CHAP. II.
As we have thus traced the situation of man from unbounded liberty to subordination, it will be proper to carry our inquiries farther, and to consider, who first obtained the pre-eminence in these _primoeval societies_, and by what particular methods it was obtained.
There were only two ways, by which such an event could have been produced, by _compulsion_ or _consent_. When mankind first saw the necessity of government, it is probable that many had conceived the desire of ruling. To be placed in a new situation, to be taken from the common herd, to be the first, distinguished among men, were thoughts, that must have had their charms. Let us suppose then, that these thoughts had worked so unusually on the pa.s.sions of any particular individual, as to have driven him to the extravagant design of obtaining the preeminence by force. How could his design have been accomplished?
How could he forcibly have usurped the jurisdiction at a time, when, all being equally free, there was not a single person, whose a.s.sistance he could command? Add to this, that, in a state of universal liberty, force had been repaid by force, and the attempt had been fatal to the usurper.
As _empire_ then could never have been gained at first by _compulsion_, so it could only have been obtained by _consent_; and as men were then going to make an important sacrifice, for the sake of their _mutual_ happiness, so he alone could have obtained it, (not whose _ambition_ had greatly distinguished him from the rest) but in whose _wisdom, justice, prudence_, and _virtue_, the whole community could confide.
To confirm this reasoning, we shall appeal, as before, to facts; and shall consult therefore the history of those nations, which having just left their former state of _independent society_, were the very people that established _subordination_ and _government_.
The commentaries of Caesar afford us the following accounts of the ancient Gauls. When any of their kings, either by death, or deposition, made a vacancy in the regal office, the whole nation was immediately convened for the appointment of a successor. In these national conventions were the regal offices conferred. Every individual had a voice on the occasion, and every individual was free. The person upon whom the general approbation appeared to fall, was immediately advanced to pre-eminence in the state. He was uniformly one, whose actions had made him eminent; whose conduct had gained him previous applause; whose valour the very a.s.sembly, that elected him, had themselves witnessed in the field; whose prudence, wisdom and justice, having rendered him signally serviceable, had endeared him to his tribe. For this reason, their kingdoms were not hereditary; the son did not always inherit the virtues of the sire; and they were determined that he alone should possess authority, in whose virtues they could confide. Nor was this all. So sensible were they of the important sacrifice they had made; so extremely jealous even of the name of superiority and power, that they limited, by a variety of laws, the authority of the very person, whom they had just elected, from a confidence of his integrity; Ambiorix himself confessing, "that his people had as much power over him, as he could possibly have over his people."
The same custom, as appears from Tacitus, prevailed also among the Germans. They had their national councils, like the Gauls; in which the regal and ducal offices were confirmed according to the majority of voices. They elected also, on these occasions, those only, whom their virtue, by repeated trial, had unequivocally distinguished from the rest; and they limited their authority so far, as neither to leave them the power of inflicting imprisonment or stripes, nor of exercising any penal jurisdiction. But as punishment was necessary in a state of civil society, "it was permitted to the priests alone, that it might appear to have been inflicted, by the order of the G.o.ds, and not by any superiour authority in man."
The accounts which we have thus given of the ancient Germans and Gauls, will be found also to be equally true of those people, which had arrived at the same state of subordinate society. We might appeal, for a testimony of this, to the history of the Goths; to the history of the Franks and Saxons; to, the history, in short, of all those nations, from which the different governments, now conspicuous in Europe, have undeniably sprung. And we might appeal, as a farther proof, to the Americans, who are represented by many of the moderns, from their own ocular testimony, as observing the same customs at the present day.
It remains only to observe, that as these customs prevailed among the different nations described, in their early state of subordinate society, and as they were moreover the customs of their respective ancestors, it appears that they must have been handed down, both by tradition and use, from the first introduction of _government_.
CHAP. III.
We may now deduce those general maxims concerning _subordination_, and _liberty_, which we mentioned to have been essentially connected with the subject, and which some, from speculation only, and without any allusion to facts, have been bold enough to deny.
It appears first, that _liberty_ is a _natural_, and _government_ an _advent.i.tious_ right, because all men were originally free.
It appears secondly, that government is a [042]_contract_ because, in these primeval subordinate societies, we have seen it voluntarily conferred on the one hand, and accepted on the other. We have seen it subject to various restrictions. We have seen its articles, which could then only be written by tradition and use, as perfect and binding as those, which are now committed to letters. We have seen it, in short, partaking of the _federal_ nature, as much as it could in a state, which wanted the means of recording its transactions.
It appear thirdly, that the grand object of the _contrast_, is the _happiness_ of the people; because they gave the supremacy to him alone, who had been conspicuous for the splendour of his abilities, or the integrity of his life: that the power of the mult.i.tude being directed by the _wisdom_ and _justice_ of the prince, they might experience the most effectual protection from injury, the highest advantages of society, the greatest possible _happiness_.
FOOTNOTES
[Footnote 042: The author has lately read a work, int.i.tled Paley"s Moral and Political Philosophy, which, in this one respect, favours those which have been hinted at, as it denies that government was a contract.
"No social compact was ever made in fact,"--"it is to suppose it possible to call savages out of caves and deserts, to deliberate upon topicks, which the experience and studies, and the refinements of civil life alone suggest. Therefore no government in the universe begun from this original." But there are no grounds for so absurd a supposition; for government, and of course the social compact, does not appear to have been introduced at the time, when families coming out of their caves and deserts, or, in other words, quitting their former _dissociated_ state, joined themselves together. They had lived a considerable time in _society_, like the Lybians and Gaetulians before-mentioned, and had felt many of the disadvantages of a want of discipline and laws, before government was introduced at all. The author of this Essay, before he took into consideration the origin of government, was determined, in a matter of such importance, to be bia.s.sed by no opinion whatever, and much less to indulge himself in speculation. He was determined solely to adhere to fact, and, by looking into the accounts left us of those governments which were in their infancy, and, of course in the least complicated state, to attempt to discover their foundation: he cannot say therefore, that upon a very minute perusal of the excellent work before quoted, he has been so far convinced, as to retract in the least from his sentiments on this head, and to give up maxims, which are drawn from historical facts, for those, which are the result of speculation. He may observe here, that whether government was a _contract_ or not, it will not affect the reasoning of the present Essay; since where ever the contract is afterwards mentioned, it is inferred only that its object was "the _happiness of the people_," which is confessedly the end of government. Notwithstanding this, he is under the necessity of inserting this little note, though he almost feels himself ungrateful in contradicting a work, which has afforded him so much entertainment.]
CHAP. IV.
Having now collected the materials that are necessary for the prosecution of our design, we shall immediately enter upon the discussion.
If any man had originally been endued with power, as with other faculties, so that the rest of mankind had discovered in themselves an _innate necessity_ of obeying this particular person; it is evident that he and his descendants, from the superiority of their nature, would have had a claim upon men for obedience, and a natural right to command: but as the right to empire is _advent.i.tious_; as all were originally free; as nature made every man"s body and mind _his own_; it is evident that no just man can be consigned to _slavery_, without his own _consent_.
Neither can men, by the same principles, be considered as lands, goods, or houses, among _possessions_. It is necessary that all _property_ should be inferiour to its _possessor_. But how does the _slave_ differ from his _master_, but by _chance_?
For though the mark, with which the latter is pleased to brand him, shews, at the first sight, the difference of their _fortune_; what mark can be found in his _nature_, that can warrant a distinction?
To this consideration we shall add the following, that if men can justly become the property of each other, their children, like the offspring of cattle, must inherit their _paternal_ lot. Now, as the actions of the father and the child must be thus at the sole disposal of their common master, it is evident, that the _authority_ of the one, as a _parent_, and the _duty_ of the other, as a _child_, must be instantly annihilated; rights and obligations, which, as they are sounded in nature, are implanted in our feelings, and are established by the voice of G.o.d, must contain in their annihilation a solid argument to prove, that there cannot be any _property_ whatever in the _human species_.
We may consider also, as a farther confirmation, that it is impossible, in the nature of things, that _liberty_ can be _bought_ or _sold_! It is neither _saleable_, nor _purchasable_. For if any one man can have an absolute property in the liberty of another, or, in other words, if he, who is called a _master_, can have a _just_ right to command the actions of him, who is called a _slave_, it is evident that the latter cannot be accountable for those crimes, which the former may order him to commit. Now as every reasonable being is accountable for his actions, it is evident, that such a right cannot _justly_ exist, and that human liberty, of course, is beyond the possibility either of _sale_ or _purchase_.
Add to this, that, whenever you sell the liberty of a man, you have the power only of alluding to the _body_: the _mind_ cannot be confined or bound: it will be free, though its mansion be beset with chains. But if, in every sale of the _human species_, you are under the necessity of considering your slave in this abstracted light; of alluding only to the body, and of making no allusion to the mind; you are under the necessity also of treating him, in the same moment, as a _brute_, and of abusing therefore that nature, which cannot otherwise be considered, than in the double capacity of _soul_ and _body_.
But some person, perhaps, will make an objection to one of the former arguments. "If men, from _superiority_ of their nature, cannot be considered, like lands, goods, or houses, among possessions, so neither can cattle: for being endued with life, motion, and sensibility, they are evidently _superiour_ to these." But this objection will receive its answer from those observations which have been already made; and will discover the true reason, why cattle are justly to be estimated as property. For first, the right to empire over brutes, is _natural_, and not _advent.i.tious_, like the right to empire over men. There are, secondly, many and evident signs of the _inferiority_ of their nature; and thirdly, their liberty can be bought and sold, because, being void of reason, they cannot be _accountable_ for their actions.
We might stop here for a considerable time, and deduce many valuable lessons from the remarks that have been made, but that such a circ.u.mstance might be considered as a digression. There is one, however, which, as it is so intimately connected with the subject, we cannot but deduce. We are taught to treat men in a different manner from brutes, because they are so manifestly superiour in their nature; we are taught to treat brutes in a different manner from stones, for the same reason; and thus, by giving to every created thing its due respect, to answer the views of Providence, which did not create a variety of natures without a purpose or design.
But if these things are so, how evidently against reason, nature, and every thing human and divine, must they act, who not only force men into _slavery_, against their own _consent_; but treat them altogether as _brutes_, and make the _natural liberty_ of man an article of publick commerce! and by what arguments can they possibly defend that commerce, which cannot be carried on, in any single instance, without a flagrant violation of the laws of nature and of G.o.d?
CHAP. V.
That we may the more accurately examine the arguments that are advanced on this occasion, it will be proper to divide the _commerce_ into two parts; first, as it relates to those who _sell_, and secondly, as it relates to those who _purchase_, the _human species_ into slavery. To the former part of which, having given every previous and necessary information in the history of servitude, we shall immediately proceed.
Let us inquire first, by what particular right the _liberties_ of the harmless people are invaded by the _prince_. "By the _right of empire_," it will be answered; "because he possesses dominion and power by their own approbation and consent." But subjects, though under the dominion, are not the _property_, of the prince. They cannot be considered as his _possessions_. Their _natures_ are both the same; they are both born in the same manner; are subject to the same disorders; must apply to the same remedies for a cure; are equally partakers of the grave: an _incidental_ distinction accompanies them through life, and this--is all.
We may add to this, that though the prince possesses dominion and power, by the consent and approbation of his subjects, he possesses it only for the most _salutary_ ends. He may tyrannize, if he can: he may alter the _form_ of his government: he cannot, however, alter its _nature_ and _end_. These will be immutably the same, though the whole system of its administration should be changed; and he will be still bound to _defend_ the lives and properties of his subjects, and to make them _happy_.
Does he defend those therefore, whom he invades at discretion with the sword? Does he protect the property of those, whose houses and effects he consigns at discretion to the flames? Does he make those happy, whom he seizes, as they are trying to escape the general devastation, and compels with their wives and families to a wretched _servitude?_ He acts surely, as if the use of empire consisted in violence and oppression; as if he, that was most exalted, ought, of necessity, to be most unjust. Here then the voice of _nature_ and _justice_ is against him. He breaks that law of _nature_, which ordains, "that no just man shall be given into slavery, against his own _consent_:"
he violates the first law of _justice_, as established among men, "that no person shall do harm to another without a previous and sufficient _provocation_;" and he violates also the sacred condition of _empire_, made with his ancestors, and necessarily understood in every species of government, "that, the power of the mult.i.tude being given up to the wisdom and justice of the prince, they may experience, in return, the most effectual protection from injury, the highest advantages of society, the greatest possible _happiness_."
But if kings then, to whom their own people have granted dominion and power, are unable to invade the liberties of their harmless subjects, without the highest _injustice_; how can those private persons be justified, who treacherously lie in wait for their fellow-creatures, and sell them into slavery? What arguments can they possibly bring in their defence? What treaty of empire can they produce, by which their innocent victims ever resigned to them the least portion of their _liberty_? In vain will they plead the _antiquity_ of the custom: in vain will the _honourable_ light, in which _piracy_ was considered in the ages of barbarism, afford them an excuse. Impious and abandoned men! ye invade the liberties of those, who, (with respect to your impious selves) are in a state of _nature_, in a state of original _dissociation_, perfectly _independent_, perfectly _free_.
It appears then, that the two orders of slaves, which have been mentioned in the history of the African servitude, "of those who are publickly seized by virtue of the authority of their prince; and of those, who are privately kidnapped by individuals," are collected by means of violence and oppression; by means, repugnant to _nature_, the principles of _government_, and the common notions of _equity_, as established among men.
CHAP. VI.