TUESDAY AFTERNOON, OCTOBER 24, 1961.
Secretary Rusk was irritated that General Clay was providing him with un-solicited advice on how to conduct diplomacy with Moscow, then unilaterally making deployment decisions at Berlinas border connected to those suggestions. On Ruskas behalf, Berlin task force chief Foy Kohler called Allan Lightner at nine in the evening German time to get him back on the State Department reservation and to pull him out from under General Clayas seductive spell.
Speaking to Lightner, Kohler shot down Clayas advice that Rusk should use the unfolding border dispute as leverage for negotiations with Moscow. Beyond that, he reminded a defensive Lightner that he reported to Rusk and not to Clay. In his memo to Rusk afterward that reported on his chat with Lightner, Kohler complained, aThe conversation was almost entirely in double-talk.a Lightner a.s.sured Kohler that his role in the border-crossing incident two days earlier had been aentirely unexpected and rather embarra.s.sing.a In all his life as a diplomat, Lightner had never encountered so much media attention, ranging from sneering insinuations in the communist press that he was crossing to meet with his mistress to excessive praise in the West Berlin press that the top American in Berlin was finally demonstrating U.S. t.e.s.t.i.c.l.es.
Kohler joked that Lightneras name had become aa household word in the U.S.a overnight, which in the publicity-shy State Department wasnat a compliment. What bothered Kohler more, he said, was that Clay had suspended the border crossings without Washingtonas clearance, which Kohler called aa serious tactical mistake.a He believed the Soviet officialas eventual appearance at the border crossing on October 22 had achieved the U.S. purpose of showing that it remained the Soviets and not the East Germans who would guarantee U.S. free pa.s.sage in East Berlin.
In putting a stop to the military escorts, Lightner apologized to his superiors in Washington that he had been aoverruled by a higher authority,a namely Clay. At the same time, he wanted to know what Rusk thought of Clayas ingenious idea of calling in the Soviet amba.s.sador and informing him that the U.S. would refuse to negotiate with Russia until the East Germans canceled their expanded border inspections.
Kohler said Clayas proposal was being considered but that many other factors would play into the decision of when and how to talk to the Russians. Thus, Rusk wanted Clay to resume his probes with aboth armed and unarmed escorts of U.S. vehiclesa if the East Germans continued to refuse American rights of free pa.s.sage.
With that, General Clay had clear instructions to resume his escorts. The slap on Clayas hand, however, was just as unmistakable. Rusk wanted him to stay out of U.S.a"Soviet diplomacy, which was none of his business. For whatever reason, Clayas superiors were encouraging his more a.s.sertive course but refusing to connect it with a more a.s.sertive diplomacy.
The outcome was destined to be an unhappy one.
CHECKPOINT CHARLIE, WEST BERLIN.
FRIDAY AFTERNOON, OCTOBER 27, 1961.
United States Army First Lieutenant Vern Pike had two concerns as he looked down the enemy tank barrels, adjusted his green army helmet with the bold white aMPa emblazoned across its front, and ensured his M14 rifle had its safety off, a bullet in its chamber, and its bayonet unsheathed.
Foremost in his mind, the twenty-four-year-old U.S. military police officer was worried for his wife, Renny, who at age twenty was increasingly pregnant with their twins. Pike had decided against sending her home for Christmas, as the young couple didnat want to be separated for that long, but now that decision looked irresponsible.
That was due to his second fear. Pike knew from his training that the scene unfolding before him could escalate to wara"perhaps even a nuclear onea"and take with it him, his young bride, and their unborn twins, not to mention a good portion of the planet. All it would take was one nervous U.S. or Soviet trigger finger, he thought to himself.
It was just past nine in the evening, and ten American M48 Patton tanks were poised at the Friedrichstra.s.se crossing, facing an identical number of Soviet T-54 tanks about a hundred paces away. The showdown had begun to unfold several hours earlier in the afternoon when U.S. tanks had clanked up to the border as they had the two previous days to back up what were already becoming routine military escorts of American civilian cars into East Berlin.
At precisely 4:45 p.m., after another successful and uneventful operation, U.S. commanders had ordered the American tanks withdrawn to Tempelhof Air Base. Pike, whose military police platoon supervised Checkpoint Charlie, then took a cigarette break with Major Thomas Tyree, who commanded the tank group. From the warmth of a drugstore on the corner of Friedrichstra.s.se and Zimmerstra.s.se, they looked out the window toward the East and turned to each other in disbelief.
aDo you see what I see?a said Tyree to Pike.
aSir, those are tanks!a Pike responded with alarm. aAnd they arenat ours.a He calculated that they were no more than seventy to a hundred yards from where they stood.
Though they looked to be newly built Soviet T-54 tanks, their national markings were obscured. All the more mysterious, the military personnel driving them and manning their guns appeared to be wearing unmarked black uniforms. If they were Sovieta"and it was hard to imagine they were anything elsea"they were preserving deniability.
aVern,a said Tyree, aI donat know whose tanks those are, but get the h.e.l.l to Tempelhof and get me my tanks back, quick as you can.a aYes, sir,a said Pike, glancing at his watch. The U.S. tanks had left ten minutes earlier, so it would not take long for him to catch them. He jumped into his military police car, a white Ford, and raced through Friday rush-hour traffic, weaving in and out with his siren blaring and his agumball machine,a as he called his rooftop light, rotating. He caught up with the tanks just as they were arriving at their base.
Pike shouted out his window at the lead tank, which was driven by his Berlin neighbor, Captain Bob Lamphir. aSir, weave got trouble at Checkpoint Charlie; follow me and letas get back there as fast as we can go.a aWhoopee!a yelped Lamphir as he ordered all the tanks to turn around and head back to the border. Pike later recalled how the thrill of impending danger surged through him: aHere we are at five oaclock in the afternoon rush hour on an October Friday in Berlin, racing down Mariendamm towards Checkpoint Charlie with my little MP car going bebop, bebop out in the front. And every living Berliner within eyesight gets the h.e.l.l out of the way.a Just before the American tanks had returned to the scene at 5:25 p.m., the Soviet tanks had withdrawn to parking areas on a vacant lot near East Berlinas main boulevard of Unter den Linden. If not for all the potential peril, the scene had the atmosphere of a French farce, with the Soviet actors rumbling behind the curtain just as their American counterparts rushed onto the stage. In expectation that their opponents might return, the U.S. tanks remained and arranged themselves in defensive positions.
Some forty minutes later, at just past six in the evening, what appeared to be Russian tanks returned and a.s.sembled themselves with guns pointed across the line. A Washington Post reporter who had gathered at the crossing with dozens of other correspondents announced it was athe first time that the forces of the two wartime allies, now the worldas biggest powers, had met in direct and hostile confrontation.a In reference to the lack of national markings, CBS Radio correspondent Daniel Schorr called them, ato borrow a term from Orwellathe un-tanks. Or we may one day hear that they were just Russian-speaking volunteers who had bought some surplus tanks and come down on their own.a Schorr reported on the curious scene: In the West, the American GIs sat atop their tanks, smoking, chatting, and eating dinner from mess kits. West Berliners, held back behind rope barriers, bought pretzel sticks from street vendors, and presented flowers to GIs. The Western scene was all lit by enormous floodlights beamed from the communist sidea"an effort to intimidate using superior wattage. On the Eastern side, the apparently Russian tanks sat in darkness with their black-uniformed crews. aWhat a picture for the history books!a Schorr exclaimed.
Clay required confirmation for his masters in Washington that they were Soviet. It was not an academic point: for the U.S., the danger of a confrontation with Soviet tanks was that it could turn into a general war. East German tanks posed another sort of difficulty, because their deployment was prohibited in East Berlin under the four-power agreements.
Under orders to ascertain the tanksa origin, Pike and his driver Sam McCart climbed into an Army sedan and weaved through the barricades and down a side street well past the tanks, where they parked and then walked back. It was part of the surreal nature of the showdown that both sides continued to respect military freedom of movement at the border, so Pike could drive through without impediment.
Pike was surprised at the tanksa illogical two-three-two formation, which made it impossible for the rear tanks to fire upon the enemy. Beyond that, they also were making themselves easy targets. Pike walked up to the rear tank and saw nothing to help his investigation: ano Russians, no East Germans, no one.a So he climbed onto the tank and down into the driveras compartment. There he confirmed it was Soviet by the Cyrillic script on the controls and the Red Army newspaper by the brake handle, which Pike could identify, given his smattering of Russian. aHey, McCart, look at this,a he said as he climbed out of the tank and showed him the newspaper that he had taken as evidence.
The tanksa crews, about fifty men in all, were sitting on the ground a short distance away, apparently getting briefed on their mission. Pike walked up close enough to hear they were speaking Russian. When one of the Soviet officers spotted him, Pike turned to McCart and said, aLetas get the h.e.l.l out of here.a After driving back, they reported to Colonel Sabolyk, who was Pikeas superior, that the tanks were Soviet. When Pike explained how he had found out and showed the newspaper, Sabolyk said in shock, aYou did what?a The disbelieving colonel put Pike on the phone to the emergency operations center, which connected him with Kennedyas special representative so he could hear for himself. aWhose tanks are they?a Clay asked.
aThey are Soviet, sir,a Pike said.
aHow do you know?a When Pike told him, Clay was silent on the other end of the line. Pike felt as though he could hear him thinking, aOh, G.o.d, a lieutenant has started World War Three.a Pike had dared to undertake the mission partly because he felt young and invulnerable, but also because by then American soldiers thought little of Soviet discipline, morale, or military capability. Though GIs knew they were outnumbered, they also felt superior. When driving into West Berlin on the Helmstedt Autobahn from West Germany, Pike had seen Russian grunts hawking their belt buckles, caps, and even Soviet medals as souvenirs in exchange for Playboy magazines, chewing gum, ink pens, or especially cigarettes.
At less generous moments, GIs would flick burning cigarettes to the ground just to watch the Russians scramble to recover them for a few drags. Pike recalled later that their gear was of poor quality, their boots flimsy, their field jackets old; they looked to Pike like hand-me-downs from previous conscripts. He told friends that atheir body odor would chase a buzzard off a s.h.i.t wagon.a Pike had little more regard for their tanks, which maneuvered badly. The drivers were often from Asian minorities, Pike had noticed, because he reckoned they were the only ones able to fit into compartments that had been built too small. He and his men chuckled when the first tanks had rolled up that day and officers standing on the road struggled to position them using exaggerated hand movements and semaph.o.r.es, apparently to overcome language and handling difficulties.
But nothing was very funny about Pikeas realization that the Soviet army could asimply swat us out of the way if they ever decided to take the Western half of the city.a Pike recalled his orientation briefing when he had reported for duty in West Berlin.
aYou are the first line of defense,a his commander had said. aThe best way to get out of here if the balloon goes up is to put on a Stra.s.senmeister [street cleaner] armband on your left arm, pick up a broom, and start sweeping down the Autobahn all the way to West Germany. Thatas the only way youare going to get out of Berlin alive.a Pike had laughed then, but not now. He calculated the possible outcomes as he stamped his feet to stay warm. Either U.S. or Soviet leaders would blink and withdraw from the battlefield, or someone would shoot and a war would begin. In any case, he couldnat imagine his wife, Renny, heavy with twins, grabbing for a broom and sweeping her way out of Berlin.
The scene before Pike varied between one of imminent threat and touching human drama.
At one point, an eighty-year-old East Berlin woman decided to take advantage of the confusion to simply walk across the border to escape as a refugee. From the West Berlin side and only thirty feet away from her, her son shouted repeatedly at her to keep walking though an East Berlin policeman blocked her path. The crowd watched in fear as her son shouted over and over again: aMutter, komm doch, bitte!a (aMother, come on, please!a).
The officer, whose standing orders were to shoot to kill those trying to flee, stood to the side and called off his dog in a random act of mercy. The old woman took ten more faltering steps before falling into her sonas arms as she crossed the line to freedom amid onlookersa cheers.
Down the street from the unmarked Soviet tanks in the capitalist West, bathed in light from six high-powered searchlights mounted by the East Germans on wooden towers just the day before, four U.S. M48 Patton tanks rested, the first pair on the white painted line on Friedrichstra.s.se separating East and West. Two more tanks were in a lot just off Friedrichstra.s.se, and four more were poised for action a quarter mile away. Near them were five personnel carriers and five jeeps loaded with MPs wearing bulletproof vests and with bayonets fixed to rifles.
U.S. commanders had placed their entire 6,500-man garrison in Berlin on alert. The French command had ordered its 3,000 men held in barracks. The British had brought out two ant.i.tank guns near the Brandenburg Gate, about 600 yards away, and had sent armed patrols right up to the barbed-wire barricade at the gate. A New York Times reporter chronicled the scene for his readers: aIt was like two chess players trying to come to grips in the middle of a disorganized board, with General Clay moving the American pieces and, presumably, Marshal Ivan S. Konev, the recently appointed Soviet Commander in East Germany moving the Soviet mena. As personal representative of President Kennedy, General Clay does not have a place in the regular chain of command. Butait is clear that his special position has given him the decisive voice in local decisions.a Pike and his MPs were eager to stand up to the communists, having been frustrated that their commanders had kept them in barracks on August 13. It was three weeks after the border had been closed, and Pike and his men had been reduced to watching helplessly across the border as East German Young Pioneer construction brigades replaced the flimsy barbed-wire barrier with cinder blocks.
Pike had sought guidance from his superiors over whether he should do something to disrupt their handiwork, but he got what became a consistent message: U.S. soldiers should sit on their hands and watch the Wall rise.
On the evening of September 1, Pike would recall that one of the East Germans building the wall had glanced left and right to make sure no one was watching, and then said to him over the barbed wire, aLieutenant, look how slowly Iam working. What are you waiting for?a He wanted the Americans to intervene.
Later, a police officer standing behind the worker said much the same: aLook, Lieutenant, my machine gun isnat loaded. What are you waiting for?a In order to avoid an unwanted firefight, East German officers had not put bullets in the chambers of such border troops, and he was sharing that information with Pike so the U.S. would know it could strike.
Pike pa.s.sed all that information to his superiors but was again told to show restraint.
The orders to begin the military escorts the previous Sunday were the biggest morale-booster of the year. Pikeas men were to hold the line, be vigilant, and fire upon communist border police should they engage. With rifles loaded and tanks protecting their rear, they had repeatedly guided Allied civilian cars and tourist buses through the borderas zigzag barriers.
Until Soviet tanks had rolled up that afternoon, the operation had worked as planned. Now all forces were frozen in place as commanders huddled in opposing headquarters on opposite sides of Berlin, awaiting instructions from Washington and Moscow.
Pike was relieved his fatigues were still dry. The paraphernalia he carried was hardly the stuff to stop Soviet tanks or infantry: an MP bra.s.sard wrapped around his upper left arm, a first-aid pouch, a canteen, handcuffs, a billy club, a .45 caliber automatic, and his rifle. Pike braced for a long and cold night. Looking through his binoculars at the young, frightened faces of his enemies, he worried awhat would happen if one of those idiots took a shot at usa"and then if the showdown became a shootout.a Even as the Soviets were escalating their tank presence, Clay received new instructions from Washington to retreat. Rusk was warning Clay off the aggressive course Rusk himself had endorsed just three days earlier. Foy Kohler, the lead man at the State Department handling the Checkpoint Charlie showdown, had attached a note to Ruskas cable that was intended to convince Clay that any appeal to Kennedy would be a waste of time. It read: aApproved by [Rusk] after consideration by the President.a Clay had seen plenty of political mushiness from Washington over the years, but nothing topped the message that followed.
aIn the nature of things,a Rusk wrote, awe had long since decided that entry into Berlin is not a vital interest which would warrant determined recourse to force to protect and sustain. Having for this reason acquiesced in the building of the wall we must recognize frankly among ourselves that we thus went a long way in accepting the fact that the Soviets could, in the case of East Berlin, as they have done previously in other areas under their effective physical control, isolate their unwilling subjects.a Ruskas message was unmistakable: Clay should view Kennedyas lack of resistance to the border closure as de facto acceptance that the Soviets could do whatever they wished on territory they currently controlled. Rusk said U.S. allies would not support stronger measures, aespecially on the issue of showing credentials,a where the British had already caved.
Rusk conceded to Clay that Kennedy was having difficulty convincing the Allies of the areal prospecta of armed conflict over West Berlin. Consequently, while the Kennedy administration wanted to demonstrate the illegality of the East German and Soviet actions of August 13, awe have not wished this to go so far as to const.i.tute simply a demonstration of impotence, to focus world-wide public attention on the wrong issue and to arouse hopes and expectations on the part of West Berliners and the West Germans who in the end could only be disillusioned,a Rusk explained.
Clay had never been more convinced that appeas.e.m.e.nt would only encourage the Russian bear. Because of that, earlier that same day he had sent a telegram calling for aa raid in forcea to knock down portions of the Wall should the East Germans respond to ongoing U.S. actions by shutting down Friedrichstra.s.se altogether, which he considered possible.
He outlined how it would work: tanks with bulldozer mounts would cross legally into East Germany, which was technically allowed under four-power rights, but then they would plow demonstratively through sections of the Wall on their way back. On October 26, NATO Supreme Commander Norstad had authorized General Watson to use athe present [Clay] plan for anosinga down the Friedrichstra.s.se barriera if the East Germans blocked the crossing entirely. He instructed Watson to prepare an alternative plan in which the tanks would anose downa different portions of the Wall simultaneously, aif practicable from a military standpoint, at several [two or more] other places as well as the Friedrichstra.s.se.a He had added as an unmistakable message to Clay: aThis alternate plan will not under any circ.u.mstances be placed in action without specific approval from me.a In fact, Ruskas new cable had shot down Norstad and Clay at the same time. aI am unable to see what national purpose would be accomplished by the proposed raid in force,a wrote Rusk. He added that Clayas lesser goal of using a tank to open up the Friedrichstra.s.se crossing would be discussed that afternoon with the president.
However, said Rusk, given the importance of keeping athe three princ.i.p.al Allies together it seems quite possible that we cannot get agreement on even this much.a Rusk expressed his appreciation for Clayas counsel but told him that at the moment it was far more important to keep the Allies together ain the face of the grave Soviet threat while at the same time building up pressures on Soviets against further unilateral action.a The great General Lucius Clay of the 1948 Berlin Airlift was being hog-tied by Washington while Soviet tanks were pointing their barrels down his throat.
He had never felt so powerless.
THE KREMLIN, MOSCOW.
FRIDAY, OCTOBER 27, 1961.
Marshal Konev complained to Khrushchev that the U.S. tanks were gunning their engines at the border and seemed prepared for a major operation. Having already provided the Soviet leader with the photographic evidence of Clayas exercises in the woods, where tanks had practiced knocking down replicas of the Wall, he believed that Khrushchev needed to take seriously the prospect that the Americans might try to undo the Soviet success of August 13.
Khrushchev, who by this time was managing the crisis personally from Moscow despite his ongoing Party Congress, had already called for an additional twenty-three Soviet tanks to be brought into Berlin. aTake our tanks to the neighboring street,a he told Konev, abut let their engines run there in the same high gear. And put the noise and the roar from the tanks through amplifiers.a Konev warned Khrushchev that if he challenged the Americans in such a way, the U.S. tanks amay rush forward.a He worried that the impetuous Khrushchev might overplay the Soviet hand and start a war.
aI donat think so,a Khrushchev replied, aunless, of course, the minds of the American military have been made blind with hatred.a CABINET ROOM, THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON, D.C.
6:00 P.M., FRIDAY, OCTOBER 27, 1961.
An aide handed General Clay a note informing him of the Soviet increase in armor at Checkpoint Charlie just while he was in the midst of a telephone conversation with President Kennedy, who was huddled in the Cabinet Room in an emergency session with his national security team. By that time it seemed that all of Washington had turned against Clay except Kennedy, who had not yet revealed his hand.
To counteract the concerns of the presidentas advisers, Clay rea.s.sured Kennedy that matters in Berlin were under control. He insisted that the Soviet decision to move twenty more tanks forward was a message of moderation, as the Soviets were merely mathematically matching the U.S. force capability in Berlin.
That said, the Soviets were nervous enough about the Checkpoint Charlie showdown, and its potential for escalation, that Khrushchev had put his nuclear strike forces on special alert status for the first time ever over a U.S.a"Soviet dispute. Khrushchev could not be sure that matters would not spin out of control, and he was preparing for all possibilities.
Clayas view was clear: aIf the Soviets donat want war over West Berlin, we canat start it. If they do, thereas nothing we can do to stop them.a The general was willing to gamble they didnat want a war and believed that the U.S. should push back. However, the president was holding the dice and was unwilling to take the risk.
What Clay would never know was that Kennedy was so unnerved by the Checkpoint Charlie showdown that he had dispatched his brother to solve the crisis with his regular interlocutor of the past six months, the Soviet spy Georgi Bolshakov. At the same time he was again working a second, more traditional channel through Amba.s.sador Thompson in Moscow, just as he had done before the Vienna Summit.
The president wasnat turning to the Bolshakov back channel because of its proven success. Bobbyas meetings with Bolshakov before Vienna had done little to prepare him for Khrushchevas ambush on Berlin. At a dangerous moment, however, Bolshakov was the fastest and most direct line to Khrushchev.
By late October, Bobby knew how to arrange a meeting with Bolshakov rapidly, and where the media would not find them. James Symington, Bobbyas a.s.sistant at the Office of the Attorney General, thought his boss had warmed up to aGeorgia partly due to his apredilection for harmless buffoons.a They met every fortnight or so, and Bobby discussed with him amost of the major matters dealing with the Soviet Union and the United States.a The presidentas brother made arrangements for the meetings himself, and would later regret that aunfortunatelya"stupidlya"I didnat write many of the things down. I just delivered the messages verbally to my brother and head act on them and I think sometimes head tell the State Department and sometimes he didnat.a The first Bobby Kennedya"Bolshakov meeting about the rising border tensions at Checkpoint Charlie came at 5:30 p.m. on October 26, one day before Soviet tanks rolled up to the crossing. According to the recollection of the presidentas brother, the second and crucial negotiations came at 11:30 p.m. Washington time on October 27, or 5:30 in the morning on October 28 in Berlin, at a time when the two sidesa tanks and soldiers were positioned across from each other in the damp, cold autumn dawn.
Bobby Kennedy recalled that he told Bolshakov, aThe situation in Berlin has become more difficult.a He complained that Foreign Minister Gromyko had rebuffed Amba.s.sador Thompsonas efforts that day to defuse the crisis. aIt is our opinion that such an att.i.tude is not helpful at a time when efforts are being made to find a way to resolve this problem,a said Kennedy. He appealed for a aperiod of relative moderation and calm over the course of the next four to six weeks.a The attorney general would later recall that he then told Bolshakov, aThe President would like them to take their tanks out of there in twenty-four hours.a And thatas precisely what Khrushchev would do. Bobby would later say that their exchange on the tank showdown at Checkpoint Charlie demonstrated that Bolshakov adelivered effectively when it was a matter of importance.a What no one recorded were the details of the agreement. However, from that point forward, the U.S. stopped its military escorts of civilians, and Clay no longer challenged East German authority at the border points. Whatever contingencies Clay had scripted to knock through portions of the Wall were shelved, and the shovels mounted to tanks to knock portions of the Wall were removed and put in storage.
Absent any resistance, East Germany further reinforced and expanded its Wall.
WASHINGTON, D.C.
10:00 P.M., FRIDAY, OCTOBER 27, 1961.
On Friday night, October 27, Secretary of State Rusk sent a telegram to the U.S. Mission in Berlin that declared victory while engaging in retreat. The cable noted that the crucial decision ending the Berlin Crisis had been taken at a meeting at the White House at 5:00 p.m. attended by the president, Rusk, McNamara, Bundy, Kohler, and Hillenbrand. It would be sent to NATO and all the U.S. emba.s.sies in the three chief Allied capitals. Almost as an afterthought, Clay was copied as well.
aProbes to date have accomplished their purpose,a Rusk lied. Kennedy and Clay could argue that Soviet tanksa appearance at the border was their victory, proving their point that it was Moscow and not East Berlin that still controlled events in the city.
Yet it was clear Rusk was waving the white flag. The cable declared, aFurther probes by U.S. personnel wearing civilian clothes and riding in official U.S. vehicles or privately owned vehicles bearing plates of U.S. Armed Forces and using armed guards or military escort will be deferred.a Just in case his point was missed, Ruskas next instruction made clear that the president wanted Clay to avoid any further confrontation with the East Germans or the Soviets. aU.S. civilian officials,a it said, awill for the time being refrain from going into East Berlin except that one civilian official will attempt daily to enter East Berlin in a privately owned vehicle without armed escort.a Clay would stay for another several months, but his enemies had won. Rusk drove home that reality further, saying, aFor the time being nothing further can be done on the spot since the matter has now moved to the highest government levelsa. Instructions have been issued to defer any further civilian probes with armed escorts into East Berlin.a Even as stubborn a man as Clay knew he had to stand down.
PALACE OF CONGRESSES, MOSCOW.
SAt.u.r.dAY MORNING, OCTOBER 28, 1961.
After an evening of tension at the Berlin border, Marshal Konev met with Khrushchev in Moscow as his long Party Congress entered its final two days. Konev reported to Khrushchev that the situation at the border in Berlin was unchanged. No one was moving, he told the Soviet leader, aexcept when the tank operators on both sides would climb out and walk around to warm up.a Khrushchev instructed Konev to withdraw Soviet tanks first. aIam sure that within twenty minutes or however long it takes them to get their instructions, the American tanks will pull back, too,a he said, speaking with the confidence of a man who had made a deal.
aThey canat turn their tanks around and pull them back as long as our guns are pointing at them,a Khrushchev said. aTheyave gotten themselves into a difficult situation, and they donat know how to get out of ita. So letas give them one.a Shortly after 10:30 on Sat.u.r.day morning, the first Soviet tanks retreated from Checkpoint Charlie. Some of them were covered by flowers, garlands put on them that morning by members of the Freie Deutsche Jugend, the partyas youth organization.
After a half houras wait, the U.S. tanks pulled back as well.
With that, the Cold Waras most perilous moment ended with a whimper. However, the aftershocks of Berlin 1961 would be dramatic and long-lasting. They would shake the world a year later in Cubaa"and they would shape the world for three decades to come.
Epilogue.
AFTERSHOCKS.
I recognize fully that Khrushchevas main intention may be to increase his chances at Berlin, and we shall be ready to take a full role there as well as in the Caribbean. What is essential at this moment of highest test is that Khrushchev should discover that if he is counting on weakness or irresolution, he has miscalculated.
President Kennedy, in a secret cable informing British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan of the photographic evidence of Cuban missiles, October 21, 1962 There are many people in the world who really donat understand, or say they donat, what is the great issue between the free world and the Communist world. Let them come to Berlin. There are some who say that Communism is the wave of the future. Let them come to Berlin. And there are some who say in Europe and elsewhere we can work with the Communists. Let them come to Berlina.
All free men, wherever they may live, are citizens of Berlin, and therefore, as a free man, I take pride in the words aIch bin ein Berliner.a President Kennedy, in a speech to Berliners, June 26, 1963 BERLIN AND HAVANA.