_Socr._ I do not think, then, that it will come to-day, but to-morrow. I conjecture this from a dream which I had this very night, not long ago, and you seem very opportunely to have refrained from waking me.
_Cri._ But what was this dream?
_Socr._ A beautiful and majestic woman, clad in white garments seemed to approach me, and to call to me and say, "Socrates, three days hence you will reach fertile Pythia"[9].
_Cri._ What a strange dream, Socrates!
_Socr._ Very clear, however, as it appears to me, Crito.
3. _Cri._ Very much so, as it seems. But, my dear Socrates, even now be persuaded by me, and save yourself. For if you die, not only a single calamity will befall me, but, besides being deprived of such a friend as I shall never meet with again, I shall also appear to many who do not know you and me well, when I might have saved you had I been willing to spend my money, to have neglected to do so. And what character can be more disgraceful than this--to appear to value one"s riches more than one"s friends? For the generality of men will not be persuaded that you were unwilling to depart hence, when we urged you to it.
_Socr._ But why, my dear Crito, should we care so much for the opinion of the many? For the most worthy men, whom we ought rather to regard, will think that matters have transpired as they really have.
_Cri._ Yet you see, Socrates, that it is necessary to attend to the opinion of the many. For the very circ.u.mstances of the present case show that the mult.i.tude are able to effect not only the smallest evils, but even the greatest, if any one is calumniated to them.
_Socr._ Would, O Crito that the mult.i.tude could effect the greatest evils, that they might also effect the greatest good, for then it would be well. But now they can do neither; for they can make a man neither wise nor foolish; but they do whatever chances.
4. _Cri._ So let it be, then. But answer me this, Socrates: are you not anxious for me and other friends, lest, if you should escape from hence, informers should give us trouble, as having secretly carried you off, and so we should be compelled either to lose all our property, or a very large sum, or to suffer something else besides this? For, if you fear any thing of the kind, dismiss your fears; for we are justified in running the risk to save you--and, if need be, even a greater risk than this. But be persuaded by me, and do not refuse.
_Socr._ I am anxious about this, Crito, and about many other things.
_Cri._ Do not fear this, however; for the sum is not large on receipt of which certain persons are willing to save you, and take you hence. In the next place, do you not see how cheap these informers are, so that there would be no need of a large sum for them? My fortune is at your service, sufficient, I think, for the purpose; then if, out of regard to me, you do not think right to spend my money, these strangers here are ready to spend theirs. One of them, Simmias the Theban, has brought with him a sufficient sum for the very purpose. Cebes, too, is ready, and very many others. So that, as I said, do not, through fears of this kind, hesitate to save yourself, nor let what you said in court give you any trouble, that if you went from hence you would not know what to do with yourself. For in many places, and wherever you go, men will love you; and if you are disposed to go to Thessaly, I have friends there who will esteem you very highly, and will insure your safety, so that no one in Thessaly will molest you.
5. Moreover, Socrates, you do not appear to me to pursue a just course in giving yourself up when you might be saved; and you press on the very results with respect to yourself which your enemies would press, and have pressed, in their anxiety to destroy you. Besides this, too, you appear to me to betray your own sons, whom, when it is in your power to rear and educate them, you will abandon, and, so far as you are concerned, they will meet with such a fate as chance brings them, and, as is probable, they will meet with such things as orphans are wont to experience in a state of orphanage. Surely one ought not to have children, or one should go through the toil of rearing and instructing them. But you appear to me to have chosen the most indolent course; though you ought to have chosen such a course as a good and brave man would have done, since you profess to have made virtue your study through the whole of your life; so that I am ashamed both for you and for us who are your friends, lest this whole affair of yours should seem to be the effect of cowardice on our part--your appearing to stand your trial in the court, since you appeared when it was in your power not to have done so, the very manner in which the trial was conducted, and this last circ.u.mstance, as it were, a ridiculous consummation of the whole business; your appearing to have escaped from us through our indolence and cowardice, who did not save you; nor did you save yourself, when it was practicable and possible, had we but exerted ourselves a little.
Think of these things, therefore, Socrates, and beware, lest, besides the evil _that will result_, they be disgraceful both to you and to us; advise, then, with yourself; though, indeed, there is no longer time for advising--your resolve should be already made. And there is but one plan; for in the following night the whole must be accomplished. If we delay, it will be impossible and no longer practicable. By all means, therefore, Socrates, be persuaded by me, and on no account refuse.
6. _Socr._ My dear Crito, your zeal would be very commendable were it united with right principle; otherwise, by how much the more earnest it is, by so much is it the more sad. We must consider, therefore, whether this plan should be adopted or not. For I not now only, but always, am a person who will obey nothing within me but reason, according as it appears to me on mature deliberation to be best. And the reasons which I formerly professed I can not now reject, because this misfortune has befallen me; but they appear to me in much the same light, and I respect and honor them as before; so that if we are unable to adduce any better at the present time, be a.s.sured that I shall not give in to you, even though the power of the mult.i.tude should endeavor to terrify us like children, by threatening more than it does now, bonds and death, and confiscation of property. How, therefore, may we consider the matter most conveniently? First of all, if we recur to the argument which you used about opinions, whether on former occasions it was rightly resolved or not, that we ought to pay attention to some opinions, and to others not; or whether, before it was necessary that I should die, it was rightly resolved; but now it has become clear that it was said idly for argument"s sake, though in reality it was merely jest and trifling. I desire then, Crito, to consider, in common with you, whether it will appear to me in a different light, now that I am in this condition, or the same, and whether we shall give it up or yield to it. It was said, I think, on former occasions, by those who were thought to speak seriously, as I just now observed, that of the opinions which men entertain some should be very highly esteemed and others not. By the G.o.ds! Crito, does not this appear to you to be well said? For you, in all human probability, are out of all danger of dying to-morrow, and the present calamity will not lead your judgment astray. Consider, then; does it not appear to you to have been rightly settled that we ought not to respect all the opinions of men, but some we should, and others not?
Nor yet the opinions of all men, but of some we should, and of others not? What say you? Is not this rightly resolved?
_Cri._ It is.
_Socr._ Therefore we should respect the good, but not the bad?
_Cri._ Yes.
_Socr._ And are not the good those of the wise, and the bad those of the foolish?
_Cri._ How can it be otherwise?
7. _Socr._ Come, then: how, again, were the following points settled?
Does a man who practices gymnastic exercises and applies himself to them, pay attention to the praise and censure and opinion of every one, or of that one man only who happens to be a physician, or teacher of the exercises?
_Cri._ Of that one only.
_Socr._ He ought, therefore, to fear the censures and covet the praises of that one, but not those of the mult.i.tude.
_Cri._ Clearly.
_Socr._ He ought, therefore, so to practice and exercise himself, and to eat and drink, as seems fitting to the one who presides and knows, rather than to all others together.
_Cri._ It is so.
_Socr._ Well, then, if he disobeys the one, and disregards his opinion and praise, but respects that of the mult.i.tude and of those who know nothing, will he not suffer some evil?
_Cri._ How should he not?
_Socr._ But what is this evil? Whither does it tend, and on what part of him that disobeys will it fall?
_Cri._ Clearly on his body, for this it ruins.
_Socr._ You say well. The case is the same, too, Crito, with all other things, not to go through them all. With respect then, to things just and unjust, base and honorable, good and evil, about which we are now consulting, ought we to follow the opinion of the mult.i.tude, and to respect it, or that of one, if there is any one who understands, whom we ought to reverence and respect rather than all others together? And if we do not obey him, shall we not corrupt and injure that part of ourselves which becomes better by justice, but is ruined by injustice?
Or is this nothing?
_Cri._ I agree with you, Socrates.
8. _Socr._ Come, then, if we destroy that which becomes better by what is wholesome, but is impaired by what is unwholesome, through being persuaded by those who do not understand, can we enjoy life when that is impaired? And this is the body we are speaking of, is it not?
_Cri._ Yes.
_Socr._ Can we, then, enjoy life with a diseased and impaired body?
_Cri._ By no means.
_Socr._ But can we enjoy life when that is impaired which injustice ruins but justice benefits? Or do we think that to be of less value than the body, whatever part of us it may be, about which injustice and justice are concerned"
_Cri._ By no means.
_Socr._ But of more value?
_Cri._ Much more.
_Socr._ We must not then, my excellent friend, so much regard what the mult.i.tude will say of us, but what he will say who understands the just and the unjust, the one, even truth itself. So that at first you did not set out with a right principle, when you laid it down that we ought to regard the opinion of the mult.i.tude with respect to things just and honorable and good, and their contraries. How ever, some one may say, are not the mult.i.tude able to put us to death?
_Cri._ This, too, is clear, Socrates, any one might say so.
_Socr._ You say truly. But, my admirable friend, this principle which we have just discussed appears to me to be the same as it was before[10].
And consider this, moreover, whether it still holds good with us or not, that we are not to be anxious about living but about living well.
_Cri._ It does hold good.
_Socr._ And does this hold good or not, that to live well and Honorable and justly are the same thing?
_Cri._ It does.
9. _Socr._ From what has been admitted, then, this consideration arises, whether it is just or not that I should endeavor to leave this place without the permission of the Athenians. And should it appear to be just, we will make the attempt, but if not, we will give it up. But as to the considerations which you mention, of an outlay of money, reputation, and the education of children, beware, Crito, lest such considerations as these in reality belong to these mult.i.tudes, who rashly put one to death, and would restore one to life, if they could do so, without any reason at all. But we, since reason so requires, must consider nothing else than what we just now mentioned, whether we shall act justly in paying money and contracting obligations to those who will lead me hence, as well they who lead me as we who are led hence, or whether, in truth, we shall not act unjustly in doing all these things.
And if we should appear in so doing to be acting unjustly, observe that we must not consider whether from remaining here and continuing quiet we must needs die, or suffer any thing else, rather than whether we shall be acting unjustly.
_Cri._ You appear to me to speak wisely, Socrates, but see what we are to do.