But that I may meet this objection founded on consciousness, full in the face, I am prepared to a.s.sert, and I think prove, that man, so far from being conscious that he has by nature adequate power to serve G.o.d, is conscious of the very reverse of this. What truly awakened sinner has not a deep conviction of his utter helplessness? How many experiences of intelligent and pious Calvinists could I quote on this point? As a specimen take that of the Rev. David Brainerd, who stands high in the Church, not only among Calvinists, but among all Christians who know him. I quote a pa.s.sage from his experience quoted by Dr. Griffin: "I saw that it was utterly impossible for me to do any thing toward helping or delivering myself. I had the greatest certainty that my state was for ever miserable for all that I could do, and wondered that I had never been sensible of it before."--This pa.s.sage is very strong; too unqualified, perhaps, but it is the natural language of a weak sinner, convinced, as all must be before they _can become strong_, of their utter helplessness without grace. How fully does such a one prove the truth of Scripture, that "the _natural_ man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of G.o.d, for they are foolishness unto him, neither _can_ he know them, for they are spiritually discerned;" that "no man knoweth the Father, but the Son, and he to whom the Son shall reveal him." Hence the necessity that "the Spirit should take of the things of Jesus Christ, and show them unto them." Indeed, but for this darkness and weakness of the understanding, the penitent sinner would not feel the necessity of the agency of the Spirit: nor would it in fact be necessary. It is on this ground that the doctrine of natural ability has led to the idea of conversion by _moral suasion_. Thus it is evident that a man may be conscious of having an understanding, but at the same time be as _fully_ conscious that that understanding is too dark and weak for holy purposes, unaided by grace. The same is also true of conscience.
Experience teaches us that it often becomes languid or dead, and needs quickening. Hence the Christian often prays--
"Quick as the apple of an eye, O G.o.d! my conscience make; Awake my soul when sin is nigh, And keep it still awake."
Hence also we pray G.o.d to alarm the conscience of sinners. So also we learn from Scripture and experience that the conscience needs purging "from dead works," for the very object that we may be able "to serve G.o.d with filial fear;" we learn also that we may have "defiled consciences,"
"weak consciences," "seared consciences," &c. And here let it be noticed, that whether we understand these pa.s.sages as applying to the regenerate or unregenerate, to derived depravity or contracted depravity, the argument against the objector will in every case apply with resistless force, viz. it shows that this faculty of the soul may become so disordered as to have its original healthy action impaired, and that in this case nothing can give it its original sensibility and strength but the G.o.d who made it. If sin does disorder the conscience, it disordered Adam"s: and if he begat children in his own moral likeness, then his posterity had a similar conscience. And therefore it is necessary that, as by the offence of the first Adam sin abounded, so by the obedience of the second, grace may abound in a way directly to meet the evil.
Let us next examine the will. Are we not conscious that this also is weak? How repeatedly does the awakened sinner resolve and fail! until he becomes deeply impressed that he is "without strength!" He tries to keep the law, but cannot; for he finds that "the carnal mind is not subject to the law of G.o.d, neither indeed _can be_." Hear his complaint! and that we may be sure of taking a genuine case, let us select a Bible experience from Rom. vii; "I am carnal, sold under sin." (How much liberty to serve G.o.d has a bond slave to sin?) "That which I do I allow not; for what I would do that I do not, but what I hate that do I." "To will is present with me, but how to perform that which is good, I find not," &c. (See through the chapter.) Hear him finally exclaim, in self despair, "Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" Why, Saul of Tarsus! are you not conscious that you have understanding, conscience, and will? Why make such an exclamation? Who shall deliver you? _Deliver yourself_. No! such philosophy and such theology were not known to this writer, neither as a penitent sinner, nor as an inspired apostle. "I thank G.o.d, through Jesus Christ my Lord."--"The law of the spirit of life, in Christ Jesus, hath made me free from the law [the controlling power] of sin and death."
Should any one say that the apostle was not describing his _conversion_ here, but his experience as a Christian believer, I reply: If any thing, _that_ would make the pa.s.sage so much the stronger for my present purpose; for "if these things are done in the green tree, what shall be done in the dry?" If a saint--one who has been washed and renewed--finds nevertheless that his will is so weak as to need the continued grace of G.o.d to enable him to do the things that he would, much more is this true of the unrenewed sinner. If this account of the apostle"s experience means any thing, _it is as express a contradiction of the doctrine, that we have natural strength to serve G.o.d, as could be put into words_. And I am bold to say that this is the experience of all Christians. And it presents an argument against the doctrine of natural ability which no metaphysical reasoning can overthrow--not indeed an argument to prove that we have not understanding, conscience, and will; but to show that, having these in a disordered and debilitated state, grace is indispensable to aid them, in order to an efficient holy choice. How often soever the judgment may be brought to a preference of the Divine law, it will as often be carried away by the strength of the unholy pa.s.sions until it is delivered by the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ.
_We are conscious therefore that we have not natural power to keep the Divine law_.
3. But it is objected again, "that the Scriptures require us to use our natural faculties in the service of G.o.d;" and hence the inference is, that these faculties are adequate to this service.
It is certainly no objection to our doctrine, that the Scriptures, dealing with man as he is, require him to use his natural powers to serve G.o.d. With what other powers should he serve him? I again repeat that the question is not, whether we have _mental faculties_, nor whether man may or can serve G.o.d with these faculties, but simply whether the command to obey is given independently of the considerations of grace. We say it is not; and in proof refer to the Scriptures, which give a promise corresponding with every command, and a.s.surances of gracious aid suited to every duty--all of which most explicitly imply, not only man"s need, but also the ground on which the command is predicated. And with this idea agrees the alleged condemnation, so often presented in the Scriptures: "This is the condemnation, that light has come into the world, and men have loved darkness." "He that believeth not is condemned already." "But they grieved his Holy Spirit, therefore he is turned to be their enemy." "How shall we escape, if we neglect so great salvation." These, and many other pa.s.sages, show that the turning point of guilt and condemnation is not so much the abuse of natural powers, as the neglect and abuse of grace bestowed.
This point may be ill.u.s.trated by Christ"s healing the withered hand. He commanded the man to stretch it forth. What was the ground of that command, and what was implied in it? The ground of it was, that aid would be given him to do it; otherwise the command to stretch forth a palsied limb would have been unreasonable. And yet it was understood that the man was to have no new muscles, or nerves, or bones, to accomplish this with; but he was to use those he had, a.s.sisted, as they would be, by the gracious power of G.o.d. So man, it is true, is commanded to use his natural powers in obeying G.o.d; but not without Divine aid, the promise of which is always either expressed or implied in the command.
4. "The Scriptures ascribe no other inability to man to obey G.o.d, but that which consists in or results from the perversion of those faculties which const.i.tute him a moral agent."
It is true, the Scriptures blame man for his inability--for inability they certainly ascribe to him, and why? Because where sin abounded grace has much more abounded. That sinners are perverse and unprepared for holy obedience up to this hour is undoubtedly their own fault, for grace has been beforehand with them. It met them at the very threshold of their moral agency, with every thing necessary to meet their case. It has dug about the fruitless fig tree. It has laid the foundation to say justly, "What more could I have done for my vineyard?" If the sinner has rejected all this, and has increased his depravity by actual transgression, then indeed is he justly chargeable for all his embarra.s.sments and moral weakness, for he has voluntarily a.s.sumed to himself the responsibility of his native depravity, and he has added to this the acc.u.mulated guilt of his repeated sins.
5. It is farther objected, with a good deal of confidence, that Arminians, after all, make man"s natural power the ground and measure of his guilt, since "no part of his free agency arises from furnished grace, but it consists simply inability to use or abuse that grace, and of course in an ability distinct from, and not produced by the grace."
Let us see, however, if there is not some sophistry covered up here.
Arminians do not mean that man"s ability to use grace is independent of, and separate from the grace itself. They say that man"s powers are directly a.s.sisted by grace, so that through this a.s.sistance they have ability or strength _in those powers_ which before they had not, to make a right choice. To talk of ability to use gracious ability, in any other sense, would be absurd. It would be like talking of _strength_ to use _strength_--of _being able to be able_. This absurdity, however, appears to me justly chargeable upon the natural ability theory, taken in connection with the Scripture account of this matter. The Scriptures instruct us to look to G.o.d for strength; that he gives us "power to become the children of G.o.d;" that he "strengthens with might in the inner man, that we may be _able_," &c. This theory, however, tells us that we have an ability back of this; an ability on which our responsibility turns, and by means of which we can become partakers of the grace of the Gospel. This is certainly to represent the Divine Being as taking measures to make _ability able_, and adding power to make _adequate strength sufficiently strong_.--Such is the work of supererogation which this theory charges upon the Gospel, for which its advocates alone are answerable; but let them not, without better ground, attempt to involve us in such an absurdity. But the strongest objections, in the opinion of those who differ from us, are yet to come.
They are of a doctrinal, rather than of a philosophical character, and are therefore more tangible, and will, for this reason, perhaps, be more interesting to the generality of readers. Let us have patience, then, to follow them out.
6. _Doctrinal Objections_.--On the ground of gracious ability it is objected that, 1. "As the consequence of Adam"s fall, Adam himself and all his posterity became incapable of committing another sin." 2. "Every sinful action performed in this world, since the fall of Adam, has been the effect of supernatural grace." 3. "Man needed the grace of G.o.d, not because he was wicked, but because he was weak." 4. "The moral difference between one man and another is not to be ascribed to G.o.d." 5.
"The posterity of Adam needed no Saviour to atone for actual sin." 6.
"This opinion is inconsistent with the doctrine of grace." 7. "There can be no guilt in the present rebellion of the infernal regions." 8. "Is not this grace a greater calamity to our race than the fall of Adam?"
I have thrown these objections together, and presented them in connection to the reader, for the reason that they all rest mainly on one or two erroneous a.s.sumptions, to correct which will be substantially to answer them all.
One erroneous a.s.sumption of this writer is, that "there is no free agency to do wrong, which is not adequate to do right." This writer seems to think this a self-evident proposition, which needs no proof; for although he has used it in argument a number of times, he has left it unsustained by any thing but his naked a.s.sertion. This proposition has already been denied, and an unqualified denial is all that in fairness can be claimed by an antagonist to meet an unqualified a.s.sertion. Our object, however, is truth, and not victory. Let me request you then, reader, to look at this proposition. Can you see any self-evident proof of this a.s.sertion? If the Creator should give existence to an intelligent being, and infuse into his created nature the elements of unrighteousness, and give to his faculties an irresistible bias to sin, and all this without providing a remedy, or a way for escape, then indeed all our notions of justice would decide that such a being ought not to be held responsible. But this is not the case with any of the sinful beings of G.o.d"s moral government.--Not of the fallen angels, for they had original power to stand, but abused it and fell--not of fallen man, for in the first place his is not a created depravity; but, in the case of Adam, it was contracted by voluntary transgression when he had power to stand; and in the case of his posterity, it is derived and propagated in the ordinary course of generation: and in the second place, a remedy is provided which meets the exigencies of man"s moral condition, at the very commencement of his being. This it does by graciously preventing the imputation of guilt until man is capable of an intelligent survey of his moral condition; for "as by the offence of one, judgment came upon all men unto condemnation: even so, by the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life." And when man becomes capable of moral action, this same gracious remedy is suited to remove his native depravity, and to justify him from the guilt of actual transgression; for "if we confess our sins, he is faithful and just to forgive us our sins, and cleanse us from all unrighteousness." It does not appear, then, either from the obvious character of the proposition itself; or from the condition of sinful beings, that "the same free agency which enables a man to do wrong, will enable him also to do right." Hence it is not true that Adam, by the fall, lost his power to sin, or that there is now no sin in the infernal regions. It is true, the writer tries to sustain this idea farther, by a.s.serting that "_that_ ceases to be a moral wrong which is unavoidable; for no being can be held responsible for doing what is unavoidable." This is little better, however, than a reiteration of the former a.s.sumption. If the character and conduct of a being are not _now_, and never _have been_ avoidable, then indeed he ought not to have guilt imputed to him. But to say that there is "no moral wrong" in the case, is to say that characters and actions are not wrong in themselves, even where it would not be just to impute guilt. And this is an idea which is implied also in another part of this writer"s reasoning; for he tells us that, according to the doctrine of gracious ability "every sinful action performed in this world, since the fall of Adam, has been the effect of supernatural grace;" and that "man needed the grace of G.o.d, not because he was wicked, but because he was weak," &c. This reasoning, or rather these propositions, are predicated on the a.s.sumption, that there is no _moral wrong_ where there is no _existing_ ability to do right: in other words, that dispositions and acts of intelligent beings are not _in themselves_ holy or unholy, but are so only in reference to the _existing_ power of the being who is the subject of these dispositions and acts.
But is this correct? Sin may certainly exist where it would not be just to impute it to the sinner. For the apostle tells us that "until the law sin was in the world;" and yet he adds, "Sin is not imputed (he does not say sin does not exist,) where there is no law." The fact there are certain dispositions and acts that are _in their nature_ opposite to holiness, whatever may be the power of the subject _at the time_ he possesses this character or performs these acts. Sin is sin, and holiness is holiness, under all circ.u.mstances. They have a positive, and not merely a relative existence. And although they have not existence abstract from an agent possessing understanding, conscience, and will, still they may have an existence abstractly from the power of being or doing otherwise at the time. If not, then the new-born infant has no moral character, or he has power to become holy with his first breath.
Whether the subject of this unavoidable sin shall be responsible for it, is a question to be decided by circ.u.mstances. If a being has had power, and lost it by his own avoidable act, then indeed he is responsible for his impotency--his very weakness becomes his crime, and every act of omission or commission resulting from his moral impotency, is justly imputed to him, the a.s.sertion of our objector to the contrary notwithstanding. Hence it is incorrect to say there is now "no guilt in the rebellion of the infernal regions." It is of little consequence whether, in this case, you a.s.sume that all the guilt is in the first act, by which the ability to do good was lost, or in each successive act of sin, which was the unavoidable consequence of the first. In either case, the acts that follow are the measure of the guilt; and hence, according to the nature of the mind, the consciousness of guilt will be constantly felt, as the acts occur. For all practical purposes, therefore, the sense of guilt, and the Divine administration of justice will be the same in either view of the subject. The writer supposes the case of "a servant"s cutting off his hands to avoid his daily task," and says, "this he is to blame, and ought to be punished;" but thinks he ought not to be punished for his subsequent deficiencies. But I ask, How much is he to blame, and to what extent should he be punished? His guilt and punishment are to be measured, certainly, by the amount of wrong he has done his master--that is, by every act of omission consequent upon this act, which rendered these omissions unavoidable. Therefore he is justly punishable for every act of omission; and you may refer this whole punishment to the first act exclusively, or to all the acts separately: it amounts to the same thing in the practical administration of government and of justice. Indeed, to say that each succeeding act is to be brought up and taken into the estimate, in order to fix the quantum of punishment, is to acknowledge that these succeeding acts are sins; else why should they be brought into the account at all, in estimating guilt and punishment? Take another case. The drunkard destroys or suspends the right use of his reason, and then murders. Is he to be held innocent of the murder because he was drunk? or was the whole guilt of the murder to be referred to the act of getting intoxicated? If you say the former, then no man is to be punished for any crime committed in a fit of intoxication; and one has only to get intoxicated in order to be innocent. If you say the latter, then, as getting drunk is the same in one case as another, _every_ inebriate is guilty of murder, and whatever other crimes drunkeness _may_ occasion, or has occasioned. Is either of these suppositions correct? Shall we not rather say that the inebriate"s guilt is to be measured by the aggregate of crimes flowing from the voluntary act of drowning his reason? And so in the case before us. Instead then of saying, that on our principles "there is no guilt in the present rebellion of the infernal regions," I would say that their present rebellion is the fruits and measure of their guilt. Thus we see, that a being who has had power and lost it, is guilty of his present acts.
And by examination we shall find that by how much we enhance the estimated guilt of the first act, it is by borrowing so much from the acts of iniquity which follow. And will you then turn round and say, the acts which follow have no guilt? Why have they no guilt? Evidently because you have taken the amount of that guilt and attached it to the first act. And does this make these acts in themselves innocent? The idea is preposterous. As well may you say that the filthy streams of a polluted fountain are not impure in themselves, because but for the fountain they would not be impure; as to say that the current of unholy volitions which unavoidably flows from a perverted heart is not unholy and criminal.
Another clearly erroneous a.s.sumption of this writer is, that if it would be unjust for the Divine Being to leave his plan _unfinished_, after it is begun, the _whole_ plan must be predicated on justice, and not on grace. It is true, he has not said this, in so many words, but his reasoning implies it. For he says this scheme of gracious ability "annihilates the whole doctrine of grace." Because G.o.d, if he held man accountable, was bound to give him this ability, as a matter of justice; hence it is not an ability by grace, but an ability by justice. The whole of this reasoning, and much more, goes upon the principle, that the _completion_ of a plan of grace, after it is begun, cannot be claimed on the scale of justice, without making the whole a plan of justice. But is this true? Is not a father, after he has been instrumental of bringing a son into the world, bound _in justice_ to provide for and educate him? And yet does not the son owe a debt of grat.i.tude to that father, when he has done all this? If a physician should cut off the limb of a poor man, to save his life, is he not bound _in justice_, after he has commenced the operation, to take up the arteries and save the man from dying, by the operation. And if he should not do it, would he not be called a wanton and cruel wretch? And yet in both these cases the persons may be unworthy. The son may show much obliquity of moral principle, and yet the father should bear with him, and discipline him. The man on whom the physician operated may be poor and perverse. Here then are cases in which _justice demands that un merited favour begun should be continued_, or else what was favour in the commencement, and what would be favour in the whole, would nevertheless by its incompleteness, be most manifest injustice. Such is the state of the question in respect to the Divine administration. The whole race of man had become obnoxious to the Divine displeasure, in their representative and federal head, by reason of _his_ sin. This is expressly stated: "By the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation." "In Adam all die." In this situation we may suppose that the strict justice of the law required punishment in the very character in which the offence was committed. Adam personally and consciously sinned; and so, according to justice, he must suffer. The prospective generations of men, existing seminally in him, as they had not consciously and personally sinned, could, in justice, only experience the effects of the curse in the same character in which they sinned, viz. pa.s.sively and seminally, unless provision could be made, by which, in their personal existence, they might free themselves from the effects of sin. Now G.o.d, in the plenitude of his wisdom and grace, saw fit to make provision for a new probation for man, on the basis of a covenant of grace, the different parts of which are all to be viewed together, in order to judge of their character. In this covenant Adam had a _new trial;_ and when the promise was made to him he stood in the same relation to his posterity as he did when he sinned, and the curse was out against him. If, by the latter, the prospective generations of men were justly cut off from possible existence; by the former this existence was mercifully secured to them. If by the corruption of the race, through sin, the possibility of salvation was cut off, on all known principles of administrative justice; by the provisions of grace the possibility of salvation was secured to the whole race; and this possibility implies every necessary provision to render grace available and efficient, in accordance with moral responsibility. If "G.o.d, who spared not his own Son, but freely gave him up for us all," had not "with him also freely given us all things" necessary for our salvation, would not the Divine procedure have been characterized both by folly and injustice? If his plan of grace had only gone so far as to have given us a conscious being, without giving us the means of making that existence happy, would it not have been wanton cruelty? And yet, taking the whole together, who does not see that it is a most stupendous system of grace, from the foundation to the top-stone? Let us not then be guilty of such manifest folly, as to take a part of the Divine administration, and make up a judgment upon that, as viewed independently of the rest, and then transfer this abstract character to the whole. As in chemical combinations, though one of the ingredients taken alone might be deleterious, yet the compound may be nutritious or salutary, so in the new covenant, if we separate legal exactions and penalties from gracious provisions, the operations of the former may be unjust and cruel, yet the whole, united as G.o.d hath combined them, may be an administration of unparalleled grace. It is in this heavenly combination that "mercy and truth are met together, righteousness and peace have kissed each other."
Now, therefore, "if we confess our sins, he is faithful and _just_ to forgive us our sins," for on this ground he can be "_just_ and the justifier of them that believe." Although justice is thus involved in the system, and to leave out part of the system would be manifest injustice, yet the whole is the "blessed Gospel;" "the Gospel of the grace of G.o.d." It is objected, I know, that the idea that, but for the provisions of the Gospel, man would not have propagated his species, is fanciful and unauthorized by Scripture. The Scriptures, I grant, do not strike off into speculations about what G.o.d might have done, or would have done, if he had not done as he has. This is foreign from their design; and I am perfectly willing to let the whole stand as the Scriptures present it. But when our opponents set the example of raising an objection to what we think the true system, by pa.s.sing judgment on a part, viewed abstractly, we must meet them. On their own ground, then, I would say, the idea that man would have been allowed to propagate his species, without any provisions of grace, is altogether fanciful and unauthorized by Scripture. Will it be said, that it seems more reasonable, and in accordance with the course of nature, to suppose that he would? I answer, It seems to me more reasonable, and in accordance with the course of justice, to suppose that he would not. Whoever maintains that the personal existence of Adam"s posterity was not implied and included in the provisions of grace, in the new covenant, must take into his theory one of the following appendages;--he must either believe that the whole race could justly be consigned to personal and unavoidable wo, for the sin of Adam, or that all could be justly condemned for the sin of their own nature, entailed upon them without their agency, and therefore equally unavoidable; or he must believe that each would have a personal trial on the ground of the covenant of works, as Adam had. If there is another alternative, it must be some system of probation which G.o.d has never intimated, and man, in all his inventions has never devised. Whoever is prepared to adopt either of the two former propositions is prepared to go all lengths in the doctrine of predestination and reprobation charged upon Calvinism in the sermon that gave rise to this controversy, and, of course, will find his system subject to all the objections there urged against it. If any one chooses to adopt the third alternative, and consider all the posterity of Adam as standing or falling solely on the ground of the covenant of works, such a one need not be answered in a discussion purporting to be a "_Calvinistic_ controversy." He is a Socinian, and must be answered in another place. All that need be done here, is to show the embarra.s.sments of _Calvinism proper_, the utter futility of all its changes to relieve itself from these embarra.s.sments, unless it plunge into Pelagianism and Socinianism, or rest itself upon the Arminian foundation of gracious ability. It is on this latter ground we choose to rest, because here, and here alone, we find the doctrines of natural depravity, human ability and responsibility, and salvation by grace, blending in beautiful harmony.
Having noticed some of the erroneous a.s.sumptions on which the doctrinal objections to our theory are based, the objections themselves, I think, may all be disposed of in a summary way. We see, on our plan, that, 1.
Adam did not render himself incapable of sinning, by the fall, but rather rendered himself and his posterity incapable of any other moral exercise but what was sinful; and it was on this account that a gracious ability is necessary, in order to a second probation. 2. Sin, since the fall, has not been the result of supernatural grace, but the natural fruit of the fall; and supernatural grace is all that has counteracted sin. 3. "Man needed the grace of G.o.d," _both_ "because he was wicked,"
_and_ "because he was weak."--4. "The moral difference between one man and another is--to be ascribed to G.o.d." How any one could think a contrary opinion chargeable upon us, is to me surprising. It is more properly Calvinism that is chargeable with this sentiment. Calvinism says, Regeneration is a right choice. It says, also, that power to sin implies power to be holy; and of course we become holy by the same power as that by which we sin. And it farther says, that the power is of nature and not of grace. Now let the reader put all these together, and see if it does not follow most conclusively, that "the moral difference between one man and another is not to be ascribed to G.o.d." But, on the contrary, _we_ say the sinful nature of man is changed in regeneration by the power of the Holy Ghost. 5. "The posterity of Adam" _did_ "need a Saviour to atone for actual sin." For actual sin is the result, not of gracious power, as this author supposes, but of a sinful nature voluntarily retained and indulged. If our opponents charge us with the sentiment, that grace is the cause of the actual sin of Adam"s posterity, because we hold that grace was the cause of their personal existence, we grant that, in that sense, grace was a cause without which the posterity of Adam would not have sinned. But if this makes G.o.d the author of sin, by the same rule we could prove that G.o.d is the author of sin, because he created moral agents--and if there is any difficulty here, it presses on them as heavily as on us. But in any other sense, grace is not the cause of sin. 6. "This opinion is," as we have seen, perfectly "with the doctrine of grace." 7. "There is" _constant_ "guilt in the present rebellion of the infernal regions." 8. "This grace is a greater" _blessing_ "to our race than the fall of Adam" was a "calamity;" for "where sin abounded, grace did much more abound."
Thus I have endeavoured to _explain_, _prove_, and _defend_ the doctrine of gracious ability, a doctrine always maintained in the orthodox Church, until the refinements of Calvinism made it necessary to call it in question; and a doctrine on which, viewed in its different bearings, the orthodox Arminian system must stand or fall. I have been the more minute and extended in my remarks from this consideration; and also from the consideration that while this doctrine has of late been most violently a.s.sailed by all cla.s.ses of Calvinists, very little has been published in its defence. If the reader has had patience to follow the subject through, he is now perhaps prepared to judge whether our holy volitions are the result of a gracious ability or of natural power.
Should I find time to pursue this subject farther, it would be in place now to examine the doctrine of regeneration; in which examination the nature of inherent depravity, and of that choice which is conditional to the new birth, would be more fully noticed. "This will I do if G.o.d permit."
NUMBER XIII.
REGENERATION.
An important error in any one cardinal doctrine of the Gospel will make a glaring deformity in the entire system. Hence when one of these doctrines is marred or perverted, a corresponding change must be made in most or all of the others to keep up the appearance of consistency.
These remarks apply with special emphasis to the doctrine of regeneration. As this is a focal point, in which many other leading doctrines centre, this doctrine must of necessity give a character to the whole Gospel plan. This might be inferred _a priori_ from the knowledge of the relation of _this_ to the other parts of the Christian system, and it is practically ill.u.s.trated in the history of the Church.
There are those who believe, that by the various terms used in Scripture to express the change commonly called regeneration or the new birth, nothing is intended but some outward ceremony, or some change of opinion in matters of speculative belief or the like. Some say it is baptism, or a public profession of faith; others that it is a mere speculative renunciation of heathen idolatry, and an acknowledgment of the Christian faith; others that it is merely a reformed life; and a few maintain that it is the change that we shall undergo by death, or by the resurrection of the body. These persons, and all in fact who make the new birth something short of a radical change of heart, are obliged, for consistency"s sake, to accommodate the other doctrines to their views of regeneration. Hence they very generally deny const.i.tutional or derived depravity, the inflexibility and rigorous exactions of the Divine law, the destructive character of sin, the atonement, the supernatural agency of the Spirit upon the human heart, justification by faith, and the like. Thus a radical error on one point actually leads to _another gospel_--if gospel it may be called.
It does not come within the scope of my present design to enter into a refutation of the foregoing errors. But from the disastrous results of these errors we may infer the importance of guarding carefully and of understanding clearly the Scripture doctrine of the new birth. Even where the error is not so radical, as in the instances above alluded to, the evil may be considerable, and in some cases fatal.
The Arminians and Calvinists agree in this doctrine, in so far as that they both make it a radical change of moral nature, by the supernatural agency of the Holy Ghost. But they differ in respect to the _order_ in which the several parts of the change take place--in respect to the manner and degree of the agency of the Holy Spirit, and also in respect to the part which human agency has in the accomplishment of this change.
And in some, if not all of these points, Calvinists differ as much from each other as they do from us.
It is my present purpose to point out some of the more prominent Calvinistic modes of stating and explaining this doctrine, with the difficulties attending them: after which I shall endeavour to present and defend what we believe to be the Scripture doctrine of regeneration.
_First Theory_.--The notion that the mind is entirely pa.s.sive in this change, that is, that nothing is done by the subject of it, which is preparative or conditional, or in any way co-operative in its accomplishment, has been a prevailing sentiment in the various modifications of the old Calvinistic school. It is not indeed pretended that the mind is inactive, either before or at the time this renovation is effected by the Holy Spirit. On the contrary, it is said that the sinner is resisting with all the power of the mind, and with all the obstinacy of the most inveterate enmity, up to the very moment, and in the very act of conversion. So that the sinner is regenerated, not only _without_ his _co-operation_, but also in _spite_ of his _utmost resistance_. Hence it is maintained, that, but for the _irresistible_ influence of the Holy Ghost upon the heart, no sinner would be converted.
1. One of the leading objections to this view of conversion is, that it is inseparably connected with the doctrine of particular and unconditional election. The two reciprocally imply each other, and must therefore, stand or fall together. But this doctrine of particular and unconditional election has been sufficiently refuted, it is hoped, in the sermon that gave rise to this controversy; if so, then the doctrine of pa.s.sivity and irresistible grace is not true.
2. Another very serious difficulty which this theory of conversion has to contend with is, that the Scriptures, in numerous pa.s.sages, declare that the Spirit of G.o.d may be _resisted, grieved, quenched_, and utterly disregarded; and that the grace of G.o.d may be abused, or received in vain. The pa.s.sages to establish these propositions are so frequent that I need not stop to point them out. But if this be so, then the grace of G.o.d and the Spirit of grace are not irresistible.
3. It may be yet farther objected to this doctrine of the mind"s pa.s.sivity in conversion, that it is a virtual denial of all gracious influence upon the heart before regeneration. It has been shown in previous numbers that man was not able to comply with the conditions of salvation without grace--and that the gracious influences of the Divine Spirit are given to every sinner previous to regeneration. But there would be no necessity for this, and no consistency in it, if there are no conditions and no co-operation on the part of the sinner in the process of the new birth. Hence the advocates of this doctrine very consistently maintain that the first act of grace upon the heart of the sinner is that which regenerates him. Since then this theory conflicts with the Bible doctrine of a gracious influence anterior to conversion, it cannot be admitted.
4. This theory of regeneration removes all conditions on the part of the sinner to the removal of the power and guilt of sin. It teaches that if the sinner should do any thing acceptable to G.o.d, _as a condition_ to his conversion, it would imply he did not need converting; that such an idea, in fact, would be inconsistent with the doctrine of depravity, and irreconcilable with the idea of salvation _by grace_. And this is the ground on which the old Calvinists have so repeatedly charged us with the denial of the doctrines of grace, and with holding that we may be justified by our works.
There is something very singular in these notions respecting the necessity of _unconditional_ regeneration, in order that it may be by grace. These same Calvinists tell us that the sinner _can_ repent, and ought to repent, and that the Scriptures require it at his hand. What!
is the sinner able and obliged to do that which would destroy the whole economy of grace! which would blot out the Gospel and nullify the atonement itself? Ought he to do that which would prove him a practical Pelagian and an operative workmonger? Is he indeed, according to Calvinists themselves, required in Scripture to do that which would prove Calvinism false, and a conditional regeneration true? So it would seem. Put together these two dogmas of Calvinism. 1. _The sinner is able, and ought to repent._ 2. _The idea that the sinner does any thing toward his regeneration destroys the doctrine of depravity and of salvation by grace._ I say put these two together, and you have almost all the contradictions of Calvinism converged to a focus--and what is most fatal to the system, you have the authority of Calvinism itself to prove that every intelligent probationer on the earth not only has the ability, but is authoritatively required to give practical demonstration that the system is false!! What is this but to say, "You _can_, and you _cannot;_"--if you _do_ not, you will be justly condemned--if you _do_, you will ruin the Gospel system, and yourself with it? Where such glaring paradoxes appear, there must be something materially wrong in, at least, some parts of the system.
5. But the inconsistency of this theory is not its only, and certainly not its most injurious characteristic. In the same proportion as men are made to believe that there are no conditions on their part to their regeneration, they will be likely to fall into one of the two extremes of carelessness or despair, either of which, persisted in, would be ruinous. I cannot doubt but that, in this way, tens of thousands have been ruined. We should infer that such would be the result of the doctrine, from only understanding its character; and I am fully satisfied that, in my own personal acquaintance, I have met with hundreds who have been lulled in the cradle of Antinomianism on the one hand, or paralyzed with despair on the other, by this same doctrine of pa.s.sive, unconditional conversion. Calvinists, it is true, tell us this is the abuse of the doctrine; but it appears to me to be the legitimate fruit. What else could we expect? A man might as well attempt to dethrone the Mediator, as to do any thing toward his own conversion.
Teach this, and carelessness ensues, Antinomian feelings will follow--or if you arouse the mind by the curse of the law, and by the fearful doom that awaits the unregenerate, what can he do? Nothing! h.e.l.l rises from beneath to meet him, but he can do _nothing_. He looks until he is excited to phrensy, from which he very probably pa.s.ses over to raving madness, or settles down into a state of gloomy despair.
6. Another very decisive objection to this doctrine is, the frequent, and I may say uniform language of Scripture. The Scriptures require us to _seek--ask--knock--come to Christ--look unto G.o.d--repent--believe --open the door_ of the heart--_receive Christ_, &c. No one can fail to notice how these instructions are sprinkled over the whole volume of revelation. And what is specially in point here, all these are spoken of and urged upon us as conditions of blessings that shall follow--even the blessings of salvation, of regeneration--and as conditions, too, without which we cannot expect these blessings. Take one pa.s.sage of many--"As many as received him, to them gave he power to become the sons of G.o.d, even to them that believe on his name." If any one doubts whether "becoming the sons of G.o.d," as expressed in this text, means regeneration, the next verse will settle it--"Which were born not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of G.o.d," John i, 12, 13. The latter verse I may have occasion to remark upon hereafter; it is quoted here to show that the new birth is undoubtedly the subject here spoken of. And we are here expressly taught, in language that will bear no other interpretation, that _receiving_ Christ and _believing_ on his name are the conditions of regeneration. If there were no other pa.s.sage in the Bible to direct our minds on this subject, this plain unequivocal text ought to be decisive.
But the truth is, this is the uniform language of Scripture. And are there any pa.s.sages against these, any that say we cannot come, cannot believe, seek, &c? or any that say, this work of personal regeneration is performed independent of conditions? I know of none which will not fairly admit of a different construction. We are often met with this pa.s.sage--"It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of G.o.d that showeth mercy." See Rom. ix, 16. But whoever interpreteth this of personal and individual regeneration can hardly have examined the pa.s.sage carefully and candidly. But we are told again, it is G.o.d that renews the heart; and if it is his work, it is not the work of the sinner. I grant this; this is the very sentiment I mean to maintain; but then there may be conditions--_there are conditions_--or else we should not hear the psalmist _praying_ for this, in language that has been preserved for the edification of all subsequent generations, "Create in me a clean heart, O G.o.d, and renew a right spirit within me." This is a practical comment on Christ"s conditional salvation, "Ask and ye shall receive."
Since then this doctrine of pa.s.sive and unconditional regeneration implies unconditional election--since it is in opposition to those scriptures which teach that the Spirit and grace of G.o.d may be resisted and received in vain--since it is a virtual denial of all gracious influences upon the heart before regeneration--since it leads the abettors of the theory into gross contradictions, by their endeavours to reconcile the can and the _cannot_ of their system--since its practical tendency is to make sinners careless, or drive them to despair--and finally, since it contradicts that numerous cla.s.s of scriptures, some of which are very unequivocal, that predicate the blessings of regeneration and justification upon certain preparatory and conditional acts of the sinner--_therefore_ we conclude that this theory cannot be true.
_Second Theory_.--To avoid these difficulties, to make the sinner feel his responsibility, and to bring him into action, a new theory of regeneration is proposed. This const.i.tutes a leading characteristic of the New Divinity. It is the theory of _self-conversion_. Its advocates maintain that there is no more mystery or supernatural agency in the process of the change, called the new birth, than there is in any other leading purpose or decision of the mind. It is true, they do not wholly exclude the Holy Spirit from this work, but his agency is mediate and indirect. He acts in some undefinable way, through the truth as an instrument. The truth acts upon the mind, in the way of _moral suasion_, and the sinner, in the view and by the influence of truth, resolves to give himself up to G.o.d and to his service--and _this is regeneration_.
The preparation is of G.o.d--but the actual change is man"s own work. The G.o.d of providence reveals the truth and arranges the means for its promulgation, the Spirit of grace applies it to the understanding, the sinner looks at it, reflects upon it, and at length is persuaded to set about the work, and regenerates himself!
That we may be the better prepared to meet this hypothesis, it should be noticed that it is inseparable from the notion that all sin consists in voluntary exercise, or in other words, in a series of sinful volitions.
Regeneration is a change from sin to holiness--and hence a regenerate state is the opposite of a sinful state. If then a regenerate state is nothing more than a series of holy volitions, an unregenerate state, which is its opposite, is nothing more than a series of unholy volitions. Thus it appears that this doctrine of regeneration by the act of the will must stand or fall with the notion that all sin consists in voluntary exercise. Any argument, therefore, brought against this latter theory will bear with equal weight against this new idea of regeneration. Bearing this in mind, we are prepared to object to this doctrine,