This wonderful exhibition of mechanical skill, of cunning workmanship, and of the fruits of the earth, is but the evidence of the existence and character of the people that have produced them. The great ultimate fact that America would demonstrate is the existence of a people capable of attaining and preserving a superior civilization, with a government self-imposed, self-administered, and self-perpetuated. In this, her centennial year, America can exhibit nothing to the world of mankind more wonderful or more glorious than her new states--young empires, born of her own enterprise, and tutored at her own political hearthstone. Well may she say to the monarchies of the old world, who look for evidences of her regal grandeur and state, "Behold, these are my jewels." And may she never blush to add: "This one in the _center_ of the diadem is called IOWA."
CHAPTER IX
TEMPERANCE AND PROHIBITION
In giving a further account of the activities of subsequent years it will be almost impossible to preserve anything like a chronological order of events, and it will be necessary to take up certain subjects or topics that employed much of my time and energies, and probably as important as any other part of my life was my connection with the subject of temperance and prohibition.
The code of Iowa enacted in 1850 took effect July 1, 1851. Under the head of "Intoxicating Liquors" it enacted as follows: "The people of Iowa will hereafter take no part in the profits of the sale of intoxicating liquors." It then provided that the establishment of any place for the sale of intoxicating liquors to be drank on or about the premises should const.i.tute a public nuisance, and enacted penalties against the sale of intoxicating liquors to be drank on or about the premises, and provided for the abatement of such nuisances and the punishment of all persons violating the provisions of this statute.
This code was very excellent in the principle upon which the law was based; to-wit, that the people and government ought not to be a party to or share the profits of the sale of that which was the cause of so much poverty and crime, and the statute aimed at the destruction of the places of resort where the habit of drinking such liquors was contracted and promoted; but in its practical operation the law itself and its provisions were a failure. The words, "To be drank on or about the premises," involved two uncertainties--first, as to the meaning of the words "on or about," and secondly, as to the guilty knowledge or intent of the vendor of the liquors when he made his sale, as to the manner and where the purchaser intended to drink. Courts and juries gave very different and very liberal interpretation in the application of this law to different cases, and many of our judges and justices were not well educated in the idea that the sale of intoxicating liquors as a beverage was really a crime against the community and against humanity. As a result of these uncertainties of the law, the people of the state in 1854 elected a legislature, the majority of the members of which were pledged to enact a statute of absolute prohibition. Such a statute pa.s.sed both branches of the general a.s.sembly, and was approved by Governor Grimes. The settlements in the larger towns along the Mississippi river and in several of the interior counties embraced very many Germans and other persons of foreign birth, accustomed to the use, not only of intoxicating liquors, but to places of resort where the same could be drank at their leisure and pleasure.
The result of this foreign demand was a fatal amendment to the statute of 1854-5 known as the "Wine and Beer Clause," which permitted the licensing and sale of beer and native wine made from the grapes or other fruits grown within the state. The practical result of this law was the establishment of the saloon in charge of keepers who paid no respect to the law and sold all kinds of intoxicating drinks under pretense of beer and native wine.
During our Civil War the people of the state were so absorbed in the progress of events that involved the existence of our nationality that they gave but little attention to local state and police legislation, but soon after the close of the war, the thought of the people was directed to the great curse of the licensed saloon and its effects upon the morals and habits of our people. In order that the policy of the state with reference to this matter might not be subjected to the caprice of political party conventions and elections, the people demanded and sought to enact an amendment to the const.i.tution of the state that should embrace to its fullest extent a provision prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors as a beverage within the state, including not only alcoholic liquors, but also malt liquors. In order to secure such a provision by way of amendment to the const.i.tution it was necessary to secure the election of two successive general a.s.semblies to pa.s.s upon such an amendment, and to secure a vote of the people endorsing and adopting the same at a subsequent election. The provisions of our const.i.tution on the subject of amending the same were as follows:
Any amendment or amendments to this const.i.tution may be proposed in either house of the general a.s.sembly; and if the same shall be agreed to by a majority of the members elected to each of the two houses, such proposed amendment shall be entered on their journals, with the yeas and nays taken thereon, and referred to the legislature to be chosen at the next general election, and shall be published, as provided by law, for three months previous to the time of making such choice; and if, in the general a.s.sembly so next chosen as aforesaid, such proposed amendment or amendments shall be agreed to by a majority of all the members elected to each house, then it shall be the duty of the general a.s.sembly to submit such proposed amendment to the people in such manner, and at such time as the general a.s.sembly shall provide; and if the people shall approve and ratify such amendment or amendments by a majority of the electors qualified to vote for members of the general a.s.sembly, voting thereon, such amendment or amendments shall become a part of the const.i.tution of this state.
In pursuance of the provisions of this const.i.tution the eighteenth general a.s.sembly of the state of Iowa, to-wit, in the year 1880, adopted as an amendment to the const.i.tution of the state the following: "No person shall manufacture for sale, or sell, or keep for sale as a beverage, any intoxicating liquors whatever, including ale, wine and beer. The general a.s.sembly shall by law prescribe regulations for the enforcement of the prohibition herein contained, and shall thereby provide suitable penalties for the violation of the provisions hereof."
This amendment, by omission of the clerk of the house of representatives, was not entered in full upon the journals of that body. It was, however, embraced in a joint resolution of the two houses and fully identified by its t.i.tle upon the journal of the house and senate, and the vote adopting the same was duly recorded by yeas and nays as required by the const.i.tution. The publication of this action of the eighteenth general a.s.sembly was duly made in the newspapers prior to the election of the nineteenth general a.s.sembly, and at the session of that body another joint resolution was pa.s.sed in both houses embracing the amendment and reciting the action of the eighteenth general a.s.sembly thereon, and this joint resolution pa.s.sed both houses, and the yeas and nays were fully recorded, and proclamation was made by the Governor of the state, and the people of the state at a subsequent election held on June 27, 1882, after a vigorous canva.s.s of the merits of the question, endorsed and adopted the amendment by nearly thirty thousand majority.
On the 26th day of August, 1882, a pretended suit was brought in the district court of Scott county by a brewing establishment owned and operated by Koehler & Lange against a saloon keeper by the name of Hill, in the city of Davenport, upon an account for beer sold by the brewer to the saloon keeper, and the saloon keeper set up by way of defense that he bought the beer and it was sold to him for the purpose of being sold as a beverage and that the sale was unlawful and contrary to the provisions of the amendment to the const.i.tution. That this suit was a mere conspiracy for the purpose of having the amendment to the const.i.tution declared void there can be no question. The judge of the district court of Scott county was opposed to the amendment personally and politically, as were also the attorneys that conducted these proceedings. The princ.i.p.al answer of the saloon keeper was to set up the const.i.tutional amendment and the brewer replied stating that the const.i.tutional amendment was not legally adopted, especially because the amendment had not been spread upon the journals of the house of representatives of the eighteenth general a.s.sembly verbatim, but that it had only been embraced in a certain joint resolution of the two houses. The judgment of the district court was against the brewer for the beer, and he took a pretended appeal therefrom to the supreme court of the state. When the case reached the supreme court J. A. Harvey, Esq., who had been an active man in the general a.s.sembly in favor of the amendment, and who was also an avowed prohibitionist and friend of the amendment, was employed by the Women"s Temperance Union of the state to appear in the case and argue the matter before the supreme court, involving the legality of the amendment. The Women"s Temperance Union also employed Judge William E. Miller, an ex-judge of the supreme court of our state, who prepared and filed in the case a printed argument. I was at that time absorbed in my own private practice and had a case on trial in the district court, and was unable to attend the session of the court at which the case was argued. I had been very active in the canva.s.s pending the adoption of this amendment at the popular election, and had spent much time in making speeches before the people in its behalf. I had promised Mr. Harvey that if my other professional engagements would admit of it I would a.s.sist him in the oral argument before the supreme court. To my great surprise, and to the surprise and consternation of the people of the state, the majority of the judges of the supreme court decided that the amendment had not been legally adopted, giving as their chief reason therefor the failure of the eighteenth general a.s.sembly to have spread upon the house journal a verbatim copy of the const.i.tutional amendment at the time it was adopted by that house. As soon as this decision was made known I prepared and filed in the supreme court of the state a pet.i.tion for a re-hearing of the case. This re-hearing was granted. The Governor of the state employed Senator James F. Wilson of Fairfield, and Hon. John F. Duncombe, of Fort Dodge, to appear and make oral argument in behalf of the amendment. I also appeared in the case at my own request and upon my own motion and argued the case orally at Davenport on the final hearing. Two of the judges of the supreme court; Judges Seevers and Rothrock, were not friends of the amendment, and I think, in sentiment, were opposed to it. Judge Day"s action in the matter in agreeing with Messrs. Seevers and Rothrock was a surprise to his friends, but I have no doubt his decision was honestly made. I think this re-hearing might possibly have resulted in a favorable opinion from a majority of the court had it not been for the intemperate zeal of a portion of the public press, particularly the Des Moines _Register_ edited by the Clarksons in which the majority opinion of the supreme court was denounced. The judges who const.i.tuted the majority of the court could scarcely be expected to change their views and opinions under the pressure of the brutal attacks that were made upon them through the press. Judge Beck, the fourth judge of the court, had delivered a very able dissenting opinion sustaining the const.i.tutional amendment. That the decision of the supreme court upon this question was radically wrong, I have never entertained the least doubt in my own mind. The supreme court in its majority opinion recognized the fact that the only proper and legal evidence of the final action of the legislative body in the enactment of its laws must be found in its enrolled bills, duly certified by the presiding officers of the senate and house of representatives respectively. The authorities were uniform, and no court had ever before undertaken to examine the journals of a legislative a.s.sembly for the purpose of contradicting and falsifying the duly certified action of the legislature by its presiding officer.
Every bill that pa.s.ses the general a.s.sembly of the state is duly enrolled by the clerk elected for that purpose by the house in which the bill originated. It is then supposed to be carefully examined by the committee on enrolled bills and reported in open session of the house, and is then presented by the clerk or secretary to the several presiding officers in open session for their signatures, and thence in the care of the proper committee on enrolled bills is presented to the Governor for his approval. To go behind this official action of the two branches of the legislature and undertake to examine and criticise the action of the clerk in recording or failing to record any part of its proceedings, by the courts of the state, is simply to destroy the independence of the law-making power, and is nothing more or less than usurpation on the part of a coordinate branch of the government. The const.i.tution of Iowa in its provisions in regard to an amendment of that instrument selects, first, the two houses of the general a.s.sembly, secondly, the executive of the state, and thirdly, the people of the state, the source of all political power, and entrusts to them and them alone the power to amend its organic law. This amendment originated with and was carefully prepared by and approved by both branches of the eighteenth general a.s.sembly, and subsequently by the nineteenth general a.s.sembly, there can be no question; that it was then submitted to a vote of the people, voted and approved by the people by a large majority, was then proclaimed by the Governor of the state in his proclamation as part of the organic law of the state, there was no question, and I do not hesitate to say, after years of thought and deliberation upon this matter, that the decision of the supreme court of the state in the case of Koehler & Lange against Hill was simply usurpation. During the pendency of this re-hearing and before the final arguments in the case Mr. Hill, the saloon-keeper of Davenport, attempted to defeat the re-hearing by asking the court to strike from the files the pet.i.tion for rehearing and denying the authority of the attorneys who had filed the same to act in his name. The Governor of the state, after the final disposition of the cause, appropriated $750 to the three princ.i.p.al counsel engaged in the re-hearing, and sent me one-third of the amount; to-wit, $250 for my services in the matter.
The const.i.tutional amendment thus attempted to be rendered null and void by the opinion of the supreme court in the case of Koehler & Lange against Hill was really only an amendment to the const.i.tution enjoining upon the legislature the duty of enacting a prohibitory liquor law, and forbidding the enactment of any statute authorizing the license and sale of intoxicating liquors as a beverage. The immediate effect of the decision of the supreme court was to arouse the people of the state to an a.s.sertion of their rights in regard to these matters; consequently they elected a general a.s.sembly in the fall of 1883, a large majority of whose members were pledged to give the people, by legislative enactment, a law such as the const.i.tutional amendment required, and in pursuance of that purpose the twentieth general a.s.sembly enacted the prohibitory law, chapter 143, page 146 of the laws of that session.
This law was popularly known as the Clark law, taking its name from the fact that it was introduced into the senate by Senator Clark of Page county. He was not, however, the author of the law, and was only ent.i.tled to the credit of having introduced it as a member of the senate.
Some time before these events there had been organized in the state of Iowa a temperance league, with its headquarters at Des Moines. Mr. J.
A. Harvey, before referred to, and myself, with Louis Todhunter of Indianola, had been appointed by the Temperance League a committee to draft a prohibitory law and secure its pa.s.sage by the twentieth general a.s.sembly. Another effect of the decision of the supreme court in the Koehler & Lange case was the retirement of Judge Day from the supreme bench of the state, and the election of Judge Read of Council Bluffs in his stead. I was a delegate to the republican state convention from Polk county. I did not sympathize with the idea of the defeat for renomination of a judge of the court on the simple ground that his decision or action as judge did not meet with the approval of the people, but I could not, with my ideas of right and justice, approve of the renomination of any judge of the court that had a.s.sumed the prerogative attempted to be exercised by the majority of judges in the Koehler & Lange case, and I cordially supported Judge Read for the nomination. I had a.s.sisted Mr. Harvey in framing the prohibitory law that was enacted by the twentieth general a.s.sembly, part of which was written by myself. I did not entirely agree with the committee, however, in providing as that statute does that the prosecuting witness or party filing informations for a violation of the law should take to his personal use any part of the fines or penalties provided for in the statute. I disliked that feature of the law for the reason that I antic.i.p.ated that bad men, for the sake of personal profit and gain, would bring the law into disrepute. The State Temperance League undertook to provide, to a greater or less extent, for the prosecution of offenders under this law of the twentieth general a.s.sembly. I was on the committee appointed by the League and was chairman of the committee that had advisory powers in regard to prosecutions undertaken or promoted by the officers of the League, and as chairman of that committee I had occasion, a number of times, to defeat the purposes and plans of those who sought to use the authority of the League for some ulterior purpose. The most serious case of this kind that arose during my administration related to the effort of a certain whiskey trust to use the prohibitory law as a means of destroying an industry established in Des Moines by invitation of its business men just prior to the taking effect of this prohibitory law of 1884. One of the chief men in encouraging the establishment of the International Distillery in Des Moines, so-called, was J. S. Clarkson, editor-in-chief then of the Des Moines _Register_. This International Distillery was an alcohol manufactory, established by a man by the name of Kidd. Before he invested his money in the plant he had taken the precaution to consult with a number of prominent citizens and prohibitionists of the city of Des Moines, to know whether or not his enterprise would at all be affected by the const.i.tutional amendment or the statute that might be pa.s.sed in pursuance thereof. Pending the action of the general a.s.sembly upon the const.i.tutional amendment, the Des Moines _Register_ had insisted upon some legislative interpretation of the meaning and effect of the proposed amendment upon the question of the manufacture of alcohol within the state as an article of commerce, for the purpose of shipping the same to the markets abroad and not to be sold within the state. In pursuance of the suggestion of the Des Moines _Register_, the state senate of Iowa in 1882 adopted the following explanatory resolution as to the meaning and intent of the amendment then pending, and thereafter to be voted upon by the people, as follows:
Whereas, doubts have been suggested as to the true intent and meaning of the joint resolution agreed to by the 18th general a.s.sembly, and by this general a.s.sembly, as proposing to amend the const.i.tution of the state so as to prohibit the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors as a beverage within this state; and
Whereas, it is desirable that such doubts should be removed as far as practicable before said proposed amendment is voted upon by the people; therefore,
Be it resolved by the senate, that said proposed amendment was and is designed and intended to prevent the manufacture within this state, for sale within this state, as a beverage, all intoxicating liquors, including ale, wine and beer, and to prohibit the selling of such liquors within this state for use as a beverage, and to prohibit the keeping of such liquors for sale as a beverage within this state; and was not designed to prohibit the manufacture for sale, or keeping for sale, of such liquors for any or all other purposes.
A short time before this resolution was pa.s.sed a meeting of the board of trade of the city of Des Moines was held with reference to the same matter. It was attended by many of the most prominent prohibitionists of the city, and all concurred in the view of the amendment afterward taken by the senate. The sense of the meeting was expressed by a resolution reported by a committee, consisting of T. S. Wright, J. S.
Polk, and J. S. Clarkson, and adopted with but one dissenting vote. The resolution is as follows:
Whereas, the agitation of the proposed amendment to the const.i.tution of this state, prohibiting the manufacture of alcoholic liquors for sale, is creating doubt and uncertainty in the minds of capitalists proposing to invest a large amount of means in the manufacture of alcohol in this city; and
Whereas, we are satisfied the great majority of the people of the state do not construe such amendment as prohibiting the manufacture of alcohol for exportation, but that it simply prohibits its manufacture for sale as a beverage in the state, a view in which the leading friends and the most of the supporters of the amendment concur; and
Whereas, we are sure the people of the state would vote down overwhelmingly any amendment absolutely prohibiting the manufacture of alcohol; therefore be it
Resolved, that the Des Moines Board of Trade accept the interpretation of the leading friends and supporters of the amendment, that it intends only to prohibit the manufacture for sale of alcoholic liquors in the state as a beverage, pledges itself to the support and defense of capitalists investing in such manufacturing as against all doubts as to the real meaning of the amendment, and further, that we will lend our active influence toward securing such legislative expression as will put upon the amendment the construction that it will only prohibit the manufacture of such liquors for sale as a beverage in the state.
This meeting of the board of trade, which was attended by many of the prominent prohibitionists of the city and of the state, I did not attend, though invited to be present.
In pursuance of the encouragement thus given to Mr. Kidd, and prior to the taking effect of the prohibitory law of 1884, Mr. Kidd expended several hundred thousand dollars in the building of his plant for the manufacture of alcohol at the city of Des Moines, Iowa, and continued such manufacture without interruption until certain prosecutions were commenced against him at the instance of the Western Export a.s.sociation, a whisky trust organized by the distillers of the United States to prevent an excess of alcohol being manufactured, and by this means to regulate and keep up the price of the article. After the decision of the princ.i.p.al suit undertaken in this behalf, in which I.
E. Pearson and a man by the name of Loughran were nominal plaintiffs and the International Distillery and Mr. Kidd were defendants, a decision adverse to the distillery was obtained and the defendants took an appeal to the supreme court of the state. Mr. Kidd and his attorney called upon me and reminded me of the fact that our firm, consisting of B. F. Kauffman and myself, had given them a written opinion to the effect that the law of 1884 did not make it unlawful to manufacture alcohol in this state as an article of merchandise, to be shipped and disposed of beyond the limits of the state, and Mr. Kidd appealed to me to know if I was willing to accept of a retainer to argue that question in the supreme court of the state on his appeal, suggesting that he thought it my duty to do so as a lawyer, and asked if I was afraid to perform my duty in that behalf. I told him that I was not afraid and accepted of the employment.
As soon as this became known to the Des Moines _Register_, its editors commenced a series of abusive articles against me, containing misrepresentations and insinuations, and for some reasons best known to the editors of that paper and of which I am not advised, they became very active in trying to promote the success of this prosecution against the distillery and to destroy the same. These articles of the State _Register_ created, of course, quite an inquiry among the friends of prohibition in the state, and they wrote a number of letters to Mrs.
A. E. McMurray, secretary of the State Temperance League, making inquiry in regard to the matter of my employment. She accordingly wrote a letter to me upon the subject and I answered the same very fully, giving a history of the whole controversy, and particularly the motives of the men that were trying to destroy Kidd and his enterprise. Though the letter is somewhat in detail, yet, as it is a complete answer to all of the criticisms that have been made of my professional conduct in this matter, I give it here in full:
DES MOINES, IOWA, MARCH 19, 1887.
Mrs. E. A. McMurray, Secretary of Iowa State Temperance Alliance:
I have your communication of the 17th inst., and appreciating the motives that have prompted it, I take pleasure in responding to your inquiries.
The case of I. E. Pearson and S. J. Loughran against John S. Kidd, now pending upon appeal in the supreme court of the state, and in which I have been retained for the defendant, involves only the question as to the right of the defendant to manufacture alcohol in this state, under the permit granted him by the board of supervisors of Polk county, for the purpose of export. There is no pretense that Mr. Kidd, since the taking effect of our present statute, has ever sold any intoxicating liquors, or alcohol, within the state of Iowa, for any purpose whatever. The only evidence offered to sustain the pet.i.tion is contained in the official reports of Mr. Kidd to the auditor of the county, by which it appears that he has manufactured alcohol and shipped it out of the state. The article manufactured by Mr. Kidd and put upon the market is not itself a beverage, and is not and cannot be used as such in the form in which he has produced and sold it. The case was first tried in the circuit court of Polk county, before Judges Given and Henderson, upon an application for a preliminary injunction. In December last those two judges delivered an opinion in the case, deciding that Mr. Kidd had not in any manner violated the prohibitory law, and they refused an injunction. At the present term of the district court Judge Conrad, our newly-elected district judge, put a different construction upon the law and held, that by the amendment made to the prohibitory law by the legislation of 1884 it was unlawful to manufacture alcohol in the state for export; and this is the sole question to be determined by the supreme court upon the appeal. This answers the first inquiry in your letter, as to what is involved in the case.
Your next question is whether or not my employment in this case is consistent with my past record; and whether or not it is calculated to impair my influence and usefulness for the cause of prohibition in the future.
I was one of the committee appointed by the State Temperance Alliance to prepare a bill to be presented to the legislature for its consideration, in 1884, that should carry out the will of the people of Iowa, as expressed in the amendment to the const.i.tution, which amendment the supreme court of the state had then decided was not operative, by reason of the failure of the eighteenth general a.s.sembly to properly enter the same upon their journals.
As early as the 31st of May, 1881, I prepared and delivered before the Methodist state convention that was held in Des Moines at that date an address on the legal phase of the prohibitory amendment. This address was afterwards printed in pamphlet form by the _Prohibitionist_, and was circulated during the amendment campaign as a campaign doc.u.ment, and seemed to meet with the views of the friends of prohibition at that time. In that address I took occasion to discuss the meaning and scope of the proposed amendment, and in it occurs the following pa.s.sage, defining my view of the legislation that would be required by that amendment, if adopted. I quote:
We have, in regard to spirituous liquors, laws upon our statute books designed to prohibit their manufacture or sale, except for medicinal, mechanical, culinary and sacramental purposes.
For these lawful purposes certain persons are authorized to sell. They must obtain a permit, give bonds, keep books, etc., and are subject to the supervision and control of the authorities. The manufacturer could be required to sell only to persons thus authorized to sell for lawful purposes; if sold _within the state_, otherwise than as permitted by the statute, the act could be punished by fine or confiscation.
May 12, 1881, I attended a meeting of the State Bar a.s.sociation of Iowa, the proceedings of which are reported in the Des Moines _Register_ of May 13, 1881. That meeting discussed the meaning and interpretation of the proposed prohibitory amendment to the const.i.tution. Mr. c.u.mmins, an attorney of this city, offered a resolution at that meeting as follows:
Resolved, That the proposed amendment prohibits the manufacture of intoxicating liquors within the state for sale as a beverage without the state.
The _Register"s_ report says that "Judge Nourse arose and stated that Iowa had no control over the liquor after it left the state."
From the above it will appear that my interpretation of the const.i.tutional amendment and of the efforts that we were about to make at that time to control the manufacture of intoxicating liquors within this state, did not contemplate any interference with the manufacture of alcohol for the purpose of export. That this view was in entire harmony with the views and opinions of the great ma.s.s of the people then favoring legislation upon this subject, is conclusively shown by the following extracts taken from the _Iowa State Register_ of the following dates:
THE AMENDMENT"S MEANING
(_Iowa State Register_, February 3, 1882)
Nine-tenths of the ma.s.s of the supporters of the amendment that we know of hold the view that it is to deal with liquors only so far as forbidding their sale for use as a beverage in this state. So it is not a "Des Moines idea" at all, but the view of the great body of supporters of the amendment itself.
The truth is, then, as shown by the records of the supporters of the submission of the amendment in the legislature, and by the testimony of nine-tenths of the supporters of it among the people who have publicly expressed themselves, that the amendment was not intended to prohibit manufactures for export.
The State Bar a.s.sociation at its last meeting discussed the meaning of it, and failed to agree upon it, opinion being about equally divided as to whether it means absolute and total prohibition or only as to manufacture and sale as a beverage in this state. We do not doubt that the original friends of the amendment intended to have it go no further than to make it deal with liquor as a beverage in Iowa. Nor do we doubt that the great body of them hold to the view now that it is intended to go no further than that. They know that the state has no power to go beyond that, and they realize that to attempt to carry the amendment, with the interpretation of total prohibition or manufacture given to it, it would be defeated.
For the people of Iowa will never consent, in our judgment, to prohibit the manufacture of their greatest staple into alcohol for export. In that form Iowa corn can be sent into South America and to the ports of the Mediterranean Sea, while in its raw form it can only go there by taking from five to ten bushels to pay the freight on one. This alcohol trade must be supplied, and will be supplied, and Iowa corn will inevitably supply a good deal of it, whether it is made up into alcohol for this purpose in Iowa, to the profit of the Iowa farmer, or whether it be shipped to Chicago and St. Louis, or elsewhere, at the loss of the Iowa farmer, and made into form there.
We do not ask that the amendment itself shall be tinkered with.
But we do ask that the same majority which shall vote to submit it to the people shall put on record the true interpretation of its meaning. From this position we do not intend to be driven either by the ridicule of whisky rings or whisky papers, nor by the sneers of temperance papers, which have not yet examined into the question themselves, and would have every body else as stupid about it as they are themselves.
THE AMENDMENT"S MEANING
(_Iowa State Register_, February 7, 1882)