"In the meanwhile, our soldiers, at the given signal advanced with javelins in hand; but having noticed that Pompey"s soldiers were not running towards them, and taught by experience and trained by previous battles, they slowed down and stopped in the midst of their run, in order not to arrive out of breath and worn out. Some moments after, having taken up their run again, they launched their javelins, and immediately afterwards, according to Caesar"s order drew their swords.
The Pompeians conducted themselves perfectly. They received the darts courageously; they did not stir before the dash of the legions; they preserved their lines, and, having dispatched their javelins, drew their swords.
"At the same time Pompey"s entire cavalry dashed from the left wing, as had been ordered, and the ma.s.s of his archers ran from all parts of the line. Our cavalry did not await the charge, but fell back a little. Pompey"s cavalry became more pressing, and commenced to reform its squadrons and turn our exposed flank. As soon as Caesar saw this intention, he gave the signal to the fourth line of six cohorts. This line started directly and, standards low, they charged the Pompeian cavalry with such vigor and resolution that not a single man stood his ground. All wheeled about and not only withdrew in full flight, but gained the highest mountains as fast as they could. They left the archers and slingers without their defense and protection. These were all killed. At the same time the cohorts moved to the rear of Pompey"s left wing, which was still fighting and resisting, and attacked it in rear.
"Meanwhile, Caesar had advanced his third line, which up to this moment had been kept quietly at its post. These fresh troops relieved those that were fatigued. Pompey"s men, taken in rear, could no longer hold out and all took to flight.
"Caesar was not in error when he put these cohorts in a fourth line, particularly charged with meeting the cavalry, and urged them to do well, since their effort would bring victory. They repulsed the cavalry. They cut to pieces the slingers and archers. They turned Pompey"s left wing, and this decided the day.
"When Pompey saw his cavalry repulsed and that portion of the army upon which he had counted the most seized with terror, he had little confidence in the rest. He quit the battle and galloped to his camp, where, addressing his centurions who were guarding the praetorian gate, he told them in a loud voice heard by the soldiers: "Guard well the camp and defend it vigorously in case of attack; as for myself, I am going to make the tour of the other gates and a.s.sure their defense."
"That said, he retired to the praetorium, despairing of success and awaiting events.
"After having forced the enemy to flee to his entrenchments Caesar, persuaded that he ought not to give the slightest respite to a terrorized enemy, incited his soldiers to profit by their advantage and attack the camp. Although overcome by the heat, for the struggle was prolonged into the middle of the day, they did not object to greater fatigue and obeyed. The camp was at first well defended by the cohorts on watch and especially by the Thracians and barbarians. The men who had fled from the battle, full of fright and overcome with fatigue, had nearly all thrown their arms and colors away and thought rather more of saving themselves than of defending the camp. Even those who defended the entrenchments were unable long to resist the shower of arrows. Covered with wounds, they abandoned the place, and led by their centurions and tribunes, they took refuge as quickly as they could in the high mountains near the camp.
"Caesar lost in this battle but two hundred soldiers, but nearly thirty of the bravest centurions were killed therein. Of Pompey"s army fifteen thousand perished, and more than twenty-four thousand took refuge in the mountains. As Caesar had invested the mountains with entrenchments, they surrendered the following day."
Such is Caesar"s account. His action is so clearly shown that there is scarcely any need of comment.
Initially Caesar"s formation was in three lines. This was the usual battle order in the Roman armies, without being absolute, however, since Marius fought with two only. But, as we have said, according to the occasion, the genius of the chief decided the battle formation.
There is no reason to suppose that Pompey"s army was in a different order of battle.
To face that army, twice as large as his, Caesar, if he had had to preserve the disposition of cohorts in ten ranks, would have been able to form but one complete line, the first, and a second, half as numerous, as a reserve. But he knew the bravery of his troops, and he knew the apparent force of deep ranks to be a delusion. He did not hesitate to diminish his depth in order to keep the formation and morale of three-fifths of his troops intact, until the moment of their engagement. In order to be even more sure of the third line of his reserve, and in order to make sure that it would not be carried away by its enthusiasm for action, he paid it most particular attention.
Perhaps, the text is doubtful, he kept it at double the usual distance in rear of the fighting lines.
Then, to guard against a turning movement by Pompey"s seven thousand cavalry and forty-two hundred slingers and archers, a movement in which Pompey placed the hopes of victory, Caesar posted six cohorts that represented scarcely two thousand men. He had perfect confidence that these two thousand men would make Pompey"s cavalry wheel about, and that his one thousand hors.e.m.e.n would then press the action so energetically that Pompey"s cavalry would not even think of rallying.
It happened so; and the forty-two hundred archers and slingers were slaughtered like sheep by these cohorts, aided, without doubt, by four-hundred foot [16] young and agile, whom Caesar mixed with his thousand hors.e.m.e.n and who remained at this task, leaving the hors.e.m.e.n, whom they had relieved, to pursue the terror-stricken fugitives.
Thus were seven thousand hors.e.m.e.n swept away and forty-two hundred infantrymen slaughtered without a struggle, all demoralized simply by a vigorous demonstration.
The order to await the charge, given by Pompey to his infantry, was judged too severely by Caesar. Caesar certainly was right as a general rule; the enthusiasm of the troops must not be dampened, and the initiative of the attack indeed gives to the a.s.sailant a certain moral influence. But with trusted soldiers, duly trained, one can try a stratagem, and the men of Pompey had proven their dependability by awaiting on the spot, without stirring, a vigorous enemy in good order, when they counted on meeting him in disorder and out of breath.
Though it may not have led to success, the advice of Triarius was not bad. Even the conduct of Caesar"s men proves this. This battle shows the confidence of the soldier in the material rank in ancient combat, as a.s.suring support and mutual a.s.sistance.
Notwithstanding the fact the Caesar"s soldiers had the initiative in the attack, the first encounter decided nothing. It was a combat on the spot, a struggle of several hours. Forty-five thousand good troops lost scarcely two hundred men in this struggle for, with like arms, courage and ability, Pompey"s infantry ought not to have lost in hand-to-hand fighting more than that of Caesar"s. These same forty-five thousand men gave way, and, merely between the battle field and their camp, twelve thousand were slaughtered.
Pompey"s men had twice the depth of Caesar"s ranks, whose attack did not make them fall back a step. On the other hand their ma.s.s was unable to repel him, and he was fought on the spot. Pompey had announced to them, says Caesar, that the enemy"s army would be turned by his cavalry, and suddenly, when they were fighting bravely, step by step, they heard behind them the shouts of attack by the six cohorts of Caesar, two thousand men.
Does it seem an easy matter for such a force to ward off this menace?
No. The wing taken in rear in this way loses ground; more and more the contagion of fear spreads to the rest. Terror is so great that they do not think of re-forming in their camp, which is defended for a moment only by the cohorts on guard. Just as at Cannae, their arms drop from their hands. But for the good conduct of the camp guards which permitted the fugitives to gain the mountains, the twenty-four thousand prisoners of the next day might have been corpses that very day.
Cannae and Pharsalus, are sufficient to ill.u.s.trate ancient combat. Let us, however, add some other characteristic examples, which we shall select briefly and in chronological order. They will complete our data. [17]
Livy relates that in an action against some of the peoples in the neighborhood of Rome, I do not recall now which, the Romans did not dare to pursue for fear of breaking their ranks.
In a fight against the Hernici, he cites the Roman hors.e.m.e.n, who had not been able to do anything on horseback to break up the enemy, asking the consul for permission to dismount and fight on foot. This is true not only of Roman cavalrymen, for later on we shall see the best riders, the Gauls, the Germans, the Parthanians even, dismounting in order really to fight.
The Volsci, the Latini, the Hernici, etc., combined to fight the Romans; and as the action nears its end, Livy relates: "Finally, the first ranks having fallen, and carnage being all about them, they threw away their arms and started to scatter. The cavalry then dashed forward, with orders not to kill the isolated ones, but to hara.s.s the ma.s.s with their arrows, annoy it, to delay it, to prevent dispersion in order to permit the infantry to come up and kill."
In Hamilcar"s engagement against the mercenaries in revolt, who up to then had always beaten the Carthaginians, the mercenaries endeavored to envelop him. Hamilcar surprised them by a new maneuver and defeated them. He marched in three lines: elephants, cavalry and light infantry, then heavily armed phalanxes. At the approach of the mercenaries who were marching vigorously towards him the two lines formed by the elephants, the cavalry and light infantry, turned about and moved quickly to place themselves on the flanks of the third line.
The third line thus exposed met a foe which had thought only of pursuit, and which the surprise put to flight. It thus abandoned itself to the action of the elephants, horses and the light infantry who ma.s.sacred the fugitives.
Hamilcar killed six thousand men, captured two thousand and lost practically n.o.body. It was a question as to whether he had lost a single man, since there had been no combat.
In the battle of Lake Trasimenus, the Carthaginians lost fifteen hundred men, nearly all Gauls; the Romans fifteen thousand and fifteen thousand prisoners. The battle raged for three hours.
At Zama, Hannibal had twenty thousand killed, twenty thousand prisoners; the Romans two thousand killed. This was a serious struggle in which Hannibal"s third line alone fought. It gave way only under the attack on its rear and flank by the cavalry.
In the battle of Cynoscephalae, between Philip and Flaminius, Philip pressed Flaminius with his phalanx thirty-two deep. Twenty maniples took the phalanx from behind. The battle was lost by Philip. The Romans had seven hundred killed; the Macedonians eighty thousand, and five thousand prisoners.
At Pydna, Aemilius Paulus against Perseus, the phalanx marched without being stopped. But gaps occurred from the resistance that it encountered. Hundreds penetrated into the gaps in the phalanx and killed the men embarra.s.sed with their long pikes. They were effective only when united, abreast, and at shaft"s length. There was frightful disorder and butchery; twenty thousand killed, five thousand captured out of forty-four thousand engaged! The historian does not deem it worth while to speak of the Roman losses.
After the battle of Aix against the Teutons, Marius surprised the Teutons from behind. There was frightful carnage; one hundred thousand Teutons and three hundred Romans killed. [18]
In Sulla"s battle of Chaeronea against Archelaus, a general of Mithridates, Sulla had about thirty thousand men, Archelaus, one hundred and ten thousand. Archelaus was beaten by being surprised from the rear. The Romans lost fourteen men, and killed their enemies until worn out in pursuit.
The battle of Orchomenus, against Archelaus, was a repet.i.tion of Chaeronea.
Caesar states that his cavalry could not fight the Britons without greatly exposing itself, because they pretended flight in order to get the cavalry away from the infantry and then, dashing from their chariots, they fought on foot with advantage.
A little less than two hundred veterans embarked on a boat which they ran aground at night so as not to be taken by superior naval forces.
They reached an advantageous position and pa.s.sed the night. At the break of day, Otacilius dispatched some four hundred hors.e.m.e.n and some infantry from the Alesio garrison against them. They defended themselves bravely; and having killed some, they rejoined Caesar"s troops without having lost a single man.
In Macedonia Caesar"s rear-guard was caught by Pompey"s cavalry at the pa.s.sage of the Genusus River, the banks of which were quite steep.
Caesar opposed Pompey"s cavalry five to seven thousand strong, with his cavalry of six hundred to one thousand men, among which he had taken care to intermingle four hundred picked infantrymen. They did their duty so well that, in the combat that followed, they repulsed the enemy, killed many, and fell back upon their own army without the loss of a single man.
In the battle of Thapsus in Africa, against Scipio, Caesar killed ten thousand, lost fifty, and had some wounded.
In the battle under the walls of Munda in Spain, against one of Pompey"s sons, Caesar had eighty cohorts and eight thousand hors.e.m.e.n, about forty-eight thousand men. Pompey with thirteen legions had sixty thousand troops of the line, six thousand cavalry, six thousand light infantry, six thousand auxiliaries; in all, about eighty thousand men.
The struggle, says the narrator, was valiantly kept up, step by step, sword to sword. [19]
In that battle of exceptional fury, which hung for a long time in the balance, Caesar had one thousand dead, five hundred wounded; Pompey thirty-three thousand dead, and if Munda had not been so near, scarcely two miles away, his losses would have been doubled. The defensive works of Munda were constructed from dead bodies and abandoned arms.
In studying ancient combats, it can be seen that it was almost always an attack from the flank or rear, a surprise action, that won battles, especially against the Romans. It was in this way that their excellent tactics might be confused. Roman tactics were so excellent that a Roman general who was only half as good as his adversary was sure to be victorious. By surprise alone they could be conquered. Note Xanthippe,--Hannibal--the unexpected fighting methods of the Gauls, etc.
Indeed Xenophon says somewhere, "Be it agreeable or terrible, the less anything is foreseen, the more does it cause pleasure or dismay. This is nowhere better ill.u.s.trated than in war where every surprise strikes terror even to those who are much the stronger."
But very few fighters armed with cuira.s.s and shield were killed in the front lines.
Hannibal in his victories lost almost n.o.body but Gauls, his cannon-fodder, who fought with poor shields and without armor.
Nearly always driven in, they fought, nevertheless, with a tenacity that they never showed under any other command.
Thucydides characterizes the combat of the lightly armed, by saying: "As a rule, the lightly armed of both sides took to flight." [20]
In combat with closed ranks there was mutual pressure but little loss, the men not being at liberty to strike in their own way and with all their force.
Caesar against the Nervii, saw his men, who in the midst of the action had instinctively closed in ma.s.s in order to resist the ma.s.s of barbarians, giving way under pressure. He therefore ordered his ranks and files to open, so that his legionaries, closed in ma.s.s, paralyzed and forced to give way to a very strong pressure, might be able to kill and consequently demoralize the enemy. And indeed, as soon as a man in the front rank of the Nervii fell under the blows of the legionaries, there was a halt, a falling back. Following an attack from the rear, and a melee, the defeat of the Nervii ensued. [21]