Years later, Travell would recall that Paris was the beginning of aa very hard period.a Travell would give Kennedy two to three shots a day in Paris. White House doctor Admiral George Burkley was worried because the procaine soothed the president through only a temporary numbness that was followed by even greater soreness, requiring ever larger doses and ever stronger narcotics. Burkley had prescribed more exercise and physical therapy, but Kennedy preferred the quicker fix of the drugs.
Travell kept an ongoing aMedicine Administration Recorda to track the c.o.c.ktail of pills and shots she provided the president: penicillin for urinary infections and abscesses, Tuinal to help him sleep, Transentine to control diarrhea and weight loss, and a.s.sorted other remedies, including testosterone and phen.o.barbital. What she couldnat log were the more unconventional administrations of a more unconventional medic who had traveled more secretly to Paris and Vienna.
Known as aDr. Feelgooda to his celebrity patients, who included Tennessee Williams and Truman Capote, Dr. Max Jacobson provided injections that contained hormones, animal organ cells, steroids, vitamins, enzymes, anda"most importanta"amphetamines to combat fatigue and depression.
Kennedy was so pleased with Jacobsonas remedies that he had recommended them as well for Jackie after the difficult November delivery of their son John-Johna"and again to boost her stamina before the Paris trip. On the night of their grand state dinner with de Gaulle at Versailles, Dr. Feelgood administered Kennedy his customary shot. The diminutive, red-cheeked, dark-haired doctor then wandered through the First Coupleas suite of rooms to Jackieas bedroom, where she was choosing an elegant French gown designed by Givenchy over a dress designed by the American Oleg Ca.s.sini, to drive home her connection to the host country.
She cleared the room when Dr. Jacobson arrived, and he put a needle in her behind and injected a fluid that would help her glow incandescently through a six-course dinner in the Hall of Mirrors. Truman Capote would later praise Jacobsonas treatments: aYou feel like Superman. Youare flying. Ideas come at the speed of light. You go 722 hours straight without so much as a coffee break.a However, the potential national security consequences of these concoctions for the commander in chief were considerable coming just before his crucial meeting with the Soviet leader. Besides the addictive nature of what Kennedy was consuming, the potential side effects included hyperactivity, hypertension, impaired judgment, and nervousness. Between doses, his mood could swing wildly from overconfidence to bouts of depression.*
At Bobbyas urging, the president would later provide Jacobsonas concoctions to the Food and Drug Administration for a.n.a.lysis. Kennedy was untroubled when the FDA said Dr. Feelgood was shooting him up with steroids and amphetamines. aI donat care if itas horse p.i.s.s,a Kennedy said. aIt works.a In strategizing for Paris, Kennedy had three primary purposes, and they all had to do with Vienna and its impact on Berlin. First, he wanted de Gaulleas advice about how best to manage Khrushchev in Vienna. Second, he wanted to know how the French leader would recommend that the Allies wrestle with the next Berlin crisis, which he was beginning to believe was likely. Finally, Kennedy wanted to use the Paris trip to burnish his public image and thus strengthen his hand for Vienna.
When Kennedy briefed de Gaulle on Khrushchevas threats regarding Berlin as delivered to Thompson at the Ice Capades, de Gaulle dismissed them with a wave of the hand. aMr. Khrushchev,a he declared dismissively, ahas been saying and repeating that his prestige is engaged in the Berlin question and that he must have a solution within six months, and then again in six months and then still again in another six months.a The Frenchman shrugged. aIf he had wanted a war over Berlin, he would have acted already.a De Gaulle told Kennedy that he considered Berlin primarily a psychological question: aIt is annoying to both sides that Berlin should be located where it is; however, it is there,a he said.
The Kennedya"de Gaulle meeting was already off to a better start than previous U.S. presidential sessions with the French leader. Eisenhower had warned Kennedy that de Gaulle endangered the entire Atlantic alliance with his nationalist disdain for the U.S. and NATO. Franklin Roosevelt had compared de Gaulleas vicious temper to that of Joan of Arc. aThe older I get,a Eisenhower told Kennedy, athe more disgusted I am with thema"not the French people but their governments.a In contrast to his predecessors, Kennedy had two advantages in dealing with the French leader: his willingness to play the role of de Gaulleas junior and the impact of his wifeas Sorbonne education and her French-language fluency on the vain general. After she chatted amicably with de Gaulle over lunch about the Bourbons and Louis XVI, de Gaulle turned to Kennedy and enthused, aYour wife knows more French history than most French women.a Safely back in his golden tub, Kennedy told his friends, aDe Gaulle and I are hitting it off all right, probably because I have such a charming wife.a KIEVSKY STATION, MOSCOW.
SAt.u.r.dAY, MAY 27, 1961.
While Kennedy endured the Paris whirlwind, Khrushchev was making the 1,200-mile trip from Moscow to Vienna in a more leisurely fashion aboard a specially equipped six-car train. He would make barnstorming stops in Kiev, Prague, and Bratislavaa"and would be cheered at rural stations all along the trainas path.
Communist Party cells had gathered a crowd of thousands to see him off at Moscowas Kievsky Station, where Khrushchev took Amba.s.sador Thompson aside for a last exchange before departure. In a cable that would report on their brief chat, Thompson hit a strained note of optimism. aI believe Khrushchev will wish the meeting with the president to be a pleasant one,a he wrote, aand that he will desire if possible to make some proposal or take some position on some problems which have the effect of improving the atmosphere and relations. I find it extremely difficult, however, to imagine what this could be.a As Khrushchev boarded the train, a young girl rushed forward to present him a huge bouquet of red roses. Ever impulsive, Khrushchev summoned the U.S. amba.s.sadoras wife, Jane, and, with the crowd cheering, presented her the flowers.
Without confidence, Thompson told the press gathered there, aI hope everything will go well.a Privately, Thompson had begun to worry that Kennedy was heading for an ambush on Berlin issues. The latest clue was a stridently worded editorial in the official government newspaper Izvestia that had declared on the day of Khrushchevas departure that the Soviet Union could not wait any longer for Western agreement before acting on Berlin.
Khrushchev swelled with pride as he waved to enthusiastic crowds gathered alongside the tracks of the countless stations the train pa.s.sed, many of them decorated with welcoming flags, posters, and streamers. Khrushchev was particularly taken by a crimson banner that covered the entire front of the provincial station at Mukachevo in the Ukrainian region near his birthplace. It had been inscribed in Ukrainian: MAY YOU LIVE WELL, DEAR NIKITA SERGEYEVICH!
In Kiev, thousands cheered him as he toured the city and laid a wreath on the grave of its beloved poet Taras Shevchenko. At ierna, the first stop inside Czechoslovakia, the countryas party leader Antonn Novotn had seen to it that his giant portrait hung beside that of Khrushchev at every turn. A band played both national anthems to the crash of cymbals and blare of trumpets. Uniformed Young Pioneers, the partyas youth organization, filled Khrushchevas arms with flowers while pretty girls with embroidered blouses offered the traditional welcome gift of bread and salt.
His hosts in Bratislava carefully ch.o.r.eographed his final stop before Vienna. Public buildings were draped in banners: GLORY TO KHRUSHCHEVa"UNSHAKABLE CHAMPION OF PEACE. He and Novotn spoke to the crowds about finding a afinal solutiona to the Berlin problem, oblivious to whatever parallels there might be to Hitleras afinal solutiona for the Jews. Locals celebrated the eve of the Vienna meetings with a fireworks display over the medieval castle in the ancient town of Trenn, where Soviet troops in April 1945 had captured the Gestapo headquarters.
In a final, precautionary touch, Khrushchev delayed his trainas departure to Vienna from Bratislava until two p.m., four hours later than had been planned. Having received reports of the throngs that celebrated Kennedy in Paris, Khrushchevas people concluded they could only ensure a respectable reception in Vienna if communist worker unions could a.s.semble their workers near the end of the workday.
PARIS.
WEDNESDAY, MAY 31, 1961.
Acting as a self-appointed tutor, de Gaulle recounted for Kennedy how he managed Khrushchev during his most irascible moments. He warned Kennedy that it was inevitable Khrushchev would threaten war at some point in their Vienna talks.
De Gaulle recalled how he had told the Soviet leader: You pretend that you seek dtente. If such is the case, proceed with dtente. If you want peace, start with general disarmament negotiations. Under the circ.u.mstances, the entire world situation may change little by little and then we will solve the question of Berlin and the entire Germany question. However, if you insist on raising the question of Berlin within the context of the Cold War, then no solution is possible. What do you want? Do you want war?
Khrushchev had then replied to de Gaulle that he did not want war.
In that case, the Frenchman had told him, do nothing that can bring it about.
Kennedy doubted dealing with Khrushchev would be that easy. Kennedy told the French leader, for example, that he knew de Gaulle wanted his own nuclear weapons capability because he doubted that the U.S. ever would risk New York for Parisa"let alone for Berlina"in a nuclear exchange with Moscow. If the general himself so deeply doubted American resolve, why would Khrushchev feel otherwise? Kennedy wondered.
De Gaulle would not be drawn. This was a moment for a clear American message of resolve to Khrushchev, irrespective of whether the French leader believed it himself. aIt is important to show that we do not intend to let this situation change,a de Gaulle said. aAny retreat from Berlin, any change of status, any withdrawal of troops, any new obstacles to transportation and communication, would mean defeat. It would result in an almost complete loss of Germany, and in very serious losses within France, Italy and elsewhere.a Beyond that, de Gaulle told Kennedy, aIf [Khrushchev] wants war, we must make clear to him he will have it.a The French leader was confident that if Kennedy refused to retreat before Soviet dictates, Khrushchev would never risk a military confrontation.
What worried de Gaulle more was the Soviet and East German approach of slowly eroding the Western position in Berlin so that awe would have lost without seeming to have lost but in a way which would be understood by the entire world. In particular, the population of Berlin is not made up exclusively of heroes. In the face of something which they would interpret as our weakness, they might begin to leave Berlin and make it into an empty sh.e.l.l to be picked up by the East.a It struck Kennedy that de Gaulle was free to speak so bravely about Berlin because France did not have to shoulder Americaas security burden there. De Gaulle was being so vague about possible remedies that Kennedy tried to provoke a more detailed response. Kennedy said he was a practical man who wanted de Gaulle to be specific about the point at which the French leader would go to war over Berlin.
De Gaulle said he wouldnat go to war over either of the issues currently in question: if the Soviets unilaterally signed a peace treaty with East Germany or changed four-power procedures in the city to give East Germans greater sovereignty over East Berlina"for example, by handing them the right to stamp travel doc.u.ments at border crossings. aThis is in itself no reason for a military retaliation on our part,a he said.
So Kennedy pressed the great Frenchman further: aIn what way, therefore, at what moment, shall we bring pressure to bear?a The president complained that the Soviets and East Germans had a mult.i.tude of ways to complicate the Berlin situation, perhaps even causing West Berlinas ruin, but using methods that would not trigger a Western response. aHow do we answer that?a he wondered.
De Gaulle said the West should only respond militarily if the Soviets or East Germans acted militarily. aIf either [Khrushchev] or his lackeys use force to cut our communications with Berlin, then we must use force,a he said.
Kennedy agreed, but he did not believe as de Gaulle did that any weakening of the Western position in Berlin would be a disaster. He said it would be a blow awhich would not be mortal but would be seriousa to Western Germany and all of Europe.
Kennedy sought de Gaulleas advice on how he in Vienna could best convince Khrushchev of Western firmness, given that the Soviet leader so doubted U.S. resolve following the Bay of Pigs. He wanted to know what the French leader thought of U.S. and Allied contingency plans to respond to any new Berlin blockade with a demonstration of approximate company strength, and, if that failed, then of brigade strength.
Given Soviet conventional superiority around Berlin, de Gaulle told Kennedy he could deter the Soviets only with a willingness to use nuclear weapons, which was precisely what the president wanted to avoid.
aWhat we must make clear is that if there is any fighting around Berlin, this means general war,a de Gaulle said.
By the time of their grand lyse Palace banquet that evening, Jack and Jackie, as the French press called them, had taken the country by storm. They sat down that evening with three hundred other guests in the mirrored, tapestried dining hall around an immense table covered by a single tablecloth of white organza and gold embroidery, giving rise to the Kennedysa wonder over how one could create such an object. The Republican Guard symphony orchestra played everything from Gershwin to Ravel, each number embodying some deeper U.S.a"French meaning.
In his comments, Kennedy joked about how much French influence he had in his life. aI sleep in a French bed. In the morning my breakfast is served by a French chef, I go to my office, and the bad news of the day is brought to me by my press secretary Pierre Salinger, not in his native [French] language, and I am married to a daughter of France.a The view through long French windows was to a rainy evening outside where palace lawns and grand fountains turned emerald green in spotlights. The after-dinner reception expanded to a thousand guests, whom the Washington Post report portrayed as aindescribably elegant.a The French men were peac.o.c.king with bright sashes across shirtfronts, giant stars and crosses pinned to their tailcoats, and rows of miniature medals pinned on lapels. The women wore long gloves and jewels, and a few dowagers were richly tiaraed.
Yet the star that evening was Jackie, wearing a Directoire-styled gown of pale pink and white straw lace. Alexandre, hairdresser to the Parisian elite, whispered to the New York Times that he had cut an inch from the First Ladyas hair and trimmed her bangs for that evening, creating the look of aa Gothic Madonna.a For the next eveningas dinner at Versailles, Alexandre promised something more evocative of Louis XIV, with diamond flame clips sticking through her hair to agive her a fairy-like air.a Kennedyas mother, Rose, aslim as the proverbial wand,a wore a floor-length Balenciaga gown of white silk appliqud with pink flowers that had real diamonds in their centers. Paris publications gushed at how refreshingly European all the Kennedys were.
During their atub talka the following day, Kennedy reflected with his friends on de Gaulleas observation that the West could never keep West Berlin free without a willingness to use the nuclear bomb.
aSo weare stuck in a ridiculous situation,a Kennedy said through the steam. aIt seems silly for us to be facing an atomic war over a treaty preserving Berlin as the future capital of a reunified Germany when all of us know that Germany will probably never be reunified. But weare committed to that agreement, and so are the Russians, so we canat let them back out of it.a VIENNA.
SAt.u.r.dAY, JUNE 3, 1961.
Kennedyas advance team had ch.o.r.eographed the presidentas arrival in Vienna in a manner calculated to unsettle Khrushchev, who had expressed jealousy to his team about Kennedyas ever-rising global popularity. The more the Soviets opposed a grand Kennedy airport arrival and motorcade, the more OaDonnell had insisted upon it. After each Soviet objection, he had added more limousines and flags.
Vienna basked in the compet.i.tion for its attention. Never had a high-level meeting between heads of state attracted so much international media attention. At least 1,500 reporters with all their equipment and supporting staff would be on hand to cover the two men and their meetings.
Photographers furiously snapped shots of the two menas historic first encounter at 12:45 p.m. on the red-carpeted steps of the U.S. amba.s.sadoras residence, where they posed under the canopy of the gray stucco building with its brown stone columns. A small, circular graveled courtyard stood behind them, blocked from public view by thick firs and weeping willows heavy with the dayas rain.
Just minutes earlier, the Soviet premier had swung his squat legs out of his black Soviet limousine while Kennedy had bounded lightly down the steps to retrieve him. Kennedy showed no sign of his chronic pain, which was dulled by shots, pills, and a tightly strung corset. After so much antic.i.p.ation, the initial Kennedya"Khrushchev encounter was unavoidably awkward.
In the practiced tone of the political campaign trail, Kennedy issued a reflexive greeting in his Boston bray, aHow are you? Iam glad to see you.a aThe pleasure is mutual,a said Khrushchev through his interpreter.
The bald top of the communist world leaderas head reached only to Kennedyas nose. OaDonnell would later recall how sorry he was that he had not brought a movie camera to record the moment. It struck him that Kennedy was studying athe stubby little Soviet leadera a little too obviously.
Kennedy stood back, one hand deep in his jacket pocket, and slowly looked Khrushchev up and down with unconcealed curiosity. Even as photographers shouted requests for more posed handshakes, Kennedy continued ogling Khrushchev as if he were a game hunter stumbling upon a rare beast after years of tracking.
Khrushchev muttered something to Foreign Minister Gromyko and then moved inside.
In chronicling the first Kennedya"Khrushchev encounter, New York Times reporter Russell Baker wondered how much the greetings had differed in Vienna 146 years earlier as Metternich, Talleyrand, and other European leaders gathered to build a century of European stability at their Congress of Vienna. aHere in the home of the waltz, schmaltz, hot dogs and Habsburgs, the two most powerful met today in a music room,a he wrote.
The Wall Street Journal introduced the two men as boxers coming into a heavyweight ring: aThe American President is a younger man by a generation, highly educated, while Khrushchev was brought up in the school of hard knocks, his main political ambitions ahead of him rather than behind him. The confrontation of these two men, as powerful in their time as Napoleon and Alexander I were when they met on a raft in the river Niemen to redraw the map of Europe in 1807, against the background of old Vienna, once a power center in its own right, now the capital of a small state that only desires to be left alone in peace, clearly possesses the element of drama.a The Journal opined that athe least worsta outcome would be if Kennedy simply stuck to his commitment that he had come only to acquaint himself with Khrushchev and would not negotiate with him over Berlin or anything else.
European newspapers rang with the historic consequence of it all. The influential Swiss newspaper Neue Zrcher Zeitung regretted that, against its advice, Kennedy had come unprepared to meet with an unrepentant Kremlin boss. The German intellectual paper Die Zeit reported from Vienna, aThe question that the West faces is the same as the one Demosthenes described in his speech to the Athenians against Philip of Macedonia: When another man stands before you with a weapon in his hand and at the head of a great army claiming to come in peace but really intent on war, what can you do but a.s.sume a defensive position?a Six years earlier, the Austrians had signed their state treaty with the four wartime Allies, which allowed them to escape the fate of neighboring Warsaw Pact states and establish a free, sovereign, democratic, and neutral country. So the Viennese were particularly taken with their newly found stage as neutral ground for a superpower powwow. Herbert von Karajan was conducting Wagner at the Staatsoper, and Viennese cafs and streets overflowed with locals out for a gossip and in hopes of a glimpse of their visitors.
Viennese teenager Monika Sommer scribbled in her diary that she and her friends regarded Kennedy as a apop idol.a She had tacked his photograph on her bedroom wall, sorry that her country didnat provide such role models. Teenager Veronika Seyr was more unsettled by all the hoopla surrounding the summit. Having witnessed Soviet brutality in Budapest during the crackdown just five years earlier, the increased police presence all around Vienna frightened her. Perched in a cherry tree, she watched Soviet fighter planes and helicopters circle the city as Khrushchev arrived. Terrified by the prospect of a new invasion, she fell to the ground and lay on her back for some time alike a beetle,a still watching the helicopters overhead.
Antic.i.p.ating two long days of exchanges, Kennedy opened his discussions with Khrushchev with some small talk about their first meeting at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1959 during the Soviet leaderas first visit to the United States.
In an initial thrust of one-upmanship that would come to characterize their talks, Khrushchev said he remembered the meeting as well, though he had ano opportunity to say much except h.e.l.lo and good-byea to Kennedy because the then senator had arrived so late. The Soviet leader reminded Kennedy that he had remarked at the time, showing his foresight, that he had heard Kennedy was a young and promising politician.
Kennedy reminded Khrushchev that he also had said at the time that Kennedy looked too young to be a senator.
The Soviet leader questioned Kennedyas memory. Normally, Khrushchev said, he adid not say such things because young people want to look older and older people like to look younger.a Khrushchev said he also had looked younger than his age before graying prematurely at age twenty-two. Khrushchev laughed that he would abe happy to share his years with the President or change places with him.a From that opening exchange, Khrushchev was setting the tone and pace of their conversations by answering Kennedyas short statements and questions with his longer interventions. To gain an early upper hand, the U.S. side had wanted the first dayas talks to be at the U.S. amba.s.sadoras residence, and the Soviets had accepted that the two men would move to Soviet territory on Day Two. However, it was Khrushchev who was making himself most at home.
In an attempt to rea.s.sert some control, Kennedy outlined his hopes for their talks. He said he wanted their two powerful countriesa"though aallied with other countries, having different political and social systems, and competing with each other in different parts of the worldaa"to find ways to avoid situations that could lead to conflict.
Khrushchev responded by detailing what he called his long-standing efforts ato develop friendly relations with the United States and its allies.a At the same time, he said, athe Soviet Union did not wish to reach agreement with the U.S. at the expense of other peoples because such agreement would not mean peace.a The two men had agreed to leave any discussion of Berlin to their second day, so their initial talks focused on the general relationship and disarmament issues.
Khrushchev said his greatest concern was that the U.S. was trying to leverage its economic superiority over the Soviets in a way that could prompt conflict, a veiled reference to the Soviet worldas growing dependence on Western trade and credits. He said he would make the Soviet Union richer than the U.S. over time, not by acting as a predator, but by better tapping its own resources.
Khrushchev took little note of Kennedyas brief comment on how impressed he had been by improving Soviet economic growth rates before the Soviet leader took charge of the conversation again. He complained that John Foster Dulles, Eisenhoweras secretary of state from 1953 to 1959 and a Soviet opponent, had tried to liquidate communism. He said Dulles, whose name he spat out like a curse, resisted aboth de facto and de jurea the recognition that both systems could continue to exist beside each other. Khrushchev told Kennedy that during their talks he awould not try to convince the President about the advantages of Communism, just as the President should not waste his time [trying] to convert him to capitalism.a In pre-summit conversations, Amba.s.sador Thompson had warned Kennedy to avoid ideological debate with Khrushchev, a course that would consume valuable time and one that he believed Kennedy could not win against a lifelong communist with years of experience in dialectical debate. However, Kennedy came to Vienna much too convinced of his own powers of persuasion to resist the temptation.
Khrushchevas remarks raised aa very important problem,a said Kennedy. The president called it a matter of avery serious concern to usa that Khrushchev believed it was acceptable to try to eliminate free systems in countries a.s.sociated with the United States but objected to any efforts by the West to roll back communism in the Soviet sphere of influence.
Employing his calmest voice, Khrushchev told Kennedy this was aan incorrect interpretation of Soviet policy.a The Soviet Union was not imposing its system on others but merely riding the wave of historic change. With that, Khrushchev launched into a history lecture on everything from feudalism to the French Revolution. He said the Soviet system would triumph on its merits, although he added that he was certain Kennedy thought just the opposite. aIn any event, this is not a matter for argument, much less for war,a he said.
Continuing to disregard his expertsa advice, Kennedy decided again to lock swords with the Soviet leader on ideology. The president would later explain that he believed he had to successfully engage Khrushchev in ideological debate if he was to be taken seriously on other issues. aOur position is that people should have free choice,a Kennedy told Khrushchev. What concerned the president was that minority governments that did not express the will of the peoplea"governed by friends of Moscowa"were seizing control in places of interest to the U.S. aThe USSR believes that is a historical inevitability,a Kennedy said, while the U.S. did not. Kennedy worried that such situations could bring the USSR and the U.S. into military conflict.
Khrushchev wondered whether Kennedy awanted to build a dam preventing the development of the human mind and conscience.a If so, Khrushchev said, it ais not in manas power. The Spanish Inquisition burned people who disagreed with it, but ideas did not burn, and eventually triumphed. Thus if we start struggling against ideas, conflicts and clashes between the two countries will be inevitable.a The Soviet leader was savoring the exchange. In an awkward effort to find a point of agreement, Kennedy argued that communism could remain lodged where it was now, namely places like Poland and Czechoslovakia, but could not be accepted anywhere the Soviets were not already installed. American officials who would read the transcripts later would be shocked that Kennedy was going further than any president before him in his expressed willingness to accept the existing division of Europe into spheres of influence. Kennedy seemed to be suggesting that he would mortgage the future of those seeking freedom in Warsaw Pact countries if the Kremlin would abandon hope of expanding communism elsewhere.
Khrushchev challenged Kennedyas apparent belief that the Soviet Union was responsible for all communist development in the world. If Kennedy was saying that he would oppose the advance of communist ideas anywhere they did not currently exist, Khrushchev argued, then indeed aconflicts will be inevitable.a Initiating yet another tutorial for his wayward student, Khrushchev reminded Kennedy that it was not, after all, Russians who had originated communist ideas but rather the German-born Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. He joked that even if he should renounce communisma"something he made clear to Kennedy that he had no intention of doinga"its concepts would continue to develop. He asked Kennedy to agree that it was aessential for the peaceful development of the worlda that the president recognize communism and capitalism as being the worldas two primary ideologies. Naturally, Khrushchev said, either side would be happy if its ideology spread.
If the summit was going to be decided by which side controlled more of the conversation, Khrushchev had taken a commanding early lead. Nothing in Kennedyas past had prepared him for Khrushchevas immovable force. Yet Thompson, who watched with other senior U.S. officials from the sidelines, knew from previous experience that the Soviet leader was just warming up.
aIdeas should not be borne on bayonets or on missile warheads, bayonets now being obsolete,a Khrushchev said. In a war of ideas, he said, Soviet policy would triumph without violent means.
But wasnat it true, Kennedy said, that aMao Tse-tung had said that power was at the end of a riflea? Kennedy had been briefed on growing Sinoa"Soviet disagreements, and he was probing.
aI donat believe Mao could have said that,a Khrushchev lied, having experienced himself Maoas l.u.s.t for war with the West. He said Mao awas a Marxist, and Marxists are always against war.a Trying to get back to his agenda of reducing tensions and securing peace, Kennedy said what he wanted to avoid was a miscalculation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union that would cause both countries to alose for a long time to come,a a reference to the long radiation afterlife following a nuclear exchange.
aMiscalculation?a Khrushchev spat out the word like a terrible taste.
aaMiscalculationa! aMiscalculationa! aMiscalculationa! All I ever hear from your people and your news correspondents and your friends in Europe and every place else is that d.a.m.ned word amiscalculation.aa The word was vague, Khrushchev sputtered. What was the meaning of this word, amiscalculationa? He kept repeating the word for effect. Did the president want him ato sit like a schoolboy with hands on top of the deska? he asked. Khrushchev protested that he could not guarantee communist ideas would stop at Soviet borders. Yet, he said, awe will not start a war by mistakea. You ought to take that word amiscalculationa and bury it in cold storage and never use it again.a A stunned Kennedy sat back and absorbed the storm.
Kennedy tried to explain what he had meant by using the word. Referring to World War II, he said, aWestern Europe had suffered because of its failure to foresee with precision what other countries would do.a The U.S. had failed to foresee Chinese actions recently in Korea. What he wanted from their meeting was ato introduce precision in judgments of the two sides and to obtain a clearer understanding of where we are going.a Before their lunch break, Khrushchev would have the last word.
He believed the purpose of their conversation was to improve and not worsen relations. If he and Kennedy should succeed in that effort, athe expenses incurred in connection with the meeting would be well justified.a If not, the money would have been wasted and the hope of the people frustrated.
As partic.i.p.ants looked at their watches, they were surprised that it was already two p.m.
Khrushchev remained in full voice over a lunch of beef Wellington in the U.S. amba.s.sador residenceas dining room, lubricated by his mostly vodka dry martini. He regaled the long table, at which each man had nine aides and senior officials, about matters ranging from farm technology to s.p.a.ce travel.
Khrushchev boasted about Gagarinas flight as the first man in s.p.a.ce, but he conceded that Gagarinas masters at first did not want to trust him with the s.p.a.cecraftas controls. It had seemed too much power for one individual.
Kennedy suggested that the U.S. and USSR should consider a joint moon expedition.
After an initial rejection, Khrushchev reconsidered, saying, aAll right, why not?a It seemed to be the first progress of the day.
At the end of the lunch, Kennedy lit a cigar and threw the match behind Khrushchevas chair.
The Soviet leader feigned alarm. aAre you trying to set me on fire?a he asked.
Kennedy a.s.sured him he wasnat.
aAh,a said Khrushchev with a smile, aa capitalist, not an incendiary.a Khrushchevas raw energy was overpowering Kennedyas more subtle charms.
The two menas after-meal toasts reflected the unbalanced nature of their earlier conversations. Kennedy was brief and complimentary of Khrushchevas avigor and energy,a hoping for fruitful meetings.
The Soviet leader responded at greater length. He talked about how the two countries had the combined power to stop by joint effort any war any other country might start. He spoke of his initially good relationship with Eisenhower. Although Eisenhower had taken responsibility for the U-2 spy flight incident that undermined their relationship, Khrushchev said he was aalmost sure that Eisenhower had not known about the flighta but had accepted blame ain the spirit of chivalry.a Khrushchev declared the flight to have been orchestrated by those who wished to worsen U.S.a"Soviet relationsa"and they had succeeded.
He spoke of his desire to receive Kennedy in the Soviet Union awhen the time was ripe.a But he then condemned the visit of his previous guest, former Vice President Nixon, who thought aby showing the Soviet people a dream kitchen, a kitchen that did not exist nor would ever exist in the U.S., he would convert the Soviet people to capitalism.a Only Nixon, he said, acould have thought of such nonsense.a Khrushchev told Kennedy that he took full credit for Nixonas electoral defeat, which had been gained because he had refused to release the imprisoned American airmen whom his troops had shot down. If he had released them, Khrushchev said, Kennedy would have lost the presidency by at least 200,000 votes.
aDonat spread that story around,a Kennedy said, laughing. aIf you tell everybody that you like me better than Nixon, Iall be ruined at home.a Khrushchev raised his gla.s.s to the presidentas health and said how he envied his youth. Yet Kennedy bore the backache of a much older man under his corset. The benefit of his morning shot from aDr. Feelgooda was wearing thin. The procaine, vitamins, amphetamines, and enzymes could not counteract the weight of Khrushchevas onslaught.
After lunch, Kennedy invited Khrushchev for a stroll in the garden with interpreters only. Thompson and others had advised Kennedy that Khrushchev would be more pliable when he wasnat around other Soviet officials before whom he felt he had to perform.
Kennedyas friends OaDonnell and Powers watched the superpower stroll from a second-floor window at the residence. Khrushchev circled around Kennedy, snapping at him like a terrier and shaking his finger, while Kennedy strolled casually on the lawn beside him, stopping now and then to say a few words, withholding any upset or anger.
OaDonnell downed an Austrian beer and condemned himself again for not having brought a camera. He was close enough to see how hard the stroll was on Kennedyas back. The president winced as he leaned over to better hear the far shorter Khrushchev.
When the two men returned inside, Kennedy suggested that he and Khrushchev continue talking privately for a time with interpreters before their aides rejoined them. Happy with how matters were unfolding, Khrushchev agreed.
Kennedy wanted to further explain his fear of amiscalculation.a In another awkward effort to bond with the Soviet, Kennedy conceded he had made a misjudgment awith regard to the Cuba situation.a Kennedy said he had to make judgments that would drive U.S. policy based on what the USSR would do next around the world, just as Khrushchev had to amake judgments as to the moves of the U.S.a So, Kennedy said, he wanted to use their meeting to gain agreater precision in these judgments so that our two countries could survive this period of compet.i.tion without endangering their national security.a Khrushchev countered that dangers only arose when the U.S. misunderstood the sources of revolution, which he insisted were homegrown and not invented by the Soviets. He seized upon the example of Iran, a U.S. ally, where the Soviet Union adoes not want a revolution there and does not do anything in that country to promote such a development.a Khrushchev said, however, that athe people of the country are so poor that the country has become a volcano and changes are bound to occur sooner or later. The Shah will certainly be overthrown. By supporting the Shah, the United States generates adverse feelings toward the United States among the people of Iran and, conversely, favorable feelings toward the USSR.a He then turned to Cuba. aA mere handful of people, headed by Fidel Castro, overthrew the Batista regime because of its oppressive nature,a he said. aDuring Castroas fight against Batista, U.S. capitalist circlesasupported Batista, and this is why the anger of the Cuban people turned against the United States. The Presidentas decision to launch a landing in Cuba only strengthened the revolutionary forces and Castroas own position.a Said Khrushchev, aCastro is not a communist, but U.S. policy can make him one.a Referring to his own life, Khrushchev said he had not been born a communist. aIt was the capitalists who made me a communist.a Khrushchev scoffed at President Kennedyas notion that Cuba could endanger American security. Could six million people really be a threat to the mighty U.S., the Soviet leader wondered.
Khrushchev challenged Kennedy to explain to him what sort of global precedent he might be setting by arguing that the U.S. should be free to act as it wished regarding Cuba. Did that mean the USSR would be free to meddle in the internal affairs of Turkey and Iran, who were allies of the U.S. and had American bases and rockets? Through the Bay of Pigs invasion, Khrushchev argued, athe U.S. has set a precedent for intervention in the internal affairs of other countries. The USSR is stronger than Turkey and Iran, just as the U.S. is stronger than Cuba. This situation may cause amiscalculation,a to use the Presidentas term.a Khrushchevas voice hung on that dreaded word for emphasis.
Turning Kennedyas words on himself, Khrushchev agreed both sides should agree ato rule out miscalculation.a This is why he was ahappy that the President had said that Cuba was a mistake.a Kennedy attempted again to appease the growling bear. He conceded Khrushchevas point that if Iranas current prime minister didnat improve his peopleas lot, athere would be important changes in that country as well.a Having been challenged on Cuba, Turkey, and Iran, Kennedy felt compelled to respond. He protested that he had not been a fan of Batista, but his concern now was that Castro would transform Cuba into a base for regional trouble. Although it was true that the U.S. had military installations in Turkey and Iran, Kennedy said, athese two countries are so weak that they could be no threat to the USSR, no more than Cuba to the U.S.a When U.S. officials read the transcripts of the two leadersa exchanges a few days later, they were again shocked by what followed. In reference to Cuba, Kennedy wondered how Khrushchev would respond if a government friendly to the West established itself in Poland. aIt was critical to have the changes occurring in the world and affecting the balance of power take place in a way that would not involve the prestige of the treaty commitments of our two countries,a he said. What Kennedy was suggesting was that because of Polandas Warsaw Pact treaty obligations, it was off-limits for American interference.
It was once again the furthest any U.S. president ever had gone with a Soviet counterpart in recognizing the division of Europe as acceptable and permanent. To balance this apparent concession, Kennedy added that the days would be numbered for Soviet bloc leaders who failed to produce better living standards and education for their people. At the same time, Kennedy was saying that the U.S. would not meddle where the Kremlinas prestige was in questiona"and Moscow ought to play by the same rules.
Khrushchev shot back that American policy was inconsistent, then apologized to the president that he wasnat criticizing Kennedy personally, as he had only been in the White House a very short time. The Soviet leader again returned to the subject of Iran, and said that for all the U.S. emphasis on democracy, Washington supported the Shah, awho says his power was given to him by G.o.d. Everybody knows how this power was seized by the Shahas father, who had been a sergeant in the Iranian Army and who had usurped the throne by means of murder, plunder and violencea. The United States is spending vast sums of money in Iran but that money does not go to the people; it is plundered by the Shahas entourage.a Hammering away further at what he condemned as American hypocrisy, Khrushchev turned to Washingtonas support for Spanish dictator Franco. aThe U.S. knows how he came to power and yet it supports him,a said Khrushchev. aThe United States supports the most reactionary regimes and this is how the people see U.S. policy.a He conceded that Castro might indeed become a communist, though he didnat start that way. Khrushchev felt that U.S. sanctions had turned him toward Moscow.
Kennedy was in over his head. For all Kennedyas willingness to debate Khrushchev, he had failed to challenge the Soviet leader where he was most vulnerable. He had not condemned the Soviet use of force in East Germany and Hungary in 1953 and 1956. Worse, he had not posed the most important question of all: Why were hundreds of thousands of East German refugees fleeing to a better life in the West?