1. That G.o.d, foreseeing the certainty of the conduct of his creatures, purposes merely to _treat them in a corresponding manner_.
2. That he, first of all, resolves _what the conduct of his creatures shall be_, and next resolves on such measures as _shall bring_ them to that conduct.
3. That, foreseeing the conduct which will certainly ensue on the different measures it is possible for him to take, he purposes to _pursue those measures which will certainly lead to the best possible results_."
"The first view is that which we understood to be advocated by Dr. Fisk, in the sermon we reviewed." The writer goes on farther to say that his objection to this is, "that it is utterly deficient"--"that it pa.s.ses over in silence all those acts of G.o.d in creation and government by which he determines character." Of course he means to say that the _sermon_ advocated a theory which left out of the question all the Divine influence in determining character. How strangely he has misunderstood the sermon, let those judge who have read it. It teaches that G.o.d hath fixed the laws of the physical and moral world: that he has a general plan, suited to all the various circ.u.mstances and contingencies of government; that G.o.d gives the sinner power to choose life; that his grace enlightens and strengthens the sinner to seek after and obtain salvation. In short, it must be obvious that no man who believes in the Divine government and in Gospel provisions can leave this influence out of his system. I will therefore venture upon the following declaration, which it is presumed Dr. Fitch cannot gainsay, namely, Dr. F. _never saw a man and never heard of a man_ that was a believer in revelation, who left out of his creed all that conduct in G.o.d which determines character. That such was not the character of my creed, the reviewer might have learned in my reply to his first review, if he could not from the sermon. In the reply it is said, "As G.o.d foresaw men would sin, he also determined upon the plan he would pursue in reference to them as sinners, and arranged in the counsels of his own infinite mind the extended concatenation of causes and effects so as to "make the wrath of man praise him," and _deduce the greatest possible good from the best possible system_."--And yet, strange to tell, in his answer to my reply, the reviewer says as decidedly as if it were an undisputed truth, "Dr. Fisk advocates the first," (meaning the first view of the Divine purposes given above.) "We brought forward the third," (meaning the third view.) "Now since the third upholds the fact of foreordination, free from the objections of Dr. F., we have succeeded in upholding the fact which Dr. F., as an Arminian, denies, and which Calvinists maintain." Whereas he ought to have said, for he had my statement for it directly before him, "Dr. Fisk advocates the third,"
and then he might have added, "Now since the third destroys the Calvinistic doctrine of foreordination, therefore in a.s.sisting Dr. Fisk to sustain the third we have succeeded in disproving the doctrine of foreordination, which Arminians deny, and Calvinists have attempted to maintain." In fact, as the reviewer says, there can be but those three views taken of the Divine purposes; and since neither I nor any other Arminian ever believed in the first, and as Dr. Fitch himself acknowledges we are directly opposed to the second, it follows that we must believe the third. But the third is the reviewer"s creed: therefore on this point he is an Arminian, or we are Calvinists.
That the reviewer"s theory on predestination is about the same with the Methodists" appears evident from the following quotations from Mr.
Wesley, in which it will be seen that not only does Mr. Wesley"s creed include all the Divine influence that goes "to determine character," but also that G.o.d "pursues measures which will certainly lead to the best possible results;" nay, that he does all that he _wisely can_ to exclude sin from the moral universe. These are points for which the advocates of the New-Haven theory strongly contend. Let them see, then, how in this matter they have identified themselves with Arminians.
"To G.o.d," says Mr. Wesley, in his sermon on Divine providence, "all things are possible; and we cannot doubt of his exerting all his power, as in sustaining so in governing all that he has made. Only he that can do all things else cannot deny himself--he cannot counteract himself or oppose his own work. Were it not for this, he would destroy all sin, with its attendant pain, in a moment. But in so doing he would counteract himself, and undo all that he has been doing since he created man upon the earth. For he created man in his own image--a spirit endued with understanding, with will or affections, and liberty, without which he would have been incapable of either virtue or vice. He could not be a moral agent, any more than a tree or a stone. Therefore (with reverence be it spoken) the Almighty himself cannot do this thing. He cannot thus contradict himself or undo what he has done. But were he to do this, it would imply no wisdom at all, but barely a stroke of omnipotence.
Whereas all the manifold wisdom of G.o.d (as well as all his power and goodness) is displayed in governing man as man--as an intelligent and free spirit, capable of choosing either good or evil."
Again. In the sermon ent.i.tled, The Wisdom of G.o.d"s Counsels: "In the moral world evil men and evil spirits continually oppose the Divine will, and create numberless irregularities. Here therefore is full scope for the exercise of all the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of G.o.d in counteracting all the wickedness and folly of men and all the subtlety of Satan, to carry on his glorious design, the salvation of lost mankind." Now let me ask the reviewer, is this leaving out all the Divine influence that determines character? Is not this maintaining that, "in view of the measures that it was possible tor G.o.d to take, he purposes to pursue those measures that will certainly lead to the best possible result?" Is Dr. Fitch ignorant of what Methodists hold to? or is he unwilling to identify himself with us? Ignorant of _my_ views he could not be, I think, after reading my reply.--Why, then, does he persist in talking of a difference where there is none?
Mr. Metcalf has taken a more correct view of the subject. After reading my reply, he says, "if you will preach this doctrine to your Methodist brethren thoroughly and forcibly, and sustain it with the strong arguments on which the doctrine rests, if they do not call it Calvinism, I will acknowledge they do not understand the term as I do. And if you will preach in the same way to Calvinists, if they too do not call it Calvinism, I will grant that even _they_ too sometimes differ about terms. If you will take this course, I think when you shall see what the doctrine will be called, the astonishment you express that it should be regarded as Calvinism will wear away." Now how surprised Mr. M. will be when he learns that we have always preached this doctrine as thoroughly and forcibly as we could, and neither Methodists nor Calvinists ever suspected it was Calvinism until he and those who believe with him incorporated it into their creed, and _for some reason_ unknown to us, called it Calvinism! And how surprised we all are to find that he who was so anxious to be heard in the Christian Advocate and Journal, for the purpose of informing Methodists what Calvinism was, and of disabusing their minds of erroneous conceptions on this subject, himself understands neither Methodism nor Calvinism!! Yet so it is, Calvinists themselves being judges. Dr. Tyler, Dr. Griffin, Dr. Woods, the author of "Views in Theology," the author or authors of the pamphlet by an Edwardian, all condemn the New-Haven theory of predestination as anti-Calvinistic, and as being essentially Arminian.
Dr. Fitch acknowledges that we agree in some of the first principles. In reply to my answer he says, "It was certainly our intention to place this contested doctrine on grounds which our Wesleyan brethren _could not_ dispute, and it gives us pleasure to find that in this we have had complete success!" There are two things a little remarkable connected with this sentiment. One is, that the writer should so express himself as to convey the idea that _he_ has traced up the subject to first principles with much care, and, to his _great satisfaction, has succeeded in convincing us_ of the correctness of his premises. Whereas it is evident from the pa.s.sages already given from Mr. Wesley, and from the universal sentiments of the Wesleyan Methodists, that the New-Haven doctors have _at length_ come on to our ground; and it gives _us great pleasure_ to find that, from _some source_, arguments in favour of our system have with them met with _complete success_. The other thing that strikes me as remarkable is, that after the reviewer had acknowledged that we were agreed in these first principles, he should immediately go on to say, as has already been mentioned, that I and the Arminians hold to the first view he has given of the three possible views that might be taken of predestination, and deny the third; when at the same time the third contains _those very first principles_ in which he says we are agreed. This looks so much like a contradiction, almost in the same breath, that I really know not what other name to give it. If these gentlemen are disposed to come into the fortress of truth, and a.s.sist us in manning our guns and working our artillery against error, we certainly can have no objection. We are fond of help. But they must pardon us if we revolt a little at the idea of their taking the lead in this business, and accounting us as mere novices who have only learned, and that too from themselves, some of the _elementary principles_. Nay, they must not wonder if we refuse outright to be crowded from our present commanding position in the fortress of truth, and to be placed in front of our own batteries, merely to give our _new allies_ an opportunity to blow us up _with our own ordnance!_
In reply to my objection to the reviewer that "it was an abuse of terms to call the _permission of sin, not hindering it_, &c, a foreordination or purpose that it shall be," &c, he has said, "If an evil, unavoidable and hateful, is allowed by the Creator to come into his kingdom, in one place and time rather than any other, and is thus _particularly disposed of_ by his providence, because it is a disposition of it the best possible, is there no purpose of G.o.d in relation to the thing? In doing his own pleasure, in this case, does he not decide on the fact of the entrance of sin into his kingdom just when and where it does?" Now I beg the reader to go over this last paragraph once more, and then say if he does not agree with me in the following sentiment, namely, there rarely occurs in any writer an instance of so complete an evasion of a contested question as is here exhibited. Is there no difference between a "purpose in relation to a thing," and the foreordaining or decreeing that the thing shall be? And pray what is meant by G.o.d"s "deciding on the fact of the entrance of sin into his kingdom?" You can make it mean almost any thing. But taking the whole of Dr. Fitch"s theory on the subject, he means to say, doubtless, that since the entrance of sin was unavoidable, G.o.d determined to restrain and control it so as to suffer it to do the least harm possible--preferring holiness in its stead in every place where it occurs. And this is foreordaining sin!! This is predestination!! Let us ill.u.s.trate this by a case in point. Cicero, a Roman consul, knew that Cataline was plotting treason against the commonwealth. Cicero perceived that this _hated treason_, though unavoidable, was not wholly unmanageable. He determined therefore to "make a disposition of it the best possible." He took his measures accordingly. By these Cataline and the princ.i.p.al conspirators were driven out of the city, and compelled, before their plans were matured, to resort to open hostilities. Thus the citizens were aroused and united, and the state saved. In this way the evils of the conspiracy were suffered to come upon the commonwealth "in one place and time rather than any other," and "were thus _particularly disposed of_" by Cicero. In this case the consul had a special "purpose about the thing."
He determined to drive the conspirators into open war, rather than suffer them privately to corrupt all they could, and then fill the city with fire and slaughter. The question now is, and it is put not to the reviewer, for he still persists in the use of his terms, but it is put to the common understanding of community, Did the Roman consul ordain or foreordain, or predestinate the treason of Cataline? If by common consent all answer, No, such a statement is a libel upon the consul; and if, in addition to this common understanding of the term, the theological use of the term will not bear such a construction; if the great body of the Calvinists of the present day, and of New-England even, use the term in a different sense, it remains to be seen how the New-Haven divines can stand up before the world and say, "We believe G.o.d hath foreordained whatsoever comes to pa.s.s."
Before closing this number I ought, perhaps, to say a few things, if not in the defence, at least explanatory of that course of reasoning in the sermon in which I undertook to show that foreknowledge is antecedent to foreordination. To this Mr. Metcalf and others have objected because, say they, G.o.d must first have determined to make moral agents before he could know they would sin: therefore his knowledge or his foreknowledge in this case must depend upon his determination. This objection, at least so far as the New-Haven theology is concerned, is founded in error. What says Dr. Fitch? "That G.o.d, _foreseeing_ the conduct which will certainly ensue on the different measures it is possible for him to take, _purposes_," &c. The sermon says, "G.o.d knows all that is, or will be, or might be, under any possible contingency," and that "his plan is the result of his infinite knowledge--the decrees of his throne flow forth from the eternal fountain of his wisdom." Where is the discrepancy here? G.o.d saw this general plan, as a whole, before he resolved upon its adoption; (I speak now of the order of thought;) he saw, if he made free moral agents, and governed them as such, sin would ensue. And he also saw what he might do in that case to counteract and overrule it to his own glory and the good of the universe.--And he judged, in his infinite wisdom, that such a moral universe, notwithstanding the sin that would certainly result from it, would, on the whole, be the best; and therefore upon this _foreknowledge_ of the whole, G.o.d _founded_ his determination to create the universe, and govern it as proposed. G.o.d"s foreknowledge of the _certainty_ of any event in this universe, it must be acknowledged, depended upon his determination to create and govern the universe. And in _this sense_ his purpose was _causa sine qua non_, a cause without which any given event would not have happened, and therefore could not have been foreseen as _certain_. But then it should be remembered that there was a foreknowledge anterior to all this, and which was, in fact, the foundation of all subsequent instances of knowing or decreeing. It is therefore true in the sense in which the sentiment is advanced and sustained in the sermon, that "G.o.d foreknows in order to predestinate, but he does not (primarily) predestinate in order to foreknow."
To conclude: from the view taken in this number it appears that one cla.s.s of Calvinists acknowledge that predestination is chargeable with all that was included in my definition of it. Another, and a rapidly increasing cla.s.s, have given up Calvinian predestination, and, in all but the name, have in that point come on to the Methodist ground. There is still another cla.s.s, who are evidently not Arminians, but still deny the correctness of my definition of their doctrine. They say they are not chargeable with such a doctrine, either directly or by inference. In the next number, therefore, an attempt will be made to sustain from their own positions this definition.
NUMBER VII.
PREDESTINATION, CONTINUED.
From my last number the reader will perceive that there are two cla.s.ses of Calvinists, so-called, with whom we have no need to contend; with one there is no cause of controversy, because they have given up the doctrine; and with the other there is no _need_ of controversy, because their plain manner of avowing the doctrine, _logical consequences and all_, renders any arguments against it unnecessary. Its character is too monstrous and abhorrent to gain much credit. There is yet another and a larger portion, who, while they reject the views both of the New-Haven divines and of the old school and Hopkinsian Calvinists, are nevertheless strongly opposed to the issue proposed in the sermon. They deny, as appears from some public intimations and many private statements, that I have given a fair representation of the doctrine.
They appear to manifest as much horror as an Arminian would to the idea, that "the responsible acts of moral agents are definitely fixed and efficiently produced by the purpose and decree of G.o.d,"--that these acts "are the result of an overruling and controlling power,"--"that the will, in all its operations, is governed and irresistibly controlled by some secret impulse, some fixed and all-controlling arrangement." Hence, I suppose, if it can be proved that these are the genuine characteristics of Calvinism, the system itself will, by many at least, be given up. At any rate, since the exception is taken to the definition of the doctrine, it may be presumed, by sustaining this, we sustain our own cause and refute the opposite. The present inquiry then is, are these, in very deed, the characteristics of absolute predestination? I shall endeavour to maintain that they are. Let the intelligent and the candid judge.
1. It may be urged as a consideration of no small weight in this question, that all but predestinarians, as well as many predestinarians themselves, have entertained these views of the doctrine. With respect to anti-predestinarians, I know of no exception; all unite, in charging these things, directly or by consequence, upon the Calvinistic system.
And will Calvinists say, this is owing to prejudice and to a want of understanding the subject? With what kind of modesty will they a.s.sume that they are free from blinding prejudice in _favour_ of their own doctrine, and all the world beside are prejudiced against it? It may be a.s.serted, as it often has been, that these doctrines are humbling to the pride of the natural heart, and this is the ground of the universal opposition to them! But this is a gratuitous a.s.sumption of what ought first to be proved, viz. that these doctrines are true; and it also exhibits a most reprehensible spirit of pride and Pharisaism--a spirit that says to a brother, "Stand by, for I am holier than thou!" There have doubtless been as many eminently pious Arminians as Calvinists, and how is it, that these men have never had this doctrine so explained to them as to be able to see it free from these charges?
But not only anti-predestinarians have universally entertained these opinions of this doctrine; even the advocates themselves have, in a great variety of instances, acknowledged the same. Mention has before been made, (in the sermon,) of the opposition raised against free will, by the Calvinists of Mr. Wesley"s day--and quotations have also been given from the early Calvinistic authors, showing how decidedly they held that G.o.d moved the will to sin, by a direct positive influence. To these we may add all the Hopkinsians of modern days, who openly acknowledge "that those scriptures which teach that G.o.d has decreed the sinful acts of men, do imply that he is the efficient cause of moral evil." (See review of my sermon in the Boston Telegraph.) It should not be forgotten, moreover, that the New-Haven divines, who have studied Calvinism all their lives, with the best opportunities for understanding it, inform us that the view of Calvinism which makes sin preferable to holiness in its stead, is unanswerably exposed to all the objections brought against it in the sermon. It is known too, that most of the Methodists in New-England, and many elsewhere, were educated predestinarians; but have revolted from the traditions of their fathers for the very reason that Calvinism is what we have described it to be.
The Universalists are almost all predestinarians, and they understand that this doctrine necessarily implies the _Divine efficiency_ in producing sin; and hence they very consistently infer that G.o.d is not angry with them, and will not punish them for being controlled by his decrees.
Suppose now an intelligent person, who knew nothing of the arguments on either side, should be informed of what is true in this case, viz. that a great portion, probably on the whole by far the greatest portion of predestinarians, and _all_ anti-predestinarians, understood the doctrine of absolute predestination, as involving directly, or by consequence, certain specified principles; but that a portion of predestinarians persisted in denying that these principles were involved in the doctrine; and suppose this intelligent person should be informed of the additional facts, that these predestinarians had tried all their skill at explanation and argument, generation after generation, but had never succeeded in the view of the other party in freeing their doctrine from these charges, nay, that they had so far failed of it, that many, very many were leaving them, and adopting the anti-predestinarian system, for the _very reason_ that they could not rid the system, in which they had been educated, from those principles which were charged upon it--and that even among those who had adhered to the old doctrine there were new modes of explaining and stating the theory, constantly springing up, until finally numbers of them _had explained themselves entirely out of the doctrine_, and into the opposite sentiment; and that very many others, by adhering to the doctrine, and following out the principles involved in it, had come to the conclusion that there was "no h.e.l.l"--no judgment, and "no angry G.o.d." Suppose, I say, this intelligent man should be informed of all these facts, and then be requested to _presume_ whether or not these contested principles were involved in the doctrine--what would be his judgment? I need not answer this question.
There is _strong_ presumptive evidence that the views in the sermon are correct.
2. Another reason for believing that this doctrine is what we have defined it to be, and involves in it the principles we have charged upon it, is drawn from the terms in which it is expressed, and the manner and circ.u.mstances in which these terms are used. The more common terms are _decree, predestination, foreordination, predetermination, purpose_, &c.--These are all authoritative terms, and carry with them the idea of absolute sovereignty. But lest they should not be sufficiently strong and imperious, they are, in this theory, generally accompanied by some strong qualifying terms, such as _sovereign decree, eternal and immutable purposes;_ and without any reference to other bearings, the whole is placed on the ground of G.o.d"s absolute and sovereign will.
These sovereign decrees, however, are not proposed to his subjects in the light of a law enforced by suitable sanctions, and liable to be broken. They are the _secret counsels_ of his own will; and so far from being law, that often, perhaps oftener than otherwise, in the moral world, they are in direct opposition to the precepts of the law. When these decrees come in contact with the law they supersede it. Laws may sometimes be broken, the decrees, never. G.o.d commits his law to subordinate moral agents, who may break or keep them; but his decrees he executes himself. It should also be understood that the advocates of this theory, in their late controversy with Dr. Taylor, strenuously maintain that sin, wherever it occurs, is preferable to holiness in its stead, and is the _necessary means_ of the _greatest good_. The idea that G.o.d, foreseeing what moral agents would do, under all possible circ.u.mstances, _so ordered his works_ as to take up and incorporate into his plan the foreseen volitions of moral agents, and thus const.i.tute a grand whole, as perfect as any system which involves a moral government could be, they discard as rank Arminianism. Now is it possible that decrees like these, concealed in the eternal mind of him that conceived them--dependent solely on Almighty power to execute them, not modified by subordinate agencies, but made to control these agencies with absolute and arbitrary sway; can it be _possible_, I say, that such decrees do not efficiently control and actuate the human will? Must not he who, in this manner, forms and executes the general plan, also form and execute all its parts? Must not he who gives the first impulse to this concatenation of events, linked together by his eternal purposes, follow up the whole with his continued and direct agency, and carry on this work in every mind and through every emotion? Most a.s.suredly he must. His is, undoubtedly, according to this doctrine, that operative, controlling and propelling energy that
"Lives through all life, extends through all extent, Acts undivided, operates unspent."
And that we may be sure not to misrepresent the Calvinists on this subject, let them speak for themselves. Dr. Hill, who is a modern, and is reputed a moderate Calvinist, says:--"The Divine decree is the determination to _produce_ the universe, that is, the _whole series_ of _beings_ and _events_ that was then future." Dr. Chalmers, who has been esteemed so moderate a Calvinist, that some had doubted whether he had not given up absolute predestination altogether, comes out in his sermon on predestination in the following language:--"Every step of every individual character, receives as determinate a character from the hand, of G.o.d, as every mile of a planet"s...o...b..t, or every gust of wind, or every wave of the sea, or every particle of flying dust, or every rivulet of flowing water. This power of G.o.d knows no exceptions: it is absolute and unlimited. And while it embraces the vast, it carries its resistless influence to all the minute and unnoticed diversities of existence. It _reigns_ and operates through all the secrecies of the inner man. It gives birth to every purpose, it gives impulse to every desire, it gives shape and colour to every conception. It wields an entire ascendancy over every attribute of the mind; and the will, and the fancy, and the understanding, with all the countless variety of their hidden and fugitive operations, are submitted to it. It gives movement and direction through every one point of our pilgrimage. At no moment of time does it abandon us. It follows us to the hour of death, and it carries us to our place, and to our everlasting destiny in the region beyond it!!!" These quotations need no comment; if they do not come up to all we have ever charged upon this doctrine, there is no definite meaning in words.
But we have another authority on this subject, which bears more directly on the Calvinists of this country, the a.s.sembly"s Catechism. Dr. Fitch, who is certainly as well qualified to judge in this matter as another man, informs us, through the medium of the Christian Spectator, that "the articles of faith prepared by that body, (the a.s.sembly of English and Scotch divines at Westminster,) are considered as expressing essentially the views not only of the Presbyterian Church in this country, but also of the orthodox Congregational Churches of New-England." It is known, also, that the Shorter Catechism has been almost universally used by them in their families, and in the religious instruction of their children. Here then we have a standard of faith, which all the _cla.s.ses_, I suppose, will acknowledge,--and what saith it? After stating that the decrees of G.o.d are his eternal purpose, according to the counsel of his own will, whereby, for his own glory, he hath foreordained whatsoever cometh to pa.s.s, it goes on to say, "G.o.d _executeth_ his decrees in the works of creation and providence," and then for farther explanation adds--"G.o.d"s works of providence are his most holy, wise, and powerful, preserving and governing all his creatures and all their actions." This is certainly an awkward sentence, if I may be allowed to say this of the productions of an a.s.sembly which has been characterised as a paragon of excellency in erudition and theology. Its meaning, however, according to grammar and logic, must be, that by his acts of providence G.o.d, in a most holy, wise, and powerful manner, preserves and governs both all his creatures, and all their actions. But as it seems to be a solecism to talk about _preserving actions_, we will understand _preserving_ to belong to _creatures_, and _governing_ to _actions_, and then it will be thus: G.o.d powerfully preserves all his creatures, and powerfully governs all their actions: and it is in this way he _executes_ his decrees. There are evidently two methods of governing. That control which is made up of legal precepts, and sanctions, and retributions, is called a government; not that all the subjects of such a government always obey its ordinances, but if they violate them, they are subjected to punishment. _This_ is evidently not the kind of government that the a.s.sembly contemplated. It was a government by which G.o.d _executed his decrees;_ but, as we have seen, his decrees are not his laws, for they are frequently in direct opposition to his laws. Decree and law are not only frequently opposed, in respect to the moral action demanded by each, but even where those demands are coincident they differ greatly in the _manner_ and _certainty_ of their fulfilment. Of course government, by _executing decrees_, is another thing altogether from government by _executing laws_. But there is another kind of government. It is that _efficient control_ of a superior, by which a being or an act is _made to be what it is_, in opposition to _non-existence_, or a _different existence_.
Now this appears to be precisely the kind of government alluded to when it said, "G.o.d _executes his decrees_ by powerfully _governing_ all the actions of his creatures." That is, he efficiently produces and controls all the responsible volitions, good and bad, of the moral universe. And what is this, but affirming all that the sermon has affirmed on this subject? If any one is disposed to deny that this is a fair exposition of the Catechism, let him reflect that as he cannot pretend that _government_ here means a _legal administration_, it will be inc.u.mbent on him to show what other fair construction can be put upon it than the one given above; to show how G.o.d can execute a secret decree, by his own powerful act, in any other way than in the one already explained.
In corroboration of the foregoing views it should also be borne in mind, that the Calvinists uniformly use these very same terms, _decree, predestination_, &c, in the _same sense_, in reference to _all events_.
They say, G.o.d"s decrees extend to all events, physical and moral, good and evil, by which they must mean, if they mean any thing intelligible, that his predestination bears the same relation to all events. If then his decree of election embraces the means to the accomplishment of the end, so also must his decree of reprobation. If his decree of election requires for its accomplishment an _efficient_ operation, so also does his decree of reprobation. If Divine agency is directly and efficiently, requisite to produce a good volition, it must follow that it is in the same sense requisite to produce a sinful volition.
To tell us a thousand times, without any distinction or discrimination, that all things are _equally_ the result of the Divine decree, and then tell us that the relation between G.o.d"s decree and sin is essentially different from the relation existing between his decree and holiness, would certainly be a very singular and unwarrantable use of language.
How then, I inquire, does G.o.d produce holy volitions?--Why, say the Calvinists, by a direct, positive, and efficient influence upon the will, and in proof quote--"Thy people _shall_ be willing in the day of thy power." Well, how, I ask again, does G.o.d execute his decrees respecting unholy volitions? Consistency requires the same reply. But, says the Calvinist, he need not exert the same influence to produce unholy volitions, because it is in accordance with the nature of sinful men to sin. Indeed! and is not this _nature_ the result of a decree? It would seem G.o.d approaches his work of executing his decree _respecting sin_, either more reluctantly or with greater difficulty, so that it requires two steps to execute this, and only one the other. It is in both cases, however, equally his work. This will be seen more clearly if we turn our attention to the first sin; for it is certainly as much against a perfectly holy nature to commit sin, as it is against an unholy nature to have a holy volition. Hence the one as much requires a direct and positive influence as the other, and therefore the pa.s.sage in the 110th Psalm, if it applies at all to a positive Divine influence in changing the will, must have a much more extensive meaning, than has been generally supposed. It should be paraphrased thus:--Not only shall thy elect people, who are yet in their sins, and therefore not yet in a strict and proper sense thine, be made willing to become holy in the day that thou dost efficiently change their will, but also thy angels and thy first created human pair, who were before their fall more truly thine, as they were made perfectly holy, shall be made willing to become unholy in the day that thou dost efficiently change their wills from submission to rebellion. For if Divine efficiency is necessary to make a naturally perverse will holy, it is also necessary to make a naturally holy will perverse.
I am aware that we may be met here by this reply, that although G.o.d does efficiently control the will, still it is in a way suited to the nature of mind, and consistent with free agency, because he operates upon the mind through the influence of moral suasion, or by the power of motives.
To this it may be answered, that the Calvinists generally condemn Dr.
Taylor"s views of conversion, because they suspect him of holding that motives alone convert the sinner; whereas they deem it necessary that the Holy Spirit should act directly upon the will; if so, then, as I have shown above, it is also necessary that there should be a direct Divine influence upon the will of a holy being, to make him sinful. And this more especially, since both changes are decreed, and both stand in the same relation to the Divine purpose. But this doctrine of motives leads me to another argument, viz.
3. That the view I have taken of predestination is correct, appears evident from the Calvinistic doctrine of motives, especially when this doctrine is viewed in connection with the Calvinistic theory of depravity.
The doctrine of motives I understand to be this, that "the power of volition is never excited, nor _can be_, except in the presence and from the excitement of motives," (see "Views in Theology,") and that the mind must necessarily be swayed by the strongest motive, or by what appears to the mind to be the greatest good. Dr. Edwards, following Leibnitz, incorporated this doctrine of philosophical necessity with the Calvinistic theology. In this he has been followed by a great portion, I believe, of the Calvinistic clergy. Without stopping here to attempt a refutation of this theory, my present object is to show that it necessarily fastens upon Calvinism the charges brought against it, and sustains the definition that has been given to predestination. For since G.o.d creates both the mind and the motives, and brings them together for the _express purpose_ that the former should be swayed by the latter, it follows conclusively that G.o.d _efficiently_ controls the will, and produces all its volitions. And this is according to express Calvinistic teaching:--"G.o.d," says the author of "Views in Theology," already quoted, "G.o.d is the determiner of perceptions, and perceptions are the determiners of choices." The inference therefore is plain and unavoidable, _G.o.d is the determiner of choices_. The plea that G.o.d does not produce volitions, by a direct influence, but indirectly, through second causes, avails nothing. Although there should be ten, or ten thousand intermediate links, if they are all arranged by our Creator in such order as to produce the intellectual vibration intended, whenever he pleases to give the impulse, what is the difference? In point of efficient agency, none at all. Nor yet will it alter the case to say, that "this effect is produced by G.o.d through such a medium as is suited to the nature of the mind, and therefore it cannot be said, that G.o.d does any violence to the will, or to man"s free agency." G.o.d created the _mind_, and the _means_ that were to influence it. He gave to mind its nature, and to motives their influence and arrangement, for _this very purpose_. Hence, unless man can unmake himself, he is _bound by the law of his nature_ to act in all cases as he does. Why talk about a _free_ agency when it is such an agency as _must_, by _the const.i.tution_ of _G.o.d_, lead inevitably to sin and ruin! That old, and in the premises, foolish reply, that man could do differently, _if he chose_, does not help the case. It is only saying, the nature of man is such that it is governed by his perceptions, and since "G.o.d is the determiner of perceptions, and perceptions the determiners of choices," whenever G.o.d pleases to alter the perceptions so as thereby to change the choice, _then_, and not before, man can do differently. According to this doctrine is it possible, according to the very nature of mind, for the choice to be different until the perceptions are changed? And can the perceptions be changed, until G.o.d changes them? To answer either or both of these questions in the affirmative, would be to give up the doctrine of motives. To answer them in the negative, would be to entail upon the doctrine all that I have charged upon it. The advocates of the theory may have their choice. Nor yet, again, will it destroy the force of this argument, to say "man has an _unholy nature;_ and this is the reason why the motives presented influence him to sin; therefore the guilt is chargeable upon himself, and G.o.d is clear." For, in the first place, this would not account for the first unholy volitions of holy angels and the first human pair.
This argument presupposes that, but for the consideration of man"s _unholy nature_, the charge against the Calvinistic theory would be valid. And inasmuch as here are cases in which the argument obviously affords no relief to the system, it follows that in these uses, at least, G.o.d is the efficient and procuring cause of unholy volitions--and therefore the charges against predestination are established. But by a little farther attention we shall see that this argument affords as little relief to the system in the case of man as he now is. For this first sin, which was itself the necessary result of the Divine arrangement and of positive Divine influence, threw, if possible, a stronger and a more dire necessity over all the coming generations of men. For this act entailed upon man a depraved heart. Hence this corrupt nature came upon man without his knowledge or agency. We trace it back then, thus:--Man"s love of sin was produced by the unholy choice of the first pair--that choice was produced by perceptions--these perceptions were produced by motives--and these motives were brought by G.o.d to bear upon the minds which he had made for this very purpose--therefore G.o.d, by design, and because he purposed it, produced our corrupt nature; and then, for the express purpose of leading that unholy nature to put forth unholy volitions, he brings those motives to bear upon our minds, which, from the unavoidable nature of those minds, _must produce_ the sin designed. It is thus that, according to his theory, our Creator binds the human mind by the strong cords of depravity with one hand, and with the other lashes it, by the maddening scourge of motives, into all the excitement of unholy delirium; and then, for his own glory, consigns the sinner over to the prison house of wo!! Turn this system, then, as you will, you find this doctrine of predestination binding the human mind, and efficiently producing all the volitions of the moral universe. The strong arm of Jehovah not more directly and irresistibly moves and binds the planets in their orbits, than it moves and controls, in the mysterious circle of his eternal decrees, "all the actions of all his creatures."
I know, as a closing argument, it is urged, whatever may be our inferences, we all know that we are free, and that we are responsible, because _we are conscious of it_. This is a most singular course of reasoning, and seems to have been adopted to reconcile contradictions.
If this doctrine be true, I am not _sure_ that I am free, and that I am responsible merely because I feel that I am. I am at least _quite_ as conscious that I ought not to be held responsible for what is unavoidable, as I am that I am possessed of moral liberty. Break down my consciousness in one case, and you prepare the way for me to suspect it of fallacy in another. And if I must give up my consciousness, between two alternatives I will choose that which will not involve the government of G.o.d in injustice, and myriads of intelligent beings in unavoidable perdition. Hence, with Dr. Edwards" premises, which he holds in common with Lord Kaimes, I would come to his lordship"s conclusion, viz. that G.o.d never intended to hold men responsible, and the universal feeling of responsibility is a kind of pious fraud--a salutary delusion, imposed as a check and restraint upon man here, but to be followed by no unpleasant consequences either here or hereafter. But this would be charging our Creator with both deception and folly--deception in the delusive consciousness of responsibility, and folly in suffering Lord Kaimes and others to disclose the secret, and frustrate the Divine purpose! This cannot be. The charge of deception and of fallacy, therefore, must be rolled back from consciousness and from the throne of G.o.d upon the doctrine of predestination. And if the reaction should crush the theory for ever, it would doubtless be a blessing to the Church and to the world.
To conclude. For the reasons given, I must still maintain that the charges contained in the sermon against that modification of Calvinism I am now opposing, are just; and the definition a.s.sumed, is correct. If the advocates of the system can clear themselves, or their doctrine, let it be done. If not, let one of two courses be pursued--either let the system be abandoned, or _let us have it as it is_.
I have dwelt the longer on this subject, because I am weary, and I believe we all are, of hearing the oft-repeated complaint, "You misrepresent us!" "You mistake our doctrine!"
In the next No., by the leave of Providence, the nature of human agency, and the ground of human responsibility, will be examined.
NUMBER VIII.
MORAL AGENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY.
BY what has been said on the theory of Calvinistic predestination, it will be seen, I think, that this system involves such necessity of moral action as is incompatible with free agency. It is possible, I grant, to give to the terms _will, liberty, free agency_, such a definition as will make these terms, _thus defined_, compatible with the other peculiarities of the Calvinistic system.--Both parties agree that man is a free moral agent; both maintain that he is responsible; but we maintain that what the Calvinists call free moral agency, is not such in fact as is commonly understood by the term, nor such as is requisite to make man accountable. Here, therefore, we are again thrown back upon our definitions, as the starting point of argument. What is that power, or property, or faculty of the mind, which const.i.tutes man a free moral agent? It is the power of choice, connected with liberty to choose either good or evil. Both the _power_ and _liberty_ to choose either _good_ or _evil_ are requisite to const.i.tute the free agency of a probationer. It has been contended that choice, though from the condition of the moral agent it must of necessity be exclusively _on one side_, is nevertheless free; since it implies a _voluntary_ preference of the mind. Hence it is contended that the fallen and the holy angels, glorified and lost human spirits, though some of these are confined in an impeccable state, and the others have a perpetual and invincible enmity to good, are nevertheless free agents. With respect to the free agency of these beings, a question might be started, whether it is such as renders them responsible for their _present acts_, the decision of which might have some bearing on the subject under investigation; but not such bearing as would make it important to discuss it here. If they are responsible for their _present acts_, it must be on account of a former probation, which by sin they have judicially forfeited. Or if any one thinks otherwise, and is disposed to maintain that a being who is not, and _never was_ so circ.u.mstanced as to render the choice of good possible to him, is nevertheless a free moral agent, in any such sense as renders him accountable, with such a sentiment at present I have no controversy. Indeed such an opinion is so violent an outrage upon all the acknowledged principles of justice, that to controvert it would be a work of little profit.
It is certain that the moral standing of those angels and men whose states are now unalterably fixed, differs materially from their probationary state; and this difference renders their moral agency unsuited to ill.u.s.trate the agency of beings who are on probation. Man, in this life, is in a state of trial; good and evil are presented before him as objects of choice; and upon this choice are suspended eternal consequences of happiness or misery. Of a being thus circ.u.mstanced, it is not enough to say he is free to choose as he does, unless you can say, also, he is equally free to make an opposite choice.--Hence, in defining the free agency of man, as a probationer, we say, as above, that it implies a power of choice, with full liberty to choose either good or evil.
The foregoing definition, at first view, seems sufficient for all practical purposes, and so indeed it would have been, if a speculative philosophy had not thrown it into the alembic of metaphysics for decomposition and a.n.a.lysis. It is doubtful whether this process has subserved the cause of truth; nay, it is certain, I think, that it has produced many perplexing refinements and speculations that have greatly aided the cause of error. Into these abstrusities, therefore, it seems necessary to follow this question, to try, if possible, to draw out and combine the elements of truth.
Having defined free agency to mean _the power of choice_, &c, it is asked again, _What is this power of choice?_ It is probable that the different answers given to this question const.i.tute the fundamental differences between Calvinists and Arminians. To the above question some, like the reply of the Jews to Christ, have said, "We cannot tell."
And they give this evasive reply perhaps for a reason similar to that which influenced the Jews; they fear that a definite answer will involve themselves or their theory in difficulty. This is a very convenient way to avoid responsibility, but not indicative of much fairness, or confidence in their cause. When men have involved their system in apparent contradictions, it will hardly satisfy the candid inquirer after truth to see them start aside from the very point that is to give character to their whole system. We are told by men who reason upon foreknowledge, &c, that "G.o.d hath decreed whatsoever comes to pa.s.s;" and then we are told that all men are free, and they enter into a great deal of metaphysical speculation about foreknowledge, the nature of voluntary action, &c, to prove these positions; but when they are pressed upon this point, "How can you reconcile with free agency that kind of Divine efficiency necessary to secure the execution of the decrees, and that kind of dependency of moral agents which this efficiency implies?" the reply is, "We cannot tell--the how in the case we cannot explain." This evasion might be allowable, perhaps, in either of the two following cases: 1. If the apparent discrepancy of the two positions grew out of what is _mysterious_, and not of what is _palpably contradictory;_ or, 2. If both propositions were so _clearly proved_, that it would do greater violence to our reasons, and be a greater outrage upon all acknowledged principles of belief, to disbelieve either of them, than it would to believe them with all their apparent contradictions. With respect to the first alternative, it appears to me, and doubtless it would so appear to all whose prejudices did not mislead the mind, that the want of apparent agreement between the two is not for lack of light in the case, but from the natural incongruity of the things compared.
When you say, "G.o.d executes his decrees by efficiently controlling the will of man," and say also, "The mind of man is free," both these propositions are clear; there is nothing mysterious about them. But you say, perhaps, "The mystery is in the want of light to see the _agreement_ of the two; we cannot _see_ their agreement, but we should not therefore infer that they do not agree." I answer, What is light, in this case, but a clear conception of the propositions? This we have, and we see that they are, _in their nature_, incompatible; and the more light you can pour upon this subject, the more clearly must this incompatibility appear. If you say that "perhaps neither you nor I fully understand the meaning of these propositions;" then I reply, _We have no business to use them_. "Who is this that darkens counsel by words without knowledge?" And this is what I have already complained of; men will reason themselves into propositions which they call doctrinal facts, but which seem to the eye of common sense to have all the characteristics of contradictions, and when we urge these contradictions in objection, the objection is not allowed to have any weight, because we do not fully understand the propositions. So then the propositions must be received, _though we do not understand them!_ and though, as far as we do understand them, they are obviously incompatible!! Is this the way to gain knowledge, and to make truth triumphant? How much more consistent to say, Since it is evident the mind is free, and since the doctrine of predestination is apparently incompatible with that freedom, therefore this doctrine should be exploded!
Or will this second alternative be resorted to? Will it be said that both of these propositions are so clearly proved, that to deny them would do greater violence to our reasons, and the principles of belief, than to acknowledge them, notwithstanding their apparent incongruity?