In conclusion, if fire at command was impossible with the ancient rifle, it is more so to-day, for the simple reason that trembling increases as the destructive power increases. Under Turenne, lines held longer than to-day, because the musket was in use and the battle developed more slowly. To-day when every one has the rapid fire rifle, are things easier? Alas no! Relations between weapons and the man are the same. You give me a musket, I fire at sixty paces, a rifle, at two hundred; a chessepot, at four hundred. But I have perhaps less coolness and steadiness than at the old sixty paces, for with the rapidity of fire the new weapon is more terrible at four hundred paces, for me as well as for the enemy, than was the musket at sixty paces. And is there even more fire accuracy? No. Rifles were used before the French revolution, and yet this perfectly well known weapon was very rarely seen in war, and its efficacy, as shown in those rare cases, was unsatisfactory. Accurate fire with it at combat distances of from two hundred to four hundred meters was illusory, and it was abandoned in favor of the old rifle. Did the foot cha.s.seurs know fire at command? Picked troops, dependable, did they use it? Yet it would have been a fine method of employing their weapons. To-day we have weapons that are accurate at six hundred to seven hundred meters. Does that mean that accurate fire at seven hundred meters is possible? No.
If your enemy is armed as we are, fire at seven hundred meters will show the same results that have been shown for four hundred meters.
The same losses will be suffered, and the coolness shown will be the same--that is, it will be absent. If one fire three times as fast, three times as many men will fall, and it will be three times as difficult to preserve coolness. Just as formerly it was impossible to execute fire at command, so it is to-day. Formerly no sight-setting was possible; it is no better to-day.
But if this fire is impossible, why attempt it? Let us remain always in the realm of the possible or we shall make sad mistakes. "In our art," said General Daine, "theorists abound; practical men are very rare. Also when the moment of action arrives, principles are often found to be confused, application impossible, and the most erudite officers remain inactive, unable to use the scientific treasures that they have ama.s.sed."
Let us then, practical men, seek for possible methods. Let us gather carefully the lessons of their experience, remembering Bacon"s saying, "Experience excels science."
Appendix II
HISTORICAL DOc.u.mENTS
1. Cavalry
An Extract from Xenophon.
"The unexpectedness of an event accentuates it, be it pleasant or terrible. This is nowhere seen better than in war, where surprise terrorizes even the strongest.
"When two armies are in touch or merely separated by the field of battle, there are first, on the part of the cavalry, skirmishes, thrusts, wheels to stop or pursue the enemy, after which usually each goes cautiously and does not put forth its greatest effort until the critical part of the conflict. Or, having commenced as usual, the opposite is done and one moves swiftly, after the wheel, either to flee or to pursue. This is the method by which one can, with the least possible risk, most harm the enemy, charging at top speed when supported, or fleeing at the same speed to escape the enemy. If it is possible in these skirmishes to leave behind, formed in column and un.o.bserved four or five of the bravest and best mounted men in each troop they may be very well employed to fall on the enemy at the moment of the wheel."
2. Marius Against the Cimbrians
Extract from Plutarch"s "Life of Marius."
"Boiorix, king of the Cimbrians, at the head of a small troop of cavalry, approached Marius" camp and challenged him to fix a day and place to decide who would rule the country. Marius answered that Romans did not ask their enemies when to fight, but that he was willing to satisfy the Cimbrians. They agreed then to give battle in three days on the plain of Verceil, a convenient place for the Romans to deploy their cavalry and for the barbarians to extend their large army. The two opponents on the day set were in battle formation.
Catulus had twenty thousand three hundred men. Marius had thirty-two thousand, placed on the wings and consequently on either side of those of Catulus, in the center. So writes Sylla, who was there. They say that Marius gave this disposition to the two parts of his army because he hoped to fall with his two wings on the barbarian phalanxes and wished the victory to come only to his command, without Catulus taking any part or even meeting with the enemy. Indeed, as the front of battle was very broad, the wings were separated from the center, which was broken through. They add that Catulus reported this disposition in the explanation that he had to make and complained bitterly of Marius"
bad faith. The Cimbrian infantry came out of its positions in good order and in battle array formed a solid phalanx as broad as it was wide, thirty stades or about eighteen thousand feet. Their fifteen thousand hors.e.m.e.n were magnificently equipped. Their helmets were crowned by the gaping mouths of savage beasts, above which were high plumes which looked like wings. This accentuated their height. They were protected by iron cuira.s.ses and had shields of an astonishing whiteness. Each had two javelins to throw from a distance, and in close fighting they used a long heavy sword.
"In this battle the cavalry did not attack the Romans in front, but, turning to the right they gradually extended with the idea of enclosing the Romans before their infantry and themselves. The Roman generals instantly perceived the ruse. But they were not able to restrain their men, one of whom, shouting that the enemy was flying, led all the others to pursue. Meanwhile the barbarian infantry advanced like the waves of a great sea.
"Marius washed his hands, raised them to heaven, and vowed to offer a hecatomb to the G.o.ds. Catulus for his part, also raised his hands to heaven and promised to consecrate the fortune of the day. Marius also made a sacrifice, and, when the priest showed him the victim"s entrails, cried, "Victory is mine." But, as the two armies were set in motion, something happened, which, according to Sylla, seemed divine vengeance on Marius. The movements of such a prodigious mult.i.tude raised such a cloud of dust that the two armies could not see each other. Marius, who had advanced first with his troops to fall on the enemy"s formation, missed it in the dust, and having pa.s.sed beyond it, wandered for a long time in the plain. Meanwhile fortune turned the barbarians toward Catulus who had to meet their whole attack with his soldiers, among whom was Sylla. The heat of the day and the burning rays of the sun, which was in the eyes of the Cimbrians, helped the Romans. The barbarians, reared in cold wooded places, hardened to extreme cold, could not stand the heat. Sweating, panting, they shaded their faces from the sun with their shields. The battle occurred after the summer solstice, three days before the new moon of the month of August, then called s.e.xtilis. The cloud of dust sustained the Romans"
courage by concealing the number of the enemy. Each battalion advancing against the enemy in front of them were engaged, before the sight of such a great horde of barbarians could shake them.
Furthermore, hardship and hard work had so toughened them that in spite of the heat and impetuousness with which they attacked, no Roman was seen to sweat or pant. This, it is said, is testified to by Catulus himself in eulogizing the conduct of his troops.
"Most of the enemy, above all the bravest, were cut to pieces, for, to keep the front ranks from breaking, they were tied together by long chains attached to their belts. The victors pursued the fugitives to their entrenched camp.
"The Romans took more than sixty thousand Cimbrians prisoners, and killed twice as many."
3. The Battle of the Alma
Extract from the correspondence of Colonel Ardant du Picq. A letter sent from Huy, February 9, 1869, by Captain de V----, a company officer in the attack division.
"My company, with the 3rd, commanded by Captain D---- was designated to cover the battalion.
"At eight or nine hundred meters from the Alma, we saw a sort of wall, crowned with white, whose use we could not understand. Then, at not more than three hundred meters, this wall delivered against us a lively battalion fire and deployed at the run. It was a Russian battalion whose uniform, partridge-gray or chestnut-gray color, with white helmet, had, with the help of a bright sun, produced the illusion. This, parenthetically, showed me that this color is certainly the most sensible, as it can cause such errors. [51] We replied actively, but there was effect on neither side because the men fired too fast and too high.... The advance was then taken up, and I don"t know from whom the order can have come.... We went on the run, crossing the river easily enough, and while we were a.s.sembling to scramble up the hill we saw the rest of the battalion attacking, without order, companies mixed up, crying, "Forward," singing, etc. We did the same, again took up the attack, and were lucky enough to reach the summit of the plateau first. The Russians, astounded, ma.s.sed in a square. Why? I suppose that, turned on the left, attacked in the center, they thought themselves surrounded, and took this strange formation. At this moment a most inopportune bugle call was sounded by order of Major De M---- commanding temporarily a battalion of foot cha.s.seurs. This officer had perceived the Russian cavalry in motion and believed that its object was to charge us, while, on the contrary it was maneuvering to escape the sh.e.l.ls fired into it while in squadron formation by the Megere, a vessel of the fleet. This order given by bugle signal was executed as rapidly as had been the attack, such is the instinct of self-preservation which urges man to flee danger, above all when ordered to flee. Happily a level-headed officer, Captain Daguerre, seeing the gross mistake, commanded "Forward" in a stentorian tone. This halted the retreat and caused us again to take up the attack. The attack made us masters of the telegraph-line, and the battle was won. At this second charge the Russians gave, turned, and hardly any of them were wounded with the bayonet. So then a major commanding a battalion, without orders, sounds a bugle call and endangers success. A simple Captain commands "Forward," and decides the victory. This is the history of yesterday, which may be useful tomorrow."
It appears from this that, apart from the able conception of the commander-in-chief, the detail of execution was abominable, and that to base on successes new rules of battle would lead to lamentable errors. Let us sum up:
First: A private cha.s.seur d"Afrique gave the order to attack;
Second: The troops went to the attack mixed up with each other. We needed nearly an hour merely to reform the brigade. This one called, that one congratulated himself, the superior officers cried out, etc., etc.; there was confusion that would have meant disaster if the cavalry charge which was believed to threaten us, had been executed.
Disorder broke out in the companies at the first shot. Once engaged, commanders of organizations no longer had them in hand, and they intermingled, so that it was not easy to locate oneself;
Third: There was no silence in ranks. Officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers commanded, shouted, etc.; the bugles sounded the commands they heard coming from n.o.body knew where;
Fourth: There was no maneuvering from the first shot to the last. I do not remember being among my own men; it was only at the end that we found each other. Zouaves, cha.s.seurs, soldiers of the 20th line formed an attack group--that was all. About four o"clock there was a first roll call. About a third of the battalion was missing at nine at night there was a second roll call. Only about fifty men were missing, thirty of whom were wounded. Where the rest were I do not know.
Fifth: To lighten the men, packs had been left on the plain at the moment fire opened, and as the operation had not been worked out in advance, no measures were taken to guard them. In the evening most of the men found their packs incomplete, lacking all the little indispensables that one cannot get in the position in which we were.
It is evidently a vital necessity to restrain the individual initiative of subordinates and leave command to the chiefs, and above all to watch the training of the soldiers who are always ready, as they approach, to run on the enemy with the bayonet. I have always noted that if a body which is charged does not hold firm, it breaks and takes flight, but that if it holds well, the charging body halts some paces away before it strikes. I shall tell you something notable that I saw at Castel-Fidardo. They talk a lot of the bayonet. For my part I only saw it used once, in the night, in a trench. Also it is noted that in the hospital, practically all the wounds treated were from fire, rarely from the bayonet.
4. The Battle of the Alma
Extract from the correspondence of Colonel A. du Picq. Letters dated in November, 1868, and February, 1869, sent from Rennes by Captain P---- of the 17th battalion of foot cha.s.seurs, with remarks by the colonel and responses of Captain P----.
First letter from Captain P----
"... It is there that I had time to admire the coolness of my brave Captain Daguerre, advancing on a mare under the enemy"s eyes, and observing imperturbable, like a tourist, all the movements of our opponents.
"I will always pay homage to his calm and collected bravery...."
Remarks by the colonel.
"Did not Captain Daguerre change the bugle call "Retreat," ordered by ---- to the bugle call "Forward?""
Answer of Captain P----
"In fact, when protected in the wood by pieces of wall we were firing on the Russians, we heard behind us the bugle sounding "Retreat" at the order of ----. At this moment my captain, indignant, ordered "Forward" sounded to reestablish confidence which had been shaken by the distraction or by the inadvertance of ----."
5. The Battle of Inkermann
Extract from the correspondence of Colonel Ardant du Picq.
First: Letter sent from Lyon, March 21, 1869, by Major de G----, 17th Line Regiment.
"... The 1st Battalion of the 7th Light Regiment had hardly arrived close to the telegraph when it received a new order to rush to the help of the English army, which, too weak to hold such a large army, had been broken in the center of its line and driven back on its camps.
"The 1st Battalion of the 7th Light Regiment, Major Vaissier, had the honor to arrive first in the presence of the Russians, after moving three kilometers on the run. Received by the enthusiastic cheers of the English, it formed for battle, then carried away by burning cries of "Forward, with the bayonet" from its brave major it threw itself headlong, on the Russian columns, which broke.
"For two hours the 1st Battalion of the 7th Light Regiment, a battalion of the 6th Line Regiment, four companies of the 3rd Battalion of foot cha.s.seurs, five companies of Algerian cha.s.seurs held the head of the Russian army which continued to debouch in ma.s.sed columns from the ravine and plateau of Inkermann.