Delegates its warmest appreciation of the latter"s self-sacrificing and honest work for the strengthening of the new order in Russia, in the interests of the Russian Democracy and at the same time wishes to see, in the nearest possible future, the above Council transformed into an All-Russian Council of Workmen"s and Soldiers" Delegates.
_The convention is of the opinion that the war is at present conducted for purposes of conquest and against the interests of the ma.s.ses_, and it, therefore, urges the Council of Workmen"s and Soldiers" Delegates to take the most energetic and effective measures for the purpose of ending this butchery, on the basis of free self-determination of nations and of renunciation by all belligerent countries of annexations and indemnities. Not a drop of Russian blood shall be given for aims foreign to us.
Considering that the earliest possible achievement of this purpose is contingent only upon a strong revolutionary army, which would defend freedom and government, and be fully supported by the organized Revolutionary Democracy, that is, by the Council of Workmen"s and Soldiers" Delegates, responsible for its acts to the whole country, the convention welcomes the responsible decision of the Council of Workmen"s and Soldiers" Delegates to take part in the new Provisional Government.
The convention demands that the representatives of the Church give up for the country"s benefit the treasures and funds now in the possession of churches and monasteries. The convention makes an urgent appeal to all parts of the population.
1. To the comrade-soldiers in the rear: Comrades! Come to fill up our thinning ranks in the trenches and rise shoulder to shoulder with us for the country"s defense!
2. Comrade-workers! Work energetically and unite your efforts, and in this way help us in our last fight for universal peace for nations! By strengthening the front you will strengthen freedom!
3. Fellow-citizens of the capitalist cla.s.s! Follow the historic example of Minin! Even as he, open your treasuries and quickly bring your money to the aid of Russia!
4. To the peasants: Fathers and Brothers! Bring your last mite to help the weakening front! Give us bread, and oats and hay to our horses. Remember that the future Russia will be yours!
5. Comrades-Intellectuals! Come to us and bring the light of knowledge into our dark trenches! Share with us the difficult work of advancing Russia"s freedom and prepare us for the citizenship of new Russia!
6. To the Russian women: Support your husbands and sons in the performing of their civil duty to the country! Replace them where this is not beyond your strength! Let your scorn drive away all those who are slackers in these difficult times!
No one can read this declaration without a deep sense of the lofty and sincere citizenship of the brave men who adopted it as their expression.
The fundamental loyalty of these leaders of the common soldiers, their spokesmen and delegates, is beyond question. Pardonably weary of a war in which they had been more shamefully betrayed and neglected than any other army in modern times, frankly suspicious of capitalist governments which had made covenants with the hated Romanov dynasty, they were still far from being ready to follow the leadership of Bolsheviki. They had, instead, adopted the sanely constructive policy of Tchcheidze, Tseretelli, Skobelev, Plechanov, and other Socialists who from the first had seen the great struggle in its true perspective. That they did not succeed in averting disaster is due in part to the fact that the Revolution itself had come too late to make military success possible, and in part to the failure of the governments allied with Russia to render intelligent aid.
VII
The Provisional Government was reorganized. Before we consider the actions of the All-Russian Congress of Peasants" Delegates, one of the most important gatherings of representatives of Russian workers ever held, the reorganization of the Provisional Government merits attention. On the 17th, at a special sitting of the Duma, Guchkov and Miliukov explained why they had resigned. Guchkov made it a matter of conscience. Anarchy had entered into the administration of the army and navy, he said: "In the way of reforms the new government has gone very far. Not even in the most democratic countries have the principles of self-government, freedom, and equality been so extensively applied in military life. We have gone somewhat farther than the danger limit, and the impetuous current drives us farther still.... I could not consent to this dangerous work; I could not sign my name to orders and laws which in my opinion would lead to a rapid deterioration of our military forces. A country, and especially an army, cannot be administered on the principles of meetings and conferences."
Miliukov told his colleagues of the Duma that he had not resigned of his own free will, but under pressure: "I had to resign, yielding not to force, but to the wish of a considerable majority of my colleagues. With a clear conscience I can say that I did not leave on my own account, but was compelled to leave." Nevertheless, he said, the foreign policy he had pursued was the correct one. "You could see for yourselves that my activity in foreign politics was in accord with your ideas," he declared amid applause which eloquently testified to the approval with which the bourgeoisie regarded policies and tendencies which the proletariat condemned. He pointed out that the pacifist policies of Zimmerwald and Keinthal had permeated a large part of the Socialist movement, and that the Soviet, the Councils of Workmen"s and Soldiers" Delegates, claiming to exercise control over the Provisional Government, were divided. He feared that the proposal to establish a Coalition Government would not lead to success, because of "discord in the Council of Workmen"s and Soldiers"
Delegates itself." Not all the members of the latter body were agreed upon entering into a Coalition Government, and "it is evident that those who do not enter the government will continue to criticize those who have entered, and it is possible that the Socialists who enter the Cabinet will find themselves confronted with the same storm of criticism as the government did before." Still, because it meant the creation of a stronger government at once, which was the most vital need, he, like Guchkov, favored a coalition which would ally the Const.i.tutional Democratic party with the majority of the Socialists.
The Soviet had decided at its meeting on May 14th to partic.i.p.ate in a Coalition Ministry. The struggle upon that question between Bolsheviki and Mensheviki was long and bitter. The vote, which was forty-one in favor of partic.i.p.ation to nineteen against, probably fairly represented the full strength of Bolshevism in its stronghold. After various conferences between Premier Lvov and the other Ministers, on the one side, and representatives of the Soviet, on the other side, a new Provisional Government was announced, with Prince Lvov again Prime Minister. In the new Cabinet there were seven Const.i.tutional Democrats, six Socialists, and two Octobrists. As Minister of War and head of the army and navy Alexander Kerensky took the place of Guchkov, while P.N. Pereverzev, a clever member of the Socialist-Revolutionary party, succeeded Kerensky as Minister of Justice.
In Miliukov"s position at the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was placed M.I. Terestchenko, a wealthy sugar-manufacturer, member of the Const.i.tutional-Democratic party, who had held the post of Minister of Finance, which was now given to A.I. Shingariev, a brilliant member of the same party, who had proved his worth and capacity as Minister of Agriculture. To the latter post was appointed V.M. Chernov, the leader of the Socialist-Revolutionists, one of the most capable Socialists in Russia, or, for that matter, the world. Other Socialists of distinction in the new Provisional Government were I.G. Tseretelli, as Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, and M.I. Skobelev, as Minister of Labor. As Minister of Supply an independent Socialist, A.V. Peshekhonov, was chosen.
It was a remarkable Cabinet. So far as the Socialists were concerned, it would have been difficult to select worthier or abler representatives. As in the formation of the First Provisional Government, attempts had been made to induce Tchcheidze to accept a position in the Cabinet, but without success. He could not be induced to enter a Coalition Ministry, though he strongly and even enthusiastically supported in the Soviet the motion to partic.i.p.ate in such a Ministry. Apart from the regret caused by Tchcheidze"s decision, it was felt on every hand that the Socialists had sent into the Second Provisional Government their strongest and most capable representatives; men who possessed the qualities of statesmen and who would fill their posts with honorable distinction and full loyalty. On the side of the Const.i.tutional Democrats and the Octobrists, too, there were men of sterling character, distinguished ability, and very liberal minds. The selection of Terestchenko as Minister of Foreign Affairs was by many Socialists looked upon with distrust, but, upon the whole, the Coalition Ministry met with warm approbation. If any coalition of the sort could succeed, the Cabinet headed by Prince Lvov might be expected to do so.
On the 18th, the Petrograd Council of Workmen"s and Soldiers" Delegates adopted a resolution, introduced by Tchcheidze, president of the Council, warmly approving the entrance of the Socialist Ministers into the Cabinet and accepting the declaration of the new Provisional Government as satisfactory. This resolution was bitterly opposed by the Bolsheviki, who were led in the fight by Trotzky. This was Trotzky"s first speech in Petrograd since his arrival the previous day from America. His speech was a demagogic appeal against co-operation with any bourgeois elements.
Partic.i.p.ation in the Coalition Ministry by the Socialists was a dangerous policy, he argued, since it sacrificed the fundamental principle of cla.s.s struggle. Elaborating his views further, he said: "I never believed that the emanc.i.p.ation of the working cla.s.s will come from above. Division of power will not cease with the entrance of the Socialists into the Ministry.
A strong revolutionary power is necessary. The Russian Revolution will not perish. But I believe only in a miracle from below. There are three commandments for the proletariat. They are: First, transmission of power to the revolutionary people; second, control over their own leaders; and third, confidence in their own revolutionary powers."
This was the beginning of Trotzky"s warfare upon the Coalition Government, a warfare which he afterward systematically waged with all his might.
Tchcheidze and others effectively replied to the Bolshevik leader"s criticisms and after long and strenuous debate the resolution of the Executive Committee presented by Tchcheidze was carried by a large majority, the opposition only mustering seven votes. The resolution read as follows:
Acknowledging that the declaration of the Provisional Government, which has been reconstructed and fortified by the entrance of representatives of the Revolutionary Democracy, conforms to the idea and purpose of strengthening the achievements of the Revolution and its further development, the Council of Workmen"s and Soldiers" Delegates has determined:
I. Representatives of the Council of Workmen"s and Soldiers"
Delegates must enter into the Provisional Government.
II. Those representatives of the Council of Workmen"s and Soldiers" Delegates who join the government must, until the creation of an All-Russian organ of the Council of Workmen"s and Soldiers" Delegates, consider themselves responsible to the Petrograd Council of Workmen"s and Soldiers" Delegates, and must pledge themselves to give accounts of all their activities to that Council.
III. The Council of Workmen"s and Soldiers" Delegates expresses its full confidence in the new Provisional Government, and urges all friends of democracy to give this government active a.s.sistance, which will insure it the full measure of power necessary for the safety of the Revolution"s gains and for its further development.
If there is any one thing which may be said with certainty concerning the state of working-cla.s.s opinion in Russia at that time, two months after the overthrow of the old regime, it is that the overwhelming majority of the working-people, both city workers and peasants, supported the policy of the Mensheviki and the Socialist-Revolutionists--the policy of co-operating with liberal bourgeois elements to win the war and create a stable government--as against the policy of the Bolsheviki. The two votes of the Petrograd Soviet told where the city workers stood. That very section of the proletariat upon which the Bolsheviki leaders based their hopes had repudiated them in the most emphatic manner. The Delegates of the Soldiers at the Front had shown that they would not follow the advice of the leaders of the Bolsheviki. And at the first opportunity which presented itself the peasants placed themselves in definite opposition to Bolshevism.
On the afternoon preceding the action of the Soviet in giving its indors.e.m.e.nt to the new Provisional Government and instructing its representatives to enter the Coalition Cabinet, there a.s.sembled in the People"s House, Petrograd, more than one thousand peasant delegates to the first All-Russian Congress of Peasants. Never before had so many peasant delegates been gathered together in Russia to consider their special problems. There were present delegates from every part of Russia, even from the extreme border provinces, and many from the front. On the platform were the members of the Organizing Committee, the Executive Committee of the Council of Workmen"s and Soldiers" Delegates, the Socialist-Revolutionary party, the Social Democratic party, and a number of prominent Socialist leaders. As might be expected in a peasants" Congress, members of the Socialist-Revolutionary party were in the majority, numbering 537. The next largest group was the Social Democratic party, including Bolsheviki and Mensheviki, numbering 103. There were 136 delegates described as non-partizan; 4 belonged to the group called the "People"s Socialists" and 6 to the Labor Group. It was the most representative body of peasant workers ever brought together.
Among the first speakers to address the Congress was the venerable "Grandmother" of the Russian Revolution, Catherine Breshkovskaya, who spoke with the freedom accorded to her and to her alone. "Tell me," she demanded, "is there advantage to us in keeping our front on a war footing and in allowing the people to sit in trenches with their hands folded and to die from fever, scurvy, and all sorts of contagious diseases? If our army had a real desire to help the Allies, the war would be finished in one or two months, _but we are prolonging it by sitting with our hands folded_." V.M.
Chernov, leader of the Socialist-Revolutionary party, the new Minister of Agriculture, made a notable address in which he traversed with great skill and courage the arguments of the Bolsheviki, making a superb defense of the policy of partic.i.p.ation in the government.
Kerensky, idol of the peasants, appearing for the first time as Minister of War and head of the army and navy, made a vigorous plea for unity, for self-discipline, and for enthusiastic support of the new Provisional Government. He did not mince matters: "I intend to establish an iron discipline in the army. I am certain that I shall succeed in my undertaking, because it will be a discipline based upon duty toward the country, the duty of honor.... By all means, we must see that the country becomes free and strong enough to elect the Const.i.tuent a.s.sembly, the a.s.sembly which, through its sovereign, absolute power, will give to the toiling Russian peasants that for which they have been yearning for centuries, the land.... We are afraid of no demagogues, whether they come from the right or from the left. We shall attend to our business, quietly and firmly." Kerensky begged the peasants to a.s.sert their will that there should be "no repet.i.tion of the sad events of 1905-06, when the entire country seemed already in our hands, but slipped out because it became involved in anarchy." The speech created a profound impression and it was voted to have it printed in millions of copies, at the expense of the Congress, and have them distributed throughout the army.
A similar honor was accorded the speech of I.I. Bunakov, one of the best known and most popular of the leaders of the Socialist-Revolutionary party.
With remorseless logic he traversed the arguments of the Bolsheviki and the Porazhentsi. Taking the cry that there must be "no annexations," for example, he declared that the peasants of Russia could only accept that in the sense that Poland be reunited and her independence be restored; that the people of Alsace and Lorraine be permitted to be reunited to France; that Armenia be taken from Turkey and made independent. The peasants could not accept the _status quo ante_ as a basis for peace. He a.s.sailed the treacherous propaganda for a separate peace with terrific scorn: "But such peace is unacceptable to us peasants. A separate peace would kill not only our Revolution, but the cause of social revolution the world over. A separate peace is dishonor for Russia and treason toward the Allies.... We must start an offensive. To remain in the trenches without moving is a separate truce, more shameful even than a separate peace. A separate truce demoralizes the army and ruins the people. This spring, according to our agreement with the Allies, we should have begun a general offensive, but instead of that we have concluded a separate truce. _The Allies saved the Russian Revolution, but they are becoming exhausted_.... When our Minister of War, Kerensky, speaks of starting an offensive, the Russian army must support him with all its strength, with all the means available.... From here we should send our delegates to the front and urge our army to wage an offensive. Let the army know that it must fight and die for Russia"s freedom, for the peace of the whole world, and for the coming Socialist commonwealth."
In the resolutions which were adopted the Congress confined itself to outlining a program for the Const.i.tuent a.s.sembly, urging the abolition of private property in land, forests, water-power, mines, and mineral resources. It urged the Provisional Government to "issue an absolutely clear and unequivocal statement which would show that on this question the Provisional Government will allow n.o.body to oppose the people"s will." It also issued a special appeal "to the peasants and the whole wage-earning population of Russia" to vote at the forthcoming elections for the Const.i.tuent a.s.sembly, "only for those candidates who pledge themselves to advocate the nationalization of the land without reimburs.e.m.e.nt on principles of equality." In the election for an Executive Committee to carry on the work of the Congress and maintain the organization the delegates with Bolshevist tendencies were "snowed under." Those who were elected were, practically without exception, stalwart supporters of the policy of partic.i.p.ation in and responsibility for the Provisional Government, and known to be ardent believers in the Const.i.tuent a.s.sembly.
Chernov, with 810 votes, led the poll; Breshkovskaya came next with 809; Kerensky came third with 804; Avksentiev had 799; Bunakov 790; Vera Finger 776, and so on. Nineteenth on the list of thirty elected came the venerable Nicholas Tchaykovsky, well known in America. Once more a great representative body of Russian working-people had spoken and rejected the teachings and the advice of the Bolsheviki.
VIII
As we have seen, it was with the authority and mandate of the overwhelming majority of the organized workers that the Socialists entered the Coalition Ministry. It was with that mandate that Kerensky undertook the Herculean task of restoring the discipline and morale of the Russian army. In that work he was the agent and representative of the organized working cla.s.s.
For this reason, if for no other, Kerensky and his a.s.sociates were ent.i.tled to expect and to receive the loyal support of all who professed loyalty to the working cla.s.s. Instead of giving that support, however, the Bolsheviki devoted themselves to the task of defeating every effort of the Provisional Government to carry out its program, which, it must be borne in mind, had been approved by the great ma.s.s of the organized workers. They availed themselves of every means in their power to hamper Kerensky in his work and to hinder the organization of the economic resources of the nation to sustain the military forces.
Kerensky had promised to organize preparations for a vigorous offensive against the Austro-German forces. That such offensive was needed was obvious and was denied by none except the ultra-pacifists and the Bolsheviki. The Congress of Soldiers" Delegates from the Front and the Petrograd Soviet had specifically urged the need of such an offensive, as had most of the well-known peasants" leaders. It was a working-cla.s.s policy. But that fact did not prevent the Bolsheviki from throwing obstacles in the way of its fulfilment. They carried on an active propaganda among the men in the army and the navy, urging insubordination, fraternization, and refusal to fight. They encouraged sabotage as a means of insuring the failure of the efforts of the Provisional Government. So thoroughly did they play into the hands of the German military authorities, whether intentionally or otherwise, that the charge of being in the pay of Germany was made against them--not by prejudiced bourgeois politicians and journalists, but by the most responsible Socialists in Russia.
The epic story of Kerensky"s magnificently heroic fight to recreate the Russian army is too well known to need retelling here. Though it was vain and ended in failure, as it was foredoomed to do, it must forever be remembered with grat.i.tude and admiration by all friends of freedom. The audacity and the courage with which Kerensky and a few loyal a.s.sociates strove to maintain Russia in the struggle made the Allied nations, and all the civilized world, their debtors. Many mistakes were made, it is true, yet it is very doubtful if human beings could have achieved more or succeeded where they failed. It must be confessed, furthermore, that the governments of the nations with which they were allied made many grievous mistakes on their part.
Perhaps the greatest blunder that a discriminating posterity will charge to Kerensky"s account was the signing of the famous Declaration of Soldiers"
Rights. This doc.u.ment, which was signed on May 27th, can only be regarded in the light of a surrender to overpowering forces. In his address to the All-Russian Congress of Peasants" Delegates, on May 18th, speaking for the first time in his capacity as Minister of War, Kerensky had declared, "I intend to establish an iron discipline in the army," yet the Declaration of Soldiers" Rights which he signed nine days later was certain to make any real discipline impossible. Was it because he was inconsistent, vacillating, and weak that Kerensky attached his name to such a doc.u.ment?
Such a judgment would be gravely unjust to a great man. The fact is that Kerensky"s responsibility was very small indeed. He and his Socialist a.s.sociates in the Cabinet held their positions by authority of the Council of Workmen"s and Soldiers" Delegates, and they had agreed to be subject to its guidance and instruction. The Soviet was responsible for the Declaration of Soldiers" Rights. Kerensky was acting under its orders. The Soviet had already struck a fatal blow at military discipline by its famous Order Number One, which called on the soldiers not to execute the orders of their officers unless the orders were first approved by the revolutionary authorities--that is, by the Soviet or its accredited agents. That the order was prompted by an intense love for revolutionary ideals, or that it was justified by the amount of treachery which had been discovered among the officers of the army, may explain and even excuse it, but the fact remains that it was a deadly blow at military discipline. The fact that Kerensky"s predecessor, Guchkov, had to appear at a convention of soldiers"
delegates and explain and defend his policies showed that discipline was at a low ebb. It brought the army into the arena of politics and made questions of military strategy subject to political maneuvering.
The Declaration of Soldiers" Rights was a further step along a road which inevitably led to disaster. That remarkable doc.u.ment provided that soldiers and officers of all ranks should enjoy full civic and political rights; that they should be free to speak or write upon any subject; that their correspondence should be uncensored; that while on duty they should be free to receive any printed matter, books, papers, and so on, which they desired. It provided for the abolition of the compulsory salute to officers; gave the private soldier the right to discard his uniform when not actually on service and to leave barracks freely during "off-duty"
hours. Finally, it placed all matters pertaining to the management in the hands of elective committees in the composition of which the men were to have four-fifths of the elective power and the officers one-fifth.
Of course, the Declaration of Soldiers" Rights represented a violent reaction. Under the old regime the army was a monstrously cruel machine; the soldiers were slaves. At the first opportunity they had revolted and, as invariably happens, the pendulum had swung too far. On May 28th the Council of Workmen"s and Soldiers" Delegates issued a declaration in which it was said: "From now on the soldier-citizen is free from the slavery of saluting, and as an equal, free person will greet whomsoever he chooses....
Discipline in the Revolutionary Army will exist, prompted by popular enthusiasm and the sense of duty toward the free country rather than by a slavish salute." If we are tempted to laugh at this nave idealism, we Americans will do well to remember that it was an American statesman-idealist who believed that we could raise an army of a million men overnight, and that a shrewd American capitalist-idealist sent forth a "peace ship" with a motley crew of dreamers and disputers to end the greatest war in history.
IX
Throughout the first half of June, while arrangements for a big military offensive were being made, and were causing Kerensky and the other Socialist Ministers to strain every nerve, Lenine, Trotzky, Kamenev, Zinoviev, and other leaders of the Bolsheviki were as strenuously engaged in denouncing the offensive and trying to make it impossible. Whatever gift or genius these men possessed was devoted wholly to destruction and obstruction. The student will search in vain among the mult.i.tude of records of meetings, conventions, debates, votes, and resolutions for a single instance of partic.i.p.ation in any constructive act, one positive service to the soldiers at the front or the workers" families in need, by any Bolshevik leader. But they never missed an opportunity to embarra.s.s those who were engaged in such work, and by so doing add to the burden that was already too heavy.
Lenine denounced the offensive against Germany as "an act of treason against the Socialist International" and poured out the vials of his wrath against Kerensky, who was, as we know, simply carrying out the decisions of the Soviet and other working-cla.s.s organizations. Thus we had the astonishing and tragic spectacle of one Socialist leader working with t.i.tanic energy among the troops who had been betrayed and demoralized by the old regime, seeking to stir them into action against the greatest militarist system in the world, while another Socialist leader worked with might and main to defeat that attempt and to prevent the rehabilitation of the demoralized army. And all the while the German General Staff gloated at every success of the Bolsheviki. There was a regular system of communications between the irreconcilable revolutionists and the German General Staff. In proof of this statement only one ill.u.s.tration need be offered, though many such could be cited: At the All-Russian Congress of Workmen"s and Soldiers" Delegates, on June 22d, Kerensky read, in the presence of Lenine, a long message, signed by the commander-in-chief of the German eastern front, sent by wireless in response to a declaration of certain delegates of the Council of Workmen"s and Soldiers" Delegates.
At this session Lenine bitterly a.s.sailed the proposed offensive. He said that it was impossible for either side to win a military victory, revamping all the defeatist arguments that were familiar in every country. He minimized the loss which Russia had suffered at Germany"s hands, and the gains Germany had made in Belgium and northern France, pointing out that she had, on the other hand, lost her colonies, which England would be very unlikely to give back unless compelled to do so by other nations. Taunted with being in favor of a separate peace with Germany, Lenine indignantly denied the accusation. "It is a lie," he cried. "Down with a separate peace! _We Russian revolutionists will never consent to it._" He argued that there could be only one policy for Socialists in any country--namely, to seize the occasion of war to overthrow the capitalist-cla.s.s rule in that country. No war entered into by a capitalist ruling cla.s.s, regardless what its motives, should be supported by Socialists. He argued that the adoption of his policy by the Russian working cla.s.s would stand ten times the chance of succeeding that the military policy would have. The German working cla.s.s would compel their government and the General Staff to follow the example of Russia and make peace.
Kerensky was called upon to reply to Lenine. At the time when the restoration of the army required all his attention and all his strength, it was necessary for Kerensky to attend innumerable and well-nigh interminable debates and discussions to maintain stout resistance to the Bolshevik offensive always being waged in the rear. That, of course, was part of the Bolshevist plan of campaign. So Kerensky, wearied by his tremendous efforts to perform the task a.s.signed him by the workers, answered Lenine. His reply was a forensic masterpiece. He took the message of the commander-in-chief of the German eastern front and hurled it at Lenine"s head, figuratively speaking, showing how Lenine"s reasoning was paralleled in the German propaganda. With merciless logic and incisive phrase he showed how the Bolsheviki were using the formula, "the self-determination of nationalities," as the basis of a propaganda to bring about the dismemberment of Russia and its reduction to a chaotic medley of small, helpless states. To Lenine"s statements about the readiness of the German working cla.s.s to rebel, Kerensky made retort that Lenine should have remained in Germany while on his way to Russia and preached his ideas there.