The Aristotelian distribution of the intellectual faculties corresponds fully to this division of the objects of knowledge. The human intellect is divided by Aristotle into,
1. The Pa.s.sive or Receptive Intellect (???? paf?t????).--Its office is the reception of sensible impressions or images (Fa?t?sata) and their retention in the mind (???). These sensible forms or images are essentially immaterial. "Each sensoriurn (a?s??t????) is receptive of the sensible quality _without the matter_, and hence when the sensibles themselves are absent, sensations and fa?tas???? remain."[707]
[Footnote 707: "De Anima," bk. iii. ch. ii.]
2. The Active or Creative Intellect (???? p???t????).--This is the power or faculty which, by its own inherent power, impresses "form" upon the material of thought supplied by sense-perception, exactly as the First Cause combines it, in the universe, with the recipient matter.
"It is necessary," says Aristotle, "that these two modes should be opposed to each other, as matter is opposed to form, and to all that gives form. The receptive reason, which is as matter, becomes all things by receiving their forms. The creative reason gives existence to all things, as light calls color into being. The creative reason transcends the body, being capable of separation from it, and from all things; it is an everlasting existence, incapable of being mingled with matter, or affected by it; prior, and subsequent to the individual mind. The receptive reason is necessary to individual thought, but it is perishable, and by its decay all memory, and therefore individuality, is lost to the higher and immortal reason."[708]
This "Active or Creative Intellect" is again further subdivided, by Aristotle--
1. The _Scientific_ (?p?st???????) part--the "virtue," faculty, or "habit of principles." He also designates it as the "place of principles," and further defines it as the power "which apprehends those existences whose principles can not be otherwise than they are"--that is, self-evident, immutable, and necessary truths[709]--the _intuitive reason_.
2. The _Reasoning_ (????st????) part--the power by which we draw conclusions from premises, and "contemplate contingent matter"[710]--the _discursive reason_.
The correlatives _noetic_ and _dianoetic_, says Hamilton, would afford the best philosophic designation of these two faculties; the knowledge attained by the former is an "intuitive principle"--a truth at first hand; that obtained by the latter is a "demonstrative proposition"--a truth at second hand.
The preceding notices of the psychology of Aristotle will aid us materially in interpreting his remarks "_Upon the Method and Habits necessary to the ascertainment of Principles_."[711]
[Footnote 708: "De Anima," bk. iii. ch. v.]
[Footnote 709: "Ethics," bk. vi. ch. i.]
[Footnote 710: Ibid.]
[Footnote 711: "Post. a.n.a.lytic," bk. ii, ch. xix., the concluding chapter of the Organon.]
"That it is impossible to have scientific knowledge through demonstration without a knowledge of first immediate principles, has been elucidated before." This being established, he proceeds to explain how that "knowledge of first, immediate principles" is developed in the mind.
1. The knowledge of first principles is attained by the _intuition of sense_--the immediate perception of external objects, as the _exciting_ or _occasional cause_ of their development in the mind.
"Now there appears inherent in all animals an innate power called _sensible perception_ (a?s??s??); but sense being inherent, in some animals a permanency of the sensible object is engendered, but in others it is not engendered. Those, therefore, wherein the sensible object does not remain have no knowledge without sensible perception, but others, when they perceive, retain one certain thing in the soul,... with some, _reason_ is produced from the permanency (of the sensible impression), [as in man], but in others it is not [as in the brute]. From sense, therefore, as we say, memory is produced, and from the repeated remembrance of the same thing we get experience.... From experience, or _from every universal remaining in the soul_--the one besides the many which in all of them is _one_ and the _same_--the principles of art and science arise. If experience is conversant with generation, the principles of art; if with being, the principles of science.... Let us again explain: When one thing without difference abides, there is then the first universal (notion) [developed] in the soul; for the singular indeed is perceived by sense, _but sense is [also] of the universal_"--that is, the universal is immanent in the sensible object as a property giving it "form." "It is manifest, then, that primary things become necessarily known by induction, for thus sensible perception produces [develops or evokes] the _universal_." 2. The knowledge of first principles is attained by the _intuition of pure intellect_ (????)--that is, "_intellect itself is the principle of science_" or, in other words, intellect is the _efficient, essential cause_ of the knowledge of first principles.
"Of those habits which are about intellect by which we ascertain truth, _some[712] are always true_, but others[713] admit the false, as opinion and reasoning. But science and (pure) intellect are always true, and no other kind of knowledge, except intellect [intellectual intuition], is more accurate than science. And since the principles of demonstration are more known, and all science is connected with reason, there could not be a science of principles. But since nothing can be more true than science, except intellect, intellect will belong to principles. From these [considerations] it is evident that, as demonstration is not the principle of demonstration, so neither is science the principle of science. If, then, we have no other true genus (of habit) besides science, _intellect will be the principle of science_; it will also be the principle (or cause of the knowledge) of the principle."
[Footnote 712: The "noetic."]
[Footnote 713: The "dianaetic."]
The doctrine of Aristotle regarding "first principles" may perhaps be summed up as follows: All demonstrative science is based upon _universals_ "prior in nature"--that is, upon _a priori_, self-evident, necessary, and immutable principles. Our knowledge of these "first and immediate principles" is dependent primarily on _intellect_ (????) or intuitive reason, and secondarily on sense, experience, and induction.
Prior to experience, the intellect contains these principles in itself potentially, as "forms," "laws," "habitudes," or "predicaments" of thought; but they can not be "evoked into energy," can not be revealed in consciousness, except on condition of experience, and they can only be scientifically developed by logical abstraction and definition. The ultimate ground of all truth and certainty is thus a mode of our own mind, a subjective necessity of thinking, and truth is not in things, but in our own minds.[714] "Ultimate knowledge, as well as primary knowledge, the most perfect knowledge which the philosopher can attain, as well as the point from which he starts, is still a proposition. All knowledge seems to be included under two forms--knowledge _that_ it is so; knowledge _why_ it is so. Neither of these can, of course, include the knowledge at which Plato is aiming--knowledge which is correlated with Being--a knowledge, not _about_ things or persons, but _of_ them."[715]
[Footnote 714: "Metaphysics," bk. v. ch. iv.]
[Footnote 715: Maurice"s "Ancient Philosophy," p. 190.]
ARISTOTELIAN THEOLOGY
Theoretical philosophy, "the science which has truth for its end," is divided by Aristotle into Physics, Mathematics, and Theology, or the First Philosophy, now commonly known as "Metaphysics," because it is beyond or above physics, and is concerned with the primitive ground and cause of all things.[716]
In the former two we have now no immediate interest, but with Theology, as "the science of the Divine,"[717] the _First Moving Cause_, which is the source of all other causes, and the original ground of all other things, we are specially concerned, inasmuch as our object is to determine, if possible, whether Greek philosophy exerted any influence upon Christian thought, and has bequeathed any valuable results to the Theology of modern times.
"The Metaphysics" of Aristotle opens by an enumeration of "the principles or causes"[718] into which all existences can be resolved by philosophical a.n.a.lysis. This enumeration is at present to be regarded as provisional, and in part hypothetical--a verbal generalization of the different principles which seem to be demanded to explain the existence of a thing, or const.i.tute it what it is. These he sets down as--
[Footnote 716: "Physics are concerned with things which have a principle of motion in themselves; mathematics speculate on permanent, but not transcendental and self-existent things; and there is another science separate from these two, which treats of that which is immutable and transcendental, if indeed there exists such a substance, as we shall endeavor to show that there does. This transcendental and permanent substance, if it exist at all, must surely be the sphere of the _divine_--it must be the first and highest principle. Hence it follows that there are three kinds of speculative science--Physics, Mathematics, and Theology."--"Metaphysics," bk. x. ch. vii.]
[Footnote 717: "Metaphysics," bk. i. ch. ii.]
[Footnote 718: ??t???--cause--is here used by Aristotle in the sense of "account of" or "reason why."]
1. The Material Cause (t?? ???? ?a? t? ?p??e?e???)--the matter and subject--that _out of_ which a given thing has been originated. "From the a.n.a.logy which this principle has to wood or stone, or any actual matter out of which a work of nature or of art is produced, the name "material" is a.s.signed to this cla.s.s." It does not always necessarily mean "matter" in the now common use of the term, but "antecedents--that is, principles whose inherence and priority is implied in any existing thing, as, for example, the premises of a syllogism, which are the material cause of the conclusion."[719] With Aristotle there is, therefore, "matter as an object of sense," and "matter as an object of thought."
2. The Formal Cause (t?? ??s?a? ?a? t? t? e??a?)--the being or abstract essence of a thing--that primary nature on which all its properties depend. To this Aristotle gave the name of e?d??--the form or exemplar _according to_ which a thing is produced.
3. The Moving or Efficient Cause (??e? ? ???? t?? ????se??)--the origin and principle of motion--that _by which_ a thing is produced.
4. The Final Cause (t? ?? ??e?e? ?a? t? ??a???)--the good end answered by the existence of any thing--that for the sake of which_ any thing is produced--the ??e?a t??, or reason for it.[720] Thus, for instance, in a house, the wood out of which it is produced is the _matter (???), the idea or conception according to which it is produced is _the form_ (e?d??????f?), the builder who erects the house is the _efficient_ cause, and the reason for its production, or the end of its existence is the _final_ cause.
[Footnote 719: Encyclopaedia Britannica, article "Aristotle;" "Post.
a.n.a.lytic," bk. ii. ch. xi.]
[Footnote 720: "Metaphysics," bk. i. ch. iii.]
Causes are, therefore, the elements into which the mind resolves its first rough conception of an object. That object is what it is, by reason of the matter out of which it sprang, the moving cause which gave it birth, the idea or form which it realizes, and the end or object which it attains. The knowledge of a thing implies knowing it from these four points of view--that is, knowing its four causes or principles.
These four determinations of being are, on a further and closer a.n.a.lysis, resolved into the fundamental ant.i.thesis of MATTER and FORM.
"All things that are produced," says Aristotle,[721] "are produced from something (that is, from _matter_), by something (that is, _form_), and become something (the totality--t? s??????);" as, for example, a statue, a plant, a man. To every subject there belongs, therefore, first, _matter_ (???); secondly, _form_ (??f?). The synthesis of these two produces and const.i.tutes _substance_, or ??s?a. Matter and form are thus the two grand causes or principles whence proceed all things. The formative cause is, at the same time, the moving cause and the final cause; for it is evidently the element of determination which impresses movement upon matter whilst determining it; and it is also the end of being, since being only really exists when it has pa.s.sed from an indeterminate to a determinate state.
[Footnote 721: "Metaphysics," bk. vi. ch. vii.]
In proof that the e?d?? or form is an _efficient_ principle operating in every object, which makes it, to our conception, what it is, Aristotle brings forward the subject of generation or production.[722] There are three modes of production--natural, artificial, and automatic. In natural production we discern at once a matter; indeed Nature, in the largest sense, may be defined as "that out of which things are produced." Now the result formed out of this matter or nature is a given substance--a vegetable, a beast, or a man. But what is the _producing_ cause in each case? Clearly something akin to the result. A man generates a man, a plant produces another plant like to itself. There is, therefore, implied in the resulting thing a _productive force_ distinct from matter, upon which it works. And this is the e?d??, or form. Let us now consider artificial production. Here again the form is the producing power. And this is in the soul. The art of the physician is the e?d??, which produces actual health; the plan of the architect is the conception, which produces an actual house. Here, however, a distinction arises. In these artificial productions there is supposed a ???s?? and a p???s??. The ???s?? is the previous conception which the architect forms in his own mind; the p???s?? is the actual creation of the house out of the given matter. In this case the conception is the moving cause of the production. The form of the statue in the mind of the artist is the motive or cause of the movement by which the statue is produced; and health must be in the thought of the physician before it can become the moving cause of the healing art. Moreover, that which is true of artificial production or change is also true of spontaneous production. For example, a cure may take place by the application of warmth, and this result is accomplished by means of friction. This warmth in the body is either itself a portion of health, or something is consequent upon it which is like itself, which is a portion of health.
Evidently this implies the previous presence either of nature or of an artificer. It is also clearly evident that this kind of generating influence (the automatic) should combine with another. There must be a productive power, and there must be something out of which it is produced. In this case, then, there will be a ??? and an e?d??.[723]
[Footnote 722: Ibid.]
[Footnote 723: Maurice"s "Ancient Philosophy," pp. 205, 206.]
From the above it appears that the _efficient_ cause is regarded by Aristotle as identical with the _formal_ cause. So also the _final_ cause--the end for the sake of which any thing exists--can hardly be separated from the perfection of that thing, that is, from its conception or form. The desire for the end gives the first impulse of motion; thus the final cause of any thing becomes identical with the good of that thing. "The moving cause of the house is the builder, but the moving cause of the builder is the end to be attained--that is, the house." From such examples as these it would seem that the determinations of form and end are considered by Aristotle as one, in so far as both are merged in the conception of _actuality_; for he regarded the end of every thing to be its completed being--the perfect realization of its idea or form. The only fundamental determinations, therefore, which can not be wholly resolved into each other are _matter and form_.[724]
[Footnote 724: Schwegler"s "History of Philosophy," pp. 120, 123.]
The opposition of matter and form, with Aristotle, corresponds to the opposition between the element of _generality_ and the element of _particularity_. Matter is indeterminate; form is determinate. Matter, abstracted from form, in thought, is entirely without predicate and distinction; form is that which enters into the definition of every subject, and without which it could not be defined. Matter is capable of the widest diversity of forms, but is itself without form. Pure form is, in fact, that which is without matter, or, in other words, it is the pure conception of being. Matter is the necessary condition of the existence of a thing; form is the essence of each thing, that in virtue of which substance is possible, and without which it is inconceivable.
On the one side is pa.s.sivity, possibility of existence, capacity of action; on the other side is activity, actuality, thought. The unity of these two in the realm of determined being const.i.tutes every individual substance. The relation of matter and form, logically apprehended, is thus the relation of POTENTIALITY and ACTUALITY.
This is a further and indeed a most important step in the Aristotelian theology. Matter, as we have seen, after all, amounts to merely capacity for action, and if we can not discover some productive power to develop potentiality into actuality, we look in vain for some explanation of the phenomena around us. The discovery, however, of energy (?????e?a), as a principle of this description, is precisely what we wanted, and a momentary glance at the actual phenomena will show its perfect ident.i.ty with the e?d??, or form.[725] "For instance, what is a calm? It is evenness in the surface of the sea. Here the sea is the subject, that is, the matter in _capacity_, but the evenness is the _energy_ or actuality;... energy is thus as form."[726] The form (or idea) is thus an energy or actuality (?????e?a); the matter is a capacity or potentiality (d??a??), requiring the co-operation of the energy to produce a result.
These terms, which are first employed by Aristotle in their philosophical signification, are characteristic of his whole system. It is, therefore, important we should grasp their precise philosophical import; and this can only be done by considering them in the strictest relation to each other. It is in this relation they are defined by Aristotle. "Now ?????e?a is the existence of a thing not in the sense of its potentially existing. The term _potentially_ we use, for instance, of the statue in the block, and of the half in the whole (since it may be subtracted), and of a person knowing a thing, even when he is not thinking of it, but might be so; whereas ?????e?a is the opposite. By applying the various instances our meaning will be plain, and one must not seek a definition in each case, but rather grasp the conception of the a.n.a.logy as a whole,--that it is as that which builds to that which has a capacity for building; as the waking to the sleeping; as that which sees to that which has sight, but whose eyes are closed; as the definite form to the shapeless matter; as the complete to the unaccomplished. In this contrast, let the ?????e?a be set off as forming the one side, and on the other let the potential stand. Things are said to be in ?????e?a not always in like manner (except so far as there is an a.n.a.logy, that as this thing is in this, and related to this, so is that in that, or related to that); for sometimes it implies _motion_ as opposed to the _capacity of motion_, and sometimes _complete existence_ opposed to _undeveloped matter_".[727] As the term d??a?? has the double meaning of "_possibility of existence_" as well as "_capacity of action_" so there is the double contrast of "_action_" as opposed to the capacity of action; and "_actual existence_" opposed to possible existence or potentiality. To express accurately this latter ant.i.thesis, Aristotle introduced the term ??te???e?a[728]--entelechy, of which the most natural account is that it is a compound of ?? t??e? ??e??--"being in a state of perfection."[729] This term, however, rarely occurs in the "Metaphysics," whilst ?????e?a is everywhere employed, not only to express activity as opposed to pa.s.sivity, but complete existence as opposed to undeveloped matter.