Callias, who had never before been present at a great sea-fight, but who had taken pains to acquire as much professional knowledge as he could, expressed his surprise to Diomedon. "How is this, sir?" he said, "how can our ships maneuver when they are packed together in this fashion?"
Diomedon, an old sailor who had been afloat for nearly forty years, smiled somewhat bitterly as he answered.
"Maneuver, my dear boy! That is exactly what we want to avoid. We can"t do it ourselves, and we don"t mean to let our enemies do it, if it can be helped. The generation that could manoeuver is gone. Five and twenty years of fighting have used it up. But, happily, we can still fight, at least such a fleet as we have got to-day, the real Athenian grit, can fight. If the weather holds fine, and I think it will for the day, though I don"t quite like the looks of the sky, we shall do well, because we shall be able to keep together."
The arrangement of the Athenian line may be very briefly described. It had two strong wings, each consisting of sixty ships, formed in four squadrons of fifteen. These wings consisted wholly of Athenian galleys; the contingents of the allies were posted in the centre, and were in single line, either because they were better sailors, or because, as being directly in front of the group of islets, they were protected by their position.
The policy of the Athenian commander was successful. Arginusae was not a battle of skillful maneuvers, but of hard fighting. Such battles are often determined by the fate of the general, and so it was that day.
Callicratidas, had that pride of valor which had often done such great things for Sparta and for Greece, but which some times resulted in immediate disaster. His sailing master, a man of Megara, had advised him to decline a battle. A rapid survey of the position, of the numbers of the enemy and of the tactics which they were evidently intending to pursue, had convinced this skillful, experienced seaman, that the chances were against him. Callicratidas would not listen to him. "If I perish," he said, "Sparta will not be one whit the worse off." It was the answer of a man who was as modest as he was brave; but it was not to the point. Sparta would be a great deal worse off if she lost not only him--and he was worth considering--but, as actually happened, nearly the half of her fleet.
The signal to advance was pa.s.sed along the line, and the admiral himself took up his place in the foremost ship. The whole fleet could see him as he stood a conspicuous figure in the lead. His stately and chivalrous presence, the feeling that a man whom it was a privilege to follow anywhere, gave, for a time, an effective encouragement. But the loss was proportionately great when that presence was removed. Early in the day his ship endeavored to ram that which carried the Athenian admiral Diomedon, itself in the van of the opposing force. Diomedon himself was at the rudder and managed his galley with remarkable skill. He avoided or rather half avoided the blow of the enemy"s boat, and this in such a way that the Spartan admiral lost his balance, and fell into the water.
Callias, who was standing on the rear of the Athenian galley, at the head of a detachment of men ready either to board or to repel boarders, endeavored to save him; but the weight of his armor was fatal. He sank almost instantaneously. His death, it is easy to believe, cost Athens even more than it cost Sparta. It would have been infinitely better for her to fall into his hands than to have to sue for terms, as she did not many months afterwards, to the less generous Lysander.
The battle lasted for several hours. About noon the weather became threatening. The wind changed to the south-west and the sea began to rise. By general consent the struggle was suspended. Both sides had fought with conspicuous valor, but there could be no doubt that the victory remained with the Athenians. Their losses were serious, nearly a fifth of their force, or to give the numbers exactly, twenty-nine ships out of one hundred and fifty. But they had inflicted much more damage than they had suffered. Out of the small squadron of Spartan ships, ten in number, nine had been destroyed; and more than sixty belonging to the various allied contingents were either sunk or taken. The fifty that remained--and there were barely fifty of them--made the best of their way either to the friendly island of Chios, or to Phocaea on the mainland. Without doubt the Athenians had won a great victory. Whether the opportunity could have been used to restore permanently the fortunes of the city, is doubtful; but it is certain that it was lamentably wasted.
FOOTNOTES:
[20] Phormion won some brilliant victories in the Corinthian gulf in the early years of the war. He died prematurely, it would seem about 429 B.
C.
[21] The number of triremes contributed by Athens to the Greek fleet of Salamis was one hundred and eighty, but this comprised, of course, literally every ship that they possessed. In the expedition against Syracuse, the triremes numbered one hundred and thirty-four.
[22] Diomedon was the officer in command of Samos, and had already attempted with the twelve ships that composed his squadron, to relieve Conon. His force was so inferior to that of the Spartans that he could only have hoped to succeed by eluding their observations. Accordingly he had avoided the harbors and endeavored to make his way up a narrow channel, known by the common name of "Euripus" (a channel with a swift current) by which Mitylene could be approached. Callicratidas, however, had discovered the maneuver and captured ten out of the twelve ships.
CHAPTER VII.
AFTER THE FIGHT.
A council of war was held by the Athenian admirals on one of the Arginusae islets as soon as they could meet after the fighting had come to an end. Callias, by Diomedon"s desire, waited outside the tent in which the deliberations were being held, and could not help hearing, so high were the voices of the speakers raised, that there was an angry argument about the course to be pursued. The intolerably clumsy system of having ten generals of equal authority was on its trial, if indeed any trial was needed, and was once more found wanting.[23] Even if the right decision should be reached, time was being wasted, time that, as we shall see, was of a value absolutely incalculable.
When at last the council broke up--its deliberations had lasted for more than an hour--and Diomedon rejoined the young officer, he wore a gloomy and anxious look.
"I am afraid," he said, "that mischief will come of this. I feel it so strongly that, though I ought not, perhaps, to tell outside the council what has been going on within, I must call you to witness. I did my very best to persuade my colleagues. "Our first business," I said, "is to save our friends. There were twenty-six ships, I said, disabled. A few were sunk on the spot; others, I am afraid, have gone down since; but more than half, I hope, are still afloat. Even where the ship is gone already, there are sure to be some of the crew who have been able to keep themselves afloat either by swimming or by holding on to floating stuff. For the sake of the G.o.ds, gentlemen,"--I give you my very words--"don"t lose another moment. We have lost too many already.
Send every seaworthy ship that you have got to the rescue of the shipwrecked. It is better to let ten enemies escape, than lose a single friend." They would not listen to me. They were bent, they said, on following up their victory, an excellent thing, I allow; but only when the first duty of making all that you have got quite safe has been performed. One of them--I will mention no names--positively insulted me.
"Diomedon," he said, "has doubtless had enough fighting for the day."
Why, in the name of Athene, do they put such lowbred villains into office. The fellow has a long tongue, and so the people elect him. I "tired of fighting" indeed? I might have some excuse if I were, for I was hard at it, when he was a thievish boy, picking up unconsidered trifles in the market-place. Well; the end of it was that we came to a sort of compromise. Forty-odd ships are to go and save what can be saved from the wrecks--the G.o.ds only know how many will be left by this time--while the rest are to make the best of their way to Mitylene, and cut off the blockading squadron."
"And you, sir?" asked Callias, "with which squadron are you to be?"
"I am to go to Mitylene, of course, after what that fellow said, I could not ask to have the other duty; but I feel that it is what I ought to be doing."
"Who is to have it, sir," said Callias.
"No one, if you will believe it," answered the admiral, with an angry stamp of the foot. "I mean no one of ourselves, of the Ten. They are all so anxious to follow up the victory, as they put it, and make a great show of taking Spartan ships, that they will not take the trouble.
Theramenes and Thrasybulus are to do it. I know that they have been in command in former years and may be supposed to be competent.
Thrasybulus, too, is trustworthy; but Theramenes--to put it plainly--is a scoundrel. You know that I don"t care about politics; I am a plain sailor and leave such things to others; but I say this, politics or no politics, a man who turns against his friends is a scoundrel.[24] I don"t know what trick he is not capable of playing. Anyhow, whether these two do the business ill or well, one of the Ten ought to go. It would be better; and I am sure trouble will come of our not going. Mind this is all in confidence. You are never to breathe a word of it, till I give you leave."
"And am I to go with you, sir?" said Callias.
"No," was the answer; "I forgot to tell you; the worry of all this put it out of my mind. You are to take the despatch to Athens."
"But the shipwrecked men"--exclaimed Callias.
"We must obey orders."
An hour afterward Callias was on his way to Athens; the storm had now increased to something like a gale. As the waves came from the south it was impossible to take a straight course for the point in view, lying as it did almost due west. Few ships in those days could keep a straight line with the wind on the quarter.[25] Indeed it was soon impossible to keep up any sail at all, nor was it safe, even if the strength of the rowers already wearied by the labors of the day, had permitted it to keep the ship broadside to the waves. Nothing remained but to put her about and drive before the wind, a sail being now hoisted again and the rowers exerting themselves to the utmost to avoid being "p.o.o.ped" by the heavy waves. Toward morning the wind moderated, but by that time the _Swallow_, for that was the name of the despatch-boat which had been told off for the service, had been driven as much as fifty miles out of her course. This would not have been of much consequence, but that the timber of the _Swallow_ had been so strained by her battle with the sea that she began to leak inconveniently, if not dangerously. Her crew, too, were now in urgent need of rest. Under ordinary circ.u.mstances, Chios, which could be seen, as the day broke, about ten miles on the right bow, would have afforded a convenient shelter; but Chios was in the hands of the enemy. The little island of Vara, lying some ten miles to the north-west, was the only alternative. Here Callias, much against his will, for he feared that his news would be antic.i.p.ated, was compelled to stop, the captains of the despatch-boat refusing to proceed, until vessel and men were better able to face the weather.
As it turned out, the delay did no harm. In fact it was the means of his reaching Athens with more speed and safety than he might otherwise have done. A day indeed was lost in doing such repairs as the imperfect resources of the little island permitted, but on the morrow, Callias set out again, and was groaning over the day that had been lost, and the very little good that the clumsy boat-builders had been able to do for him, when he found himself being rapidly overhauled by a vessel which had not long before hove in sight. Before noon he recognized the cut of the disguised _Skylark_, and at once ran up a signal which Hippocles whom he supposed to be on board would, he knew, recognize. The signal was immediately answered, and before another half-hour had pa.s.sed the _Skylark_ was along-side. After a brief colloquy it was arranged that the _Swallow_ should make the best of her way to Samos, where there was an a.r.s.enal in which she could be properly repaired and that Callias with his dispatches should take his pa.s.sage to Athens in the yacht.
Hippocles was acquainted with the general fact that the Athenian fleet had won a great victory; but he knew no details, and was eager to hear from the lips of one who had taken a part in the action. And he had much that was interesting to say to his young friend. The three weeks which he had spent in Mitylene with the blockaded squadron had not made him hopeful about the first issue of the war. He had found that Conon was not hopeful, and Conon was as able and intelligent an officer as Athens had in her service.
"This has been a stupendous effort on the part of the city," he said, "and it has saved us for a time, but it can"t be kept, and it can"t be repeated. Athens is like a gambler reduced to his last stake. He wins it; very good. But then he has to throw again; and as often as he throws, it is the same--if he loses, he loses all. And, sooner or later, lose he must. In the long run the chances are against us. We have lost our _morale_. I saw a good deal of Conon"s men when I was shut up, and I thought very badly of them; and he thinks badly, too, I know. It is only a question of time. Do you know," he went on, sinking his voice to a whisper--"and mark you, this is a thing that I should not venture to say to anyone in the world but you--I am half inclined to wish that we had been beaten in the last battle--that is, if Callicratidas had lived. A n.o.ble fellow indeed! Do you know that he let the Athenians whom he took at Methymna go on their _parole_? Any one else would have sold them for slaves."
"Well," said Callias, who was a little staggered by his friend"s view of affairs, "as your hero is drowned--mind that I quite agree in what you say of him--perhaps it is better that things have turned out as they have. And I can"t believe that our chances are as bad as you make out.
Anyhow we are better off than when I saw you last."
"I hope so; I hope so;" said Hippocles in a despondent tone, "But they might have done better. For instance, we have let the blockading squadron at Mitylene escape."
"How was that?" asked Callias. "Did you see nothing of our fleet. It was to sail northward at once."
"No--I never saw or heard of it. Now listen to what happened. On the day after the battle--though of course I knew nothing of what happened--_two_ despatch-boats came into the harbor--so at least everyone thought--and the second had wreaths on mast and stern, as if it had brought good news. And Eteonicus--he was in command of the blockading squadron--was good enough to send us a herald with the intelligence that Callicratidas had won a great sea fight, and that the whole of the Athenian fleet had been destroyed. Of course we did not quite believe that, but if only a quarter of it was true, it was not pleasant hearing. My old sailing master, who has as sharp eyes as any man I know, said to me. "My belief, sir, is that it is all nonsense about this great victory, and that the second boat was only the first _dressed up_. I observed them both particularly, and they were amazingly alike. In both the bow sides oars were just a little behind the stroke, and one of the oars, I noticed, was a new one, and not painted like the rest. And why should the man take the trouble to tell us about the victory as he calls it. If it is true, he has us safe, and can cut us up at his leisure. No, sir, I don"t believe a word of it." Well, I was not certain that the old man was right, but I strongly suspected that he was. Anyhow I was so convinced of it that I spent the whole night in getting ready; and, sure enough, the next morning the blockading squadron had slipped off, with n.o.body to hinder them."
"That was a very smart trick for a Spartan," said Callias.
FOOTNOTES:
[23] I may refer my readers to a signal instance in earlier Greek history where the same system almost led to disaster. It was only by the unusual personal influence of Miltiades, a personal influence almost unparalleled in Athenian history, that thus the ten generals were induced to fight at Marathon. There can be little doubt that, if the conflict had been delayed the pro-Persian party might have seriously hampered, if it did not altogether defeat, the efforts of the patriots.
[24] Theramenes had taken a prominent part four years before this date in the establishment of the oligarchy of the Four Hundred; finding that his own position was not such as he conceived to be suited to his merits, and having reason also to believe that the oligarchy would soon be overthrown--the fleet had declared against them--he changed sides and was the means of bringing up the condemnation of two of his own intimate friends, Antiphon and Archeptolemus.
[25] Catullus mentions it as a special excellence of his yacht that it could
"Carry its load o"er stormy seas Whether from right or left the breeze Call o"er the main, as safe and fleet Over course, as when, on either sheet With equal strength blew fair behind, With level keel the following wind."
CHAPTER VIII.
THE NEWS AT ATHENS.
The _Skylark_ excelled herself in the display of her sailing qualities.
Thanks to this, Callias, in spite of the untoward delays which had occurred on his journey, was the first to bring intelligence of the victory to Athens. The news ran like wild fire through the city, gathering, as may be supposed, a vast number of imaginary details, as it pa.s.sed from mouth to mouth, and the a.s.sembly which was called by proclamation for the next day, to hear the reading of the despatches, was, considering the empty condition of the city, most unusually crowded. No one who could crawl to the market-place was absent, and all the entrances and approaches were thronged by women, children, and slaves. The first stress of fear had been relieved, for it was known that a victory had been won; but there was still much room for anxiety.
The victory had not been gained without cost--no victories ever were--and it was only too probable that in this case the cost had been heavy. The despatch was brief and formal. It told the numbers engaged, and the order of formation, with the number of hostile vessels captured or sunk. It mentioned the fact that there had been losses on the side of the conquerors, and promised details when there should have been time to ascertain the facts.