But even if this point be wholly laid out of the case, and it had been conceded that Miss Anthony had knowingly violated the law, if she should be proved to have voted at all, so that the only questions before the Court were, first--whether she had voted as charged, and secondly--whether the law forbade her voting; and if in this state of the case a hundred witnesses had been brought by the government, to testify that she had "openly avowed" in their presence that she had voted, so that practically the question of her having voted was proved beyond all possible question, still, the judge would have no right to order a verdict of guilty. The proof that she voted would still be _evidence_, and _mere evidence_, and a judge has no power whatever to deal with evidence. He can deal only with the law of the case, and the jury alone can deal with the facts.
But we will go further than this. We will suppose that in New York, as in some of the States, a defendant in a criminal case is allowed to testify, and that Miss Anthony had gone upon the stand as a witness, and had stated distinctly and unequivocally that she did in fact vote as charged. We must not forget that, if this had actually occurred, she would at the same time have stated that she voted in the full belief that she had a right to vote, and that she was advised by eminent counsel that she had such right; a state of the case which we have before referred to as presenting a vital question of fact for the jury, and which excludes the possibility of the case being legally dealt with by the judge alone; but this point we are laying out of the case in the view we are now taking of it. We will suppose that Miss Anthony not only testified that she voted in fact, but also that she had no belief that she had any right to vote; making a case where, if the Court should hold as matter of law that she had no right to vote, there would seem to be no possible verdict for the jury to bring in but that of "guilty."
Even in this case, which would seem to resolve itself as much as possible into a mere question of law, there is yet no power whatever on the part of the judge to order a verdict of guilty, but it rests entirely in the judgment and conscience of the jury what verdict they will bring in. They may act unwisely and unconscientiously, perhaps by mere favoritism, or a weak sympathy, or prejudice, or on any other indefensible ground; but yet they have entire _power_ over the matter.
It is for them finally to say what their verdict shall be, and the judge has no power beyond that of instruction upon the law involved in the case.
The proposition laid down by the writer before referred to, that "in jury trials all questions of law are decided by the judge," is not unqualifiedly true. It is so in civil causes, but in criminal causes it has been holden by many of our best courts that the jury are judges of the law as well as of the facts. Pages could be filled with authorities in support of this proposition. The courts do hold, however, that the judges are to _instruct_ the jury as to the law, and that it is their duty to take the law as thus laid down. But it has never been held that if the jury a.s.sume the responsibility of holding a prisoner not guilty in the face of a charge from the judge that required a verdict of guilty, where the question was wholly one of law, they had not full power to do it.
The question is one ordinarily of little practical importance, but it here helps to make clear the very point we are discussing. Here the judge laid down the law, correctly, we will suppose, certainly in terms that left the jury no doubt as to what he meant; and here, by all the authorities, the jury ought, as a matter of proper deference in one view, or of absolute duty in the other, to have adopted the view of the law given them by the judge. But it was in either case the _jury only_ who could apply the law to the case. The judge could _instruct_, but the jury only could _apply the instruction_. That is, the instruction of the judge, no matter how authoritative we may regard it, could find its way to the defendant _only through the verdict of the jury_.
It is only where the confession of facts is _matter of record_, (that is, where the plea filed or recorded in the case _admits_ them), that the judge can enter up a judgment without the finding of a jury. Thus, if the defendant pleads "guilty," there is no need of a jury finding him so. If, however, he pleads "not guilty," then, no matter how overwhelming is the testimony against him on the trial, no matter if a hundred witnesses prove his admission of all the facts, the whole is not legally decisive like a plea of guilty; but the question still remains a question of fact, and the jury alone can determine what the verdict shall be. In other words, it is no less a question of fact for the reason that the evidence is all one way and overwhelming, or that the defendant has in his testimony admitted all the facts against himself.
The writer has intended this article for general rather than professional readers, and has therefore not enc.u.mbered it with authorities; but he has stated only rules and principles that are well established and familiar to all persons practising in our courts of law.
This case ill.u.s.trates an important defect in the law with regard to the revision of verdicts and judgments in the United States Circuit Court.
In almost all other courts, an application for a new trial on the ground of erroneous rulings by the judge, is made to a higher and independent tribunal. In this court, however, an application for a new trial is addressed to and decided by the same judge who tried the case, and whose erroneous rulings are complained of. Such a motion was made and argued by Miss Anthony"s counsel before Judge Hunt, who refused to grant a new trial. Thus it was Judge Hunt alone who was to decide whether Judge Hunt was wrong. It is manifest that the opportunity for securing justice even before the most honest of judges, would be somewhat less than before an entirely distinct tribunal, as the judge would be prejudiced in favor of his own opinion, and the best and most learned of judges are human and fallible; while if a judge is disposed to be unfair, it is perfectly easy for him to suppress all attempts of a party injured by his decision to set it aside.
The only remedy for a party thus wronged is by an appeal to the public.
Such an appeal, as a friend of justice and of the law, without regard to Miss Anthony"s case in any other aspect, the writer makes in this article. The public, thus the only appellate tribunal, should willingly listen to such a case, and pa.s.s its own supreme and decisive judgment upon it.
The writer cannot but regard Judge Hunt"s course as not only irregular as a matter of law, but a very dangerous encroachment on the right of every person accused to be tried by a jury. It is by yielding to such encroachments that liberties are lost.