[Footnote 507: Cousin"s "The True, the Beautiful, and the Good," p. 40.]
In attempting to present to the reader an adequate representation of the Platonic Ideas, we shall be under the necessity of antic.i.p.ating some of the results of his Dialectical method before we have expounded that method. And, further, in order that it may be properly appreciated by the modern student, we shall avail ourselves of the lights which modern psychology, faithful to the method of Plato, has thrown upon the subject. Whilst, however, we admit that modern psychology has succeeded in giving more definiteness and precision to the "doctrine of Ideas," we shall find that all that is fundamentally valuable and true was present to the mind of Plato. Whatever superiority the "Spiritual" philosophy of to-day may have over the philosophy of past ages, it has attained that superiority by its adherence to the principles and method of Plato.
In order to the completeness of our preliminary exposition of the Platonic doctrine of Ideas, we shall conditionally a.s.sume, as a natural and legitimate hypothesis, the doctrine so earnestly a.s.serted by Plato, that the visible universe, at least in its present form, is an _effect_ which must have had a _cause_,[508] and that the Order, and Beauty, and Excellence of the universe are the result of the presence and operation of a "regulating Intelligence"--a _Supreme Mind_.[509] Now that, anterior to the creation of the universe, there must have existed in the Eternal Mind certain fundamental principles of Order, Right, and Good, will not be denied. Every conceivable _form_, every possible _relation_, every principle of _right_, must have been eternally present to the Divine thought. As pure intelligence, the Deity must have always been self-conscious--must have known himself as substance and cause, as the Infinite and Perfect. If then the Divine Energy is put forth in creative acts, that energy must obey those eternal principles of Order, Right, and Good. If the Deity operate at all, he must operate rightly, wisely, and well. The created universe must be an _image_, in the sphere of sense, of the ideas which inhere in the reason of the great First Cause.
[Footnote 508: "Timaeus," ch. ix.]
[Footnote 509: "Phaedo," -- 105.]
"Let us declare," says Plato, "with what _motive_ the Creator hath formed nature and the universe. He was _good_, and in the good no manner of envy can, on any subject, possibly subsist. Exempt from envy, he had wished that all things should, as far as possible, _resemble himself_.... It was not, and is not to be allowed for the Supremely Good to do any thing except what is most _excellent_ (?????st??)--most _fair_, most _beautiful_."[510] Therefore, argues Plato, "inasmuch as the world is the most beautiful of things, and its artificer the best of causes, it is evident that the Creator and Father of the universe looked to the _Eternal Model_(pa??de??a), pattern, or plan,"[511] which lay in his own mind. And thus this one, only-generated universe, is the _image_ (e????) of that G.o.d who is the object of the intellect, the greatest, the best, and the most perfect Being.[512]
[Footnote 510: "Timaeus," ch. x.]
[Footnote 511: Ibid., ch. ix.]
[Footnote 512: "Timaeus," ch. lxxiii.]
And then, furthermore, if this Supreme Intelligence, this Eternal Mind, shall create another _mind_, it must, in a still higher degree, resemble him. Inasmuch as it is a rational nature, it must, in a peculiar sense, partake of the Divine characteristics. "The soul," says Plato, "is that which most partakes of the _Divine_"[513] The soul must, therefore, have native _ideas_ and sentiments which correlate it with the Divine original. The ideas of substance and cause, of unity and ident.i.ty, of the infinite and perfect, must be mirrored there. As it is the "offspring of G.o.d,"[514] it must bear some traces and lineaments of its Divine parentage. That soul must be configured and correlated to those principles of Order, Right, and Good which dwell in the Eternal Mind.
And because it has within itself the same ideas and laws, according to which the great Architect built the universe, therefore it is capable of knowing, and, in some degree, of comprehending, the intellectual system of the universe. It apprehends the external world by a light which the reason supplies. It interprets nature according to principles and laws which G.o.d has inwrought within the very essence of the soul. "That which imparts truth to knowable things, and gives the knower his power of knowing truth, is the _idea of the good_, and you are to conceive of this as the source of knowledge and of truth."[515]
[Footnote 513: "Laws," bk. v. ch. i.]
[Footnote 514: Ibid., bk. x.]
[Footnote 515: "Republic," bk. vi. ch. xviii.]
And now we are prepared to form a clear conception of the Platonic doctrine of Ideas. Viewed in their relation to the Eternal Reason, as giving the primordial thought and law of all being, these principles are simply e?d? a?t? ?a?? a?t?--_ideas in themselves_--the essential qualities or attributes of Him who is the supreme and ultimate Cause of all existence. When regarded as before the Divine imagination, giving definite forms and relations, they are the t?p??, the pa?ade??ata--_the types_, _models, patterns, ideals_ according to which the universe was fashioned. Contemplated in their actual embodiment in the laws, and typical forms of the material world, they are e????e?--_images_ of the eternal perfections of G.o.d. The world of sense pictures the world of reason by a partic.i.p.ation (??e???) of the ideas. And viewed as interwoven in the very texture and framework of the soul, they are ????ata--copies of the Divine Ideas which are the primordial laws of knowing, thinking, and reasoning. Ideas are thus the nexus of relation between G.o.d and the visible universe, and between the human and the Divine reason.[516] There is something divine in the world, and in the human soul, namely, _the eternal laws and reasons of things_, mingled with the endless diversity and change of sensible phenomena. These ideas are "the light of the intelligible world;" they render the invisible world of real Being perceptible to the reason of man. "Light is the offspring of the Good, which the Good has produced in his own likeness.
Light in the visible world is what the _idea of the Good_ is in the intelligible world. And this offspring of the Good--light--has the same relation to vision and visible things which the Good has to intellect and intelligible things."[517]
[Footnote 516: "Now, Idea is, as regards G.o.d, a mental operation by him (the notions of G.o.d, eternal and perfect in themselves); as regards us, the first things perceptible by mind; as regards Matter, a standard; but as regards the world, perceptible by sense, a pattern; but as considered with reference to itself, an existence."--Alcinous, "Introduction to the Doctrines of Plato," p. 261.
"What general notions are to our minds, he (Plato) held, ideas are to the Supreme Reason (???? as??e??); they are the eternal thoughts of the Divine Intellect, and we attain truth when our thoughts conform with His--when our general notions are in conformity with the ideas."--Thompson, "Laws of Thought," p. 119.]
[Footnote 517: "Republic," bk. vi. ch. xix.]
_Science_ is, then, according to Plato, _the knowledge of universal, necessary, unchangeable, and eternal ideas_. The simple cognition of the concrete phenomena of the universe is not regarded by him as _real_ knowledge. "Science, or real knowledge, belongs to _Being_, and ignorance to _non_-Being." Whilst that which is conversant only "with that which partakes of both--of being and non-being--and which can not be said either to be or not to be"--that which is perpetually "becoming," but never "really is," is "simply _opinion_, and not real knowledge."[518] And those only are "philosophers" who have a knowledge of the _really-existing_, in opposition to the mere seeming; of the _always-existing_, in opposition to the transitory; and of that which exists _permanently_, in opposition to that which waxes and wanes--is developed and destroyed alternately. "Those who recognize many beautiful things, but who can not see the Beautiful itself, and can not even follow those who would lead them to it, they _opine_, but do not _know_.
And the same may be said of those who recognize right actions, but do not recognize an absolute righteousness. And so of other ideas. But they who look at these ideas--permanent and unchangeable ideas--these men _really know_."[519] Those are the true philosophers alone who love the sight of truth, and who have attained to the vision of the eternal order, and righteousness, and beauty, and goodness in the Eternal Being.
And the means by which the soul is raised to this vision of real Being (t? ??t?? ??) is THE SCIENCE OF REAL KNOWLEDGE.
Plato, in the "Theaetetus," puts this question by the interlocutor Socrates, "What is Science (??p?st??) or positive knowledge?"[520]
Theaetetus essays a variety of answers, such as, "Science is sensation,"
"Science is right judgment or opinion," "Science is right opinion with logical definition." These, in the estimation of the Platonic Socrates, are all unsatisfactory and inadequate. But after you have toiled to the end of this remarkable discussion, in which Socrates demolishes all the then received theories of knowledge, he gives you no answer of his own.
He abruptly closes the discussion by navely remarking that, at any rate, Theaetetus will learn that he does not understand the subject; and the ground is now cleared for an original investigation.
[Footnote 518: "Republic," bk. v. ch. xx.]
[Footnote 519: Ibid., bk. v. ch. xxii.]
[Footnote 520: "Theaetetus," -- 10.]
This investigation is resumed in the "Republic." This greatest work of Plato"s was designed not only to exhibit a scheme of Polity, and present a system of Ethics, but also, at least in its digressions, to propound a system of Metaphysics more complete and solid than had yet appeared. The discussion as to the _powers_ or _faculties_ by which we obtain knowledge, the _method_ or _process_ by which real knowledge is attained, and the ultimate _objects_ or _ontological grounds_ of all real knowledge, commences at -- 18, book v., and extends to the end of book vii.
That we may reach a comprehensive view of this "sublimest of sciences,"
we shall find it necessary to consider--
1st. _What are the powers or faculties by which we obtain knowledge, and what are the limits and degrees of human knowledge?_
2d. _What is the method in which, or the processes and laws according to which, the mind operates in obtaining knowledge?_
3d. _What are the ultimate results attained by this method? what are the objective and ontological grounds of all real knowledge?_
The answer to the first question will give the PLATONIC PSYCHOLOGY; the answer to the second will exhibit the PLATONIC DIALECTIC; the answer to the last will reveal the PLATONIC ONTOLOGY.
I. PLATONIC PSYCHOLOGY.
Every successful inquiry as to the reality and validity of human knowledge must commence by clearly determining, by rigid a.n.a.lysis, what are the actual phenomena presented in consciousness, what are the powers or faculties supposed by these phenomena, and what reliance are we to place upon the testimony of these faculties? And, especially, if it be a.s.serted that there is a science of absolute Reality, of ultimate and essential Being, then the most important and vital question is, By what power do we cognize real Being? through what faculty do we obtain the knowledge of that which absolutely _is_? If by sensation we only obtain the knowledge of the fleeting and the transitory, "_the becoming_" how do we attain to the knowledge of the unchangeable and permanent, "the _Being_?" Have we a faculty of universal, necessary, and eternal principles? Have we a faculty, an interior eye which beholds "_the intelligible_," ideal, spiritual world, as the eye of sense beholds the visible or "_sensible world_?"[521]
Plato commences this inquiry by first defining his understanding of the word d??a??--_power_ or _faculty_. "We will say _faculties_ (d???e??) are a certain kind of real existences by which we can do whatever we are able (_e.g._, to know), as there are powers by which every thing does what it does: the eye has a _power_ of seeing; the ear has a _power_ of hearing. But these powers (of which I now speak) have no color or figure to which I can so refer that I can distinguish one power from another.
_In order to make such distinction, I must look at the power itself, and see what it is, and what it does. In that way I discern the power of each thing, and that is the same power which produces the same effect, and that is a different power which produces a different effect_."[522]
That which is employed about, and accomplishes one and the same purpose, this Plato calls a _faculty_.
[Footnote 521: "Republic," bk. vi. ch. xviii.]
[Footnote 522: Ibid., bk. v. ch. xxi.]
We have seen that our first conceptions (_i.e._, first in the order of time) are of the mingled, the concrete (t? s???e??????), "the multiplicity of things to which the mult.i.tude ascribe beauty, etc.[523]
The mind "contemplates what is great and small, not as distinct from each other, but as confused.[524] Prior to the discipline of _reflection_, men are curious about mere sights and sounds, love beautiful voices, beautiful colors, beautiful forms, but their intelligence can not see, can not embrace, the essential nature of the Beautiful itself.[525] Man"s condition previous to the education of philosophy is vividly presented in Plato"s simile of the cave.[526] He beholds only the images and shadows of the ectypal world, which are but dim and distant adumbrations of the real and archetypal world.
Primarily nothing is given in the abstract (t? ?e????s????), but every thing in the concrete. The primary faculties of the mind enter into action spontaneously and simultaneously; all our primary notions are consequently synthetic. When reflection is applied to this primary totality of consciousness, that is, when we a.n.a.lyze our notions, we find them composed of diverse and opposite elements, some of which are variable, contingent, individual, and relative, others are permanent, unchangeable, universal, necessary, and absolute. Now these elements, so diverse, so opposite, can not have been obtained from the same source; they must be supplied by separate powers. "Can any man with common sense reduce under one what _is infallible_, and what is _not infallible?_"[527] Can that which is "_perpetually becoming_" be apprehended by the same faculty as that which "_always is?_"[528] Most a.s.suredly not.
[Footnote 523: Ibid., bk. v. ch. xxii.]
[Footnote 524: Ibid., bk. vii. ch. viii.]
[Footnote 525: Ibid., bk. v. ch. xx.]
[Footnote 526: Ibid., bk. vii. ch. i., ii.]
[Footnote 527: "Republic," bk. v. ch. xxi.]
[Footnote 528: Ibid., bk. v. ch. xxii.; also "Timaeus," -- 9.]
These primitive intuitions--the simple perceptions of sense, and the _a priori_ intuitions of the reason, which const.i.tute the elements of all our complex notions, have essentially _diverse objects_--the sensible or ectypal world, seen by the eye and touched by the hand, which Plato calls d??ast??--_the subject of opinion_; and the noetic or archetypal world, perceived by reason, and which he calls d?a???t????--_the subject of rational intuition or science_. "It is plain," therefore, argues Plato, "that _opinion_ is a different thing from _science_. They must, therefore, have a different _faculty_ in reference to a different object--science as regards that which _is_, so as to know the nature of real _being_--opinion as regards that which can not be said absolutely to be, or not to be. That which is known and that which is opined can not possibly be the same,... since they are naturally faculties of different things, and both of them are faculties--_opinion_ and _science_, and each of them different from the other."[529] Here then are two grand divisions of the mental powers--a faculty of apprehending universal and necessary Truth, of intuitively beholding absolute Reality, and a faculty of perceiving sensible objects, and of judging according to appearance.
[Footnote 529: Ibid., bk. v. ch. xxi., xxii.]
According to the scheme of Plato, these two general divisions of the mental powers are capable of a further subdivision. He says: Consider that there are two kinds of things, the _intelligible_ and the _visible_; two different regions, the intelligible world and the sensible world. Now take a line divided into two equal segments to represent these two regions, and again divide each segment in the same ratio--both that of the visible and that of the intelligible species.
The parts of each segment are to represent differences of clearness and indistinctness. In the visible world the parts are _things_ and _images_. By _images_ I mean shadows,[530] reflections in water and in polished bodies, and all such like representations; and by _things_ I mean that of which images are resemblances, as animals, plants, and things made by man.