"The Germans have more divisions on the western front than would have been thought possible a year ago, but already a half score of Germany"s best divisions have been smashed to pieces by the British onslaught and their own unsuccessful counter-attacks. The Bavarian divisions were sacrificed first, but the Prussian Guard divisions, thrown in to stem the British flood tide, have suffered such casualties in the last few days that they will have to be relieved."
The Canadians accounted for a large contingent of Prussian grenadiers in the fighting about "The Pimple" on Vimy ridge while an engagement at Lagnicourt April 15 took its heaviest toll both in dead and prisoners from five German guard regiments.
GERMAN ROUT AT LAGNICOURT.
The rout of the Germans at Lagnicourt, after what they believed to have been a successful attack, will ever be one of the striking pictures of the war. Repulsed and running for their own trenches, they were trapped by the barbed wire entanglements which had been built with such great strength and thickness in front of them. The boast of the Hindenburg line had been its belts of protective wire.
Caught within the meshes of this wire, the German guardsmen screamed madly for help and guidance. Some, like trapped rabbits, scurried up and down the outer barrier, searching in vain for openings. The British troops meantime had the greatest opportunity for open field rifle shooting since the battle of the Marne. Lying flat upon the ground, they poured bullets into the panic-stricken, gray-coated Germans until each man had fired a full 100 rounds.
While this was going on the British field guns came into play with a shrapnel barrage fire which completed the demolition of the entrapped enemy. It was little wonder that later 1,500 German dead could be counted, or that 400 guardsmen surrendered with upheld hands and emotional cries of "Kamerad!"
FRENCH CONTINUE ADVANCE IN APRIL
The French under General Nivelle continued their victorious advance on the Soissons-Craonne line April 18, crushing the German resistance along a front of thirty-five miles, and raising the total of German prisoners taken during the movement to 17,000. Seventy-five guns, including a number of heavy siege pieces, were captured.
CHAPTER x.x.x
GEN. PERSHING"S OWN STORY
_American Operations in France Described by the Commander-in- Chief--Glowing Tribute to His Men_.
A remarkable summary of the operations of the American Expeditionary Force in France from the date of its organization, May 26, 1917, to the signing of the armistice November 11, 1918, was cabled to the Secretary of War by General Pershing on November 20, 1918. His account of the active military operations was as follows:
COMBAT OPERATIONS
During our period of training in the trenches some of our divisions had engaged the enemy in local combats, the most important of which was Seicheprey by the 26th on April 20, 1918, in the Toul sector, but none had partic.i.p.ated in action as a unit. The 1st Division, which had pa.s.sed through the preliminary stages of training, had gone to the trenches for its first period of instruction at the end of October, and by March 21, when the German offensive in Picardy began, we had four divisions with experience in the trenches, all of which were equal to any demands of battle action. The crisis which this offensive developed was such that our occupation of an American sector must be postponed.
On March 28 I placed at the disposal of Marshal Foch, who had been agreed upon as Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, all of our forces to be used as he might decide. At his request the 1st Division was transferred from the Toul sector to a position in reserve at Chaumont en Vexin. As German superiority in numbers required prompt action, an agreement was reached at the Abbeville conference of the allied Premiers and commanders and myself on May 2 by which British shipping was to transport ten American divisions to the British Army area, where they were to be trained and equipped and additional British shipping was to be provided for as many divisions as possible for use elsewhere.
On April 26 the 1st Division had gone into the line in the Montdidier salient on the Picardy battle-front. Tactics had been suddenly revolutionized to those of open warfare, and our men, confident of the results of their training, were eager for the test. On the morning of May 28 this division attacked the commanding German position in its front, taking with splendid dash the town of Cantigny and all other objectives, which were organized and held steadfastly against vicious counterattacks and galling artillery fire. Although local, this brilliant action had an electrical effect, as it demonstrated our fighting qualities under extreme battle conditions, and also that the enemy"s troops were not altogether invincible.
The German Aisne offensive, which began on May 27, had advanced rapidly toward the River Marne and Paris, and the Allies faced a crisis equally as grave as that of the Picardy offensive in March. Again every available man was placed at Marshal Foch"s disposal, and the 3d Division, which had just come from its preliminary training: in the trenches, was hurried to the Marne. Its motorized machine-gun battalion preceded the other units and successfully held the bridgehead at the Marne, opposite Chateau-Thierry. The 2d Division, in reserve near Montdidier, was sent by motor trucks and other available transport to check the progress of the enemy toward Paris. The division attacked and retook the town and railroad station at Bouresches and st.u.r.dily held its ground against the enemy"s best guard divisions. In the battle of Belleau Wood, which followed, our men proved their superiority and gained a strong tactical position, with far greater loss to the enemy than to ourselves. On July 1, before the Second was relieved, it captured the village of Vaux with most splendid precision.
Meanwhile our 2d Corps, under Major-General George W. Read, had been organized for the command of our divisions with the British, which were held back in training areas or a.s.signed to second-line defences. Five of the ten divisions were withdrawn from the British area in June, three to relieve divisions in Lorraine and in the Vosges and two to the Paris area to join the group of American divisions which stood between the city and any further advance of the enemy in that direction.
AMERICAN DIVISIONS IN THE FIGHTING
The great June, July troop movement from the States was well under way, and, although these troops were to be given some preliminary training before being put into action, their very presence warranted the use of all the older divisions in the confidence that we did not lack reserves.
Elements of the 42d Division were in the line east of Rheims against the German offensive of July 15, and held their ground unflinchingly. On the right flank of this offensive four companies of the 28th Division were in position in face of the advancing waves of the German infantry. The 3d Division was holding the bank of the Marne from the bend east of the mouth of the Surmelin to the west of Mezy, opposite Chateau-Thierry, where a large force of German infantry sought to force a pa.s.sage under support of powerful artillery concentrations and under cover of smoke screens. A single regiment of the 3d wrote one of the most brilliant pages in our military annals on this occasion. It prevented the crossing at certain points on its front while, on either flank, the Germans, who had gained a footing, pressed forward. Our men, firing in three directions, met the German attacks with counterattacks at critical points and succeeded in throwing two German divisions into complete confusion, capturing 600 prisoners.
The great force of the German Chateau-Thierry offensive established the deep Marne salient, but the enemy was taking chances, and the vulnerability of this pocket to attack might be turned to his disadvantage. Seizing this opportunity to support my conviction, every division with any sort of training was made available for use in a counteroffensive. The place of honor in the thrust toward Soissons on July 18 was given to our 1st and 2d Divisions in company with chosen French divisions. Without the usual brief warning of a preliminary bombardment, the ma.s.sed French and American artillery, firing by the map, laid down its rolling barrage at dawn while the infantry began its charge. The tactical handling of our troops under these trying conditions was excellent throughout the action. The enemy brought up large numbers of reserves and made a stubborn defense, both with machine guns and artillery, but through five days" fighting the 1st Division continued to advance until it had gained the heights above Soissons and captured the village of Berzy-le-Sec. The 2d Division took Beau Repaire farm and Vierzy in a very rapid advance and reached a position in front of Tigny at the end of its second day. These two divisions captured 7,000 prisoners and over 100 pieces of artillery.
The 26th Division, which, with a French division, was under command of our 1st Corps, acted as a pivot of the movement toward Soissons. On the 18th it took the village of Torcy while the 3d Division was crossing the Marne in pursuit of the retiring enemy. The 26th attacked again on the 21st, and the enemy withdrew past the Chateau-Thierry-Soissons road. The 3d Division, continuing its progress, took the heights of Mont St. Pere and the villages of Charteves and Jaulgonne in the face of both machine gun and artillery fire.
On the 24th, after the Germans had fallen back from Trugny and Epieds, our 42d Division, which had been brought over from the Champagne, relieved the Twenty-sixth, and fighting its way through the Foret de Fere, overwhelmed the nest of machine guns in its path. By the 27th it had reached the Ourcq, whence the 3d and 4th Divisions were already advancing, while the French divisions with which we were cooperating were moving forward at other points.
The 3d Division had made its advance into Roncheres Wood on the 29th and was relieved for rest by a brigade of the Thirty-second. The Forty-second and Thirty-second undertook the task of conquering the heights beyond Cierges, the Forty-second capturing Sergy and the Thirty-second capturing Hill 230, both American divisions joining in the pursuit of the enemy to the Vesle, and thus the operation of reducing the salient was finished. Meanwhile the Forty-second was relieved by the Fourth at Chery-Chartreuve, and the Thirty-second by the Twenty-eighth, while the 77th Division took up a position on the Vesle. The operations of these divisions on the Vesle were under the 3d Corps, Maj.-Gen.
Robert L. Bullard commanding.
BATTLE OF ST. MIHIEL
With the reduction of the Marne salient, we could look forward to the concentration of our divisions in our own zone. In view of the forth-coming operation against the St. Mihiel salient, which had long been planned as our first offensive action on a large scale, the First Army was organized on August 10 under my personal command. While American units had held different divisional and corps sectors along the western front, there had not been up to this time, for obvious reasons, a distinct American sector; but, in view of the important parts the American forces were now to play, it was necessary to take over a permanent portion of the line. Accordingly, on August 30, the line beginning at Port sur Seille, east of the Moselle and extending to the west through St. Mihiel, thence north to a point opposite Verdun, was placed under my command. The American sector was afterward extended across the Meuse to the western edge of the Argonne Forest, and included the 2d Colonial French, which held the point of the salient, and the 17th French Corps, which occupied the heights above Verdun.
The preparation for a complicated operation against the formidable defenses in front of us included the a.s.sembling of divisions and of corps and army artillery, transport, aircraft, tanks, ambulances, the location of hospitals, and the molding together of all of the elements of a great modern army with its own railroads, supplied directly by our own Service of Supply, The concentration for this operation, which was to be a surprise, involved the movement, mostly at night, of approximately 600,000 troops, and required for its success the most careful attention to every detail.
The French were generous in giving us a.s.sistance in corps and army artillery, with its personnel, and we were confident from the start of our superiority over the enemy in guns of all calibers. Our heavy guns were able to reach Metz and to interfere seriously with German rail movements. The French Independent Air Force was placed under my command which, together with the British bombing squadrons and our air forces, gave us the largest a.s.sembly of aviation that had ever been engaged in one operation on the Western front.
From Les Eparges around the nose of the salient at St. Mihiel to the Moselle River the line was roughly forty miles long and situated on commanding ground greatly strengthened by artificial defenses. Our 1st Corps (82d, 90th, 5th and 2d Divisions), under command of Major-Gen.
Hunter Liggett, restrung its right on Pont-a-Mousson, with its left joining our 3d Corps (the 89th, 42d and 1st Divisions), under Major-Gen.
Joseph T. d.i.c.kman, in line to Xivray, were to swing toward Vigneulles on the pivot of the Moselle River for the initial a.s.sault. From Xivray to Mouilly the 2d Colonial French Corps was in line in the center, and our 5th Corps, under command of Major-Gen. George H. Cameron, with our 26th Division and a French division at the western base of the salient, were to attack three different hills--Les Eparges, Combres and Amaramthe.
Our 1st Corps had in reserve the 78th Division, our 4th Corps the 3d Division, and our First Army the 35th and 91st Divisions, with the 80th and 33d available. It should be understood that our corps organizations are very elastic, and that we have at no time had permanent a.s.signments of divisions to corps.
After four hours" artillery preparations, the seven American divisions in the front line advanced at 5 a.m. on September 12, a.s.sisted by a limited number of tanks manned partly by Americans and partly by French.
These divisions, accompanied by groups of wire cutters and others armed with bangalore torpedoes, went through the successive bands of barbed wire that protected the enemy"s front line and support trenches, in irresistible waves on schedule time, breaking down all defense of an enemy demoralized by the great volume of our artillery fire and our sudden approach out of the fog.
Our 1st Corps advanced to Thiaucourt, while our 4th Corps curved back to the southwest through Nonsard. The 2d Colonial French Corps made the slight advance required of it on very difficult ground, and the 5th Corps took its three ridges and repulsed a counterattack. A rapid march brought reserve regiments of a division of the 5th Corps into Vigneulles in the early morning, where it linked up with patrols of our 4th Corps, closing the salient and forming a new line west of Thiaucourt to Vigneulles and beyond Fresnes-en-Woevre. At the cost of only 7, casualties, mostly light, we had taken 16,000 prisoners and 443 guns, a great quant.i.ty of material, released the inhabitants of many villages from enemy domination, and established our lines in a position to threaten Metz. This signal success of the American First Army in its first offensive was of prime importance. The Allies found they had a formidable army to aid them, and the enemy learned finally that he had one to reckon with.
MEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE, FIRST PHASE
On the day after we had taken the St. Mihiel salient, much of our corps and army artillery which had operated at St. Mihiel, and our divisions in reserve at other points, were already on the move toward the area back of the line between the Meuse River and the western edge of the forest of Argonne. With the exception of St. Mihiel, the old German front line from Switzerland to the east of Rheims was still intact.
In the general attack all along the line, the operation a.s.signed the American Army as the hinge of this allied offensive was directed toward the important railroad communications of the German armies through Mezieres and Sedan. The enemy must hold fast to this part of his lines or the withdrawal of his forces with four years" acc.u.mulation of plants and material would be dangerously imperiled.
The German Army had as yet shown no demoralization, and, while the ma.s.s of its troops had suffered in morale, its first-cla.s.s divisions, and notably its machine-gun defense, were exhibiting remarkable tactical efficiency as well as courage. The German General Staff was fully aware of the consequences of a success on the Meuse-Argonne line. Certain that he would do everything in his power to oppose us, the action was planned with as much secrecy as possible and was undertaken with the determination to use all our divisions in forcing decision. We expected to draw the best German divisions to our front and to consume them while the enemy was held under grave apprehension lest our attack should break his line, which it was our firm purpose to do.
Our right flank was protected by the Meuse, while our left embraced the Argonne Forest, whose ravines, hills, and elaborate defense, screened by dense thickets, had been generally considered impregnable. Our order of battle from right to left was the 3d Corps from the Meuse to Malancourt, with the 33d, 80th and 4th Divisions in line, and the 3d Division as corps reserve; the 5th Corps from Malancourt to Vauquois, with 79th, 87th and 91st Divisions in line, and the 32d in corps reserve, and the 1st Corps, from Vauquois to Vienne le Chateau, with 35th, 28th and 77th Divisions in line, and the 92d in corps reserve. The army reserve consisted of the 1st, 29th and 82d Divisions.
On the night of September 25 our troops quietly took the place of the French, who thinly held the line of this sector, which had long been inactive. In the attack which began on the 26th we drove through the barbed wire entanglements and the sea of sh.e.l.l craters across No Man"s Land, mastering all the first-line defences. Continuing on the 27th and 28th, against machine guns and artillery of an increasing number of enemy reserve divisions, we penetrated to a depth of from three to seven miles and took the village of Montfaucon and its commanding hill and Exermont, Gercourt, Cuisy, Septsarges, Malancourt, Ivoiry, Epinonville, Charpentry, Very and other villages. East of the Meuse one of our divisions, which was with the 2d Colonial French Corps, captured Marcheville and Rieville, giving further protection to the flank of our main body. We had taken 10,000 prisoners, we had gained our point of forcing th$ battle into the open, and were prepared for the enemy"s reaction, which was bound to come, as he had good roads and ample railroad facilities for bringing up his artillery and reserves.
In the chill rain of dark nights our engineers had to build new roads across spongy sh.e.l.l-torn areas, repair broken roads beyond No Man"s Land, and build bridges. Our gunners, with no thought of sleep, put their shoulders to wheels and drag-ropes to bring their guns through the mire in support of the infantry, now under the increasing fire of the enemy"s artillery. Our attack had taken the enemy by surprise, but quickly recovering himself, he began to fire counterattacks in strong force, supported by heavy bombardments, with large quant.i.ties of gas.
From September 28 until October 4 we maintained the offensive against patches of woods defended by snipers and continuous lines of machine guns, and pushed forward our guns and transport, seizing strategical points in preparation for further attacks.
OTHER UNITS WITH ALLIES
Other divisions attached to the allied armies were doing their part.
It was the fortune of our 2d Corps, composed of the 27th and 30th Divisions, which had remained with the British, to have a place of honor in cooperation with the Australian Corps on September 29 and October in the a.s.sault on the Hindenburg Line where the St. Quentin Ca.n.a.l pa.s.ses through a tunnel under a ridge. The 30th Division speedily broke through the main line of defense for all its objectives, while the 27th pushed on impetuously through the main line until some of its elements reached Gouy. In the midst of the maze of trenches and sh.e.l.l craters and under crossfire from machine guns the other elements fought desperately against odds. In this and in later actions, from October 6 to October 19, our 2d Corps captured over 6,000 prisoners and advanced over thirteen miles. The spirit and aggressiveness of these divisions have been highly praised by the British Army commander under whom they served.
On October 2-9 our 2d and 36th Divisions were sent to a.s.sist the French in an important attack against the old German positions before Rheims.
The 2d conquered the complicated defense works on their front against a persistent defense worthy of the grimmest period of trench warfare and attacked the strongly held wooded hill of Blanc Mont, which they captured in a second a.s.sault, sweeping over it with consummate dash and skill. This division then repulsed strong counterattacks before the village and cemetery of Ste. Etienne and took the town, forcing the Germans to fall back from before Rheims and yield positions they had held since September, 1914. On October 9 the 36th Division relieved the 2d, and in its first experience under fire withstood very severe artillery bombardment and rapidly took up the pursuit of the enemy, now retiring behind the Aisne.
MEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE, SECOND PHASE
The allied progress elsewhere cheered the efforts of our men in this crucial contest, as the German command threw in more and more first-cla.s.s troops to stop our advance. We made steady headway in the almost impenetrable and strongly held Argonne Forest, for, despite this reinforcement, it was our army that was doing the driving. Our aircraft was increasing in skill and numbers and forcing the issue, and our infantry and artillery were improving rapidly with each new experience.
The replacements fresh from home were put into exhausted divisions with little time for training, but they had the advantage of serving beside men who knew their business and who had almost become veterans overnight. The enemy had taken every advantage of the terrain, which especially favored the defense by a prodigal use of machine guns manned by highly trained veterans and by using his artillery at short ranges.
In the face of such strong frontal positions we should have been unable to accomplish and progress according to previously accepted standards, but I had every confidence in our aggressive tactics and the courage of our troops.