"By Jupiter! we most a.s.suredly do allow it," replied Simmias.
51. "And do we know what it is itself?"
"Certainly," he replied.
"Whence have we derived the knowledge of it? Is it not from the things we have just now mentioned, and that from seeing logs, or stones, or other things of the kind, equal, we have from these formed an idea of that which is different from these--for does it not appear to you to be different? Consider the matter thus. Do not stones that are equal, and logs sometimes that are the same, appear at one time equal, and at another not?"
"Certainly."
"But what? Does abstract equality ever appear to you unequal? or equality inequality?"
"Never, Socrates, at any time."
"These equal things, then," he said, "and abstract equality, are not the same?"
"By no means, Socrates, as it appears."
"However, from these equal things," he said, "which are different from that abstract equality, have you not formed your idea and derived your knowledge of it?"
"You speak most truly," he replied.
"Is it not, therefore, from its being like or unlike them?"
"Certainly."
"But it makes no difference," he said. "When, therefore, on seeing one thing, you form, from the sight of it, the notion of another, whether like or unlike, this," he said, "must necessarily be reminiscence."
"Certainly."
52. "What, then, as to this?" he continued. "Are we affected in any such way with regard to logs and the equal things we have just now spoken of?
And do they appear to us to be equal in the same manner as abstract equality itself is, or do they fall short in some degree, or not at all, of being such as equality itself is?"
"They fall far short," he replied.
"Do we admit, then, that when one, on beholding some particular thing, perceives that it aims, as that which I now see, at being like something else that exists, but falls short of it, and can not become such as that is, but is inferior to it--do we admit that he who perceives this must necessarily have had a previous knowledge of that which he says it resembles, though imperfectly?"
"It is necessary."
"What, then? Are we affected in some such way, or not, with respect to things equal and abstract equality itself?"
"a.s.suredly."
"It is necessary, therefore, that we must have known abstract equality before the time when, on first seeing equal things, we perceived that they all aimed at resembling equality, but failed in doing so."
"Such is the case."
53. "Moreover, we admit this too, that we perceived this, and could not possibly perceive it by any other means than the sight, or touch, or some other of the senses, for I say the same of them all."
"For they are the same, Socrates, so far as, our argument is concerned."
"However, we must perceive, by means of the senses, that all things which come under the senses aim at that abstract equality, and yet fall short of it; or how shall we say it is?"
"Even so."
"Before, then, we began to see, and hear, and use our other senses, we must have had a knowledge of equality itself--what it is, if we were to refer to it those equal things that come under the senses, and observe that all such things aim at resembling that, but fall far short of it."
"This necessarily follows, Socrates, from what has been already said."
"But did we not, as soon as we were born, see and hear, and possess our other senses?"
"Certainly."
"But, we have said, before we possessed these, we must have had a knowledge of abstract equality?"
"Yes."
"We must have had it, then, as it seems, before we were born."
"It seems so."
54. "If, therefore, having this before we were born, we were born possessing it, we knew, both before we were born and as soon as we were born, not only the equal and the greater and smaller, but all things of the kind; for our present discussion is not more respecting equality than the beautiful itself, the good, the just, and the holy, and, in one word, respecting every thing which we mark with the seal of existence, both in the questions we ask and the answers we give. So that we must necessarily have had a knowledge of all these before we were born."
"Such is the case."
"And if, having once had it, we did not constantly forget it, we should always be born with this knowledge, and should always retain it through life. For to know is this, when one has got a knowledge of any thing, to retain and not lose it; for do we not call this oblivion, Simmias, the loss of knowledge?"
"a.s.suredly, Socrates," he replied.
55. "But if, having had it before we were born, we lose it at our birth, and afterward, through exercising the senses about these things, we recover the knowledge which we once before possessed, would not that which we call learning be a recovery of our own knowledge? And in saying that this is to remember, should we not say rightly?"
"Certainly."
"For this appeared to be possible, for one having perceived any thing, either by seeing or hearing, or employing any other sense, to form an idea of something different from this, which he had forgotten, and with which this was connected by being unlike or like. So that, as I said, one of these two things must follow: either we are all born with this knowledge, and we retain it through life, or those whom we say learn afterward do nothing else than remember, and this learning will be reminiscence."
"Such, certainly, is the case, Socrates."
56. "Which, then, do you choose, Simmias: that we are born with knowledge, or that we afterward remember what we had formerly known?"
"At present, Socrates, I am unable to choose."
"But what? Are you able to choose in this case, and what do you think about it? Can a man who possesses knowledge give a reason for the things that he knows, or not?"
"He needs must be able to do so, Socrates," he replied.
"And do all men appear to you to be able to give a reason for the things of which we have just now been speaking?"
"I wish they could," said Simmias; "but I am much more afraid that at this time to-morrow there will no longer be any one able to do this properly."
"Do not all men, then, Simmias," he said, "seem to you to know these things?"