As you would expect, the internal structure of the Navy variant will be strengthened in order to handle the loads a.s.sociated with catapult launches and arrested landings. There will be a carrier-suitable tailhook, though this may not have to be as strong as on previous naval aircraft, because the JSF will be powered by the same Pratt & Whitney F119-PW-100 turbofan planned for use on the USAF F-22A Raptor. This engine has a "2-Dimensional" nozzle (it will rotate in the vertical plane), which will allow it to have much lower landing approach speeds than current carrier aircraft, and may allow the next generation of carriers (CVX) to do away with catapults altogether.
The Navy"s need for survivability means that the JSF design will have a level of stealth technology comparable with the F-22 or B-2 stealth designs, which are the current gold standard in that area. All ordnance will be internally carried, and plans are for it to carry two 2,000-lb/909.1-kg-cla.s.s weapons in addition to an internal gun and AAMs Boeing and Lockheed Martin are scheduled to conduct a fly-off of their competing JSF designs in the year 2000, with a contract award the following year. The Boeing model is known as the X-32, while the Lockheed Martin design has been designated X-35. The winning entry should become operational sometime around 2010, at which time it will begin to replace the remaining F/A-18C/D aircraft in service. This is a make-or-break program for all the armed services of the United States. If it works, then the U.S. and our allies will have the pre-eminent strike fighter of the 21st century at their command.
The Future: Common Support Aircraft While fighters and strike aircraft are important, the various support aircraft like the S-3 Viking and E-2 Hawkeye play equally vital roles in a CVW. And like fighters, they will someday have to be replaced. While this is not going to happen soon, planning for what will be known as the Common Support Aircraft (CSA) is already underway. This aircraft will take over the AEW, COD, ESM/SIGINT, and perhaps even tanker roles currently handled by no less than three different airframes. As always, funding is a problem. Right now, there is very little money available for the development of a new medium-lift airframe that could be made carrier-capable. In current-year dollars, it would probably cost something like $3 billion just to design and develop the airframe. And the price of the various mission equipment packages for each role is anybody"s guess.
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An artist"s concept of an AGM-84 SLAM-ER cruise missile. The SLAM-ER is headed into production, and will be the long-range strike weapon for naval aviation into the 21st century.
BOEING MISSILE SYSTEMS.
One likely way around this dilemma might involve adapting for the Navy the new V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor transport currently entering production for the USMC and USAF. A V-22-based CSA could eliminate much of the airframe development costs and allow the design of state-of-the-art mission-equipment packages. It might even replace the SH-60Rs and CH-60"s when they begin to wear out.
The Future: Bombs and Missiles With the introduction of GPS-guided air-to-ground ordnance and improved versions of a number of older PGM systems, the era of Navy aircraft dropping and firing unguided ordnance is dead.62 In Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia, for example, something like 70% of the weapons expended in that short but effective air campaign were PGMs. This percentage is likely to rise in future conflicts. What follows is a quick look at the programs that are important to naval aviators. In Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia, for example, something like 70% of the weapons expended in that short but effective air campaign were PGMs. This percentage is likely to rise in future conflicts. What follows is a quick look at the programs that are important to naval aviators.
AGM-84E SLAM Expanded Response Missile As mentioned earlier, the engineers at Boeing Missile Systems have been working on an improved version of the AGM-84E SLAM missile, which they call SLAM Expanded Response (SLAM-ER). SLAM-ER is designed to add a new generation of technology to the solid foundation laid by Harpoon and SLAM. This new missile will give the Navy a standoff strike weapon with unprecedented lethal power and accuracy. Improvements to the basic SLAM include a pair of "pop-out" wings (similar to those on the TLAM), which will give it more range (out to 150 nm/278 km) and better maneuverability. A new warhead utilizes the same kind of reactive t.i.tanium casing used on the Block III TLAM, while its nose has been modified with a new seeker window to give the seeker a better field-of-view. The guidance system of SLAM-ER incorporates a new software technology developed by Boeing and the labs at Naval Weapons Center at China Lake, California. Known as Automatic Target Acquisition (ATA, also known as Direct Attack Munition Affordable Seeker-DAMASK), it allows the SLAM-ER seeker to automatically pick out a target from the background clutter. The seeker then "locks" it up and flies the missile to a precise hit (within three meters/ten feet of the planned aimpoint). The SLAM-ER is already in low-rate production and has pa.s.sed all of its tests with flying colors. In fact, this program has become so successful that the Navy has deleted its funding for the planned Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (Ja.s.sAM), since SLAM-ER completely meets the requirements for that. Current plans have SLAM-ER entering the fleet in 1999.
A testing version of the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) guided bomb. JDAM utilizes GPS technology to guide it within just a few yards/meters of the aimpoint.
BOEING MISSILE SYSTEMS.
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GBU-29/30/31/32 Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) Guided Bomb Family One key limitation of the current generation of LGBs and Imaging Infrared (IIR)-guided PGMs is that they do not perform well in poor weather. Water vapor and cloud cover are the enemies of these weapons and targeting systems, and have proven to be significant roadblocks to their employment. What airpower planners need is a family of true, all-weather PGMs. Creating this is the goal of the joint USAF/USN/USMC Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) program, which will go into service in 1999.
Now being developed by Boeing Missile Systems (formerly McDonnell Douglas Missile Systems), JDAM is designed to be a "strap-on" guidance kit, compatible with a variety of different bomb warheads. JDAM will be equipped with a GPS guidance system and control fins, which can fit around a conventional Mk. 83 (1,000-lb/454 kg), Mk. 84 (2,000-lb/909-kg), or BLU-109 (2,000 lb/909 kg) bomb. Since the JDAM will take its guidance from the constellation of GPS satellites in orbit around the earth, all you"ll need to designate a target will be the sixteen-digit numeric code that represents the target"s geographic location on the earth"s surface.
As currently planned, there will be four separate versions of the Phase I JDAM family. They include: [image]
An F/A-18C Hornet armed with four AGM-154A Joint Standoff Weapons (JSOWs) during a test flight. JSOW is one of a family of precision-strike weapons guided by the NAVISTAR GPS satellite navigation system.
RAYTHEON STRIKE SYSTEMS.
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The majority of the JDAM acquisition will be composed of kits for the GBU-31 and -32 versions. These are sized to fit around both Mk. 83/84 general-purpose bombs, as well as BLU-109/110 penetration warheads. So far, the program is proceeding well in tests, and has proved to be quite accurate. The specified thirteen-meter/forty-three foot-accuracy (six meters/ twenty feet when the new Block IIR GPS satellites are put into service) is regularly being beaten in drop tests, and JDAM should come into service on schedule. At a price of only about $15,000 over the price of the bomb, JDAM is going to be quite a bargain. It needs to be, since current plans have the American military alone buying over 87,000 JDAM kits over the next decade or so. One intriguing question about JDAM is whether or not it will be fitted with an ATA-type seeker to enable it to hit really precise targets. While an ATA seeker would only add another $15,000 to the cost of each kit, the accuracy would narrow to less than three meters/ten feet-as good as the Paveway III LGBs in service today. I would expect that you would see an ATA-based seeker deployed on JDAM by 2003.
AGM-154 Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) Well on its way into active service, the AGM-154 Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) is intended to be a munitions "truck" able to carry a variety of weapons and payloads.63 Designed to glide to a target with guidance from an onboard GPS/INS system, it can deliver its payload with the same accuracy as a JDAM bomb. The initial AGM-154A version is armed with BLU-97 Combined Effect Munitions (CEMs), while the -B model will carry BLU- 108 Sensor Fused Weapons (SFWs) for attacking armor and vehicles. There are also plans for a -C model for the Navy, which will have a 500-lb/226.8-kg Mk. 82/BLU-111 unitary warhead as well as a man-in-the-loop data-link system similar to that on SLAM. An ATA-type seeker may also be fitted. This weapon is now officially operational with the fleet, with six -A models forward-deployed on the USS Designed to glide to a target with guidance from an onboard GPS/INS system, it can deliver its payload with the same accuracy as a JDAM bomb. The initial AGM-154A version is armed with BLU-97 Combined Effect Munitions (CEMs), while the -B model will carry BLU- 108 Sensor Fused Weapons (SFWs) for attacking armor and vehicles. There are also plans for a -C model for the Navy, which will have a 500-lb/226.8-kg Mk. 82/BLU-111 unitary warhead as well as a man-in-the-loop data-link system similar to that on SLAM. An ATA-type seeker may also be fitted. This weapon is now officially operational with the fleet, with six -A models forward-deployed on the USS Nimitz Nimitz (CVN-68) prior to the 1997 Iraq crisis, where they almost got their combat introduction. (CVN-68) prior to the 1997 Iraq crisis, where they almost got their combat introduction.
AIM-9X Sidewinder Air-to-Air Missile For almost a decade, the fighter pilots of the United States have been flying with a short-range AAM that has been thoroughly outcla.s.sed by competing products from Russia, Israel, and France. Despite its past successes, the third-generation AIM-9L/M Sidewinder AAM has been pa.s.sed by and is now thoroughly outcla.s.sed. Help is on the way however, in the form of a new fourth-generation Sidewinder, the AIM-9X. Built by Raytheon-Hughes Missile Systems, it will become operational in 1999. The changes in the AIM- 9X start at the seeker head, which will be a "staring" IIR array, able to detect targets at ranges beyond those of the human eye. A new guidance and control section at the rear of the missile will make it the most maneuverable AAM in the world. Reduced drag will also extend its range and "no-escape" zone for enemy target aircraft. Finally, the entire AIM-9X system will be controlled by a new helmet-mounted sighting system, which will first see service in the Super Hornet (but it will also be fitted on the Tomcat and earlier-model Hornets). This new missile will be so maneuverable that an AIM-9X can be fired at enemy aircraft that are alongside alongside the launching aircraft! the launching aircraft!
The Real Real Future: Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles Future: Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles Even as the JSF designs are being finalized and the eventual winner selected, it is important to remember that Lockheed Martin and Boeing can"t engineer out the nature of the humans that will fly it. Right now, combat aircraft require their air crews to endure dynamic forces that are nothing less than physical torture. At times these stresses can turn deadly. The rapid onset of G-forces in sharp turns literally drains the blood from pilots" heads, causing a sudden "G-Induced Loss-of-Consciousness," or G-LOC. This means that there is a limit to the performance engineers can put into new aircraft-the physical limitations of the human pilots.
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A flight of Lockheed Martin Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle (UCAV) concept aircraft. Such remote-controlled aircraft will likely serve in the mid-21st century.
LOCKHEED MARTIN.
With this in mind, it is likely that the generation of combat aircraft after after JSF will be unmanned. Today, in roles like photo-reconnaissance and wide-area surveillance, a great deal is already being done with Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). Back in the 1970"s there were even trials with armed drones, though the threat to pilot billets put short work to that idea. Even so, they make a lot of sense-if not today, then tomorrow. What will be known as Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles, or UCAVs for short, will probably start out as modified existing designs (such as leftover F-16"s or F/A-18"s) whose c.o.c.kpits will be filled with sensors and data links back to the operators on the ground. In fact, a modified F/A-18C would make an excellent first-generation UCAV, since it already can conduct automatic carrier landings. JSF will be unmanned. Today, in roles like photo-reconnaissance and wide-area surveillance, a great deal is already being done with Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). Back in the 1970"s there were even trials with armed drones, though the threat to pilot billets put short work to that idea. Even so, they make a lot of sense-if not today, then tomorrow. What will be known as Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles, or UCAVs for short, will probably start out as modified existing designs (such as leftover F-16"s or F/A-18"s) whose c.o.c.kpits will be filled with sensors and data links back to the operators on the ground. In fact, a modified F/A-18C would make an excellent first-generation UCAV, since it already can conduct automatic carrier landings.
The aircraft would fly and operate conventionally, with the exception that when high-G maneuvers are needed, the 9-G limit in the flight-control software could be disabled and the UCAV flown to the actual structural limits of the design. Since we already have in service AAMs that make thirty-G turns, we could easily produce combat aircraft with performances that would make manned aircraft obsolete overnight. UCAVs would doubtless also be much cheaper than current designs, since so much of the money in a manned aircraft design goes into making it safe for the pilot and crew to operate. Keep an eye on this emerging technology. It will be exciting!
Carrier Battle Group: Putting It All Together Aircraft Carrier Battle Groups (CVBGs) are the single most useful military force available in time of crisis or conflict. No other military unit, be it an airborne brigade or a wing of strategic bombers, gives the leadership of a nation the options and power that such a force commands. This is because the real real value of CVBGs goes far beyond the simple existence of the unit and its availability for combat; CVBGs also provide value of CVBGs goes far beyond the simple existence of the unit and its availability for combat; CVBGs also provide presence. presence. America"s forward-deployed battle groups in the Middle East and the Western Pacific are the most visible symbol of the nation"s global commitments. Because of these battle groups, our nation has a say in the affairs of nations and people who threaten America"s forward-deployed battle groups in the Middle East and the Western Pacific are the most visible symbol of the nation"s global commitments. Because of these battle groups, our nation has a say in the affairs of nations and people who threaten our our vital national interests. The commander of such a battle group bears an awesome responsibility. vital national interests. The commander of such a battle group bears an awesome responsibility.
Rear Admiral Jay Yakley was one of those commanders. He"s gone from flying fighters in Vietnam to commanding his own aircraft carrier battle group (CVBG), based around the USS Abraham Lincoln Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72). Back in the early days of August 1990, he was the one of the point men facing down the forces of Saddam Hussein following the invasion of Kuwait. As commander of Carrier Air Wing Fourteen (CVW-14) aboard the USS Indepen (CVN-72). Back in the early days of August 1990, he was the one of the point men facing down the forces of Saddam Hussein following the invasion of Kuwait. As commander of Carrier Air Wing Fourteen (CVW-14) aboard the USS Independence (CV-61), he was in charge of the first organized combat air unit to reach the region following the invasion. In this capacity, together with roughly ten thousand other Americans of the (CV-61), he was in charge of the first organized combat air unit to reach the region following the invasion. In this capacity, together with roughly ten thousand other Americans of the Independence Independence CVBG, he had the job of holding the line until other reinforcements could arrive. CVBG, he had the job of holding the line until other reinforcements could arrive.
He did not have long to wait. Within days, Allied units began to pour in and form the core of the coalition that eventually liberated Kuwait and defeated Saddam"s forces. But for those first few days, Jay Yakley and his roughly ninety airplanes were the only credible aerial force that might have struck at Saddam"s armored columns, had they chosen to continue their advance into the oil fields and ports of northern Saudi Arabia. Only Hussein himself knows whether or not the Independence Independence group was the deterrent that kept Saddam from invading Saudi Arabia. group was the deterrent that kept Saddam from invading Saudi Arabia.
However, the ability to quickly move the Independence Independence and her battle group from their forward-deployed position near Diego Garcia made it possible to demonstrate American resolve to the Iraqi dictator. and her battle group from their forward-deployed position near Diego Garcia made it possible to demonstrate American resolve to the Iraqi dictator. That That is the real point of aircraft carriers: is the real point of aircraft carriers: to be seen. to be seen. Once seen, they can cause an aggressor to show common sense and back off. But if the aggressor fails to show common sense, then the CVBG can act to make them back off with force. Once seen, they can cause an aggressor to show common sense and back off. But if the aggressor fails to show common sense, then the CVBG can act to make them back off with force.
It is not just the obvious power of the carriers-or more particularly, of the aircraft that fly off them-that is the source of the options a CVBG provides national leadership. In fact, to look at a CVBG without seeing beyond the carrier is to look at an iceberg without seeing what lies submerged. The real real power of a CVBG is far more than what the flattop with its air wing can bring to bear. Each CVBG is a carefully balanced mix of ships, aircraft, personnel, and weapons, designed to provide the national command authorities with an optimum mix of firepower and capabilities. That the group can be forward-deployed means that it has a presence wherever it goes, and that American leaders have options when events take a sudden or unpleasant turn on the other side of the planet. The downside is cost. CVBGs are among the most expensive military units to build, operate, train, and maintain; a country can only buy so many. Nevertheless, in the years since the end of the Cold War, CVBGs have demonstrated how very useful they can be on a number of occasions. Operations like Southern Watch (Iraqi no-fly patrols, 1991 to present), Uphold Democracy (Haiti, 1994), and Deliberate Force (Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1995) are only a few of these. power of a CVBG is far more than what the flattop with its air wing can bring to bear. Each CVBG is a carefully balanced mix of ships, aircraft, personnel, and weapons, designed to provide the national command authorities with an optimum mix of firepower and capabilities. That the group can be forward-deployed means that it has a presence wherever it goes, and that American leaders have options when events take a sudden or unpleasant turn on the other side of the planet. The downside is cost. CVBGs are among the most expensive military units to build, operate, train, and maintain; a country can only buy so many. Nevertheless, in the years since the end of the Cold War, CVBGs have demonstrated how very useful they can be on a number of occasions. Operations like Southern Watch (Iraqi no-fly patrols, 1991 to present), Uphold Democracy (Haiti, 1994), and Deliberate Force (Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1995) are only a few of these.
Carrier Battle Group Development Common sense dictates protecting the most valuable warships in your a.r.s.enal when they head into potentially hostile waters. And that-simply-is the reason why aircraft carriers are placed in battle groups. Aircraft carriers are useless unless they are carrying carrying aircraft. But it takes more than just airplanes to insure the carrier"s survival. More important, using the CVW"s a.s.sets for carrier defense defeats the real strength of sea-based aviation. Unless carrier-based aircraft are flying attack missions or defending other fleet vessels (and aircraft are not in fact able to stay airborne long enough to fully accomplish that job), they are being wasted. In other words, sentinels with more staying power than aircraft must protect the carrier against threats-particularly submarines-that can leave it so much burned and twisted sc.r.a.p metal on the ocean floor. Any ship, no matter how well built, even a huge ninety-thousand-plus-ton aircraft. But it takes more than just airplanes to insure the carrier"s survival. More important, using the CVW"s a.s.sets for carrier defense defeats the real strength of sea-based aviation. Unless carrier-based aircraft are flying attack missions or defending other fleet vessels (and aircraft are not in fact able to stay airborne long enough to fully accomplish that job), they are being wasted. In other words, sentinels with more staying power than aircraft must protect the carrier against threats-particularly submarines-that can leave it so much burned and twisted sc.r.a.p metal on the ocean floor. Any ship, no matter how well built, even a huge ninety-thousand-plus-ton Nimitz-cla.s.s Nimitz-cla.s.s (CVN-68) carrier, can be sunk by (CVN-68) carrier, can be sunk by conventional conventional weapons. Without some sort of escort, a carrier is just a very large opportunity for some enemy officer. weapons. Without some sort of escort, a carrier is just a very large opportunity for some enemy officer.
The original configuration that gave birth to CVBG development dates from the early experiments with carriers in the late 1920"s. Because of their high speeds and medium-caliber gun armament, the large carriers that emerged from the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty tended to be a.s.signed to the scouting or cruiser forces of navies. They initially were used as "eyes" for the lines of battleships that were then the real measure of seapower. But before long, carrier admirals found ways to operate independently, showing that they could survive without the backing of a line of battleships. By the outbreak of the Second World War, they were the battle forces.
In 1939, no nation had more than a half-dozen large-deck carriers, and most CVBGs had only a single flattop, with a handful of cruisers and destroyers as escorts. However, this practice began to change very rapidly with the outbreak of World War II. Early in the war, the British began to add fast battleships and battle cruisers to carrier groups, providing protection against enemy surface units. Then the j.a.panese grouped their six big-deck carriers into a single unit called the Kido Butai Kido Butai (j.a.panese for "Striking Force"). Its escort included a pair of fast battleships, some cruisers, and over a dozen destroyers-enough to stand up against all but the largest surface fleet. With multiple flight decks and hundreds of fighters and strike aircraft, (j.a.panese for "Striking Force"). Its escort included a pair of fast battleships, some cruisers, and over a dozen destroyers-enough to stand up against all but the largest surface fleet. With multiple flight decks and hundreds of fighters and strike aircraft, Kido Butai Kido Butai could overwhelm any fleet or air force it encountered. Officially known as the "First Air Fleet," and commanded by Admiral Chichi Nagumo, it was could overwhelm any fleet or air force it encountered. Officially known as the "First Air Fleet," and commanded by Admiral Chichi Nagumo, it was Kido Kido Butai that struck Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941. For the next six months, Nagumo and Butai that struck Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941. For the next six months, Nagumo and Kido Butai Kido Butai ranged across half the globe, the most powerful force in Naval history. Only the "miracle at Midway" stopped ranged across half the globe, the most powerful force in Naval history. Only the "miracle at Midway" stopped Kido Kido Butai, and returned the initiative in CVBG evolution to the Americans. Butai, and returned the initiative in CVBG evolution to the Americans.
By early 1943, the power of American industry began to make itself felt as a stream of new Ess.e.x Ess.e.x (CV-9) and (CV-9) and Independence-cla.s.s Independence-cla.s.s (CVL-22) fast fleet carriers steamed across the Pacific. Before heading for action, they would stop at Pearl Harbor to conduct training and be integrated with fast, new battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and other support ships, and then formed into Task Groups. (Two or more Task Groups formed a Task Force.) Experience gained during raids on j.a.panese island outposts in 1943 showed that the optimum size for such groups was three or four carriers, a pair of fast battleships, four cruisers, and twelve to sixteen destroyers. More carriers than that tended to make the groups unwieldy. Task Groups were commanded by a senior naval aviator, who a.s.signed strike missions, refueling a.s.signments, independent raids, and other jobs. (CVL-22) fast fleet carriers steamed across the Pacific. Before heading for action, they would stop at Pearl Harbor to conduct training and be integrated with fast, new battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and other support ships, and then formed into Task Groups. (Two or more Task Groups formed a Task Force.) Experience gained during raids on j.a.panese island outposts in 1943 showed that the optimum size for such groups was three or four carriers, a pair of fast battleships, four cruisers, and twelve to sixteen destroyers. More carriers than that tended to make the groups unwieldy. Task Groups were commanded by a senior naval aviator, who a.s.signed strike missions, refueling a.s.signments, independent raids, and other jobs.
By early 1944, Task Force 34/58 had developed into the most powerful Naval force in history. This force, based around four Task Groups and commanded by Admiral Marc Mitscher, won key battles-in the Philippine Sea, off Formosa, at Leyte Gulf, in the South China Sea, and around Okinawa-that eventually led to Allied victory in the Pacific. Task Force 34/58 never lost a battle, and throughout its two-year life span lost only a single flattop, the light carrier Princeton Princeton (CVL-23). (CVL-23).
The end of World War II brought a number of changes to CVBGs. In fact, the ma.s.sive force reductions following the war almost spelled their end. Results of the early atomic tests at Bikini showed the need to disperse carrier groups. Thus single-carrier CVBGs again became the norm. On the other hand, new technologies began to make these individual carriers much more effective and powerful. Angled flight decks, steam catapults, jet engines, air-to-air missiles (AAMs), and atomic weapons marked just a few of the new systems that Naval aviators saw arrive in the decade of Elvis and Ike. As new technologies arrived, CVBGs began to change their mixes of aircraft and ships. Piston-engined propeller aircraft were sent to the boneyard, and replaced by supersonic jets and high-performance turboprops. The battleships and big-gun cruisers were also retired, as new guided-missile destroyers and cruisers took over the job of escorting a new generation of flattops. Even without the destructive power of the nuclear weapons they carried, each carrier now had more firepower than an entire World War II Task Group.
At the start of the Vietnam War in the mid-1960"s, America had more carriers than the rest of the world combined, allowing the USN to easily station three or four CVBGs in the South China Sea. Each group normally had one attack carrier, as well as a guided-missile destroyer or cruiser to provide surface-to-air missile (SAM) coverage. Known as Task Force 77, the flattops were on station near Vietnam from the torpedo boat attacks of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident in 1964 to the evacuation of Saigon a decade later. By then, the older World War II-era carriers were worn out and had to be retired. Yet, with the defense budget drained by the Vietnam War, one-for-one replacement of ships and aircraft was impossible. Instead, the Navy built a new generation of amphibious ships with flight decks for helicopters (the Tarawa-cla.s.s Tarawa-cla.s.s (LHA-1)), and combined the attack and ASW missions into the air wings (CVWs) on the fifteen newer carriers commissioned since the end of World War II. By adding a squadron each of S-3 Vikings and SH-3 Sea King helicopters to the existing attack carrier wings, the so-called "CV Air Wing" was created in 1975. This remained the basic CVW structure for the rest of the Cold War. (LHA-1)), and combined the attack and ASW missions into the air wings (CVWs) on the fifteen newer carriers commissioned since the end of World War II. By adding a squadron each of S-3 Vikings and SH-3 Sea King helicopters to the existing attack carrier wings, the so-called "CV Air Wing" was created in 1975. This remained the basic CVW structure for the rest of the Cold War.
While the Navy was reducing the number of carriers and beefing up their air groups, the new Nimitz-cla.s.s Nimitz-cla.s.s (CVN-68) nuclear supercarriers began to arrive. A new generation of aircraft also began to appear on the decks of American flattops. In 1974, the F-14 Tomcat arrived in the fleet, along with new models of the A-6 Intruder and A-7 Corsair attack bombers, and improved models of the E-2 Hawkeye and EA-6B Prowler electronic aircraft. (CVN-68) nuclear supercarriers began to arrive. A new generation of aircraft also began to appear on the decks of American flattops. In 1974, the F-14 Tomcat arrived in the fleet, along with new models of the A-6 Intruder and A-7 Corsair attack bombers, and improved models of the E-2 Hawkeye and EA-6B Prowler electronic aircraft.
By the late 1970"s the driving force in CVBG development was no longer American plans or technology. That honor fell to Admiral of the Soviet Navy Sergei Gorshkov. In the generation following the high seas humiliation of his fleet during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Gorshkov had managed to create the largest navy in the world. Though much of the Soviet naval buildup was designed to support and protect its growing fleet of ballistic-missile submarines, a large share of its maritime budget was devoted to the destruction of American CVBGs.
Over a period of two decades, Gorshkov grew his fleet with a focus on the large air-to-surface (ASMs) and surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) that I discussed in the fifth chapter. Supporting this construction effort was a program of tactical development, exemplified by Gorshkov"s concept of "the Battle of the First Salvo." His plan was to win a naval war by crippling enemy CVBGs by means of an early series of missile strikes, some of them pre-emptive. By the late 1970"s, the Soviet fleet of ASM-armed bombers, and SSM-armed surface ships and submarines, was thought by some to be ready to take on the USN for global maritime dominance.
None of these Soviet developments went unnoticed, and systems like the F-14A Tomcat, AIM-54 Phoenix AAM, and E-2C Hawkeye were the first responses. Then, with the arrival on the scene of President Ronald Reagan and Secretary of the Navy John Lehman in 1981, the men of America"s CVBGs finally got the new ships and equipment that had been needed since the 1960"s. After years of being undermanned, underpaid, and short on spares and ordnance, the U.S. Navy was ready to win its share of the Cold War"s final victory. To meet the increasingly sophisticated Soviet threat, the Navy bought new Aegis SAM ships, and improved aircraft and weapons. However, the basic structure of the CVBG remained unchanged in the 1980"s, and would stay that way until the end of the Cold War and the coming of Desert Storm in the early 1990"s. What did change was the strategy by which carrier operations were to be conducted. In Secretary Lehman"s vision (called "The Maritime Strategy"), in the event of war with the Soviets, ma.s.sed groups of three or more CVBGs would advance into the Norwegian Sea or North Pacific to strike military bases on the Soviet mainland. In the event, the collapse of the Soviet Empire put an end to "The Maritime Strategy."
The post-Cold War American military drawdown scaled John Lehman"s vision of a "600 Ship Navy" back to just over half that number. In addition, the structure of battle groups and air wings was radically altered. Older cla.s.ses of ships were rapidly retired, along with the entire fleet of A-6 attack bombers and KA-6 tanker aircraft. The Cold War-era CVW of approximately ninety aircraft shrank to just over seventy. Because the Soviet threat of ASMs launched from bombers and SSMs fired by submarines and surface ships was no longer significant, the need for fleet air defense was greatly reduced and the CVW could become an almost purely offensive force. The "outer air battle" was therefore handed off from the squadrons of F-14"s, F/A-18"s, and E-2"s to the Aegis radars and SM-2 Standard SAMs of the battle group"s cruisers and destroyers.
Today, the Tomcats and Hornets have been a.s.signed to carry a variety of air-to-ground ordnance, including precision guided munitions (PGMs) for delivery onto targets ash.o.r.e. In the current era of "littoral warfare" (as defined in "From the Sea" and "Forward from the Sea"), this is to be the primary function of sea-based naval aviation units. Along with delivering air strikes, the battle groups of the 1990"s have been given other powerful offensive capabilities. Now CVBGs have each been teamed with a three-or-four-ship amphibious ready group (ARG) embarking a battalion-sized "Marine Expeditionary Unit-Special Operations Capable" (MEU (SOC)).64 This means that as the first century of naval aviation comes to a close, the CVBG/CVW team stands as an almost purely offensive targeting and striking force for supporting units and objectives ash.o.r.e in the littoral zones. This means that as the first century of naval aviation comes to a close, the CVBG/CVW team stands as an almost purely offensive targeting and striking force for supporting units and objectives ash.o.r.e in the littoral zones.
Force Structure: How Many Carriers?
Though the power, flexibility, and mobility of CVBGs make them a critical a.s.set for national leaders, and this is unlikely to change in the 21st century, those same leaders must justify the costs of building, training, operating, and maintaining such forces. The costs of CVBGs are immense. The price tag for the U.S. version probably runs close to $20 billion to build and equip, and another $1 billion a year to operate and maintain-a lot of money! With those mind-numbing numbers in mind, let me put a question to you: How many carriers do we need? The answer is complex.
For starters, there are very few nations in the world with the means to even own flattops. The Royal Navy is committed to maintaining two carriers, as is France. Spain and Italy also plan to build additional flattops to give them each two CVBGs. Russia, Brazil, Thailand, and India will struggle to maintain the single carrier groups they currently possess-largely for reasons of national prestige. And then, standing alone, the United States is currently committed to keeping a dozen carriers in commission-as many flattops as the rest of the world combined. In the 1980"s, John Lehman"s "600 Ship Fleet" included fifteen fifteen CVBGs, a total driven by the strategy of simultaneous strikes around the Soviet Union"s vast periphery. Launching strikes from the Norwegian Sea, the Mediterranean, and the North Pacific required between six and eight groups ready to get under way at any time. Today, with no monolithic threat on the horizon, the need for a dozen carriers in commission seems less obvious. So is twelve CVBGs overkill? No, not really. CVBGs, a total driven by the strategy of simultaneous strikes around the Soviet Union"s vast periphery. Launching strikes from the Norwegian Sea, the Mediterranean, and the North Pacific required between six and eight groups ready to get under way at any time. Today, with no monolithic threat on the horizon, the need for a dozen carriers in commission seems less obvious. So is twelve CVBGs overkill? No, not really.
The number of carriers our nation requires is ultimately determined by its commitments in the post-Cold War world. In a world without superpower confrontation, our "enemies" become "rogue states," like North Korea and Iraq, while international terrorists, criminal cartels, and chaotic regional, ethnic, or tribal conflicts now are the key threats to day-to-day peace. In today"s world order, America"s major overseas commitments and interests lie mainly outside outside the Western Hemisphere. At the same time, our victory in the Cold War has burdened the U.S. with responsibility for peacekeeping and stability in areas that, frankly, most Americans would prefer to ignore. Consider the following list of global flashpoints: the Western Hemisphere. At the same time, our victory in the Cold War has burdened the U.S. with responsibility for peacekeeping and stability in areas that, frankly, most Americans would prefer to ignore. Consider the following list of global flashpoints: * North Korea-On Korea-On the verge of starvation and collapse, North Korea continues to threaten the South Koreans and other nations in the region. It has recently deployed the Tapo-Dong ballistic missile, and may have one or two nuclear warheads. the verge of starvation and collapse, North Korea continues to threaten the South Koreans and other nations in the region. It has recently deployed the Tapo-Dong ballistic missile, and may have one or two nuclear warheads.* People"s Republic of China (PRC)/Republic of China (ROC/Taiwan)- People"s Republic of China (PRC)/Republic of China (ROC/Taiwan)- Following their confrontation over democratic elections and ballistic-missile tests/exercises in 1996 (in which two American CVBGs intervened), these two estranged countries continue to face off in a slow simmer. Following their confrontation over democratic elections and ballistic-missile tests/exercises in 1996 (in which two American CVBGs intervened), these two estranged countries continue to face off in a slow simmer.* India/Pakistan India/Pakistan-As both countries celebrate their golden anniversaries, they confront each other over disputed borders and ethnic and religious differences. An accelerating nuclear arms race raises threats of regional nuclear war, and the proximity of China only exacerbates the problem.* Persian Gulf-UN-sponsored Persian Gulf-UN-sponsored sanctions and "no-fly" operations against Iraq continue, while Iran increases the size and capability of its military forces, causing concern among other countries in the region. Iran and Iraq once again are disputing border areas in the northern end of the Persian Gulf, and firing into each other"s territory. sanctions and "no-fly" operations against Iraq continue, while Iran increases the size and capability of its military forces, causing concern among other countries in the region. Iran and Iraq once again are disputing border areas in the northern end of the Persian Gulf, and firing into each other"s territory.* Balkans-The Balkans-The crisis in the Balkans has continued, despite attempts to implement the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords. Bosnia continues to be a hot spot, requiring continuous monitoring by NATO forces, while old ethnic hostilities are erupting in Kosovo and other areas. crisis in the Balkans has continued, despite attempts to implement the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords. Bosnia continues to be a hot spot, requiring continuous monitoring by NATO forces, while old ethnic hostilities are erupting in Kosovo and other areas.* Algeria Algeria-A chronic Islamic insurrection faces a repressive military regime, as fanatic groups commit brutal ma.s.sacres in villages near the country"s large cities, killing hundreds of innocent civilians.* Central Africa Central Africa-Hutu and Tutsi factions wage genocidal war, spilling across national borders and defying international relief efforts.* West Africa-Dest.i.tute West Africa-Dest.i.tute nations continue to be wracked by coups and civil wars that have been endemic since the end of colonial rule in the 1960"s, requiring frequent evacuations of foreign civilians. nations continue to be wracked by coups and civil wars that have been endemic since the end of colonial rule in the 1960"s, requiring frequent evacuations of foreign civilians.
Current U.S. national military strategy calls for a force structure sufficient to deal with two "major regional contingencies" (small wars or big crises) plus one "complex humanitarian emergency" (natural disaster, epidemic, famine, refugee migration, etc.). You might think that a dozen CVBGs would be enough to handle all that. Unfortunately, the unforgiving demands of complex machinery and the natural limits of human endurance set boundaries that make a dozen carrier groups just barely sufficient to maintain two or three carriers on distant deployment at any one time. Let me explain.
When you build a warship like an aircraft carrier, it is not available for deployment overseas all the time. Warships require regular maintenance and upgrades. Thus, in the forty-five-year planned life of an aircraft carrier, it will spend as much as a fifth of its time in docks and yards being repaired and maintained. For example, for every year the ship is in service, two or three months are spent on minor upgrades and maintenance to keep the ship going between "deep" overhauls (when the warship is brought into dry dock for major work). These major overhauls are done every five years or so, take from eight to twelve months to complete, and include everything from repainting the hull to upgrading the living quarters and combat systems. Additionally, nuclear-powered carriers are periodically out of service for a three-year refueling, an intricate surgery (with meticulous attention to radiation safety) that requires cutting great holes through decks and bulkheads and then welding everything back together. All this means that a warship is only available to sail about three years out of every five.
The crew, also, requires its own "overhaul," for the mult.i.tude of combat skills embodied in the battle group"s ten thousand sailors, marines, and aviators are "perishable." If skills are not taught, practiced, and tested regularly, the combat potential of a ship or air group rapidly deteriorates, even when deployed into a forward area. So a battle group must be a.s.sembled and "worked up" for almost six months before each six-month deployment.
Finally, and no less important, today"s sailors and marines demand and deserve a personal life. People are not robots; they need rest, family relationships, and opportunities to advance personally and professionally. Warship crews need some portion of their service careers at or near their home ports. This human factor is the first casualty when politicians deny pay increases and hardship bonuses, or extend emergency deployments to extreme lengths. Because relatively few of today"s national leaders have the personal experience of long military deployments, the sea services have especially suffered. To remedy this problem, Admiral Johnson has inst.i.tuted a six-month "portal to portal" deployment policy. That is, the Navy has promised that sailors will spend 50% of their time in home port.
Navy planners struggle constantly to build schedules that maximize the number of carrier groups available for deployment, while providing the best quality of life for embarked sailors and marines. Given a carrier force level of a dozen units, it works out something like this: * Deep Overhaul/Nuclear Refueling Deep Overhaul/Nuclear Refueling-Two or three units at a time. Currently, there are three shipyards (Bremerton, Washington; Norfolk, Virginia; and Newport News Shipbuilding) capable of doing this intensive job, which essentially "zeros the mileage" on a ship.* Yearly/Periodic Maintenance Yearly/Periodic Maintenance-Two or three additional carriers are usually conducting yearly/periodic maintenance, which is mainly done dockside at the ship"s home port.* Deployment/Workup Deployment/Workup Cycle-The remaining six or seven carriers are on an eighteen-month cycle, broken into the following phases: Cycle-The remaining six or seven carriers are on an eighteen-month cycle, broken into the following phases:-Leave/Unit Training Period-The first six months of the cycle are devoted to resting crews coming off deployment, with leave and training time. Some individual ship or unit training is also conducted then.-Workup Period-The second six months of the cycle are designed to refresh unit combat skills, conduct combine training, and validate the unit"s ability to conduct joint operations prior to deployment.* Deployment Deployment-Designed to be six months long, this is the period where the combined battle group is packaged and forward-deployed for actual operations.
a.s.suming that this cycle is not interrupted by a major regional contingency, two or three CVBGs can be forward-deployed at any given time. There is always one from the East Coast, which can be a.s.signed to the 2nd (Atlantic), 5th (Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean), or 6th (Mediterranean) Fleets. The West Coast usually has one or two groups available, which work with the 3rd (Eastern Pacific), 5th (Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean), or 7th (Western Pacific) Fleets.65 Yes, it takes a great deal of effort and investment to keep just two or three carrier groups forward-deployed at one time. Yet the lack of forward U.S. bases in areas critical to American national interests makes these mobile air bases critical to the national leadership. If America wants to have a voice in a crisis somewhere on the other side of the world, then we need either a friendly allied host nation66 or a carrier battle group offsh.o.r.e. And CVBGs have one major advantage: They do not need anyone"s permission to sail anywhere in recognized international waters. or a carrier battle group offsh.o.r.e. And CVBGs have one major advantage: They do not need anyone"s permission to sail anywhere in recognized international waters.
The current scheme of carrier group rotations a.s.sumes a generous (by past standards) allotment of home-port time for ships and sailors, given the operations tempos (OpTempos) of today. In an emergency, though, the groups working up can be rapidly "surged" forward to reinforce groups already in the crisis zone. This is exactly what happened in 1990 and 1991 during Desert Shield and Desert Storm. By the time war broke out in early 1991, six CVBGs were in place for strikes against Iraq. Two other American CVBGs had operated in support of Operation Desert Shield and rotated home, while a British carrier group covered the Eastern Mediterranean to fill NATO commitments. In other words, even if forward-deployed carriers are tasked in a crisis, there is enough "flex" in the rotational schedule to allow units at home in the U.S. to "backfill" other American commitments.
USS George Washington George Washington (CVN-73) (CVN-73) Let"s take a look at one of these groups "up close and personal." Specifically, the CVBG based around the USS George Washington George Washington (CVN-73), one of the East Coast carrier groups a.s.signed to 2nd Fleet at Norfolk. (CVN-73), one of the East Coast carrier groups a.s.signed to 2nd Fleet at Norfolk. "GW," "GW," as her crew calls her, is an improved as her crew calls her, is an improved Nimitz-cla.s.s Nimitz-cla.s.s (CVN-68) nuclear aircraft carrier. One of the second group of three built during John Lehman"s glory years of the 1980"s, she was laid down at Newport News Shipbuilding on August 26th, 1986; launched from the dry dock on July 21st, 1990; and commissioned on July 4th, 1992. Manned by over six thousand sailors and Marines, the GW has conducted three Mediterranean and Persian Gulf deployments since commissioning, a very heavy OpTempo. During her maiden voyage she was ceremonial flagship for the 50th Anniversary Celebration of the D-Day Landings in Normandy, and has conducted "no-fly" operations like Southern Watch (Iraq) and Deny Flight (Bosnia). (CVN-68) nuclear aircraft carrier. One of the second group of three built during John Lehman"s glory years of the 1980"s, she was laid down at Newport News Shipbuilding on August 26th, 1986; launched from the dry dock on July 21st, 1990; and commissioned on July 4th, 1992. Manned by over six thousand sailors and Marines, the GW has conducted three Mediterranean and Persian Gulf deployments since commissioning, a very heavy OpTempo. During her maiden voyage she was ceremonial flagship for the 50th Anniversary Celebration of the D-Day Landings in Normandy, and has conducted "no-fly" operations like Southern Watch (Iraq) and Deny Flight (Bosnia).
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USS George Washington George Washington (CVN-73). (CVN-73).
OFFICIAL U.S. NAVY PHOTO.
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The official emblem of the aircraft carrier USS George Washington George Washington (CVN-73). (CVN-73).
JACK RYAN ENTERPRISES, LTD., BY LAURA DENINNO.
As a "working cla.s.s" carrier, GW lacks some of the glamor and polish that fleet "s...o...b..ats" enjoy (the carrier John F. Kennedy, Kennedy, CV-67, once had this reputation). This is a warship, not some floating palace to impress visiting dignitaries. You"ll notice on GW"s bridge, for example, the row of "E" (Efficiency) awards painted there. These are fleet awards, which are given within each cla.s.s of ships (aircraft carriers, guided-missile cruisers, etc.) to display the ship"s visible accomplishments. Each award reflects a particular specialty, ranging from engineering and weapons to food service and tactical ability. In fact, just before leaving on her 1997 cruise, the GW crew got the word that they had been selected to wear the Battle "E" (marking them as the top warship for the entire Atlantic Fleet) for 1997, their third such award in just five years. From the bridge to the pump rooms, the men and women who serve aboard the GW know they are expected to be the best in the fleet. They make a pretty good case that they have achieved that goal. CV-67, once had this reputation). This is a warship, not some floating palace to impress visiting dignitaries. You"ll notice on GW"s bridge, for example, the row of "E" (Efficiency) awards painted there. These are fleet awards, which are given within each cla.s.s of ships (aircraft carriers, guided-missile cruisers, etc.) to display the ship"s visible accomplishments. Each award reflects a particular specialty, ranging from engineering and weapons to food service and tactical ability. In fact, just before leaving on her 1997 cruise, the GW crew got the word that they had been selected to wear the Battle "E" (marking them as the top warship for the entire Atlantic Fleet) for 1997, their third such award in just five years. From the bridge to the pump rooms, the men and women who serve aboard the GW know they are expected to be the best in the fleet. They make a pretty good case that they have achieved that goal.
What follows is a "snapshot" of the GW GW team in the late summer and fall of 1997, and should help you appreciate the kind of people who make a carrier battle group work. But be aware that Navy crews, like all military units, are in a state of constant transition. The sailors and aviators that appear here will certainly have changed a.s.signments by the time you read this book. One other quick point. Because of the mixed Navy/Marine Corps personnel base aboard the battle group, it is easy to confuse the ranks of officers. To help straighten these out, refer to the following table for clarification: team in the late summer and fall of 1997, and should help you appreciate the kind of people who make a carrier battle group work. But be aware that Navy crews, like all military units, are in a state of constant transition. The sailors and aviators that appear here will certainly have changed a.s.signments by the time you read this book. One other quick point. Because of the mixed Navy/Marine Corps personnel base aboard the battle group, it is easy to confuse the ranks of officers. To help straighten these out, refer to the following table for clarification: MILITARY OFFICER RANK TABLE 67 67.
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Heading the GW command team when we were aboard was Captain Lindell G. "Yank" Rutheford, USN. A graduate of the University of Missouri, "Yank" has spent much of his career as an F-14 Tomcat pilot (he also flew A-4 Skyhawks and F-4 Phantom IIs). He commanded a squadron, VF-142 (the "Ghostriders"), aboard USS Eisenhower Eisenhower (CVN-69) in 1988 and 1989. Following a staff tour abroad the (CVN-69) in 1988 and 1989. Following a staff tour abroad the Theodore Roosevelt Theodore Roosevelt (nicknamed "TR," CVN-71) during Desert Shield and Desert Storm, he decided to take the carrier command track (described in the third chapter). (nicknamed "TR," CVN-71) during Desert Shield and Desert Storm, he decided to take the carrier command track (described in the third chapter).
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Captain Lindell "Yank" Rutheford, the Commanding Office (CO) of the carrier USS George Washington George Washington (CVN-73). (CVN-73).
JOHN D. GRESHAM.
Two years later, following nuclear power training and command school, he became the Executive Officer (XO) of TR TR for two deployments to the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf. Captain Rutheford then spent eighteen months as Commanding Officer (CO) of the replenishment ship USS for two deployments to the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf. Captain Rutheford then spent eighteen months as Commanding Officer (CO) of the replenishment ship USS Seattle Seattle (AOE-3), which qualified him for deep-draft command. While driving (AOE-3), which qualified him for deep-draft command. While driving Seattle, Seattle, he acquired a reputation around the fleet for superb ship-handling and organizational skills-very useful talents during the next step in his career. Following his relief as CO of the he acquired a reputation around the fleet for superb ship-handling and organizational skills-very useful talents during the next step in his career. Following his relief as CO of the Seattle Seattle in November of 1996, he joined the in November of 1996, he joined the GW GW as commanding officer. Along with his partner, the commander of the embarked Carrier Air Wing One (CVW-1), Captain John Stufflebeem (whom we will meet later), he provides the commander of the as commanding officer. Along with his partner, the commander of the embarked Carrier Air Wing One (CVW-1), Captain John Stufflebeem (whom we will meet later), he provides the commander of the GW GW battle group with a powerful core of striking capability. battle group with a powerful core of striking capability.
The Navy supports its carrier captains with handpicked subordinates who run the day-to-day activities of the boat and her three-thousand-plus-person crew (the air wing brings along more than 2,500 more). Of these, the most critical job on board is the Executive Officer, or XO. While we were aboard the GW, we were fortunate to observe a handover between two XOs, when Captain Michael R. Groothousen (the GW GW"s XO since May 1996) left to take command of Seattle, Seattle, and the new XO, Commander Chuck Smith, arrived to take his place. Captain Groothousen, a longtime F/A-18 Hornet aviator, was on his way to a deep-draft command in preparation for commanding a carrier of his own, while Commander Smith is something else entirely, having served in S-3 Viking ASW/Sea Control squadrons. and the new XO, Commander Chuck Smith, arrived to take his place. Captain Groothousen, a longtime F/A-18 Hornet aviator, was on his way to a deep-draft command in preparation for commanding a carrier of his own, while Commander Smith is something else entirely, having served in S-3 Viking ASW/Sea Control squadrons.
A tall, lean professional (he resembles a young Peter O"Toole), Chuck Smith is the kind of aviator you"d want at the controls if your plane had to make a night landing in a storm with one engine out. Carrier captains usually come from fighter and attack aviation backgrounds. The "right stuff" mystique and old-boy network of TopGun fighter jockeys make it tough for aviators from electronic warfare, ASW, AEW, and sea control specialties to claw their way to the top of the promotion ladder. However, the increasing importance and versatility of the S-3 in carrier operations, has enabled a few former Viking drivers to get choice commands: big-deck amphibious ships (like the Tarawa Tarawa (LHA-1) and (LHA-1) and Wasp-cla.s.s Wasp-cla.s.s (LHD-1) helicopter carriers), and even some supercarriers. Chuck Smith will make a terrific carrier CO when he "fleets up" in a few years. Commander Smith took over the XO job in late August 1997, while GW was steaming into the battle group"s final training exercise prior to deploying to the Mediterranean. The change happened quickly and seamlessly. The only sign of it aboard the ship was the few minutes it took for every officer who could fit into flight-deck control to see Captain Groothousen off the ship, en route to his next a.s.signment. (LHD-1) helicopter carriers), and even some supercarriers. Chuck Smith will make a terrific carrier CO when he "fleets up" in a few years. Commander Smith took over the XO job in late August 1997, while GW was steaming into the battle group"s final training exercise prior to deploying to the Mediterranean. The change happened quickly and seamlessly. The only sign of it aboard the ship was the few minutes it took for every officer who could fit into flight-deck control to see Captain Groothousen off the ship, en route to his next a.s.signment.
Master Chief Petty Officer Kevin Lavin, the Command Master Chief of the USS George Washington George Washington (CVN-73). Here he is just minutes away from boarding the GW for the 1997/98 cruise to the Persian Gulf. (CVN-73). Here he is just minutes away from boarding the GW for the 1997/98 cruise to the Persian Gulf.
JOHN D. GRESHAM.
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Commander Chuck Smith, the Executive Officer (XO) of the carrier USS George Washington George Washington (CVN- 73). (CVN- 73).
JOHN D. GRESHAM.
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Of the three thousand crewmembers aboard the GW, GW, something like 95% are enlisted sailors. Their representative, advocate, and amba.s.sador to the Captain is GW"s Command Master Chief (CMC) Petty Officer, the senior NCO on board. This is a job of great responsibility. If the food or laundry service in the enlisted s.p.a.ces is unsatisfactory, it is the CMC who makes sure the Captain knows about it. If a sailor"s family member ash.o.r.e needs a.s.sistance, he is the one to coordinate solutions through the Red Cross or other appropriate authority. On something like 95% are enlisted sailors. Their representative, advocate, and amba.s.sador to the Captain is GW"s Command Master Chief (CMC) Petty Officer, the senior NCO on board. This is a job of great responsibility. If the food or laundry service in the enlisted s.p.a.ces is unsatisfactory, it is the CMC who makes sure the Captain knows about it. If a sailor"s family member ash.o.r.e needs a.s.sistance, he is the one to coordinate solutions through the Red Cross or other appropriate authority. On GW, GW, the job is ably filled by CMC Kevin Lavin. When you meet him he seems more like the vice-president of a start-up computer company than the traditional gruff, tattooed Navy chief (his background is in electronics maintenance). Chief Lavin is Commander Smith"s senior enlisted advisor, and when he speaks both the CO and XO listen closely! the job is ably filled by CMC Kevin Lavin. When you meet him he seems more like the vice-president of a start-up computer company than the traditional gruff, tattooed Navy chief (his background is in electronics maintenance). Chief Lavin is Commander Smith"s senior enlisted advisor, and when he speaks both the CO and XO listen closely!
Captain Rutherford and Commander Smith manage an organization that seems more like a small city or corporation than a ship. Its various departments are key to keeping the GW running smoothly for the six months or more that she may spend deployed, or "on cruise" as her crew calls it. Each department performs specific tasks, which make possible the operation of her men, aircraft, and weapons. The alphabetical breakdown of these departments and their heads in the fall of 1997 is shown below: * Administration (ADMIN)- Administration (ADMIN)-Headed by Lieutenant Jerry Morrison, this is the primary record-keeping group for the ship, and includes personnel, maintenance, supply, financial, and other files.* Aircraft Maintenance Division Aircraft Maintenance Division (AIMD)-With almost six hundred personnel a.s.signed, AIMD provides the (AIMD)-With almost six hundred personnel a.s.signed, AIMD provides the GW" GW"s embarked air wing with spare parts, maintenance facilities, and specialized support personnel. Commander Gordon Coward heads this division.* Air Department Air Department (AIR)-One of the busiest groups aboard the (AIR)-One of the busiest groups aboard the GW, GW, the Air Department controls the operations of the the Air Department controls the operations of the GW"s GW"s hangar and flight decks, as well as the airs.p.a.ce directly around the ship. The Air Department is led by an officer nicknamed the "Air Boss," and his deputy, the "Mini Boss." While we were aboard hangar and flight decks, as well as the airs.p.a.ce directly around the ship. The Air Department is led by an officer nicknamed the "Air Boss," and his deputy, the "Mini Boss." While we were aboard GW, GW, the Air Boss was Commander John Kindred, while the "Mini" was Commander Carl June. Both are experienced pilots who have the skills and knowledge to control every type of carrier-capable aircraft under all weather and sea conditions. In late 1997, Commander Kindred was planning to move on to his next a.s.signment, while Commander June would stay aboard and "fleet up" as the new the Air Boss was Commander John Kindred, while the "Mini" was Commander Carl June. Both are experienced pilots who have the skills and knowledge to control every type of carrier-capable aircraft under all weather and sea conditions. In late 1997, Commander Kindred was planning to move on to his next a.s.signment, while Commander June would stay aboard and "fleet up" as the new GW GW Air Boss. Then it will be his job to train a new "Mini" before he moves on in a year or so. Air Boss. Then it will be his job to train a new "Mini" before he moves on in a year or so.* Crew Recreation and Morale Department Crew Recreation and Morale Department (CRMD)-This department deals with the crew"s spiritual and moral welfare, and is headed by (CRMD)-This department deals with the crew"s spiritual and moral welfare, and is headed by GW GW"s Command Chaplain, Captain Jim Nichols.* Deck Division Deck Division (DECK)-Even in a "high-tech" age of networked computers and PGMs, there is still a need on every Naval vessel for sailors who can handle lines, small boats, anchors, and all the paraphernalia of traditional seamanship. The (DECK)-Even in a "high-tech" age of networked computers and PGMs, there is still a need on every Naval vessel for sailors who can handle lines, small boats, anchors, and all the paraphernalia of traditional seamanship. The GW GW"s "Deck Division" handles everything from launching the ship"s boats to manning the replenishment stations during underway refueling and replenishment (UNREP). Lieutenant Commander Johnnie Draughton, who will retire in late 1997, and will be replaced by Lieutenant Greg Worley, leads the sailors of the Deck Division.* Dental Department (DENTAL)-A Dental Department (DENTAL)-A community of over six thousand people is bound to have some cavities, broken t