3. "Soon they will be dropping": d.i.c.kson, Sputnik, Sputnik, 117. 117.
4. not a cause for panic not a cause for panic: Korda, Ike, Ike, 700. 700.
5. "What most actually saw": Brzezinski, Red Moon Rising, Red Moon Rising, 176. 176.
6. Johnson sat in the Oval Office with CIA director Johnson sat in the Oval Office with CIA director: CIA Memo, Meeting with the President, Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Mr. Bundy and DCI. Re: Surfacing the OXCART, 29 November, 1963, 1.
7. it would hold aviation records it would hold aviation records: T. D. Barnes explained, "Officially, the SR-71 Blackbird still holds the world speed record for sustained flight in an oxygen-breathing plane in horizontal flight but it is common knowledge throughout the Blackbird community that the A-12 flew higher and faster because of the sacrifices the SR-71 made to accommodate a second pa.s.senger. The reason the SR-71 holds the "records" is because those of the A-12 were not certified. The A-12 Oxcart didn"t exist when the Air Force was setting records."
8. outing the Oxcart was a terrific idea outing the Oxcart was a terrific idea: If the public knew about Oxcart, there would no longer be a reason to have the Agency in charge of a program that needed secrecy as a cover. The Air Force knew the CIA had done all the work getting Oxcart up and running; now was the time to push the Agency aside. This echoes what happened with Curtis LeMay"s early summation of the U-2 program in 1955: "We"ll let [the CIA] develop it and then we"ll take it from them," from Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball, Eyeball to Eyeball, 24. 24.
9. they could take over Oxcart they could take over Oxcart: Letter, General Bernard Schriever to Eugene M. Zuckert, July 11, 1963, Top Secret.
10. McCone tried a different approach McCone tried a different approach: CIA Memo, Meeting with the President, Re: Surfacing the OXCART, 29 November, 1963, 1. "The development of the CIA and Air Force reconnaissance planes (15 in number) would cost about $700 million, of which about $400 million have now been spent." This figure does not include the aircraft"s "extraordinary engines," made by Pratt and Whitney. Regarding those costs, Lockheed Skunk Works chief (from 19751991) Ben Rich wrote, "The CIA unhappily swallowed the enormous development costs of $600 million."
11. the fict.i.tious name A-11 the fict.i.tious name A-11: Parangosky, The Oxcart Story, The Oxcart Story, 4: "The President"s reference to the "A-11" was of course deliberate. "A-11" had been the original design designation for the all-metal aircraft first proposed by Lockheed; subsequently it became the design designation for the Air Force YF-12A interceptor which differed from its parent mainly in that it carried a second man for launching air-to-air missiles. To preserve the distinction between the A-11 and the A-12 Security had briefed practically all partic.i.p.ating personnel in government and industry on the impending announcement. OXCART secrecy continued in effect. There was considerable speculation about an Agency role in the A-11 development, but it was never acknowledged by the government." 4: "The President"s reference to the "A-11" was of course deliberate. "A-11" had been the original design designation for the all-metal aircraft first proposed by Lockheed; subsequently it became the design designation for the Air Force YF-12A interceptor which differed from its parent mainly in that it carried a second man for launching air-to-air missiles. To preserve the distinction between the A-11 and the A-12 Security had briefed practically all partic.i.p.ating personnel in government and industry on the impending announcement. OXCART secrecy continued in effect. There was considerable speculation about an Agency role in the A-11 development, but it was never acknowledged by the government."
12. "The world record for aircraft speed": Public Papers of Presidents of the United States, Lyndon B. Johnson, 19631964, 1:32223.
13. the aircraft were still dripping wet the aircraft were still dripping wet: Interview with Colonel Slater.
14. "without the specific knowledge of the President": Summary of Meeting with Secretary McNamara and Secretary Gilpatric, General Carter and Mr. McCone on 5 July 1962. DCI Records dated 6 July 1962.
15. approved the Oxcart for Operation Skylark approved the Oxcart for Operation Skylark: Carter Memorandum to Wheelon, "SKYLARK," 22 Aug. 1964.
16. according to Ken Collins according to Ken Collins: Interview with Ken Collins.
17. specially designed J-58 turbojet engines specially designed J-58 turbojet engines: Interview with Dr. Robert Abernethy. Robarge, Archangel, Archangel, 1213. 1213.
18. two men working there were crushed to death two men working there were crushed to death: Rich, Skunk Works, Skunk Works, 221. 221.
19. tiny black dots began to appear tiny black dots began to appear: Ibid., 223, from a story told by Norm Nelson, the CIA-Lockheed Skunk Works liaison during Oxcart.
20. nearly knocking him unconscious nearly knocking him unconscious: Interview with Ken Collins.
21. he always sat patiently with the project pilots he always sat patiently with the project pilots: Ibid.
22. "Fix it," Park said "Fix it," Park said: Rich, Skunk Works, Skunk Works, 221. This story was also clarified for me by Ken Collins, who provided additional details. 221. This story was also clarified for me by Ken Collins, who provided additional details.
23. ""Get me out of here!"" Rich later recalled: Rich, Skunk Works, Skunk Works, 227. 227.
24. Project Kempster-Lacroix Project Kempster-Lacroix: Interview with Ed Lovick; Pedlow and Welzenbach, Central Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, 42. 42.
25. the government had exploded 286 nuclear bombs the government had exploded 286 nuclear bombs: Through Operation Hardtack there were 119 aboveground tests. Testing resumed on September 15, 1961. From then through the end of 1964, there were 167 underground tests at NTS, including 4 at Nellis Air Force Range.
26. "The first jamming system was called Red Dog": Interview with Kenneth Swanson.
27. Trapp thought it sounded interesting Trapp thought it sounded interesting: Interview with Charlie Trapp.
28. General Ledford, the head of the Office of Special Activities General Ledford, the head of the Office of Special Activities: My portrait of General Ledford is based on my interviews with men who knew him well, including Dr. Wheelon, Colonel Slater, and Frank Murray, in addition to his U.S. Air Force biographical information.
29. it was not in Frank Murray"s character it was not in Frank Murray"s character: Interview with Colonel Slater.
30. In 2005 NSA admitted In 2005 NSA admitted: Weiner, Legacy of Ashes, Legacy of Ashes, 27680. 27680.
31. Robert McNamara performing an about-face regarding Oxcart Robert McNamara performing an about-face regarding Oxcart: Robarge, Archangel, Archangel, 31. 31.
32. supplying surface-to-air missile systems supplying surface-to-air missile systems: Helms Memorandum to the 303 Committee, OXCART Reconnaissance of North Vietnam, with Attachment, 15 May 1967.
33. set up around Hanoi set up around Hanoi: Interview with Tony Bevacqua; photographs from Bevacqua"s personal collection.
Chapter Fifteen: The Ultimate Boys" Club.
Interviews: Ken Collins, Colonel Slater, Frank Murray, Fred White, Charlie Trapp, William "Bill" Weaver, Brigadier General Raymond L. Haupt 1. shaken from their beds shaken from their beds: Interview with Ken Collins. A moratorium on testing meant that the t.i.tania bomb, exploded on October 30, 1958, was the last nuclear bomb fired at the Nevada Test Site for a period of nearly three years. In August of 1961, the Russians announced they were resuming testing and conducted thirty-one nuclear tests over the next three months, including the fifty-eight-megaton Tsar Bomba, the largest bomb ever exploded. In response, Kennedy had the AEC resume testing at the Nevada Test Site; interview with Al O"Donnell.
2. The incident has never been decla.s.sified The incident has never been decla.s.sified: Interview with Collins.
3. the less you knew, the better the less you knew, the better: A sentiment unanimously shared by all CIA and USAF pilots interviewed.
4. No radio, almost no TV No radio, almost no TV: Interviews with Slater, Murray, Collins.
5. "like an incubus" "like an incubus": Helms, A Look Over My Shoulder, A Look Over My Shoulder, 309. 309.
6. "The only sin in espionage is getting caught" "The only sin in espionage is getting caught": David Robarge, "Richard Helms."
7. Helms would be recruited by the Office of Strategic Services Helms would be recruited by the Office of Strategic Services: Helms, A Look Over My Shoulder, A Look Over My Shoulder, 31. 31.
8. a seafood run to Westover Air Force Base a seafood run to Westover Air Force Base: Interview with Colonel Slater.
9. MKULTRA files destroyed MKULTRA files destroyed: The authority on this subject is John Marks, a former State Department a.n.a.lyst and staff a.s.sistant to the intelligence director. In June of 1977, Marks obtained access to part of seven boxes of MKULTRA, the only ones allegedly not lost and consisting mostly of financial records. In his book The Search for the Manchurian Candidate, The Search for the Manchurian Candidate, Marks wrote that shortly before leaving the CIA, "Helms presided over a wholesale destruction of doc.u.ments and tapes-presumably to minimize information that might later be used against him," 219. Marks wrote that shortly before leaving the CIA, "Helms presided over a wholesale destruction of doc.u.ments and tapes-presumably to minimize information that might later be used against him," 219.
10. front page of the New York Times: New York Times: According to Colonel Slater. According to Colonel Slater.
11. Slater and General Ledford would be asked Slater and General Ledford would be asked: No. 303 National Security Action Memorandum, June 2, 1964; Top Secret, From the Director of Central Intelligence, Memorandum for the 303 Committee, 22 March 1966.
12. "McNamara was delaying finding a mission": Interview with Dr. Wheelon.
13. if a CIA spy plane were to get shot down if a CIA spy plane were to get shot down: CIA Memorandum, "Reactions to a possible US Course of Action," 17 March 1966; "OXCART Development Summary and Progress," 1 October 196631 December 1966.
14. The majority voted against deployment The majority voted against deployment: Robarge, Archangel, Archangel, 33. 33.
15. Slater now wanted it reduced by nearly 30 percent Slater now wanted it reduced by nearly 30 percent: Interview with Colonel Slater.
16. Park had flown over all four corners of America Park had flown over all four corners of America: John Parangosky, deputy for technology, OSA, wrote in summation of Park"s flight: "An impressive demonstration of the OXCART capability occurred on 21 December 1966 when Lockheed test pilot Bill Park flew 10,198 statute miles in six hours. The aircraft left the test area in Nevada and flew northward over Yellowstone National Park, thence eastward to Bismarck, North Dakota, and on to Duluth, Minnesota. It then turned south and pa.s.sed Atlanta en route to Tampa, Florida, then northwest to Portland, Oregon, then southwest to Nevada. Again the flight turned eastward, pa.s.sing Denver and St. Louis. Turning around at Knoxville, Tennessee, it pa.s.sed Memphis in the home stretch back to Nevada. This flight established a record unapproachable by any other aircraft; it began at about the same time a typical government employee starts his work day and ended two hours before his quitting time." Full text at Roadrunners Internationale official Web site.
17. Walt Ray was, by all accounts, a terrific pilot Walt Ray was, by all accounts, a terrific pilot: Interviews with Colonel Slater, Walt Murray, Ken Collins, Roger Andersen, Charlie Trapp.
18. "flew down to Cabo San Lucas": Interview with Ken Collins.
19. fuel gauge move suddenly fuel gauge move suddenly: Briefing Memorandum for Acting Deputy Director for Science and Technology, Subject Loss of Oxcart A-12 Aircraft, 6 January 1967.
20. Walt Ray told Colonel Slater through his headset Walt Ray told Colonel Slater through his headset: Interview with Colonel Slater.
21. "I"m ejecting" "I"m ejecting": Interview with Colonel Slater. Immediately after the crash Air Force channels reported that an SR-71 flying on a routine flight out of Edwards Air Force Base had gone missing and was presumed down in Nevada.
22. unable to separate from his seat unable to separate from his seat: Memorandum for Acting Deputy Director for Science and Technology, Subject Loss of Article 125 (Oxcart Aircraft), 25 January 1967, 2.
23. Roger Andersen flew in low, in a T-33 Roger Andersen flew in low, in a T-33: Interview with Roger Andersen.
24. Charlie Trapp found the aircraft first Charlie Trapp found the aircraft first: Interview with Charlie Trapp.
25. ""How"d you like to fly the plane?"": Interview with Frank Murray.
26. eight-page letter to the president eight-page letter to the president: Top Secret Idealist/Oxcart, Central Intelligence Agency Office of the Director, BYE-2915-66 Alternative A, 14 December 1966.
27. a scandalous waste of an a.s.set a scandalous waste of an a.s.set: DRAFT, Director of Special Activities, Comments to W.R. Thomas III Memorandum to the Director, BOB, 27 July 1966, 11.
28. Gary Powers incident had actually strengthened Gary Powers incident had actually strengthened: Ibid., 3.
29. the CIA "controls no nuclear weapons the CIA "controls no nuclear weapons": Top Secret Idealist/Oxcart, Central Intelligence Agency Office of the Director, BYE-2915-66 Alternative A, 14 December 1966, 4.
30. But would the president see things his way But would the president see things his way: Memorandum for the President, Subject: Advanced Reconnaissance Aircraft, December 26, 1966, Top Secret. Partic.i.p.ants included Cyrus Vance (deputy secretary of defense), Donald Hornig (the president"s science adviser), C.W. Fischer (bureau of the budget), and Helms. All except Helms recommended mothballing Oxcart. On December 28, the president approved this memo recommendation and ordered the phaseout of the A-12 fleet by January 1968.
31. Slater was instructed to return to Area 51 Slater was instructed to return to Area 51: Interview with Colonel Slater.
32. ahead of a two-star general ahead of a two-star general: Ibid.
33. Slater went to visit Werner Weiss Slater went to visit Werner Weiss: Ibid.
Chapter Sixteen: Operation Black Shield and the Secret History of the USS Pueblo Pueblo Interviews: Colonel Slater, Ken Collins, Roger Andersen, Hervey Stockman, Peter Stockman, Frank Murray, Ronald L. "Jack" Layton, Eunice Layton, Charlie Trapp 1. "never found have much use for intelligence" "never found have much use for intelligence": Hathaway and Smith, Richard Helms, Richard Helms, 2. The most telling comment comes from Helms (ibid., 7): "With President Johnson... I finally came to the conclusion that what I had to say I should get into the first 60, or at least 120 seconds, that I had on my feet. Because after that he was pushing b.u.t.tons for coffee or Fresca, or talking to Rusk, or talking to McNamara, or whispering here or whispering there. I had lost my princ.i.p.al audience." 2. The most telling comment comes from Helms (ibid., 7): "With President Johnson... I finally came to the conclusion that what I had to say I should get into the first 60, or at least 120 seconds, that I had on my feet. Because after that he was pushing b.u.t.tons for coffee or Fresca, or talking to Rusk, or talking to McNamara, or whispering here or whispering there. I had lost my princ.i.p.al audience."
2. Target Tuesday lunch Target Tuesday lunch: Barrett, "Doing "Tuesday Lunch,"" 67677.
3. Helms told the president Helms told the president: John Parangosky, Deputy for Technology, OSA, wrote in summation, "Director of Central Intelligence, Richard Helms, submitted to the 303 Committee another formal proposal to deploy the OXCART. In addition, he raised the matter at President Johnson"s "Tuesday Lunch" on 16 May, and received the Presidents approval to "go." Walt Rostow later in the day formally conveyed the President"s decision, and the BLACK SHIELD deployment plan was forthwith put into effect."
4. A million pounds of materiel, 260 support crew A million pounds of materiel, 260 support crew: Johnson, History of the Oxcart Program, History of the Oxcart Program, 1. The three A-12s that were deployed to Kadena flew nonstop from Groom Lake across the Pacific. They refueled twice en route and got to Kadena in a little less than six hours; interview with Colonel Slater, Ken Collins, Frank Murray, Roger Andersen. 1. The three A-12s that were deployed to Kadena flew nonstop from Groom Lake across the Pacific. They refueled twice en route and got to Kadena in a little less than six hours; interview with Colonel Slater, Ken Collins, Frank Murray, Roger Andersen.
5. "the bird should leave the nest" "the bird should leave the nest": CIA Director of Special Activities to CIA Director of Reconnaissance, "Operation readiness of the OXCART System," 12 November 1965.
6. nearly 40 percent of all islanders" income nearly 40 percent of all islanders" income: CIA NLE MR Case No. 2000-69, Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa) June 1960, 2. "The military economy employs 13% of the working population and generates 36% of the national income."
7. to keep an extremely low profile to keep an extremely low profile: Interview with Ken Collins.
8. "no plausible cover story" "no plausible cover story": Interview with Colonel Slater.
9. the first Oxcart mission the first Oxcart mission: Photographic Interpretation Report: Black Shield Mission X-001, 31 May 1967. NPIC/R-112/67, June 1967.
10. by the time the photographic intelligence got back by the time the photographic intelligence got back: John Parangosky, Deputy for Technology, OSA, wrote: "Film from earlier missions was developed at the Eastman Kodak plant in Rochester, New York. By late summer an Air Force Center in j.a.pan carried out the processing in order to place the photointelligence in the hands of American commanders in Vietnam within 24 hours of completion of a BLACK SHIELD mission."
11. four were "detected and tracked" four were "detected and tracked": CHESS RUFF TRINE OXCART, BYE44232/67, Black Shield Reconnaissance Missions 31 May15 August 1967, 22 Sept. 1967, Central Intelligence Agency, 1. Decla.s.sified in August 2007.
12. first attempted shoot-down first attempted shoot-down: Robarge, Archangel, Archangel, 36. 36.
13. when he was involved in a midair crash when he was involved in a midair crash: interview with Hervey Stockman; also from Conversations with Hervey Stockman Conversations with Hervey Stockman (not numbered) in a section called "Mid-air collision." (not numbered) in a section called "Mid-air collision."
14. to find U.S. airmen who"d gone down to find U.S. airmen who"d gone down: Interview with Frank Murray.
15. "I hope they try something because we are looking for a fight" "I hope they try something because we are looking for a fight": Karnow, Vietnam, Vietnam, 514. 514.
16. it was on an espionage mission it was on an espionage mission: CIA Top Secret [Redacted], 24 January 1968, Memorandum: Chronology of Events Concerning the Seizure of the USS Pueblo, Pueblo, 8 pages. 8 pages.
17. two MiG-21 fighter jets appeared on the scene two MiG-21 fighter jets appeared on the scene: Ibid., 3.
18. The captain considered sinking his ship The captain considered sinking his ship: Bamford, Body of Secrets, Body of Secrets, 259. 259.
19. 90 percent of the doc.u.ments survived 90 percent of the doc.u.ments survived: Ibid., 305.
20. Pentagon began secretly preparing for war Pentagon began secretly preparing for war: Department of Defense, Top Secret Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, January 25, 1968.
21. pinpointed the pinpointed the Pueblo Pueblo"s exact location: TOP SECRET TRINE OXCART, BYE1330/68 Figure 9; a map of Weeks"s flight is noted as Mission BX-6847, 26 January 1968, figure 5.
22. he told his fellow pilots about the problems he told his fellow pilots about the problems: Interviews with Frank Murray, Ken Collins.
23. very few individuals had any idea very few individuals had any idea: In fact, for forty years, Frank Murray believed he had located the USS Pueblo Pueblo because, in a bizarre twist, the CIA told him he did. Only in 2007, when the CIA decla.s.sified the official doc.u.ments on the Oxcart program, was Jack Weeks"s true role in the crisis finally revealed. Murray"s other mission remains cla.s.sified. because, in a bizarre twist, the CIA told him he did. Only in 2007, when the CIA decla.s.sified the official doc.u.ments on the Oxcart program, was Jack Weeks"s true role in the crisis finally revealed. Murray"s other mission remains cla.s.sified.
24. "So we had to abandon any plans to hit them with airpower": Rich, Skunk Works, Skunk Works, 44. This is in a section of Rich"s book written by Walt W. Rostow, President Johnson"s national security adviser from 1966 to 1968. 44. This is in a section of Rich"s book written by Walt W. Rostow, President Johnson"s national security adviser from 1966 to 1968.
25. Murray was a.s.signed to fly Oxcart"s second mission over North Korea Murray was a.s.signed to fly Oxcart"s second mission over North Korea: TOP SECRET TRINE OXCART, BYE1330/68 figure 7. Mission BX-6853, 19 February 1968.
26. a U.S. federal judge determined a U.S. federal judge determined: Wilber, "h.e.l.l Hath a Jury."
27. There were beautiful sunsets to watch There were beautiful sunsets to watch: Interview with Ken Collins.
28. collectively flown twenty-nine missions collectively flown twenty-nine missions: Robarge, Archangel, Archangel, 35. The pilots were put on alert to fly a total of fifty-eight. Of the twenty-nine, twenty-four were over North Vietnam, two were over Cambodia, Laos, and the DMZ, and three were over North Korea. 35. The pilots were put on alert to fly a total of fifty-eight. Of the twenty-nine, twenty-four were over North Vietnam, two were over Cambodia, Laos, and the DMZ, and three were over North Korea.
29. "using our jamming systems on the bird": Interview with Frank Murray. The Pentagon was also using Oxcart photographs to identify potential targets for U.S. Air Force air strikes. TOP SECRET CHESS RUFF TRINE Oxcart BYE44232/67.
30. The Blackbirds were arriving on Kadena to take Oxcart"s place The Blackbirds were arriving on Kadena to take Oxcart"s place: Interviews with Ken Collins and Tony Bevacqua. The SR-71 began arriving in March of 1968.
31. "reaffirmed the original decision to end the A-12 program": Helms Memorandum to Paul Nitze (DOD) and Horning, "Considerations Affecting OXCART Program Phase Out," 18 April 1968.