It should be understood that the prescriptions in question have to do with dispositions before action; with methods of fighting, and not with maneuvers.
Maneuvers are the movements of troops in the theater of action, and they are the swift and ordered movement on the scene of action of tactical units of all sizes. They do not const.i.tute action. Action follows them.
Confusion in many minds between maneuvers and action brings about doubt and mistrust of our regulation drills. These are good, very good as far as they go, inasmuch as they give methods of executing all movements, of taking all possible formations with rapidity and good order.
To change them, to discuss them, does not advance the question one bit. They do not affect the problem of positive action. Its solution lies in the study of what took place yesterday, from which, alone, it is possible to deduce what will happen to-morrow.
This study must be made, and its result set forth. Each leader, whose worth and authority has been tested in war and recognized by armies, has done something of the sort. Of each of these even might be said, "He knew the soldier; he knew how to make use of him."
The Romans, too, had this knowledge. They obtained it from continuous experience and profound reflexion thereon.
Experience is not continuous to-day. It must be carefully gathered.
Study of it should be careful and the results should stimulate reflexion, especially in men of experience. Extremes meet in many things. In ancient times at the point of the pike and sword, armies have conquered similar armies twice their size. Who knows if, in these days of perfected long-range arms of destruction, a small force might not secure, by a happy combination of good sense or genius with morale and appliances, these same heroic victories over a greater force similarly armed?[33]
In spite of the statements of Napoleon I, his a.s.sumption that victory is always on the side of the strongest battalions was costly.
PART II. MODERN BATTLE
CHAPTER I
GENERAL DISCUSSION
1. Ancient and Modern Battle
I have heard philosophers reproached for studying too exclusively man in general and neglecting the race, the country, the era, so that their studies of him offer little of real social or political value.
The opposite criticism can be made of military men of all countries.
They are always eager to expound traditional tactics and organization suitable to the particular character of their race, always the bravest of all races. They fail to consider as a factor in the problem, man confronted by danger. Facts are incredibly different from all theories. Perhaps in this time of military reorganization it would not be out of place to make a study of man in battle and of battle itself.
The art of war is subjected to many modifications by industrial and scientific progress. But one thing does not change, the heart of man.
In the last a.n.a.lysis, success in battle is a matter of morale. In all matters which pertain to an army, organization, discipline and tactics, the human heart in the supreme moment of battle is the basic factor. It is rarely taken into account; and often strange errors are the result. Witness the carbine, an accurate and long range weapon, which has never given the service expected of it, because it was used mechanically without considering the human heart. We must consider it!
With improvement in weapons, the power of destruction increases, the moral effect of such weapons increases, and courage to face them becomes rarer. Man does not, cannot change. What should increase with the power of material is the strength of organization, the unity of the fighting machine. Yet these are most neglected. A million men at maneuvers are useless, if a sane and reasoned organization does not a.s.sure their discipline, and thereby their reliability, that is, their courage in action.
Four brave men who do not know each other will not dare to attack a lion. Four less brave, but knowing each other well, sure of their reliability and consequently of mutual aid, will attack resolutely.
There is the science of the organization of armies in a nutsh.e.l.l.
At any time a new invention may a.s.sure victory. Granted. But practicable weapons are not invented every day, and nations quickly put themselves on the same footing as regards armament. The determining factor, leaving aside generals of genius, and luck, is the quality of troops, that is, the organization that best a.s.sures their esprit, their reliability, their confidence, their unity. Troops, in this sense, means soldiers. Soldiers, no matter how well drilled, who are a.s.sembled haphazard into companies and battalions will never have, have never had, that entire unity which is born of mutual acquaintanceship.
In studying ancient battle, we have seen what a terrible thing battle is. We have seen that man will not really fight except under disciplinary pressure. Even before having studied modern battle, we know that the only real armies are those to which a well thought out and rational organization gives unity throughout battle. The destructive power of improved firearms becomes greater. Battle becomes more open, hindering supervision, pa.s.sing beyond the vision of the commander and even of subordinate officers. In the same degree, unity should be strengthened. The organization which a.s.sures unity of the combatants should be better thought out and more rational. The power of arms increases, man and his weaknesses remain the same. What good is an army of two hundred thousand men of whom only one-half really fight, while the other one hundred thousand disappear in a hundred ways? Better to have one hundred thousand who can be counted upon.
The purpose of discipline is to make men fight in spite of themselves.
No army is worthy of the name without discipline. There is no army at all without organization, and all organization is defective which neglects any means to strengthen the unity of combatants. Methods cannot be identical. Draconian discipline does not fit our customs.
Discipline must be a state of mind, a social inst.i.tution based on the salient virtues and defects of the nation.
Discipline cannot be secured or created in a day. It is an inst.i.tution, a tradition. The commander must have confidence in his right to command. He must be accustomed to command and proud to command. This is what strengthens discipline in armies commanded by an aristocracy in certain countries.
The Prussians do not neglect the h.o.m.ogeneity and consequent unity of organization. They recognize its value. Hessian regiments are composed, the first year, of one-third Hessians, two-thirds Prussians, to control the racial tendencies of troops of a recently annexed country; the second year, of two-thirds Hessians, one-third Prussians; the third year, all Hessians with their own officers.
The Americans have shown us what happens in modern battle to large armies without cohesion. With them the lack of discipline and organization has had the inevitable result. Battle has been between hidden skirmishers, at long distance, and has lasted for days, until some faulty movement, perhaps a moral exhaustion, has caused one or the other of the opposing forces to give way.
In this American War, the melees of Agincourt are said to have reappeared, which merely means a melee of fugitives. But less than ever has there been close combat.
To fight from a distance is instinctive in man. From the first day he has worked to this end, and he continues to do so. It was thought that with long range weapons close combat might return. On the contrary troops keep further off before its effects.
The primitive man, the Arab, is instability incarnate. A breath, a nothing, governs him at each instant in war. The civilized man, in war, which is opposed to civilization, returns naturally to his first instincts.
With the Arab war remains a matter of agility and cunning. Hunting is his princ.i.p.al pastime and the pursuit of wild beasts teaches the pursuit of man. General Daumas depicts Arabs as cavaliers. What more chivalrous warfare than the night surprise and sack of a camp! Empty words!!
It is commonly said that modern war is the most recondite of things, requiring experts. War, so long as man risks his skin in it, will always be a matter of instinct.
Ancient battle resembled drill. There is no such resemblance in modern battle. This greatly disconcerts both officers and soldiers.
Ancient battles were picnics, for the victors, who lost n.o.body. Not so to-day.
Artillery played no part in ancient battle.
The invention of firearms has diminished losses in battle. The improvement of firearms continues to diminish losses. This looks like a paradox. But statistics prove it. Nor is it unreasonable.
Does war become deadlier with the improvement of weapons? Not at all.
Man is capable of standing before a certain amount of terror; beyond that he flees from battle. The battle of Pharsalus lasted some four hours. Caesar broke his camp, which is done in the morning; then the formation for battle; then the battle, etc. And he says that his troops were tired, the battle having lasted up to noon. This indicates that he considered it long.
For the middle ages, consult Froissart. The knights in the Battle of the Thirty were armed for battle on foot which they preferred in a serious affair, that is to say in a restricted s.p.a.ce. There was a halt, a rest in the combat, when the two parties became exhausted. The Bretons, at this rest, were twenty-five against thirty. The battle had lasted up to exhaustion without loss by the English! Without Montauban the battle would have been terminated by complete and mutual exhaustion and without further losses. For the greater the fatigue, the less strength remained for piercing the armor. Montauban was at the same time felon and hero; felon because he did a thing not permitted by the code of combat; hero, because, if the Bretons had not ably profited by the disorder, he would have been killed when he entered the English formation alone. At the end of the contest the Bretons had four killed, the English eight. Four of the killed were overcome by their armor.
Explain how, under Turenne, men held much longer under fire than to-day. It is perfectly simple. Man is capable of standing before only a certain amount of terror. To-day there must be swallowed in five minutes what took an hour under Turenne. An example will be given.
With the present arms, whose usage is generally known, the instruction of the soldier is of little importance. It does not make the soldier.
Take as an example the case of the peasants of the Vendee. Their unity and not individual instruction made them soldiers, whose value could not be denied. Such unity was natural in people of the same village of the same commune, led in battle by their own lords, their own priests, etc.
The greater the perfection of weapons, the more dreadful becomes modern battle, and discipline becomes more difficult to maintain.
The less mobile the troops, the deadlier are battles. Bayonet attacks are not so easily made to-day, and morale consequently is less affected, man fearing man more than death. Astonishing losses seem to have been suffered without breaking by Turenne"s armies. Were the casualty reports submitted by the captains of those days correct?
Frederick liked to say that three men behind the enemy were worth more than fifty in front of him, for moral effect. The field of action to-day is more extensive than in Frederick"s time. Battle is delivered on more accidented terrain, as armies with great mobility do not need any particular terrain to fight on.
The nature of ancient arms required close order. Modern arms require open order, and they are at the same time of such terrible power that against them too often discipline is broken. What is the solution?
Have your combatants opened out? Have them well acquainted with each other so as to have unity. Have reserves to threaten with, held with an iron hand.
Modern weapons have a terrible effect and are almost unbearable by the nervous system. Who can say that he has not been frightened in battle?
Discipline in battle becomes the more necessary as the ranks become more open, and the material cohesion of the ranks not giving confidence, it must spring from a knowledge of comrades, and a trust in officers, who must always be present and seen. What man to-day advances with the confidence that rigid discipline and pride in himself gave the Roman soldier, even though the contest is no longer with man but with fate?