The government further addressed a proclamation to the people, addressing them this time as _Mitburger_ (fellow-citizens), instead of _Genossen_. It announced that negotiations had been broken off with the rebels, and a.s.sailed the dishonest and dishonorable tactics of the Independent Socialists represented by the Haase-Dittmann delegation.
_Die Freiheit_ and _Der rote Vorwarts_ a.s.sailed the government; still the proclamation had a good effect and decent elements generally rallied to the government"s support. The day"s fighting was confined to the _Tageblatt_ plant, where three hundred Bolsheviki were entrenched to defend the liberty of other people"s property. The place could have been taken with artillery, but it was desired to spare the building if possible.
Friday pa.s.sed with only scattered sniping. The Spartacans and their Independent helpers grew boastful. They had not yet learned to know what manner of man Gustav Noske, the new cabinet member, was. They made his acquaintance early Sat.u.r.day morning. Before the sun had risen government troops had posted themselves with artillery and mine-throwers a few hundred yards from the _Vorwarts_ plant. The battle was short and decisive. A single mine swept out of existence the Spartacans" barricade in front of the building, and a few more shots made the building ripe for storm. The government troops lost only two or three men, but more than a score of Bolsheviki were killed and more than a hundred, including some Russians and women, were captured. The _Vorwarts_ plant was a new building and much more valuable than some of the other plants occupied by the Spartacans, but it was selected for bombardment because the cabinet members wished to show, by sacrificing their own party"s property first, that they were not playing favorites.
The fall of the _Vorwarts_ stronghold and the firm stand of the government disheartened the mercenary and criminal recruits of the Spartacans. Police Headquarters, the real center of the revolutionary movement, was taken early Sunday morning after a few 10.5-centimeter sh.e.l.ls had been fired into it. The official report told of twelve Spartacans killed, but their casualties were actually much higher.
Eichhorn had chosen the better part of valor and disappeared. The Bolsheviki occupying the various newspaper plants began deserting _en ma.s.se_ over neighboring roofs and the plants were occupied by government troops without a contest. News came that Liebknecht"s followers had also abandoned the Boetzow Brewery in the eastern part of the city, one of their main strongholds. Late in the afternoon they also fled from the Silesian Railway Station, where they had been storing up stolen provisions, a.s.sembling arms and ammunition and preparing to make a last desperate stand.
The government, averse though it was to the employment of force to maintain its authority, had realized at the beginning of December the increasing strength of the Spartacans, and had begun a.s.sembling a military force of loyal soldiers in various garrisons outside the city.
Three thousand of these troops now marched into the city. Hundreds of the men in the ranks carried rifles slung across officers"
shoulder-straps. They marched as troops ought to march, sang patriotic songs and looked grimly determined. For miles along their route they were greeted by frantic cheering and even by joyous tears from the law-abiding citizens who had been terrorized by the sc.u.m of a great capital.[61]
[61] The task of the government was made harder throughout its darkest days by the aid and comfort given its enemies by the character of the reports published in certain enemy papers regarding conditions in Germany. Nearly the entire Paris press regularly published extravagantly untrue reports concerning the situation, and many English and American papers followed suit. The London _Times_ of December 10th gravely told its readers that "in a political sense Ebert is suspected of being a mere tool of the old regime, whose difficult task it is to pave the first stages of the road to the restoration of the Hohenzollerns months or years hence."
Three days later it declared that "the German army chiefs propose to let the Spartacans upset the government so that they can summon Hindenburg to save the day and reestablish the monarchy."Articles of this stamp were eagerly pounced upon and republished by Independent Socialist and Spartacan organs of the stamp of _Die Freiheit_, _Die Republik_, Liebknecht"s _Die rote Fahne_, and others, and were of great a.s.sistance to the enemies of good government in their efforts to convince the ignorant and fanatical that the government was organizing a "white guard" for counter-revolutionary purposes and was plotting the restoration of the monarchy.
One dispatch from Paris, published extensively in the American press on February 26th, quoted in all seriousness "a prominent American Socialist in close touch with German Liberals and with exceptional sources of secret information,"
who had learned that "the German revolution was a piece of theatrical manipulation by agents of the militaristic oligarchy to win an armistice." That such a report could be published in responsible organs is a staggering commentary on the manner in which the war-psychosis inhibited clear thinking. The Conservative Deputy Hergt, speaking in the Prussian Diet on March 15th, said: "We Conservatives are not conscienceless enough to plunge the land into civil warfare.
We shall wait patiently until the sound sense of the German people shall demand a return to the monarchic form of government." American papers carried the following report of this statement: "Speaking before the new Prussian Diet in Berlin, Deputy Hergt proposed that Prussia should restore the monarchy." Volumes could be written about these false reports alone.
The week of terror had practically ended. There was still some sniping from housetops and some looting, but organized resistance had been crushed. Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg had gone into hiding.
Liebknecht"s seventeen-year-old son and sister had been arrested.
Ledebour, more courageous or, perhaps, more confident that a veteran _Genosse_ had nothing to fear from a Socialist government, remained and was arrested.
It had been no part of the cabinet"s plan or desire to have their veteran colleague of former days arrested. On January 12th the writer, speaking with one of the most prominent Majority Socialist leaders, said:
"You can now hardly avoid having Ledebour locked up."
The man addressed shrugged his shoulders reflectively and answered:
"Well, you see, Herr Kollege, we can"t very well do so. Ledebour is an old comrade, he was for many years one of the party"s secretaries and has done great services for the party."
"But he has taken part in an armed uprising to overthrow the government and to destroy that same party," persisted the writer. The Socialist leader admitted it.
"But he is acting from ideal motives," he said.
This refusal to judge opponents by their acts instead of by their motives hampered the government throughout its career. It is less specifically Socialistic than German, and is the outgrowth of what is termed _Rechthaberei_ in German an untranslatable word exactly ill.u.s.trated by the colloquy reported above. It is not the least among the mental traits that make it impossible for the average German ever to become what is popularly known as a practical politician; a trait that kept the German people in their condition of political immaturity.
In Ledebour"s case, however, the government found itself compelled to act drastically. A proclamation was found which declared the government deposed and taken over temporarily by the three men who signed it. These were Liebknecht, Ledebour and another Independent Socialist named Scholtze. In the first days of the uprising they had sent a detachment of Spartacans to the War Ministry to present the proclamation and take charge of that department"s affairs, and only the presence of mind and courage of a young officer had prevented the scheme from succeeding. In the face of this, no government that demanded respect for its authority could permit Ledebour to remain at liberty. His arrest was nevertheless the signal for some adverse criticism even from Majority Socialists whose cla.s.s-conscious solidarity was greater than their intelligence.
Liebknecht was still in hiding, but it was less easy to hide in Berlin than it had been a month earlier, for the old criminal police were at work again. The experiment with soldier-policemen had resulted so disastrously that every Berliner who had anything to lose welcomed the return of these men who had been so denounced and hated in other days. The search lasted but two days. On January 15th Liebknecht"s apartment was searched, and great amounts of propagandist pamphlets and correspondence showing him to be in constant touch with the Russian Soviet Government were found. On the evening of the next day policemen and soldiers surrounded the house of a distant relative of Liebknecht"s wife in the western part of the city and Liebknecht was found. He denied his ident.i.ty at first, but finally admitted that he was the man wanted.
He was taken to the Eden Hotel in Charlottenburg, which had been occupied in part by the staff of the government troops. Rosa Luxemburg, found hiding in another house, was brought to the hotel at the same time. After the two had been questioned, preparations were made to take them to the city prison in Moabit.
Despite all precautions, news of the arrests had transpired, and the hotel was surrounded by a vast crowd, mainly made up of better cla.s.s citizens, since the district where the hotel is situated is one of the best residential districts of Greater Berlin. The feeling of these people against the two persons who were in so great measure responsible for the terrors of the week just past naturally ran high. The appearance of the soldiers guarding the two was the signal for a wild rush. The Luxemburg woman was struck repeatedly and Liebknecht received a blow on the head which caused a b.l.o.o.d.y wound.
Neither the man nor woman ever reached prison. Soldiers brought to the morgue late that night the body of "an unidentified man," alleged to have been shot while running away from his guards. One bullet had struck him between the shoulders and another in the middle of the back of the neck. The woman disappeared utterly.
On the following day (January 16th) it became known that both Liebknecht and Luxemburg had been killed. Exactly who fired the fatal shots was never clearly established, but an investigation did establish that the officers in charge of the men guarding the two prisoners were guilty of a negligence which was undoubtedly deliberate, and intended to make the killings possible.
The impression was profound. The _Deutsche Tageszeitung_, while deploring lynch law and summary justice, declared that the deaths of the two agitators must be regarded as "almost a Divine judgment." This was the tenor of all _bourgeois_ comment, and even _Vorwarts_ admitted that the dead man and woman had fallen as victims of the base pa.s.sions which they themselves had aroused. They had summoned up spirits which they could not exorcise. There was nevertheless much apprehension regarding the form which the vengeance of the victims" followers might take, but this confined itself in the main to verbal attacks on the _bourgeoisie_ and Majority Socialists, and denunciation of Noske"s "White Guard," as the loyal soldiers who protected the law-abiding part of the population were termed. Disorders were feared on the day of Liebknecht"s funeral, but none came.
The government gained a much needed breathing spell through these events. With Liebknecht and Luxemburg dead, Radek in hiding, Ledebour locked up and Eichhorn--as it transpired later--fled to Brunswick, the Spartacans, deprived of their most energetic leaders and shaken by their b.l.o.o.d.y losses of Bolshevik week, could not so quickly rally their forces for another _coup_. Their losses are not definitely known, but they were estimated at approximately two hundred dead and nearly a thousand wounded. The losses of the government troops were negligible.
Noske, who had taken over from Ebert the administration of military affairs, announced that there would be no further temporizing with persons endeavoring to overthrow the government by force. He issued a decree setting forth the duty of the soldiers to preserve order, protect property and defend themselves in all circ.u.mstances.
The decree said further:
"No soldier can be excused for failure to perform his duty if he have not, in the cases specified above, made timely and adequate use of his weapons to attain the purpose set forth."
Some six years earlier Police-President von Jagow had brought a flood of Socialist abuse on his head because, in a general order to the police, he referred to the fact that there had been an unusual number of escapes of criminals and attacks on policemen and added: "Henceforth I shall punish any policeman who in such case has failed to make timely use of his weapons." And now a Socialist issued an order of much the same tenor. The _Genossen_ had learned by bitter experience that there is a difference between criticizing and governing, and that moral suasion occasionally fails with the lowest elements of a great city.
Defeated in Berlin, the Bolsheviki turned their attention to the coast cities. The "Republic of Cuxhaven" was proclaimed, with a school-teacher as president. It collapsed in five days as a result of the government"s decisive action. An attempted _coup_ in Bremen also failed, but both these uprisings left the Spartacans and Independents of these cities in possession of large supplies of arms and ammunition.
January 18th, the forty-seventh anniversary of the founding of the German Empire, brought melancholy reflections for all Germans. The Bolshevist-hued Socialists were impotently raging in defeat; the _bourgeoisie_ lamented past glories; the Majority Socialists were under a crossfire from both sides. The Conservative _Kreuz-Zeitung_ wrote:
"January 18th: What feelings are awakened on this day under prevailing conditions! In other times we celebrated today the Empire"s glory, its resurrection from impotence and dissension to unity and strength. We believed its existence and power a.s.sured for centuries. And today? After less than half a century the old misery has come upon us and has cast us down lower than ever. This time, too, Germany could be conquered only because it was disunited. In the last a.n.a.lysis it was from the Social-Democratic poison of Internationalism and negation of state that the Empire became infected and defenseless. How painfully wrong were those who, in smiling optimism, ever made light of all warnings against the Social-Democratic danger. It will be our real danger in the future also. If we do not overcome the Social-Democratic spirit among our people we cannot recover our health."
The _Kreuz-Zeitung"s_ diagnosis was correct, but it had required a national post-mortem to establish it.
CHAPTER XVI.
The National a.s.sembly.
In preparation for the National a.s.sembly, the various existing political parties effected generally a sweeping reorganization, which included, for the most part, changes of designations as well. The Conservatives and Free Conservatives coalesced as The German National People"s Party (_Deutsch-nationale Volkspartei_). The right wing of the National-Liberals, under the leadership of Dr. Stresemann, became the German People"s Party (_Deutsche Volkspartei_). The left wing of the old party, under the leadership of Baron von Richthofen joined with the former Progressives (_Fortschrittliche Volkspartei_) to form the German Democratic Party (_Deutsch-demokratische Partei_). The Clericals retained their party solidarity but christened themselves German Christian Party (_Deutsch-Christliche Partei_). The Majority and Independent Socialists retained their old organizations and party designations. The Spartacans, as outspoken enemies of any national a.s.sembly, could not consistently have anything to do with it and placed no ticket in the field. Most of the Independent Socialists were also opponents of a const.i.tuent a.s.sembly, but the party organization was still trying to blow both hot and cold and had not yet gone on record officially as favoring a soviet government and the dictatorship of the proletariat.
Of the parties as reorganized, the National People"s and the People"s parties were monarchic. The Christian Party (Clericals) contained many men who believed a limited monarchy to be the best form of government for Germany, but as a whole the party was democratically inclined and out of sympathy with any attempt at that time to restore the monarchy.
The two Socialist parties were, of course, advocates of a republic and bitter opponents of monarchs and monarchies.
The Democratic Party came into existence mainly through the efforts of Theodor Wolff, the brilliant editor of the Berlin _Tageblatt_. No other non-Socialist editor realized so early or so completely as Wolff whither the policy of the old government was taking Germany. He had opposed the submarine warfare, condemned the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, attacked the methods and influence of the pan-Germans and constantly advocated drastic democratic reforms. Probably no other _bourgeois_ newspaper had been so often suppressed as the _Tageblatt_, and it shared with Socialist organs the distinction of being prohibited in many army units and in some military departments at home. Although Wolff held no political office, his influence in the Progressive Party and with the left wing of the National-Liberals was great, and even many Socialists regularly read his leading articles, which were more often cabled to America than were the editorials of any other German publicist, not excepting even the _poseur_ Maximilian Harden-Witkowski.
The revolution was hardly an accomplished fact before Wolff saw the necessity for a democratic, non-Socialist political party which must be free of elements compromised in any manner by partic.i.p.ation in the old government or by support of its militaristic and imperialistic policies.
He took it upon himself to issue the summons for the formation of such a party. The response was immediate and gratifying. Help came even from unexpected quarters. Prince Lichnowsky, former Amba.s.sador to Great Britain; Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, who had succeeded Dr. Solf as Foreign Minister; Baron von Richthofen of the National-Liberals, Count Johannes Bernstorff, former Amba.s.sador to the United States, and many other prominent members of the higher German n.o.bility[62] joined with _bourgeois_ political leaders to organize the new party. Not all compromised elements could be kept out of the party, but they were excluded from any active partic.i.p.ation in the conduct of its affairs or the shaping of its policies.
[62] A surprisingly large number of Americans cannot or will not believe that a prince or a count can be a real democrat. This is plainly due to a too prevalent confusion of the words democratic with republican. All republics are, Footnote: in theory at least, democratic, but a monarchist can consistently be a democrat. The two most democratic countries in the world are Denmark and Norway, yet both are kingdoms.
The democratic sentiments of the men named above, with the possible exception of one, were of no recent growth; they long antedated the revolution.
Taken as a whole, the party stood far to the left. Wolff, at the extreme left of his organization, might be described either as a _bourgeois_ Socialist or a Socialistic _bourgeois_ politician. The recruits from the former National-Liberal Party were less radical, but even they subscribed to a platform which called for the nationalization (socialization) of a long list of essential industries, notably mines and water and electrical power, and, in general, for sweeping economic reforms and the most direct partic.i.p.ation of the people in the government. The fact that the new party was chiefly financed by big Jewish capitalists caused it to be attacked by anti-Semites and proletarians alike, but this detracted little from its strength at the polls, since Germany"s anti-Semites were never found in any considerable numbers among the _bourgeois_ parties of the Left, and the proletarians were already for the most part adherents of one of the Socialist factions.
The campaign for the elections to the National a.s.sembly was conducted with great energy and equally great bitterness by all parties. Despite an alleged shortage of paper which had for months made it impossible for the newspapers to print more than a small part of the advertis.e.m.e.nts submitted to them, tons of paper were used for handbills and placards.
The streets, already filthy enough, were strewn ankle-deep in places with appeals for this or that party and vilifications of opponents.
Aeroplanes dropped thousands of dodgers over the chief cities. New daily papers, most of them unlovely excrescences on the body of the press, made their appearance and secured paper grants for their consumption.
One feature of the campaign ill.u.s.trated strikingly what had already been clear to dispa.s.sionate observers: Germany"s new government was unashamedly a party government first and a general government second.
Majority Socialist election posters were placed in public buildings, railway stations, etc., to the exclusion of all other parties. Its handbills were distributed by government employees and from government automobiles and aeroplanes. The _bourgeois Hallesche Zeitung"s_ paper supply was cut in half in order that the new Socialist _Volkszeitung_ might be established, and its protest was dismissed by the Soldiers"
Council with the statement that the _Volkszeitung_ was "more important."
Not even the most reactionary of the old German governments would have dared abuse its power in this manner. It may be doubted whether the revolutionary government was at all conscious of the impropriety of its course, but even if it had been it would have made no difference. One of the great sources of strength of Socialism is its conviction that all means are sacred for the furtherance of the cla.s.s struggle.