Irish representatives the control in their own Parliament of purely Irish affairs, and also a voice at Westminster on matters affecting England or Scotland only, was obviously unjust. Such a power would have been used, not for the benefit of England or Scotland, but as an instrument for wresting further concessions for Ireland.
"I will never be a party," said Mr. Gladstone at one time, "to allowing the Irish members to manage their own affairs in Dublin, and at the same time to come over here and manage British affairs.
Such an arrangement would not be a Bill to grant self-government to Ireland, but one to remove self-government from England; it would create a subordinate Parliament indeed, but it would be the one at Westminster, and not that in Dublin."[45]
The problem seems insoluble because, under a hybrid (or Gladstonian) system of Home Rule, it is insoluble. If a clear line is taken, there is no difficulty under this head. If full "responsible" or colonial government is granted, clearly representation in the Imperial Parliament (I do not now speak of a federal a.s.sembly) is an anomaly. On the other hand, if nothing more is in question than the extension of local government generally known as Devolution, then adequate representation in the Imperial Parliament is a matter of course. If a federal government is established, each member of the Federation must needs be represented in the federal Parliament; but in that case there must be no attempt to entrust to the same a.s.sembly both the duties of the federal Parliament and those of a Legislature for one of the federating states.
It was this attempt to treat the Imperial Parliament as the local or state Legislature for Great Britain, and also as the federal Parliament for Great Britain and Ireland, which was fatal to Mr. Gladstone"s proposals.
FEDERALISM.
These considerations bring us face to face with Federalism, or, to use the phrase which to so many perplexed Liberals has seemed to point the way to safety, "Home Rule all round." The expression covers a wide field, and before any opinion can be p.r.o.nounced upon the proposal, it is essential to know what its advocates in fact desire.
To some the phrase means nothing less than Gladstonian Home Rule "all round," in other words that we should meet the objections to dissolving the legislative and executive Union with Ireland by dissolving also the older Union with Scotland, and even (for some do not shrink from the _reductio ad absurdum_) the yet older unity of England and Wales.
Consider what this means. For more than two hundred years the English and Scottish races have been united by a const.i.tutional bond strengthened by mutual respect and good feeling, and Scotsmen, like Englishmen, have taken their part in the government of these islands. If in the division of labour and of honours there has been a balance of advantage, it has not been against the virile Scottish race, from which have sprung so many of our great soldiers and administrators, so many leaders of the nation. And such a combination is to be broken up, and Scotland to become a colony, because Ireland, unwilling to bear her share in the duties of government, desires to be reduced to that status!
To such a proposal Mr. Gladstone"s phrase about Home Rule applies in all its force:--
"Can any sensible man, can any rational man, suppose that at this time of day, in this condition of the world, we are going to disintegrate the great capital inst.i.tutions of this country for the purpose of making ourselves ridiculous in the sight of all mankind, and crippling any power we possess for bestowing benefits through legislation on the country to which we belong?"
The proposal would be incredibly stupid, if it were not recklessly mischievous.
But to most advocates of the federal system the word means less than this; and the conception, usually vaguely expressed, is that the relations of England, Scotland, and Ireland, should be something like those of the communities which make up (to quote instances commonly given) the German Empire, the Swiss Federation, the United States of America, or the British self-governing dominions of Canada, Australia, and South Africa. So expressed, the aspiration for a federal union deserves respectful consideration.
In the first place, it must not be forgotten that no proposal of this nature has yet been put forward, even in general terms, by any English or Irish Party. Mr. John Redmond, the leader of the Irish Nationalists, has indeed said that he and his friends "were only asking what had already been given in twenty-eight different portions of the Empire:"[46] and a speaker usually more careful in his language[47]
lately suggested to his audience that they should
"ask the twenty-eight Home Rule Parliaments if the Empire would be split in pieces if there were a twenty-ninth."
But in order to make up the number of Parliaments and Legislatures within the Empire to twenty-eight it is necessary to include in one category the Parliament of the United Kingdom, the colonial Parliaments of Newfoundland and New Zealand, the federal Parliaments of Canada and Australia, the provincial or state Legislatures (widely differing from one another in their const.i.tution and powers) comprised in those Federations, the Union of South Africa and its const.i.tuent provinces, and the tiny a.s.semblies surviving in the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man. From a reference so vague and confused no inference as to the real meaning or desire of either speaker can safely be drawn.[48]
But let us put aside, with the foreign confederacies (which have in most cases been achieved or maintained by armed conflict), the practically independent Parliaments within the British Empire, and confine ourselves to the Federations of Canada and Australia, and to the Union (sometimes incorrectly called a Federation) of South Africa.
In the first place, it is not immaterial to observe that each of the Legislatures here referred to resulted, not from the dissolution of an existing union, but from the voluntary a.s.sumption by communities formerly independent of one another of a closer bond. In other words, there was in each case a real _Jaedus_ or treaty, not imposed by the Imperial power, but having a local origin and springing from the need of common action. The operative force was centripetal; and as the force continues to operate, the tendency of the ma.s.s is towards a chemical in lieu of a mechanical fusion.[49] But in the case of the United Kingdom a change from organic union to Federation would be the beginning of dissolution; and the centrifugal force, once set in motion, might lead further in the same direction.
Again, there can be no true federation without (1) provincial legislatures and executives, (2) a central Parliament and executive, (3) a careful definition of the powers of each, and (4) a federal court to which should be entrusted the duty of determining questions arising between the federal and provincial governments and legislatures. If, therefore, provincial or state Governments are created for Ireland and for Scotland, a like Government should logically be created for England.
Are we prepared to see four (or, if Wales be added, five) legislatures, and four (or five) executives, in these islands? Have we considered the possible effect on our whole system of government, on the theory of Cabinet responsibility to Parliament, on the powers of the House of Commons over grievance and supply? Must not each unit in a Federation be put as regards financial matters upon a like footing; and, if so, can Ireland bear her share? Is federation consistent with the predominance of one state, England, in wealth and population? These questions are vital, and none of them have received consideration. By declaring in general terms for Federalism you go but a little way.
And if we treat the proposal for Federation as indicating a desire to adopt a const.i.tution under which the relations of the United Kingdom to each of its const.i.tuent parts would be as the relation of some one of the three self-governing Dominions to the states or provinces of which it is composed, the question remains, which of those Dominions should be adopted as a model? For they differ not only in form but in essence.
Under the British North America Act, 1867, and the amending statutes, there is "one Parliament for Canada" (sect. 17), while each province has its Legislature. Each provincial Legislature is empowered exclusively to make laws in relation to certain specified subjects (including property and civil rights and the administration of justice), and also in relation to "all matters of a merely local or private nature in the province"; while the Dominion Parliament may "make laws for the peace, order, and good government of Canada in relation to all matters not coming within" the cla.s.ses of subjects a.s.signed exclusively to the provincial Legislatures. The division of functions has given rise to much confusion and litigation; but, speaking generally, the trend of judicial decision has been towards a wide interpretation of the provincial powers. The "residuary powers" are in the Dominion Parliament.
The const.i.tution of the Commonwealth of Australia, as defined by the Commonwealth of Australia Const.i.tution Act, 1900, is of a different character. The Federal Parliament is entrusted with power to make laws with respect to a number of subjects divided into no less than 39 cla.s.ses (sect. 51); the State Legislatures have concurrent powers of legislation, but in case of conflict the law of the Commonwealth is to prevail over the State law (sect. 109). The "residuary powers" are in this case left to the States. There is power to alter the Const.i.tution with the consent of a majority of the electors in a majority of the States and of a majority of the electors of the Commonwealth (sect.
123)--a power which has been freely used.
The case of South Africa is sometimes cited as a precedent for loosening the bonds in the United Kingdom. It is a strong precedent for closer union. The South Africa Act, 1909, created in fact as well as in name, not a Federation but a true Legislative Union. Under the Act, the South African colonies were "united in a legislative union under one government under the name of the Union of South Africa" (sect. 4). The legislative power is vested in the Parliament of the Union (sect. 19), which has full power to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the Union (sect. 59). In each province (formerly a colony) there is an administrator appointed by the Governor-General of the Union in Council (sect. 68), and a Provincial Council (sect. 70); but the powers of the Provincial Councils are confined within narrow limits (sect. 85), and their ordinances (they are not called laws) have effect within the province as long as and so far as they are not repugnant to any Act of the Union Parliament (sect. 86). The Supreme Courts of the old colonies become provincial divisions of the Supreme Court of South Africa (sect. 98), and the colonial property and debts are transferred to the Union (sects. 121-124). In fact, in South Africa, where, as in Ireland, the distinction in the past has been racial and not territorial, Union and not Federation has gained the day. It is safe to prophesy that the coming proposals of the Government will not follow the South African plan.
DEVOLUTION.
The South African precedent leads naturally to a few observations on the proposals for the extension of local self-government, usually cla.s.sified under the head of Devolution. These proposals differ, not in degree only but in kind, from schemes for the granting of responsible government, or Gladstonian Home Rule. Under all devolutionary schemes, properly so-called, the central Parliament and executive remain the ultimate depositaries of power; and the powers entrusted to local bodies are administrative only, and can be resumed at will. The Acts by which County Councils were set up, first in Great Britain and afterwards in Ireland, were steps in this direction. The Welsh Intermediate Education Act, 1889, was another. The establishment by the Agriculture and Technical Instruction (Ireland) Act, 1899, of a Council of Agriculture, as Agricultural Board, and a Board of Technical Instruction, was a third. By these statutes wide powers are delegated to representative bodies directly or indirectly elected by popular vote; but in each case the delegated powers are strictly defined, their exercise is made subject to central control, and the right of Parliament to modify or withdraw any of them is absolute and unquestioned. The appointment by the House of Commons of a Grand Committee for Scottish Bills is another experiment of a similar character, though on different lines. Such delegations of power are consistent with the maintenance in its entirety of the Union of the Kingdom, and there is no reason whatever why further progress should not be made in the same direction. The events of 1907 are evidence that Devolution, regarded merely as a means of satisfying the political cry for Home Rule, is indeed "dead." But when the din of political battle has once more pa.s.sed by, it may be possible to obtain consideration for a moderate and clearly defined scheme of delegation which, if applied not exclusively to Ireland, but to the whole country, might relieve the House of Commons of much of its work, and strengthen the habit of local self-government throughout the United Kingdom.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 20: See "_Times_ Special Commission," vol. v. p. 175, and "Home Rule. What is it?" by A.W. Samuels, K.C. (Simpkin Marshall, 1911), p. 60.]
[Footnote 21: See No. 213 of the Liberal League publications.]
[Footnote 22: Erskine Childers, "The Framework of Home Rule" (Arnold, 1911).]
[Footnote 23: See speech of J.M. Robertson, M.P., London, January 11, 1912.]
[Footnote 24: "Home Rule Problems" (P.S. King & Son, 1911).]
[Footnote 25: Written in March, 1912.]
[Footnote 26: See Egerton, "Federations and Unions in the British Empire" (Clarendon Press, 1911). Introduction.]
[Footnote 27: On the financial questions involved the Government have been advised by a Committee containing financial experts; but the Report of this Committee is withheld from publication, and it is believed that its advice will not be followed.]
[Footnote 28: House of Commons, April 8, 1886.]
[Footnote 29: Quoted in "The True History of the American Revolution,"
by S.G. Fisher (Lippincott, 1903).]