On the other hand, if the temper and the manners of the inhabitants especially fitted them to promote the welfare of a great republic, the federal system smoothed the obstacles which they might have encountered.
The confederation of all the American states presents none of the ordinary disadvantages resulting from great agglomerations of men. The Union is a great republic in extent, but the paucity of objects for which its government provides a.s.similates it to a small state. Its acts are important, but they are rare. As the sovereignty of the Union is limited and incomplete, its exercise is not incompatible with liberty; for it does not excite those insatiable desires of fame and power which have proved so fatal to great republics. As there is no common centre to the country, vast capital cities, colossal wealth, abject poverty, and sudden revolutions are alike unknown; and political pa.s.sion, instead of spreading over the land like a torrent of desolation, spends its strength against the interests and the individual pa.s.sions of every state.
Nevertheless, all commodities and ideas circulate throughout the Union as freely as in a country inhabited by one people. Nothing checks the spirit of enterprise. The government avails itself of the a.s.sistance of all who have talents or knowledge to serve it. Within the frontiers of the Union the profoundest peace prevails, as within the heart of some great empire; abroad, it ranks with the most powerful nations of the earth: two thousand miles of coast are open to the commerce of the world; and as it possesses the keys of the globe, its flag is respected in the most remote seas. The Union is as happy and as free as a small people, and as glorious and as strong as a great nation.
WHY THE FEDERAL SYSTEM IS NOT ADAPTED TO ALL PEOPLES, AND HOW THE ANGLO-AMERICANS WERE ENABLED TO ADOPT IT.
Every federal System contains defects which baffle the efforts of the Legislator.--The federal System is complex.--It demands a daily Exercise of Discretion on the Part of the Citizens.--Practical knowledge of the Government common among the Americans.--Relative weakness of the Government of the Union another defect inherent in the federal System.--The Americans have diminished without remedying it.--The Sovereignty of the separate States apparently weaker, but really stronger, than that of the Union.--Why.--Natural causes of Union must exist between confederate Peoples beside the Laws.--What these Causes are among the Anglo-Americans.--Maine and Georgia, separated by a Distance of a thousand Miles, more naturally united than Normandy and Britany.--War, the main Peril of Confederations.--This proved even by the Example of the United States.--The Union has no great Wars to fear.--Why.--Dangers to which Europeans would be exposed if they adopted the federal System of the Americans.
When a legislator succeeds, after persevering efforts, in exercising an indirect influence upon the destiny of nations, his genius is lauded by mankind, while in point of fact, the geographical position of the country which he is unable to change, a social condition which arose without his co-operation, manners and opinions which he cannot trace to their source, and an origin with which he is unacquainted, exercise so irresistible an influence over the courses of society, that he is himself borne away by the current, after an ineffectual resistance. Like the navigator, he may direct the vessel which bears him along, but he can neither change its structure, nor raise the winds, nor lull the waters which swell beneath him.
I have shown the advantages which the Americans derive from their federal system; it remains for me to point out the circ.u.mstances which render that system practicable, as its benefits are not to be enjoyed by all nations. The incidental defects of the federal system which originate in the laws may be corrected by the skill of the legislator, but there are farther evils inherent in the system which cannot be counteracted by the peoples which adopt it. These nations must therefore find the strength necessary to support the natural imperfections of the government.
The most prominent evil of all federal systems is the very complex nature of the means they employ. Two sovereignties are necessarily in the presence of each other. The legislator may simplify and equalize the action of these two sovereignties, by limiting each of them to a sphere of authority accurately defined; but he cannot combine them into one, or prevent them from running into collision at certain points. The federal system therefore rests upon a theory which is necessarily complicated, and which demands the daily exercise of a considerable share of discretion on the part of those it governs.
A proposition must be plain to be adopted by the understanding of a people. A false notion, which is clear and precise, will always meet with a greater number of adherents in the world than a true principle which is obscure or involved. Hence it arises that parties, which are like small communities in the heart of the nation, invariably adopt some principle or some name as a symbol, which very inadequately represents the end they have in view, and the means which are at their disposal, but without which they could neither act nor subsist. The governments which are founded upon a single principle or a single feeling which is easily defined, are perhaps not the best, but they are unquestionably the strongest and the most durable in the world.
In examining the const.i.tution of the United States, which is the most perfect federal const.i.tution that ever existed, one is startled, on the other hand, at the variety of information and the excellence of discretion which it presupposes in the people whom it is meant to govern. The government of the Union depends entirely upon legal fictions; the Union is an ideal notion which only exists in the mind, and whose limits and extent can only be discerned by the understanding.
When once the general theory is comprehended, numerous difficulties remain to be solved in its application; for the sovereignty of the Union is so involved in that of the states, that it is impossible to distinguish its boundaries at the first glance. The whole structure of the government is artificial and conventional; and it would be ill-adapted to a people which has not long been accustomed to conduct its own affairs, or to one in which the science of politics has not descended to the humblest cla.s.ses of society. I have never been more struck by the good sense and the practical judgment of the Americans than in the ingenious devices by which they elude the numberless difficulties resulting from their federal const.i.tution. I scarcely ever met with a plain American citizen who could not distinguish, with surprising facility, the obligations created by the laws of congress from those created by the laws of his own state; and who, after having discriminated between the matters which come under the cognizance of the Union, and those which the local legislature is competent to regulate, could not point out the exact limit of the several jurisdictions of the federal courts and the tribunals of the state.
The const.i.tution of the United States is like those exquisite productions of human industry which ensure wealth and renown to their inventors, but which are profitless in any other hands. This truth is exemplified by the condition of Mexico at the present time. The Mexicans were desirous of establishing a federal system, and they took the federal const.i.tution of their neighbors the Anglo-Americans as their model, and copied it with considerable accuracy.[157] But although they had borrowed the letter of the law, they were unable to create or to introduce the spirit and the sense which gave it life. They were involved in ceaseless embarra.s.sments between the mechanism of their double government; the sovereignty of the states and that of the Union perpetually exceeded their respective privileges, and entered into collision; and to the present day Mexico is alternately the victim of anarchy and the slave of military despotism.
The second and the most fatal of all the defects I have alluded to, and that which I believe to be inherent in the federal system, is the relative weakness of the government of the Union. The principle upon which all confederations rest is that of a divided sovereignty. The legislator may render this part.i.tion less perceptible, he may even conceal it for a time from the public eye, but he cannot prevent it from existing; and a divided sovereignty must always be less powerful than an entire supremacy. The reader has seen in the remarks I have made on the const.i.tution of the United States, that the Americans have displayed singular ingenuity in combining the restriction of the power of the Union within the narrow limits of the federal government, with the semblance, and to a certain extent with the force of a national government. By this means the legislators of the Union have succeeded in diminishing, though not in counteracting, the natural danger of confederations.
It has been remarked that the American government does not apply itself to the states, but that it immediately transmits its injunctions to the citizens, and compels them as isolated individuals to comply with its demands. But if the federal law were to clash with the interests and prejudices of a state, it might be feared that all the citizens of that state would conceive themselves to be interested in the cause of a single individual who should refuse to obey. If all the citizens of the state were aggrieved at the same time and in the same manner by the authority of the Union, the federal government would vainly attempt to subdue them individually; they would instinctively unite in the common defence, and they would derive a ready-prepared organization from the share of sovereignty which the inst.i.tution of their state allows them to enjoy. Fiction would give way to reality, and an organized portion of the territory might then contest the central authority.
The same observation holds good with regard to the federal jurisdiction.
If the courts of the Union violated an important law of a state in a private case, the real, if not the apparent contest would arise between the aggrieved state, represented by a citizen, and the Union, represented by its courts of justice.[158]
He would have but a partial knowledge of the world who should imagine that it is possible, by the aid of legal fictions, to prevent men from finding out and employing those means of gratifying their pa.s.sions which have been left open to them; and it may be doubted whether the American legislators, when they rendered a collision between the two sovereignties less probable, destroyed the causes of such a misfortune.
But it may even be affirmed that they were unable to ensure the preponderance of the federal element in a case of this kind. The Union is possessed of money and of troops, but the affections and the prejudices of the people are in the bosom of the states. The sovereignty of the Union is an abstract being, which is connected with but few external objects; the sovereignty of the states is hourly perceptible, easily understood, constantly active; and if the former is of recent creation, the latter is coeval with the people itself. The sovereignty of the Union is fact.i.tious, that of the states is natural, and derives its existence from its own simple influence, like the authority of a parent. The supreme power of the nation affects only a few of the chief interests of society; it represents an immense but remote country, and claims a feeling of patriotism which is vague and ill-defined; but the authority of the states controls every individual citizen at every hour and in all circ.u.mstances; it protects his property, his freedom, and his life; and when we recollect the traditions, the customs, the prejudices of local and familiar attachment with which it is connected, we cannot doubt the superiority of a power which is interwoven with every circ.u.mstance that renders the love of one"s native country instinctive to the human heart.
Since legislators are unable to obviate such dangerous collisions as occur between the two sovereignties which co-exist in the federal system, their first object must be, not only to dissuade the confederate states from warfare, but to encourage such inst.i.tutions as may promote the maintenance of peace. Hence it results that the federal compact cannot be lasting unless there exists in the communities which are leagued together, a certain number of inducements to union which render their common dependance agreeable, and the task of the government light; and that system cannot succeed without the presence of favorable circ.u.mstances added to the influence of good laws. All the people which have ever formed a confederation have been held together by a certain number of common interests, which served as the intellectual ties of a.s.sociation.
But the sentiments and the principles of man must be taken into consideration as well as his immediate interest. A certain uniformity of civilisation is not less necessary to the durability of a confederation, than a uniformity of interests in the states which compose it. In Switzerland the difference which exists between the canton of Uri and the canton of Vaud is equal to that between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries; and, properly speaking, Switzerland has never possessed a federal government. The Union between these two cantons only subsists upon the map; and their discrepancies would soon be perceived if an attempt were made by a central authority to prescribe the same laws to the whole territory.
One of the circ.u.mstances which most powerfully contribute to support the federal government in America, is that the states have not only similar interests, a common origin, and a common tongue, but that they are also arrived at the same stage of civilisation; which almost always renders a union feasible. I do not know of any European nation, how small soever it may be, which does not present less uniformity in its different provinces than the American people, which occupies a territory as extensive as one half of Europe. The distance from the state of Maine to that of Georgia is reckoned at about one thousand miles; but the difference between the civilisation of Maine and that of Georgia is slighter than the difference between the habits of Normandy and those of Britany. Maine and Georgia, which are placed at the opposite extremities of a great empire, are consequently in the natural possession of more real inducements to form a confederation than Normandy and Britany, which are only separated by a bridge.
The geographical position of the country contributed to increase the facilities which the American legislators derived from the manners and customs of the inhabitants; and it is to this circ.u.mstance that the adoption and the maintenance of the federal system are mainly attributable.
The most important occurrence which can mark the annals of a people is the breaking out of a war. In war a people struggle with the energy of a single man against foreign nations, in the defence of its very existence. The skill of a government, the good sense of the community, and the natural fondness which men entertain for their country, may suffice to maintain peace in the interior of a district, and to favor its internal prosperity; but a nation can only carry on a great war at the cost of more numerous and more painful sacrifices; and to suppose that a great number of men will of their own accord comply with the exigencies of the state, is to betray an ignorance of mankind. All the peoples which have been obliged to sustain a long and serious warfare have consequently been led to augment the power of their government.
Those which have not succeeded in this attempt have been subjugated.
A long war almost always places nations in the wretched alternative of being abandoned to ruin by defeat, or to despotism by success. War therefore renders the symptoms of the weakness of a government most palpable and most alarming; and I have shown that the inherent defect of federal governments is that of being weak.
The federal system is not only deficient in every kind of centralized administration, but the central government itself is imperfectly organized, which is invariably an influential cause of inferiority when the nation is opposed to other countries which are themselves governed by a single authority. In the federal const.i.tution of the United States, by which the central government possesses more real force, this evil is still extremely sensible. An example will ill.u.s.trate the case to the reader.
The const.i.tution confers upon congress the right of "calling forth militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions;" and another article declares that the president of the United States is the commander-in-chief of the militia. In the war of 1812, the president ordered the militia of the northern states to march to the frontiers; but Connecticut and Ma.s.sachusetts, whose interests were impaired by the war, refused to obey the command. They argued that the const.i.tution authorizes the federal government to call forth the militia in cases of insurrection or invasion, but that, in the present instance, there was neither invasion nor insurrection. They added, that the same const.i.tution which conferred upon the Union the right of calling forth the militia, reserved to the states that of naming the officers; and that consequently (as they understood the clause) no officer of the Union had any right to command the militia, even during war, except the president in person: and in this case they were ordered to join an army commanded by another individual. These absurd and pernicious doctrines received the sanction not only of the governors and legislative bodies, but also of the courts of justice in both states; and the federal government was constrained to raise elsewhere the troops which it required.[159]
The only safeguard which the American Union, with all the relative perfection of its laws, possesses against the dissolution which would be produced by a great war, lies in its probable exemption from that calamity. Placed in the centre of an immense continent, which offers a boundless field for human industry, the Union is almost as much insulated from the world as if its frontiers were girt by the ocean.
Canada contains only a million of inhabitants, and its population is divided into two inimical nations. The rigor of the climate limits the extension of its territory, and shuts up its ports during the six months of winter. From Canada to the Gulf of Mexico a few savage tribes are to be met with, which retire, perishing in their retreat, before six thousand soldiers. To the south, the Union has a point of contact with the empire of Mexico; and it is thence that serious hostilities may one day be expected to arise. But for a long while to come, the uncivilized state of the Mexican community, the depravity of its morals, and its extreme poverty, will prevent that country from ranking high among nations. As for the powers of Europe, they are too distant to be formidable.[160]
The great advantage of the United States does not, then, consist in a federal const.i.tution which allows them to carry on great wars, but in a geographical position, which renders such enterprises improbable.
No one can be more inclined than I am myself to appreciate the advantages of the federal system, which I hold to be one of the combinations most favorable to the prosperity and freedom of man. I envy the lot of those nations which have been enabled to adopt it; but I cannot believe that any confederate peoples could maintain a long or an equal contest with a nation of similar strength in which the government should be centralised. A people which should divide its sovereignty into fractional powers, in the presence of the great military monarchies of Europe, would, in my opinion, by that very act, abdicate its power, and perhaps its existence and its name. But such is the admirable position of the New World, that man has no other enemy than himself; and that in order to be happy and to be free, it suffices to seek the gifts of prosperity and the knowledge of freedom.
Notes:
[119] See the const.i.tution of the United States.
[120] See the articles of the first confederation formed in 1778. This const.i.tution was not adopted by all the states until 1781. See also the a.n.a.lysis given of this const.i.tution in the Federalist, from No. 15 to No. 22 inclusive, and Story"s "Commentary on the Const.i.tution of the United States," pp. 85-115.
[121] Congress made this declaration on the 21st of February, 1787.
[122] It consisted of fifty-five members: Washington, Madison, Hamilton, and the two Morrises, were among the number.
[123] It was not adopted by the legislative bodies, but representatives were elected by the people for this sole purpose; and the new const.i.tution was discussed at length in each of these a.s.semblies.
[124] See the amendment to the federal const.i.tution; Federalist, No. 32.
Story, p. 711. Kent"s Commentaries, Vol. i., p. 364.
It is to be observed, that whenever the _exclusive_ right of regulating certain matters is not reserved to congress by the const.i.tution, the states may take up the affair, until it is brought before the national a.s.sembly. For instance, congress has the right of making a general law of bankruptcy, which, however, it neglects to do. Each state is then at liberty to make a law for itself. This point, however, has been established by discussion in the law-courts, and may be said to belong more properly to jurisprudence.
[125] The action of this court is indirect, as we shall hereafter show.
[126] It is thus that the Federalist, No. 45, explains the division of supremacy between the union and the states: "The powers delegated by the const.i.tution to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the state governments are numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised princ.i.p.ally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce. The powers reserved to the several states will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the internal order and prosperity of the state."
I shall often have occasion to quote the Federalist in this work. When the bill which has since become the const.i.tution of the United States was submitted to the approval of the people, and the discussions were still pending, three men who had already acquired a portion of that celebrity which they have since enjoyed, John Jay, Hamilton, and Madison, formed an a.s.sociation with the intention of explaining to the nation the advantages of the measure which was proposed. With this view they published a series of articles in the shape of a journal, which now form a complete treatise. They ent.i.tled their journal, "The Federalist,"
a name which has been retained in the work. The Federalist is an excellent book, which ought to be familiar to the statesmen of all countries, although it especially concerns America.
[127] See const.i.tution, sect. 8. Federalist, Nos. 41 and 42. Kent"s Commentaries, vol. i., p. 207. Story, pp. 358-382; 409-426.
[128] Several other privileges of the same kind exist, such as that which empowers the Union to legislate on bankruptcy, to grant patents, and other matters in which its intervention is clearly necessary.
[129] Even in these cases its interference is indirect. The Union interferes by means of the tribunals, as will be hereafter shown.
[130] Federal Const.i.tution, sect. 10, art. 1.
[131] Const.i.tution, sect. 8, 9, and 10. Federalist, Nos. 30-36 inclusive, and 41-44. Kent"s Commentaries, vol. i., pp. 207 and 381.
Story pp. 329 and 514.
[132] Every ten years congress fixes anew the number of representatives which each state is to furnish. The total number was 69 in 1789, and 240 in 1833. (See American Almanac, 1834, p. 194.)
The const.i.tution decided that there should not be more than one representative for every 30,000 persons; but no minimum was fixed upon. The congress has not thought fit to augment the number of representatives in proportion to the increase of population. The first act which was pa.s.sed on the subject (14th April, 1792: see Laws of the United States, by Story, vol. i., p. 235) decided that there should be one representative for every 33,000 inhabitants. The last act, which was pa.s.sed in 1822, fixes the proportion at one for 48,000. The population represented is composed of all the freemen and of three-fifths of the slaves.
[133] See the Federalist, Nos. 52-66, inclusive. Story, pp. 199-314 Const.i.tution of the United States, sections 2 and 3.