ARISTOTELIAN ETHICS.
We do not find in Aristotle any distinct recognition of an eternal and immutable morality, an absolute right, which has its foundation in the nature of G.o.d. Plato had taught that there was "an absolute Good, above and beyond all existence in dignity and power;" which is, in fact, "the cause of all existence and all knowledge," and which is G.o.d; that all other things are good in proportion as they "partake of this absolute Good;" and that all men are so far good as they "resemble G.o.d." But with this position Aristotle joins issue. After stating the doctrine of Plato in the following words--"Some have thought that, besides all these manifold goods upon earth, there is some _absolute good_, which is the cause to all these of their being good"--he proceeds to criticise that idea, and concludes his argument by saying--"we must dismiss the idea at present, for if there is any one good, universal and generic, or transcendental and absolute, it obviously can never be realized nor possessed by man; whereas something of this latter kind is what we are inquiring after." He follows up these remarks by saying that "Perhaps the knowledge of the idea may be regarded by some as useful, as a pattern (pa??de??a) by which to judge of relative good." Against this he argues that "There is no trace of the arts making use of any such conception; the cobbler, the carpenter, the physician, and the general, all pursue their vocations without respect to the _absolute good_, nor is it easy to see how they would be benefited by apprehending it."[754]
The good after which Aristotle would inquire is, therefore, a _relative good_, since the knowledge of the absolute good can not possibly be realized.
[Footnote 754: "Ethics," bk. i. ch. vi.]
Instead, therefore, of seeking to attain to "a transcendental and absolute good "--a fundamental idea of right, which may be useful as a paradigm by which we may judge of relative good, he addresses himself solely to the question, "what is good for man"--what is the good attainable in action? And having identified the Chief Good with the final and perfect end of all action, the great question of the _Ethics_ is, "_What is the end of human action?_" (t? ?st? t? t?? p?a?t??
t????).[755]
[Footnote 755: "Ethics," bk. i. ch. xiii.]
Now an end or final cause implies an intelligence--implies a mind to perceive and desire it. This is distinctly recognized by Aristotle. The question, therefore, naturally arises--is that end fixed for man by a higher intelligence, and does it exist for man both as an idea and as an ideal? Can man, first, intellectually apprehend the idea, and then consciously strive after its realization? Is it the duty of man to aim at fulfilling the purposes of his Creator? To this it may be answered that Aristotle is not at all explicit as to G.o.d"s moral government of the world. "Moral government," in the now common acceptation of the term, has no place in the system of Aristotle, and the idea of "duty" is scarcely recognized. He considers "the good" chiefly in relation to the const.i.tution and natural condition of man. "_It is_" says he, "_the end towards which nature tends_." As physical things strive unconsciously after the end of their existence, so man strives after the good attainable in life. Socrates had identified virtue and knowledge, he had taught that "virtue is a Science." Aristotle contended that virtue is an art, like music and architecture, which must be attained by exercise. It is not purely intellectual, it is the bloom of the physical, which has become ethical. As the flower of the field, obeying the laws of its organization, springs up, blooms, and attains its own peculiar perfection, so there is an instinctive desire (??e???) in the soul which at first unconsciously yearns after the good, and subsequently the good is sought with full moral intent and insight. Aristotle a.s.sumes that the desires or instincts of man are so framed as to imply the existence of this end (t????).[756] And he a.s.serts that man can only realize it in the sphere of his own proper functions, and in accordance with the laws of his own proper nature and its harmonious development.[757] It is not, then, through instruction, or through the perfection of knowledge, that man is to attain the good, but through exercise and habit (????). By practice of moral acts we become virtuous, just as by practice of building and of music, we become architects and musicians; for the habit, which is the ground of moral character, is only a fruit of oft-repeated moral acts. Hence it is by these three things--nature, habit, reason--that men become good.
[Footnote 756: Ibid, bk. i. ch. ii.]
[Footnote 757: "Ethics," bk. i. ch. vii.]
Aristotle"s question, therefore, is, _What is the chief good for man as man_? not what is his chief good as a spiritual and an immortal being?
or what is his chief good as a being related to and dependent upon G.o.d?
And the conclusion at which he arrives is, that it is _the absolute satisfaction of our whole nature_--that which men are agreed in calling _happiness_. This happiness, however, is not mere sensual pleasure. The brute shares this in common with man, therefore it can not const.i.tute the happiness of man. Human happiness must express the completeness of rational existence. And inasmuch as intelligence is essential activity, as the soul is the _entelechy_ of the body, therefore the happiness of man can not consist in a mere pa.s.sive condition. It must, therefore, consist in _perfect activity_ in well-doing, and especially in contemplative thought,[758] or as Aristotle defines it--"_It is a perfect practical activity in a perfect life_."[759] His conception of the chief good has thus two sides, one internal, that which exists in and for the consciousness--a "complete and perfect life," the other external and practical. The latter, however, is a means to the former.
That complete and perfect life is the complete satisfaction and perfection of our rational nature. It is a state of peace which is the crown of exertion. It is the realization of the divine in man, and const.i.tutes the absolute and all-sufficient happiness.[760] A good action is thus an End-in-itself (t??e??? t????) inasmuch as it secures the _perfection_ of our nature; it is that for the sake of which our moral faculties before existed, hence bringing an inward pleasure and satisfaction with it; something in which the mind can rest and fully acquiesce; something which can be p.r.o.nounced beautiful, fitting, honorable, and perfect.
[Footnote 758: "If it be true to say that happiness consists in doing well, a life of action must be best both for the state and the individual. But we need not, as some do, suppose that a life of action implies relation to others, or that those only are active thoughts which are concerned with the results of action; but far rather we must consider those speculations and thoughts to be so which have their _end in themselves_, and which are for their own sake."--"Politics," bk. vii.
ch. iii.]
[Footnote 759: "Ethics," bk. i. ch. x.]
[Footnote 760: "Ethics," bk. x. ch. viii.]
From what has been already stated, it will be seen that the Aristotelian conception of _Virtue_ is not conformity to an absolute and immutable standard of right. It is defined by him as _the observation of the right mean (es?t??) in action_--that is, the right mean relatively to ourselves. "Virtue is a habit deliberately choosing, existing as a mean (?s??) which refers to us, and is defined by reason, and as a prudent man would define it; and it is a mean between two evils, the one consisting in excess, the other in defect; and further, it is a mean, in that one of these falls short of, and the other exceeds, what is right both in pa.s.sions and actions; and that virtue both finds and chooses the mean."[761] The perfection of an action thus consists in its containing the right degree--the true mean between too much, and too little. The law of the es?t?? is ill.u.s.trated by the following examples: Man has a fixed relation to pleasure and pain. In relation to pain, the true mean is found in neither fearing it nor courting it, and this is _fort.i.tude_.
In relation to pleasure, the true mean stands between greediness and indifference; this is _temperance_. The true mean between prodigality and narrowness is _liberality_; between simplicity and cunning is _prudence_; between suffering wrong and doing wrong is _justice_.
Extending this law to certain qualifications of temper, speech, and manners, you have the portrait of a graceful Grecian gentleman. Virtue is thus _proportion, grace, harmony, beauty in action_.
[Footnote 761: Ibid, bk. ii. ch. vi.]
It will at once be seen that this cla.s.sification has no stable foundation. It furnishes no ultimate standard of right. The _mean_ is a wavering line. It differs under different circ.u.mstances and relations, and in different times and places. That mean which is sufficient for one individual is insufficient for another. The virtue of a man, of a slave, and of a child, is respectively different. There are as many virtues as there are circ.u.mstances in life; and as men are ever entering into new relations, in which it is difficult to determine the correct method of action, the separate virtues can not be limited to any definite number.
Imperfect as the ethical system of Aristotle may appear to us who live in Christian times, it must be admitted that his writings abound with just and pure sentiments. His science of Ethics is a _discipline of human character in order to human happiness_. And whilst it must be admitted that it is directed solely to the improvement of man in the present life, he aims to build that improvement on pure and n.o.ble principles, and seeks to elevate man to the highest perfection of which he could conceive. "And no greater praise can be given to a work of heathen morality than to say, as may be said of the ethical writings of Aristotle, that they contain nothing which a Christian may dispense with, no precept of life which is not an element of Christian character; and that they only fail in elevating the heart and the mind to objects which it needed Divine Wisdom to reveal."[762]
[Footnote 762: Encyclopaedia Britannica, article "Aristotle."]
CHAPTER XIII.
THE PHILOSOPHERS OF ATHENS _(continued)_
POST-SOCRATIC SCHOOL.
EPICURUS AND ZENO.
Philosophy, after the time of Aristotle, takes a new direction. In the pre-Socratic schools, we have seen it was mainly a philosophy of nature; in the Socratic school it was characterized as a philosophy of mind; and now in the post-Socratic schools it becomes a philosophy of life--a moral philosophy. Instead of aiming at the knowledge of real Being--of the permanent, unchangeable, eternal principles which underlie all phenomena, it was now content to aim, chiefly, at individual happiness.
The primary question now discussed, as of the most vital importance, is, What is the ultimate standard by which, amid all the diversities of human conduct and opinion, we may determine what is right and good in individual and social life?
This remarkable change in the course of philosophic inquiry was mainly due--
1st. _To the altered circ.u.mstances of the times_. An age of civil disturbance and political intrigue succeeded the Alexandrian period. The different states of Greece lost their independence, and became gradually subject to a foreign yoke. Handed over from one domination to another, in the struggles of Alexander"s lieutenants, they endeavored to reconquer their independence by forming themselves into confederations, but were powerless to unite in the defense of a common cause. The Achaean and Etolian leagues were weakened by internal discords; and it was in vain that Sparta tried to recover her ancient liberties.
Divided amongst themselves, the smaller states invoked the aid of dangerous allies--at one time appealing to Macedon, at another to Egypt.
In this way they prepared for the total ruin of Greek liberty, which was destined to be extinguished by Rome.[763]
[Footnote 763: Pressense, "Religions before Christ," pp. 136-140.]
During this period of hopeless turmoil and social disorder, all lofty pursuits and all great principles were lost sight of and abandoned. The philosophic movement followed the downward course of society, and men became chiefly concerned for their personal interest and safety. The wars of the Succession almost obliterated the idea of society, and philosophy was mainly directed to the securing of personal happiness; it became, in fact, "the art of making one"s self happy." The sad reverses to which the Grecian mind had been subjected produced a feeling of exhaustion and indifference, which soon reflected itself in the philosophy of the age.
2d. In connection with the altered circ.u.mstances of the age, we must also take account of _the apparent failure of the Socratic method to solve the problem of Being_.
The teaching of Aristotle had fostered the suspicion that the dialectic method was a failure, and thus prepared the way for a return to sensualism. He had taught that individuals alone have a real existence, and that the "essence" of things is not to be sought in the elements of unity and generality, or in the _idea_, as Plato taught, but in the elements of diversity and speciality. And furthermore, in opposition to Plato, he had taught his disciples to attach themselves to sensation, as the source of all knowledge. As the direct consequence of this teaching, we find his immediate successors, Dicearchus and Straton, deliberately setting aside "the G.o.d of philosophy," affirming "that a _divinity_ was unnecessary to the explanation of the existence and order of the universe." Stimulated by the social degeneracy of the times, the characteristic skepticism of the Greek intellect bursts forth anew. As the skepticism of the Sophists marked the close of the first period of philosophy, so the skepticism of Pyrrhonism marked the close of the second. The new skepticism arrayed Aristotle against Plato as the earlier skeptics arrayed atomism against the doctrine of the Eleatics.
They naturally said: "We have been seeking a long time; what have we gained? Have we obtained any thing certain and determinate? Plato says we have. But Aristotle and Plato do not agree. May not our opinion be as good as theirs? What a diversity of opinions have been presented during the past three hundred years! One may be as good as another, or they may be all alike untrue!" Timon and Pyrrhon declared that, of each thing, it might be said to be, and not to be; and that, consequently, we should cease tormenting ourselves, and seek to obtain an _absolute calm_, which they dignified with the name of _ataraxie_. Beholding the overthrow and disgrace of their country, surrounded by examples of pusillanimity and corruption, and infected with the spirit of the times themselves, they wrote this maxim: "Nothing is infamous; nothing is in itself just; laws and customs alone const.i.tute what is justice and what is iniquity."
Having reached this extreme, nothing can be too absurd, and they cap the climax by saying, "We a.s.sert nothing; no, not even that we a.s.sert nothing!"
And yet there must some function, undoubtedly, remain for the "wise man"
(s?f??).
Reason was given for some purpose. Philosophy must have some end. And inasmuch as it is not to determine speculative questions, it must be to determine practical questions. May it not teach men to _act_ rather than to _think_? The philosopher, the schools, the disciples, survive the darkening flood of skepticism.
Three centuries before Christ, the Peripatetic and Platonic schools are succeeded by two other schools, which inherit their importance, and which, in other forms, and by an under-current, perpetuate the disputes of the Peripatetics and Platonists, namely, the Epicureans and Stoics.
With Aristotle and Plato, philosophy embraced in its circle nature, humanity, and G.o.d; but now, in the systems of Epicurus and Zeno, moral philosophy is placed in the foreground, and a.s.sumes the chief, the overshadowing pre-eminence. The conduct of life--morality--is now the grand subject of inquiry, and the great theme of discourse.
In dealing with _morals_ two opposite methods of inquiry were possible:
1. _To judge of the quality of actions by their_ RESULTS.
2. _To search for the quality of actions in the actions them selves_.
Utility, which in its last a.n.a.lysis is _Pleasure_, is the test of right, in the first method; an a.s.sumed or discovered _Law of Nature_, in the second. If the world were perfect, and the balance of the human faculties undisturbed, it is evident that both systems would give identical results. As it is, there is a tendency to error on each side, which is fully developed in the rival schools of the Epicureans and Stoics, who practically divided the suffrages of the ma.s.s of educated men until the coming of Christ.
EPICUREANS.
Epicurus was born B.C. 342, and died B.C. 270. He purchased a Garden within the city, and commenced, at thirty-six years of age, to teach philosophy. The Platonists had their academic Grove: the Aristotelians walked in the Lyceum: the Stoics occupied the Porch: the Epicureans had their Garden, where they lived a tranquil life, and seem to have had a community of goods.
There is not one of all the various founders of the ancient philosophical schools whose memory was cherished with so much veneration by his disciples as that of Epicurus. For several centuries after his death, his portrait was treated by them with all the honors of a sacred relic: it was carried about with them in their journeys, it was hung up in their schools, it was preserved with reverence in their private chambers; his birthday was celebrated with sacrifices and other religious observances, and a special festival in his honor was held every month.
So much honor having been paid to the memory of Epicurus, we naturally expect that his works would have been preserved with religious care. He was one of the most prolific of the ancient Greek writers. Diogenes calls him "a most voluminous writer," and estimates the number of works composed by him at no less than three hundred, the princ.i.p.al of which he enumerates.[764] But out of all this prodigious collection, not a single book has reached us in a complete, or at least an independent form.
Three letters, which contain some outlines of his philosophy, are preserved by Diogenes, who has also embodied his "Fundamental Maxims"--forty-four propositions, containing a summary of his ethical system. These, with part of his work "On Nature," found during the last century among the Greek MSS. recovered at Herculaneum, const.i.tute all that has survived the general wreck.