He opposed the intellect to the world, as Carlyle opposed the weakness of man to the law of duty; and he neglected the fact that the world was there for him, only because he knew it, just as Carlyle neglected the fact that the duty was without, only because it was recognized within.
He strained the difference between the ideal and actual into an absolute distinction; and, as Carlyle condemned man to strive for a goodness which he could never achieve, so Browning condemns him to pursue a truth which he can never attain. In both, the failure is regarded as absolute.
"There is no good in us," has for its counterpart "There is no truth in us." Both the moralist and the poet dwell on the _negative_ relation of the ideal and actual, and forget that the negative has no meaning, except as the expression of a deeper affirmative. Carlyle had to learn that we know our moral imperfection, only because we are conscious of a better within us; and Browning had to learn that we are aware of our ignorance, only because we have the consciousness of fuller truth with which we contrast our knowledge. Browning, indeed, knew that the consciousness of evil was itself evidence of the presence of good, that perfection means death, and progress is life, on the side of morals; but he has missed the corresponding truth on the side of knowledge. If he acknowledges that the highest revealed itself to man, on the practical side, as love; he does not see that it has also manifested itself to man, on the theoretical side, as reason. The self-communication of the Infinite is incomplete love is a quality of G.o.d, intelligence a quality of man; hence, on one side, there is no limit to achievement, but on the other there is impotence. Human nature is absolutely divided against itself; and the division, as we have already seen, is not between flesh and spirit, but between a love which is G.o.d"s own and perfect, and an intelligence which is merely man"s and altogether weak and deceptive.
This is what makes Browning think it impossible to re-establish faith in G.o.d, except by turning his back on knowledge; but whether it is possible for him to appeal to the moral consciousness, we shall inquire in the next chapter.
CHAPTER X.
THE HEART AND THE HEAD.--LOVE AND REASON.
"And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth, so truth be in the field, we do injuriously by licensing and prohibiting to mis...o...b.. her strength. Let her and falsehood grapple; who ever knew truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter."[A]
[Footnote A: Milton"s _Areopagitica_.]
It has been shown that Browning appeals, in defence of his optimistic faith, from the intellect to the heart. His theory rests on three main a.s.sumptions:--namely (1) that knowledge of the true nature of things is impossible to man, and that, therefore, it is necessary to find other and better evidence than the intellect can give for the victory of good over evil; (2) that the failure of knowledge is a necessary condition of the moral life, inasmuch as certain knowledge would render all moral effort either futile or needless; (3) that after the failure of knowledge there still remains possible a faith of the heart, which can furnish a sufficient objective basis to morality and religion. The first of these a.s.sumptions I endeavoured to deal with in the last chapter. I now turn to the remaining two.
Demonstrative, or certain, or absolute knowledge of the actual nature of things would, Browning a.s.serts, destroy the very possibility of a moral life.[A] For such knowledge would show either that evil is evil, or that evil is good; and, in both cases alike, the benevolent activity of love would be futile. In the first case, it would be thwarted and arrested by despair; for, if evil be evil, it must remain evil for aught that man can do. Man cannot effect a change in the nature of things, nor create a good in a world dominated by evil. In the second case, the saving effect of moral love would be unnecessary; for, if evil be only seeming, then all things are perfect and complete, and there is no need of interference. It is necessary, therefore, that man should be in a permanent state of doubt as to the real existence of evil; and, whether evil does exist or not, it must seem, and only seem to exist to man, in order that he may devote himself to the service of good.[B]
[Footnote A: See Chapter VIII., p. 255.]
[Footnote B: _Ibid_.]
Now, if this view of the poet be taken in the strict sense in which he uses it in this argument, it admits of a very easy refutation. It takes us beyond the bounds of all possible human experience, into an imaginary region, as to which all a.s.sertions are equally valueless. It is impossible to conceive how the conduct of a being who is moral would be affected by absolute knowledge; or, indeed, to conceive the existence of such a being. For morality, as the poet insists, is a process in which an ideal is gradually realized through conflict with the actual--an actual which it both produces and trans.m.u.tes at every stage of the progress. But complete knowledge would be above all process. Hence we would have, on Browning"s hypothesis, to conceive of a being in whom perfect knowledge was combined with an undeveloped will. A being so const.i.tuted would be an agglomerate of utterly disparate elements, the interaction of which in a single character it would be impossible to make intelligible.
But, setting aside this point, there is a curious flaw in Browning"s argument, which indicates that he had not distinguished between two forms of optimism which are essentially different from each other,--namely, the pantheistic and the Christian.
To know that evil is only apparent, that pain is only pleasure"s mask, that all forms of wickedness and misery are only illusions of an incomplete intelligence, would, he argues, arrest all moral action and stultify love. For love--which necessarily implies need in its object--is the principle of all right action. In this he argues justly, for the moral life is essentially a conflict and progress; and, in a world in which "white ruled unchecked along the line," there would be neither the need of conflict nor the possibility of progress. And, on the other hand, if the good were merely a phantom, and evil the reality, the same destruction of moral activity would follow. "White may not triumph," in this absolute manner, nor may we "clean abolish, once and evermore, white"s faintest trace." There must be "the constant shade cast on life"s shine."
All this is true; but the admission of it in no way militates against the conception of absolutely valid knowledge; nor is it any proof that we need live in the twilight of perpetual doubt, in order to be moral.
For the knowledge, of which Browning speaks, would be knowledge of a state of things in which morality would be really impossible; that is, it would be knowledge of a world in which all was evil or all was good.
On the other hand, valid knowledge of a world in which good and evil are in conflict, and in which the former is realized through victory over the latter, would not destroy morality. What is inconsistent with the moral life is the conception of a world where there is no movement from evil to good, no evolution of character, but merely the stand-still life of "Rephan." But absolutely certain knowledge that the good is at issue with sin in the world, that there is no way of attaining goodness except through conflict with evil, and that moral life, as the poet so frequently insists, is a process which converts all actual attainment into a dead self, from which we can rise to higher things--a self, therefore, which is relatively evil--would, and does, inspire morality.
It is the deification of evil not negated or overcome, of evil as it is in itself and apart from all process, which destroys morality. And the same is equally true of a pantheistic optimism, which a.s.serts that all things _are_ good. But it is not true of a Christian optimism, which a.s.serts that all things are _working together for_ good. For such optimism implies that the process of negating or overcoming evil is essential to the attainment of goodness; it does not imply that evil, as evil, is ever good. Evil is unreal, only in the sense that it cannot withstand the power which is set against it. It is not _mere_ semblance, a mere negation or absence of being; it is opposed to the good, and its opposition can be overcome, only by the moral effort which it calls forth. An optimistic faith of this kind can find room for morality; and, indeed, it furnishes it with the religious basis it needs. Browning, however, has confused these two forms of optimism; and, therefore, he has been driven to condemn knowledge, because he knew no alternative but that of either making evil eternally real, or making it absolutely unreal. A third alternative, however, is supplied by the conception of moral evolution. Knowledge of the conditions on which good can be attained--a knowledge that amounts to conviction--is the spring of all moral effort; whereas an att.i.tude of permanent doubt as to the distinction between good and evil would paralyse it. Such a doubt must be solved before man can act at all, or choose one end rather than another. All action implies belief, and the ardour and vigour of moral action can only come from a belief which is whole-hearted.
The further a.s.sertion, which the poet makes in _La Saisiaz_, and repeats elsewhere, that sure knowledge of the consequences that follow good and evil actions would necessarily lead to the choice of good and the avoidance of evil, and destroy morality by destroying liberty of choice, raises the whole question of the relation of knowledge and conduct, and cannot be adequately discussed here. It may be said, however, that it rests upon a confusion between two forms of necessity: namely, natural and spiritual necessity. In a.s.serting that knowledge of the consequences of evil would determine human action in a necessary way, the poet virtually treats man as if he were a natural being. But the a.s.sumption that man is responsible and liable to punishment, involves that he is capable of withstanding all such determination. And knowledge does not and cannot lead to such necessary determination. Reason brings freedom; for reason const.i.tutes the ends of action.
It is the constant desire of the good to attain to such a convincing knowledge of the worth and dignity of the moral law that they shall be able to make themselves its devoted instruments. Their desire is that "the good" shall supplant in them all motives that conflict against it, and be the inner principle, or necessity, of all their actions. Such complete devotion to the good is expressed, for instance, in the words of the Hebrew Psalmist: "Thy testimonies have I taken as an heritage for ever; for they are the rejoicing of my heart. I have inclined mine heart to perform Thy statutes alway, even unto the end. I hate vain thoughts, but Thy law do I love." "Nevertheless I live," said the Christian apostle, "yet not I, but Christ liveth in me; and the life which I now live in the flesh I live by the faith of the Son of G.o.d." In these words there is expressed that highest form of the moral life, in which the individual is so identified in desire with his ideal, that he lives only to actualize it in his character. The natural self is represented as dead, and the victory of the new principle is viewed as complete. This full obedience to the ideal is the service of a necessity; but the necessity is within, and the service is, therefore, perfect freedom. The authority of the law is absolute, but the law is self-imposed. The whole man is convinced of its goodness. He has acquired something even fuller than a mere intellectual demonstration of it; for his knowledge has ripened into wisdom, possessed his sympathies, and become a disposition of his heart. And the fulness and certainty of his knowledge, so far from rendering morality impossible, is its very perfection. To bring about such a knowledge of the good of goodness and the evil of evil, as will engender love of the former and hatred of the latter, is the aim of all moral education. Thus, the history of human life, in so far as it is progressive, may be concentrated in the saying that it is the ascent from the power of a necessity which is natural, to the power of a necessity which is moral. And this latter necessity can come only through fuller and more convincing knowledge of the law that rules the world, and is also the inner principle of man"s nature.
There remains now the third element in Browning"s view,--namely, that the faith in the good, implied in morality and religion, can be firmly established, after knowledge has turned out deceptive, upon the individual"s consciousness of the power of love within himself. In other words, I must now try to estimate the value of Browning"s appeal from the intellect to the heart.
Before doing so, however, it may be well to repeat once more that Browning"s condemnation of knowledge, in his philosophical poems, is not partial or hesitating. On the contrary, he confines it definitely to the individual"s consciousness of his own inner states.
"Myself I solely recognize.
They, too, may recognize themselves, not me, For aught I know or care."[A]
[Footnote A: _A Bean-Stripe_. See also _La Saisiaz_.]
Nor does Browning endeavour to correct this limited testimony of the intellect as to its own states, by bringing in the miraculous aid of revelation, or by postulating an unerring moral faculty. He does not a.s.sume an intuitive power of knowing right from wrong; but he maintains that ignorance enwraps man"s moral sense.[B]
[Footnote B: See Chapter VIII.]
And, not only are we unable to know the rule of right and wrong in details, but we cannot know whether there _is_ right or wrong. At times the poet seems inclined to say that evil is a phenomenon conjured up by the frail intelligence of man.
"Man"s fancy makes the fault!
Man, with the narrow mind, must cram inside His finite G.o.d"s infinitude,--earth"s vault He bids comprise the heavenly far and wide, Since Man may claim a right to understand What pa.s.ses understanding."[A]
[Footnote A: _Bernard de Mandeville_.]
G.o.d"s ways are past finding out. Nay, G.o.d Himself is unknown. At times, indeed, the power to love within man seems to the poet to be a clue to the nature of the Power without, and G.o.d is all but revealed in this surpa.s.sing emotion of the human heart. But, when philosophizing, he withdraws even this amount of knowledge. He is
"a.s.sured that, whatsoe"er the quality Of love"s cause, save that love was caused thereby, This--nigh upon revealment as it seemed A minute since--defies thy longing looks, Withdrawn into the unknowable once more."[B]
[Footnote B: _A Pillar at Sebzevar_.]
Thus--to sum up Browning"s view of knowledge--we are ignorant of the world; we do not know even whether it is good, or evil, or only their semblance, that is presented to us in human life; and we know nothing of G.o.d, except that He is the cause of love in man. What greater depth of agnosticism is possible?
When the doctrine is put in this bald form, the moral and religious consciousness of man, on behalf of which the theory was invented, revolts against it.
Nevertheless, the distinction made by Browning between the intellectual and emotional elements of human life is very common in religious thought. It is not often, indeed, that either the worth of love, or the weakness of knowledge receives such emphatic expression as that which is given to them by the poet; but the same general idea of their relation is often expressed, and still more often implied. Browning differs from our ordinary teachers mainly in the boldness of his affirmatives and negatives. They, too, regard the intellect as merely human, and the emotion of love as divine. They, too, shrink from identifying the reason of man with the reason of G.o.d; even though they may recognize that morality and religion must postulate some kind of unity between G.o.d and man. They, too, conceive that human knowledge differs _in nature_ from that of G.o.d, while they maintain that human goodness is the same in nature with that of G.o.d, though different in degree and fulness. There are two _kinds_ of knowledge, but there is only one kind of justice, or mercy, or loving-kindness. Man must be content with a semblance of a knowledge of truth; but a semblance of goodness, would be intolerable.
G.o.d really reveals Himself to man in morality and religion, and He communicates to man nothing less than "the divine love." But there is no such close connection on the side of reason. The religious life of man is a divine principle, the indwelling of G.o.d in him; but there is a final and fatal defect in man"s knowledge. The divine love"s manifestation of itself is ever incomplete, it is true, even in the best of men; but there is no defect in its nature.
As a consequence of this doctrine, few religious opinions are more common at the present day, than that it is necessary to appeal, on all the high concerns of man"s moral and religious life, from the intellect to the heart. Where we cannot know, we may still feel; and the religious man may have, in his own feeling of the divine, a more intimate conviction of the reality of that in which he trusts, than could be produced by any intellectual process.
"Enough to say, "I feel Love"s sure effect, and, being loved, must love The love its cause behind,--I can and do.""[A]
[Footnote A: _A Piller at Sebzevar_.]
Reason, in trying to scale the heights of truth, falls-back, impotent and broken, into doubt and despair; not by that way can we come to that which is best and highest.
"I found Him not in world or sun, Or eagle"s wing, or insect"s eye; Nor thro" the questions men may try, The petty cobwebs we have spun."[B]
[Footnote B: _In Memoriam_.]
But there is another way to find G.o.d and to conquer doubt.
"If e"er when faith had fall"n asleep, I heard a voice "believe no more,"
And heard an ever-breaking-sh.o.r.e That tumbled in the G.o.dless deep;
"A warmth within the breast would melt The freezing reason"s colder part, And like a man in wrath the heart Stood up and answer"d "I have felt.""[A]
[Footnote A: _In Memoriam_.]
What, then, I have now to ask, is the meaning and value of this appeal to emotion? Can love, or emotion in any of its forms, reveal truths to man which his intellect cannot discover? If so, how? If not, how shall we account for the general conviction of good men that it can? We have, in a word, either to justify the appeal to the heart, by explaining how the heart may utter truths that are hidden from reason; or else to account for the illusion, by which religious emotion seems to reveal such truths.
The first requirement is shown to be unreasonable by the very terms in which it is made. The intuitive insight of faith, the immediate conviction of the heart, cannot render, and must not try to render, any account of itself. Proof is a process; but there is no process in this direct conviction of truth. Its a.s.sertion is just the denial of process; it is a repudiation of all connections; in such a faith of feeling there are no cob-web lines relating fact to fact, which doubt could break.
Feeling is the immediate unity of the subject and object. I am pained, because I cannot rid myself of an element which is already within me; I am lifted into the emotion of pleasure, or happiness, or bliss, by the consciousness that I am already at one with an object that fulfils my longings and satisfies my needs. Hence, there seems to be ground for saying that, in this instance, the witness cannot lie; for it cannot go before the fact, as it is itself the effect of the fact. If the emotion is pleasurable it is the consciousness of the unity within; if it is painful, of the disunity. In feeling, I am absolutely with myself; and there seems, therefore, to be no need of attempting to justify, by means of reason, a faith in G.o.d which manifests itself in emotion. The emotion itself is its own sufficient witness, a direct result of the intimate union of man with the object of devotion. Nay, we may go further, and say that the demand is an unjust one, which betrays ignorance of the true nature of moral intuition and religious feeling.