Equipment received first was surplus to the needs of the Soviet Union as three-quarters or more of its ma.s.sive wartime forces were demobilized.
Replacement materiel came more slowly, having to await the reequipping of Soviet units, but by the late 1950s the most essential combat weapons had been upgraded.
GOVERNMENTAL AND PARTY CONTROL OVER THE ARMED FORCES
The armed forces are subordinate to the Ministry of National Defense, which is one of the governmental ministries whose chief is a member of the Council of Ministers. Administration and routine operational controls are accomplished through government channels. The party, however, has policy authority and ultimate operational control. Division of authority is more apparent than real because nearly all high-ranking governmental officials are also important party members. The minister of national defense in 1973, Army General Dobri Dzhurov, was also a member of the party"s Central Committee. Almost without exception the higher ranking military officers are party members, as are nearly 85 percent of the officers of all ranks. The 15 percent who are not in the party are junior officers who are still members of the Dimitrov Communist Youth Union (Dimitrovski Komunisticheski Mladezhki Suyuz), commonly referred to as the Komsomol. Only a small percentage of Komsomol members become party members, but all except a very few of the young officers are selected for party membership when it becomes apparent that they probably will be successful career officers.
Political education is given priority equal to that of combat training at all levels in the military organization. Party cells are formed in all units where there are three or more party members; Komsomol cells exist in virtually all units. In 1972, 65 percent of the armed forces partic.i.p.ated in scientific-technical compet.i.tions, symposia, conferences, reviews, exhibitions, and other Komsomol activities.
One-man command has superseded the dual control system of the 1950s. In those days a political officer was placed alongside the commanding officer of all units to ensure the reliability of the forces. The political officer was in many ways equal in authority to, and independent of, the commander. The unit commander has allegedly rea.s.sumed a position where he is described as the central figure, leader, planner, and organizer; he is responsible for the discipline and combat effectiveness of his unit and for fulfilling its party tasks. The unit commander"s deputy is still a political officer in most units and, although there is no question of his subordinate position, the political officer is still responsible in part directly to the Main Political Administration of the army.
ORGANIZATION AND MISSION
The several military forces under the Ministry of National Defense are referred to collectively as the Bulgarian People"s Army. The army includes the ground, naval, and air and air defense forces and also the Border Troops (see ch. 15). Tradition prevails in common usage and even in official p.r.o.nouncements, so that when the term _army_ is used alone, it invariably refers to the ground forces or the directorates and service organizations that are common to all of the forces. Naval and air forces are frequently referred to as though they were separate service branches.
Uniformed military personnel permeate the Ministry of National Defense.
All deputy ministers and, with the exception of the medical branch, all major administrative chiefs are military officers. During the early 1970s the first deputy minister of national defense was also chairman of the General Staff and chief of the ground forces. One of the deputies was chief of the air and air defense forces, and all of the others were generals. Following the pattern of other Warsaw Pact armed forces organizations, the political, rear services (logistics), training, armor, artillery, communications, engineering, and chemical sections are directorates, administrations, or branches responsible to the minister of national defense. This is the case in spite of the facts that such branches as armor and artillery are concerned primarily with the ground forces and that others--training, for example--must be tailored to widely different kinds of operations of all the individual services.
Bulgaria is the point of contact between the Warsaw Pact nations and Greece and Turkey, which are the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries on the southern flank of the Soviet alliance. Although little is known of Warsaw Pact war plans, it is probable that Bulgarian forces would be charged with containing an attack from the south.
Statements of military leaders indicate that considerable thought has been given to the problems they would face in a nuclear war. They apparently antic.i.p.ate involvement in the initial engagements but, if nuclear weapons are used, they would employ holding tactics, staying alert to exploit any opportunities that might develop. Their p.r.o.nouncements repeatedly affirm a determination to perform their pact mission to the best of their capabilities.
Ground Forces
The ground forces have approximately 120,000 men. Their major units consist of eight motorized rifle divisions and five tank brigades. There are also various smaller special purpose units and support organizations. The forces are distributed among three territorial commands having headquarters at Sofia, Plovdiv, and Sliven. The division is the basic organizational unit in Warsaw Pact combat forces and has about 10,000 men. Five of Bulgaria"s divisions are believed to be near combat strength, but three probably have only skeletal strengths and would be built up with the mobilization that would accompany a major national emergency.
Each of the other Warsaw Pact armies has a number of tank divisions. The fact that Bulgaria has only tank brigades, which are probably one-half or less the strength of divisions, reflects the austerity of its armed forces. Motorized rifle divisions have one tank regiment, one artillery regiment, and three motorized rifle regiments. The tank brigades, because they are smaller, probably have fewer tanks than the motorized rifle divisions.
Most of the tanks used by the Bulgarian army are the early post-World War II model T-54. There are some newer models in the inventory, and a few of the older World War II T-34s are still being retained. Artillery pieces include guns and gun-howitzers from 82 mm to 152 mm, ant.i.tank weapons up to 100 mm, and small antiaircraft guns. Some units are equipped with short-range missiles and unguided rockets. There are enough personnel carriers or self-propelled weapons so that all men in a unit can be transported simultaneously.
Air and Air Defense Forces
The air and air defense forces have approximately 20,000 men, 250 combat aircraft, an a.s.sortment of antiaircraft guns, a few surface-to-air missiles, and a modest quant.i.ty of air defense radar and communications equipment. Combat aircraft are organized in squadrons, usually with twelve airplanes each. In 1973 there were six fighter-bomber, twelve fighter-interceptor, and three reconnaissance squadrons.
The fighter-bomber squadrons use the MiG-17, an aircraft that is obsolescent but that performs well in a ground support role. About one-half of the fighter-interceptors are also MiG-17s, but three of the interceptor squadrons have the newer MiG-21. The only bomber aircraft in the air forces is the near-obsolete Il-28. The Il-28 squadron has a reconnaissance role. A few old cargo or pa.s.senger planes provide a minimal transport capability, but there are about forty helicopters that can perform shorter range personnel and transport functions.
Air defense forces are positioned to provide protection for the country"s periphery as well as for a few cities and air installations.
Ground and naval forces have antiaircraft weapons to defend their own units. Early warning radars are located mainly along southern and western borders, and their communications lines are presumably linked with the Warsaw Pact air defense warning network.
Naval Forces
Naval forces, with only about 7,000 men, const.i.tute less than 5 percent of the armed forces" personnel strength. They man a variety of vessels, however, including escort ships, patrol boats, torpedo boats, two submarines, and miscellaneous supply and service vessels. They also include a contingent of naval infantry, or marines. Some of the smaller craft make up a Danube River flotilla. Other than the torpedo- and missile-carrying patrol boats, the major offensive strength consists of the submarines, which are Soviet-built W-cla.s.s medium boats, and about twenty landing craft. All of the larger vessels built since World War II have been Soviet built or designed.
Although the naval mission includes tasks confined to the portion of the Black Sea near Bulgaria"s coastline, a few fleet units have joined the Soviet fleet for maneuvers in the Mediterranean Sea, and the naval cadet training ship sails any of the high seas. For example, it visited Cuba on its 1972 summer cruise.
FOREIGN MILITARY RELATIONS
Bulgaria joined the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Albania in bilateral treaties of friendship, cooperation, and mutual a.s.sistance during the early post-World War II period and added another with the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) a few years later. This group became the tighter and more formal Warsaw Pact military alliance in 1955. Albania dissociated itself from the pact in the early 1960s, and its treaties with Bulgaria and the other members have not been renewed since then. Bulgaria"s treaties with the remainder of the original allies have been renewed regularly and are the cause for official observances each year on their anniversary dates.
Although Bulgaria may be the most loyal and reliable of the Soviet Union"s allies, military cooperation between the two countries is limited by their geographical separation. Even if Romania were to permit Bulgaria"s forces to cross its territory in order to partic.i.p.ate in Warsaw Pact training, it is probable that Bulgaria"s role in a future European war would be limited to southeastern Europe, an area that would be of less immediate concern at the outset of a war between the Warsaw Pact members and NATO. In any event, air and sea transport is in limited supply and is not used for the delivery of large numbers of Bulgarian troops to exercises in an area where they probably would not be employed. As a consequence, Bulgaria sends only token forces and observers to the larger pact exercises.
Bulgaria is not a warm proponent of ideological coexistence but is strongly in favor of arms reductions and limitations on future weapons.
It was a member of a United Nations disarmament committee in the early 1970s, and much s.p.a.ce in the printed media is devoted to support of proposals for restricting deployment and use of nuclear weapons in certain areas.
MANPOWER, TRAINING, AND SUPPORT
Manpower
Interpolations of the United Nations estimate of the country"s 1973 population indicate that there were about 2.3 million males in the fifteen- to forty-nine-year age-group, which Bulgarian authorities consider military age. There were also about 70,000 in the annual groups that were reaching the draft age of nineteen each year. Those conscripted serve two- or three-year duty tours. The basic ground force tour is two years; that of special units and air and naval forces is three years.
Approximately 70 percent of the military age groups, or 1.6 million males, are considered physically and otherwise fit for military duty.
Any number of them could be called up in the event of an emergency requiring total mobilization, but it is likely that many of the group would be occupying positions having higher priority than basic military duty. A somewhat larger proportion, or about 75 percent, of the nineteen-year-olds are in satisfactory physical condition. Most of them are drafted; a turnover of one-third of the 150,000-man regular armed forces each year would require nearly all of the group. Because there is very little room for flexibility, a young man"s education is interrupted unless he was actually enrolled in a university or college before he reached the age of eighteen. In this case he continues his education but serves his military obligation upon completion of his education.
Occupational deferments were eliminated by law in 1970, and other deferments are given infrequently and reluctantly. Young men unfit for military duty or for work in the Construction Troops, but who are fit to earn a living in some other work, pay a military tax (see ch. 15).
Those who have had military service and who have not reached the age of fifty are considered reserves. Officers remain in the reserve until the age of sixty. Various factors--primarily occupational situations, physical condition, and lack of reserve training--operate to erode this force, and those considered useful, or trained, reserves const.i.tute one-half or less of the group. Most of the some 250,000 men released in the latest five-year period, however, are available, physically fit, and familiar with the weapons and equipment in use by the armed forces.
Training
In common with its Warsaw Pact allies, Bulgaria uses equipment that is produced or designed in the Soviet Union or that is compatible with Soviet designs. The training program is patterned after that of the Soviet army because the Soviet equipment dictates the training required to maintain and operate it, and joint maneuvers partic.i.p.ated in by any or all of the pact forces make it necessary to employ standard procedures and tactics.
The program is carried on in an annual cycle. Immediately after induction a conscript"s time is spent in so-called individual or basic training. Physical exercise is rigorous, and the soldier is initiated into the care and use of individual weapons, military drill, and the various aspects of military existence with which he had not been familiar and to which he must learn to adjust. He also learns individual actions that may become necessary in group or combat situations, ranging from personal combat techniques to first aid treatment for battle wounds or exposure to gas or nuclear radiation.
As the cycle progresses, the individual usually becomes part of a crew manning a larger weapon or a more complex piece of equipment. When the crew knows its equipment, it then becomes involved in exercises of increasing size, in which it learns to employ weapons and equipment in coordination with other systems. The training cycle culminates in late summer or autumn with the largest of the year"s maneuvers. Although the more important Warsaw Pact maneuvers have been held in the northern group of Eastern European countries, smaller exercises are held in Bulgaria and are occasionally partic.i.p.ated in by visiting Soviet or Romanian forces.
Air defense crews with small-caliber antiaircraft guns and tracking radar practice in conjunction with the early warning network and air defense communications. After target identification they practice holding their weapons on the aircraft by radar or visual sighting.
Target aircraft average about 450 miles per hour and fly just above the treetops.
Ground forces train with a wide variety of weapons and in many situations, but they claim special capabilities and excellence in mountain and winter exercises. These maneuvers are scheduled to exploit the long winter nights and fog, snow, or blizzard conditions to teach troops how to achieve surprise in encircling movements. Troops exercising in the snow are provided a white outergarment for camouflage.
Combined arms exercises are held when all support units are engaged in supporting offensive operations led by tank and motorized rifle groups.
In such exercises the equipment is used as realistically as possible, with blank ammunition and training grenades. Ultra-shortwave communication equipment, whose normal fifty- to sixty-mile range would suffice more than adequately in small maneuver areas, is relayed over long distances to simulate a more typical combat situation.
Political education is the responsibility of a main administration of the Ministry of National Defense and has status on a par with the other most important ministry functions. The administration states its mission as "cultivating moral-political and combat virtues that train men and units for skillful and selfless action under the conditions of modern warfare." Its leaders stress the point that, although large forces and ma.s.sive firepower are employed in modern combat, the complexity and use of weapons is such that individual initiative is increasingly important.
A small group left alone to employ a highly complex weapon must be able to make decisions and must be motivated to do the best that is possible under any kind of unpleasant circ.u.mstances.
Political indoctrination is also aimed at combating potentially subversive elements. Political instructors urge stronger "ideological vigilance" and act to counter the influences of, for example, Western radio stations.
Schools and the Komsomol, with the various youth clubs and organizations that it sponsors, are charged with preparing predraft-age youths for military service. A preliminary training program was reorganized and revitalized in 1968. National leaders had noted that the physical condition of the average conscript was becoming less satisfactory each year and that the idea of serving in the armed forces appeared to be meeting with resistance from a small but increasing number of youths.
They also were aware that juvenile crime was increasing. Sensing that poor physical fitness, a reluctance to perform military duty, and increasing crime could be related and have common causes, they attributed much of the problem to a change in youth att.i.tudes. Political indoctrination and ideological subjects, presented in an attempt to encourage a more proper att.i.tude are, therefore, given highest priorities in the new program.
The formal portion of the program initiated in 1968 consists of a schedule of premilitary training, obligatory for all young men and women between the ages of sixteen and eighteen. Facilities for it were made available in schools for those who were students and at cooperative farms, enterprises, or anywhere that groups of working youths were employed. Young army officers on active duty and reserve officers in the local area were made available for cla.s.sroom and field instruction.
The party"s Politburo issued a statement in March 1971 to the effect that the Komsomol had successfully organized the required program. It cited statistics on recreational facilities, among which were camps that were preparing to accept 125,000 boys and girls for that summer. Camp programs feature political instruction, physical training, sports activities, military field training, and a wide variety of specialized subjects. Other Komsomol cells sponsor aero clubs for those interested in air force service and rowing, sailing, and diving clubs for those interested in the navy. Radio communication, vehicle driving, marksmanship, and many other subjects are sponsored at year-round cla.s.ses in local areas.