How many of the male bipeds who do our voting are qualified to hold high offices? How many of the large cla.s.s to whom the right of voting is supposed to have been secured by the fifteenth amendment, are qualified to hold office?
Whenever the qualifications of persons to discharge the duties of responsible offices is made the test of their right to vote, and we are to have a compet.i.tive examination on that subject, open to all claimants, my client will be content to enter the lists, and take her chances among the candidates for such honors.
But the practice of the world, and our own practice, give the lie to this objection. Compare the administration of female sovereigns of great kingdoms, from Semiramis to Victoria, with the average administration of male sovereigns, and which will suffer by the comparison? How often have mothers governed large kingdoms, as regents, during the minority of their sons, and governed them well? Such offices as the "sovereigns" who rule them in this country have allowed women to hold (they having no voice on the subject), they have discharged the duties of with ever increasing satisfaction to the public; and Congress has lately pa.s.sed an act, making the official bonds of married women valid, so that they could be appointed to the office of postmaster.
The case of _Olive vs. Ingraham (7 Modern Rep. 263)_ was an action brought to try the t.i.tle to an office. On the death of the s.e.xton of the parish of St. Butolph, the place was to be filled by election, the voters being the housekeepers who "paid Scot and lot" in the parish. The widow of the deceased s.e.xton (Sarah Bly) entered the lists against Olive, the plaintiff in the suit, and received 169 indisputable votes, and 40 votes given by women who were "housekeepers, and paid to church and poor." The plaintiff had 174 indisputable votes, and 22 votes given by such women as voted for Mrs. Bly. Mrs. Bly was declared elected. The action was brought to test two questions: 1. Whether women were legal voters; and 2. Whether a woman was capable of holding the office. The case was four times argued in the King"s Bench, and all the judges delivered opinions, holding that the women were competent voters; that the widow was properly elected, and could hold the office.
In the course of the discussion it was shown that women had held many offices, those of constable, church warden, overseer of the poor, keeper of the "gate house" (a public prison), governess of a house of correction, keeper of castles, sheriffs of counties, and high constable of England.
If women are legally competent to hold minor offices, I would be glad to have the rule of law, or of propriety, shown which should exclude them from higher offices, and which marks the line between those which they may and those which they may not hold.
Another objection is that women cannot serve as soldiers. To this I answer that capacity for military service has never been made a test of the right to vote. If it were, young men from sixteen to twenty-one would be ent.i.tled to vote, and old men from sixty and up-wards would not. If that were the test, some women would present much stronger claims than many of the male s.e.x.
Another objection is that engaging in political controversies is not consistent with the feminine character. Upon that subject, women themselves are the best judges, and if political duties should be found inconsistent with female delicacy, we may rest a.s.sured that women will either effect a change in the character of political contests, or decline to engage in them. This subject may be safely left to their sense of delicacy and propriety.
If any difficulty on this account should occur, it may not be impossible to receive the votes of women at their places of residence. This method of voting was practiced in ancient Rome under the republic; and it will be remembered that when the votes of the soldiers who were fighting our battles in the Southern States were needed to sustain their friends at home, no difficulty was found in the way of taking their votes at their respective camps.
I humbly submit to your honor, therefore, that on the const.i.tutional grounds to which I have referred, Miss Anthony had a lawful right to vote; that her vote was properly received and counted; that the first section of the fourteenth amendment secured to her that right, and did not need the aid of any further legislation.
But conceding that I may be in error in supposing that Miss Anthony had a right to vote, she has been guilty of no crime, if she voted in good faith believing that she had such right.
This proposition appears to me so obvious, that were it not for the severity to my client of the consequences which may follow a conviction, I should not deem it necessary to discuss it.
To make out the offence, it is inc.u.mbent on the prosecution to show affirmatively, not only that the defendant knowingly voted, but that she so voted _knowing that she had no right to vote_. That is, the term "knowingly," applies, not to the fact of voting, but to the fact of _want of right_. Any other interpretation of the language would be absurd. We cannot conceive of a case where a party could vote without knowledge of the fact of voting, and to apply the term "knowingly" to the more act of voting, would make nonsense of the statute. This word was inserted as defining the essence of the offence, and it limits the criminality to cases where the voting is not only without right, but where it is done wilfully, with a _knowledge that it is without right_.
Short of that there is no offence within the statute. This would be so upon well established principles, even if the word "knowingly" had been omitted, but that word was inserted to prevent the possibility of doubt on the subject, and to furnish security against the inability of stupid or prejudiced judges or jurors, to distinguish between wilful wrong and innocent mistake. If the statute had been merely, that "if at any election for representative in Congress any person shall vote without having a lawful right to vote, such person shall be deemed guilty of a crime," there could have been justly no conviction under it, without proof that the party voted _knowing_ that he had not a right to vote. If he voted innocently supposing he had the right to vote, but had not, it would not be an offence within the statute. An innocent mistake is not a crime, and no amount of judicial decisions can make it such.
Mr. Bishop says, (1 Cr. Law, --205): "There can be no crime unless _a culpable intent_ accompanies the criminal act." The same author, (1 Cr.
Prac. --521), repeated in other words, the same idea: "In order to render a party criminally responsible, _a vicious will_ must concur with a wrongful act."
I quote from a more distinguished author: "_Felony is always accompanied with an evil intention, and therefore shall not be imputed to a mere mistake, or misanimadversion_, as where persons break open a door, in order to execute a warrant, which will not justify such proceeding: _Affectio enim tua nomen imponit operi tuo: item crimen non contrahitur nisi nocendi, voluntas intercedat_," which, as I understand, may read: "For your volition puts the name upon your act; and _a crime is not committed unless the will of the offender takes part in it_."
1 Hawk. P.C., p. 99, Ch. 85, --3.
This quotation by Hawkins is, I believe, from Bracton, which carries the principle back to a very early period in the existence of the common law. It is a principle, however, which underlies all law, and must have been recognized at all times, wherever criminal law has been administered, with even the slightest reference to the principles of common morality and justice.
I quote again on this subject from Mr. Bishop: "The doctrine of _the intent_ as it prevails in the criminal law, is necessarily _one of the foundation principles of public justice_. There is only one criterion by which the guilt of man is to be tested. It is whether the mind is criminal. Criminal law relates only to crime. And neither in philosophical speculation, nor in religious or moral sentiment, would any people in any age allow that a man should be deemed guilty unless his mind was so. It is, therefore, a principle of our legal system, as probably it is of every other, that _the essence of an offence is the wrongful intent without which it cannot exist_." (_1 Bishop"s Crim. Law, --287._)
Again, the same author, writing on the subject of _knowledge_, as necessary to establish the intent, says: "It is absolutely necessary to const.i.tute guilt, as in indictments for uttering forged tokens, or other attempts to defraud, or for receiving stolen goods, and offences of a similar description." (_1 Crim. Prac. --504._)
In regard to the offence of obtaining property by false pretenses, the author says: "The indictment must allege that the defendant knew the pretenses to be false. _This is necessary upon the general principles of the law_, in order to show an offence, even though the statute does not contain the word "knowingly."" (_2 Id. --172._)
As to a _presumed knowledge_ of the law, where the fact involves a question of law, the same author says: "The general doctrine laid down in the foregoing sections," (i.e. that every man is presumed to know the law, and that ignorance of the law does not excuse,) "is plain in itself and plain in its application. Still there are cases, the precise nature and extent of which are not so obvious, wherein ignorance of the law const.i.tutes, in a sort of indirect way, not in itself a defence, but a foundation on which another defence rests. Thus, if the guilt or innocence of a prisoner, depends on the fact to be found by the jury, of his having been or not, when he did the act, in some precise mental condition, _which mental condition is the gist of the offence_, the jury in determining this question of mental condition, _may_ take into consideration his ignorance or misinformation in a matter of law. For example, to const.i.tute larceny, there must be an intent to steal, which involves the knowledge that the property taken does not belong to the taker; yet, if all the facts concerning the t.i.tle are known to the accused, and so the question is one merely of law whether the property is his or not, still he may show, and the showing _will be a defence_ to him against the criminal proceeding, that he _honestly believed it his through a misapprehension of the law_."
(1 Cr. Law, --297.)
The conclusions of the writer here, are correct, but in a part of the statement the learned author has thrown some obscurity over his own principles. The doctrines elsewhere enunciated by him, show with great clearness, that in such cases _the state of the mind const.i.tutes the essence of the offence_, and if the state of the mind which the law condemns does not exist, in connection with the act, there is no offence. It is immaterial whether its non-existence be owing to ignorance of law or ignorance of fact, in either case the fact which the law condemns, the criminal intent, is wanting. It is not, therefore, in an "indirect way," that ignorance of the law in such cases const.i.tutes a defence, but in the most direct way possible. It is not a fact which jurors "may take into consideration," or not, at their pleasure, but which they must take into consideration, because, in case the ignorance exists, no matter from what cause, _the offence which the statute describes is not committed_. In such case, ignorance of the law is not interposed as a shield to one committing a criminal act, but merely to show, as it does show, that no criminal act has been committed.
I quote from Sir Mathew Hale on the subject. Speaking of larceny, the learned author says: "As it is _cepit_ and _asportavit_, so it must be _felonice_, or _animo furandi_, otherwise it is not felony, for _it is the mind_ that makes the taking of another"s goods to be a felony, or a bare trespa.s.s only; but because the intention and mind are secret, the intention must be judged of by the circ.u.mstances of the fact, and these circ.u.mstances are various, and may sometimes deceive, yet regularly and ordinarily these circ.u.mstances following direct in the case. If A., thinking he hath a t.i.tle to the house of B., seizeth it as his own ...
this regularly makes no felony, but a trespa.s.s only; but yet this may be a trick to colour a felony, and the ordinary discovery of a felonious intent is, if the party doth it secretly, or being charged with the goods denies it."
(1 Hales P.C. 509.)
I concede, that if Miss Anthony voted, knowing that as a woman she had no right to vote, she may properly be convicted, and that if she had dressed herself in men"s apparel, and a.s.sumed a man"s name, or resorted to any other artifice to deceive the board of inspectors, the jury might properly regard her claim of right, to be merely colorable, and might, in their judgment, p.r.o.nounce her guilty of the offence charged, in case the const.i.tution has not secured to her the right she claimed. All I claim is, that if she voted in perfect good faith, believing that it was her right, she has committed no crime. An innocent mistake, whether of law or fact, though a wrongful act may be done in pursuance of it, cannot const.i.tute a crime.
[The following cases and authorities were referred to and commented upon by the counsel, as sustaining his positions: _U.S. vs. Conover, 3 McLean"s Rep. 573; The State vs. McDonald, 4 Harrington, 555; The State vs. Homes, 17 Mo. 379; Rex vs. Hall, 3 C. & P. 409, (S.C. 14 Eng. C.L.); The Queen vs. Reed, 1 C. & M. 306. (S.C. 41 Eng. C.L.); Lancaster"s Case, 3 Leon. 208; Starkie on Ev., Part IV, Vol. 2, p. 828, 3d Am. Ed._]
The counsel then said, there are some cases which I concede cannot be reconciled with the position which I have endeavoured to maintain, and I am sorry to say that one of them is found in the reports of this State.
As the other cases are referred to in that, and the principle, if they can be said to stand on any principle, is in all of them the same, it will only be inc.u.mbent on me to notice that one. That case is not only irreconcilable with the numerous authorities and the fundamental principles of criminal law to which I have referred, but the enormity of its injustice is sufficient alone to condemn it. I refer to the case of _Hamilton vs. The People_, (_57 Barb. 725_). In that case Hamilton had been convicted of a misdemeanor, in having voted at a general election, after having been previously convicted of a felony and sentenced to two years imprisonment in the state prison, and not having been pardoned; the conviction having by law deprived him of citizenship and right to vote, unless pardoned and restored to citizenship. The case came up before the General Term of the Supreme Court, on writ of error. It appeared that on the trial evidence was offered, that before the prisoner was discharged from the state prison, he and his father applied to the Governor for a pardon, and that the Governor replied in writing, that on the ground of the prisoner"s being a minor at the time of his discharge from prison, a pardon would not be necessary, and that he would be ent.i.tled to all the rights of a citizen on his coming of age.
They also applied to two respectable counsellors of the Supreme Court, and they confirmed the Governor"s opinion. All this evidence was rejected. It appeared that the prisoner was seventeen years old when convicted of the felony, and was nineteen when discharged from prison.
The rejection of the evidence was approved by the Supreme Court on the ground that the prisoner was bound to know the law, and was presumed to do so, and his conviction was accordingly confirmed.
Here a young man, innocent so far as his conduct in this case was involved, was condemned, for acting in good faith upon the advice, (mistaken advice it may be conceded,) of one governor and two lawyers to whom he applied for information as to his rights; and this condemnation has proceeded upon the a.s.sumed ground, conceded to be false in fact, that he knew the advice given to him was wrong. On this judicial fiction the young man, in the name of justice, is sent to prison, punished for a mere mistake, and a mistake made in pursuance of such advice. It cannot be, consistently with the radical principles of criminal law to which I have referred, and the numerous authorities which I have quoted, that this man was guilty of a crime, that his _mistake_ was a crime, and I think the judges who p.r.o.nounced his condemnation, upon their own principles, better than their victim, deserved the punishment which they inflicted.
The condemnation of Miss Anthony, her good faith being conceded, would do no less violence to any fair administration of justice.
One other matter will close what I have to say. Miss Anthony believed, and was advised that she had a right to vote. She may also have been advised, as was clearly the fact, that the question as to her right could not be brought before the courts for trial, without her voting or offering to vote, and if either was criminal, the one was as much so as the other. Therefore she stands, now arraigned as a criminal, for taking the only steps by which it was possible to bring the great const.i.tutional question as to her right, before the tribunals of the country for adjudication. If for thus acting, in the most perfect good faith, with motives as pure and impulses as n.o.ble as any which can find place in your honor"s breast in the administration of justice, she is by the laws of her country to be condemned as a criminal, she must abide the consequences. Her condemnation, however, under such circ.u.mstances, would only add another most weighty reason to those which I have already advanced, to show that women need the aid of the ballot for their protection.
Upon the remaining question, of the good faith of the defendant, it is not necessary for me to speak. That she acted in the most perfect good faith stands conceded.
Thanking your honor for the great patience with which you have listened to my too extended remarks, I submit the legal questions which the case involves for your honor"s consideration.
THE COURT addressed the jury as follows:
_Gentlemen of the Jury_:
I have given this case such consideration as I have been able to, and, that there might be no misapprehension about my views, I have made a brief statement in writing.
The defendant is indicted under the act of Congress of 1870, for having voted for Representatives in Congress in November, 1872. Among other things, that Act makes it an offence for any person knowingly to vote for such Representatives without having a right to vote. It is charged that the defendant thus voted, she not having a right to vote because she is a woman. The defendant insists that she has a right to vote; that the provision of the Const.i.tution of this State limiting the right to vote to persons of the male s.e.x is in violation of the 14th Amendment of the Const.i.tution of the United States, and is void. The 13th, 14th and 15th Amendments were designed mainly for the protection of the newly emanc.i.p.ated negroes, but full effect must nevertheless be given to the language employed. The 13th Amendment provided that neither slavery nor involuntary servitude should longer exist in the United States. If honestly received and fairly applied, this provision would have been enough to guard the rights of the colored race. In some States it was attempted to be evaded by enactments cruel and oppressive in their nature, as that colored persons were forbidden to appear in the towns except in a menial capacity; that they should reside on and cultivate the soil without being allowed to own it; that they were not permitted to give testimony in cases where a white man was a party. They were excluded from performing particular kinds of business, profitable and reputable, and they were denied the right of suffrage. To meet the difficulties arising from this state of things, the 14th and 15th Amendments were enacted.
The 14th Amendment created and defined citizenship of the United States.
It had long been contended, and had been held by many learned authorities, and had never been judicially decided to the contrary, that there was no such thing as a citizen of the United States, except as that condition arose from citizenship of some State. No mode existed, it was said, of obtaining a citizenship of the United States except by first becoming a citizen of some State. This question is now at rest.
The 14th Amendment defines and declares who should be citizens of the United States, to wit: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof." The latter qualification was intended to exclude the children of foreign representatives and the like. With this qualification every person born in the United States or naturalized is declared to be a citizen of the United States, and of the State wherein he resides. After creating and defining citizenship of the United States, the Amendment provides that no State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of a citizen of the United States. This clause is intended to be a protection, not to all our rights, but to our rights as citizens of the United States only; that is, the rights existing or belonging to that condition or capacity. The words "or citizen of a State," used in the previous paragraph are carefully omitted here. In article 4, paragraph 2, of the Const.i.tution of the United States it had been already provided in this language, viz: "the citizens of each State shall be ent.i.tled to all the privileges and immunities of the citizens in the several States." The rights of citizens of the States and of citizens of the United States are each guarded by these different provisions. That these rights were separate and distinct, was held in the Slaughter House Cases recently decided by the United States Supreme Court at Washington. The rights of citizens of the State, as such, are not under consideration in the 14th Amendment. They stand as they did before the adoption of the 14th Amendment, and are fully guaranteed by other provisions. The rights of citizens of the States have been the subject of judicial decision on more than one occasion. _Corfield agt.
Coryell, 4 Wash.; C.C.R., 371. Ward agt. Maryland; 12 Wall., 430. Paul agt. Virginia, 8 Wall., 140._
These are the fundamental privileges and immunities belonging of right to the citizens of all free governments, such as the right of life and liberty; the right to acquire and possess property, to transact business, to pursue happiness in his own manner, subject to such restraint as the Government may adjudge to be necessary for the general good. In _Cromwell agt. Nevada, 6 Wallace, 36_, is found a statement of some of the rights of a citizen of the United States, viz: "To come to the seat of the Government to a.s.sert any claim he may have upon the Government, to transact any business he may have with it; to seek its protection; to share its offices; to engage in administering its functions. He has the right of free access to its seaports through which all operations of foreign commerce are conducted, to the sub-treasuries, land offices, and courts of justice in the several States." Another privilege of a citizen of the United States, says Miller, Justice, in the "Slaughter House" cases, is to demand the care and protection of the Federal Government over his life, liberty and property when on the high seas or within the jurisdiction of a foreign government. The right to a.s.semble and pet.i.tion for a redress of grievances, the privilege of the writ of _habeas corpus_, he says, are rights of the citizen guaranteed by the Federal Const.i.tution.
The right of voting, or the privilege of voting, is a right or privilege arising under the Const.i.tution of the State, and not of the United States. The qualifications are different in the different States.
Citizenship, age, s.e.x, residence, are variously required in the different States, or may be so. If the right belongs to any particular person, it is because such person is ent.i.tled to it by the laws of the State where he offers to exercise it, and not because of citizenship of the United States. If the State of New York should provide that no person should vote until he had reached the age of 31 years, or after he had reached the age of 50, or that no person having gray hair, or who had not the use of all his limbs, should be ent.i.tled to vote, I do not see how it could be held to be a violation of any right derived or held under the Const.i.tution of the United States. We might say that such regulations were unjust, tyrannical, unfit for the regulation of an intelligent State; but if rights of a citizen are thereby violated, they are of that fundamental cla.s.s derived from his position as a citizen of the State, and not those limited rights belonging to him as a citizen of the United States, and such was the decision in _Corfield agt. Coryell_.
(Supra.) The United States rights appertaining to this subject are those first under article I, paragraph 2, of the United States Const.i.tution, which provides that electors of Representatives in Congress shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State Legislature, and second, under the 15th Amendment, which provides that the right of a citizen of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States, or by any State, on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. If the Legislature of the State of New York should require a higher qualification in a voter for a representative in Congress than is required for a voter for a Member of a.s.sembly, this would, I conceive, be a violation of a right belonging to one as a citizen of the United States. That right is in relation to a Federal subject or interest, and is guaranteed by the Federal Const.i.tution. The inability of a State to abridge the right of voting on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, arises from a Federal guaranty. Its violation would be the denial of a Federal right--that is a right belonging to the claimant as a citizen of the United States.
This right, however, exists by virtue of the 15th Amendment. If the 15th Amendment had contained the word "s.e.x," the argument of the defendant would have been potent. She would have said, an attempt by a State to deny the right to vote because one is of a particular s.e.x, is expressly prohibited by that Amendment. The amendment, however, does not contain that word. It is limited to race, color, or previous condition of servitude. The Legislature of the State of New York has seen fit to say, that the franchise of voting shall be limited to the male s.e.x. In saying this, there is, in my judgment, no violation of the letter or of the spirit of the 14th or of the 15th Amendment. This view is a.s.sumed in the second section of the 14th Amendment, which enacts that if the right to vote for Federal officers is denied by any state to any of the male inhabitants of such State, except for crime, the basis of representation of such State shall be reduced in proportion specified. Not only does this section a.s.sume that the right of male inhabitants to vote was the especial object of its protection, but it a.s.sumes and admits the right of a State, notwithstanding the existence of that clause under which the defendant claims to the contrary, to deny to cla.s.ses or portions of the male inhabitants the right to vote which is allowed to other male inhabitants. The regulation of the suffrage is thereby conceded to the States as a State"s right. The case of Myra Bradwell, decided at a recent term of the Supreme Court of the United States, sustains both the positions above put forth, viz: First, that the rights referred to in the 14th Amendment are those belonging to a person as a citizen of the United States and not as a citizen of a State, and second, that a right of the character here involved is not one connected with citizenship of the United States. Mrs. Bradwell made application to be admitted to practice as an attorney and counsellor at law, in the Courts of Illinois. Her application was denied, and upon appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, it was there held that to give jurisdiction under the 14th Amendment, the claim must be of a right pertaining to citizenship of the United States, and that the claim made by her did not come within that cla.s.s of cases. Mr. Justice Bradley and Mr.
Justice Field held that a woman was not ent.i.tled to a license to practice law. It does not appear that the other Judges pa.s.sed upon that question.
The 14th Amendment gives no right to a woman to vote, and the voting by Miss Anthony was in violation of the law.
If she believed she had a right to vote, and voted in reliance upon that belief, does that relieve her from the penalty? It is argued that the knowledge referred to in the act relates to her knowledge of the illegality of the act, and not to the act of voting; for it is said that she must know that she voted. Two principles apply here: First, ignorance of the law excuses no one; second, every person is presumed to understand and to intend the necessary effects of his own acts. Miss Anthony knew that she was a woman, and that the const.i.tution of this State prohibits her from voting. She intended to violate that provision--intended to test it, perhaps, but certainly intended to violate it. The necessary effect of her act was to violate it, and this she is presumed to have intended. There was no ignorance of any fact, but all the facts being known, she undertook to settle a principle in her own person. She takes the risk, and she cannot escape the consequences. It is said, and authorities are cited to sustain the position, that there can be no crime unless there is a culpable intent; to render one criminally responsible a vicious will must be present. A commits a trespa.s.s on the land of B, and B, thinking and believing that he has a right to shoot an intruder on his premises, kills A on the spot. Does B"s misapprehension of his rights justify his act? Would a Judge be justified in charging the jury that if satisfied that B supposed he had a right to shoot A he was justified, and they should find a verdict of not guilty? No Judge would make such a charge. To const.i.tute a crime, it is true, that there must be a criminal intent, but it is equally true that knowledge of the facts of the case is always held to supply this intent. An intentional killing bears with it evidence of malice in law. Whoever, without justifiable cause, intentionally kills his neighbor, is guilty of a crime. The principle is the same in the case before us, and in all criminal cases. The precise question now before me has been several times decided, viz.: that one illegally voting was bound and was a.s.sumed to know the law, and that a belief that he had a right to vote gave no defense, if there was no mistake of fact. (Hamilton against The People, 57th of Barbour, p. 625; State against Boyet, 10th of Iredell, p. 336; State against Hart, 6th Jones, 389; McGuire against State, 7 Humphrey, 54; 15th of Iowa reports, 404.) No system of criminal jurisprudence can be sustained upon any other principle. a.s.suming that Miss Anthony believed she had a right to vote, that fact const.i.tutes no defense if in truth she had not the right. She voluntarily gave a vote which was illegal, and thus is subject to the penalty of the law.