5th. _The principle of Unity_--all plurality supposes a unity as its basis and ground.]
[Footnote 569: Cudworth"s "Intellectual System," vol. ii. p. 161.]
[Footnote 570: "Timaeus," ch. ix.]
The first business of Plato"s dialectic is to demonstrate that the ground and reason of all existence can not be found in the mere objects of sense, nor in any opinions or judgments founded upon sensation.
Principles are only so far "first principles" as they are permanent and unchangeable, depending on neither time, nor place, nor circ.u.mstances.
But the objects of sense are in ceaseless flux and change; they are "_always becoming_;" they can not be said to have any "_real being_."
They are not to-day what they were yesterday, and they will never again be what they are now; consequently all opinions founded on mere phenomena are equally fluctuating and uncertain. Setting out, therefore, from the a.s.sumption of the fallaciousness of "_opinion_" it examined the various hypotheses which had been bequeathed by previous schools of philosophy, or were now offered by contemporaneous speculators, and showed they were utterly inadequate to the solution of the problem. This scrutiny consisted in searching for the ground of "contradiction"[571]
with regard to each opinion founded on sensation, and showing that opposite views were equally tenable. It inquired on what ground these opinions were maintained, and what consequences flowed therefrom, and it showed that the grounds upon which "opinion" was founded, and the conclusions which were drawn from it, were contradictory, and consequently untrue.[572] "They," the Dialecticians, "examined the opinions of men as if they were error; and bringing them together by a reasoning process to the same point, they placed them by the side of each other: and by so placing, they showed that _the opinions are at one and the same time contrary to themselves, about the same things, with reference to the same circ.u.mstances, and according to the same premises_."[573] And inasmuch as the same attribute can not, at the same time, be affirmed and denied of the same subject,[574] therefore a thing can not be at once "changeable" and "unchangeable," "movable" and "immovable," "generated" and "eternal."[575] The objects of sense, however generalized and cla.s.sified, can only give the contingent, the relative, and the finite; therefore the permanent ground and sufficient reason of all phenomenal existence can not be found in opinions and judgments founded upon sensation.
[Footnote 571: "The Dialect.i.tian is one who syllogistically infers the contradictions implied in popular opinions."--Aristotle, "Sophist," ---- 1, 2.]
[Footnote 572: "Republic," bk. vi. ch. xiii.]
[Footnote 573: "Sophist," -- 33; "Republic," bk. iv. ch. xii.]
[Footnote 574: See the "Phaedo," -- 119, and "Republic," bk. iv. ch.
xiii., where the Law of Non-contradiction is announced.]
[Footnote 575 "Parmenides," -- 3.]
The dialectic process thus consisted almost entirely of _refutation_,[576] or what both he and Aristotle denominated _elenchus_ (??e????)--a process of reasoning by which the contradictory of a given proposition is inferred. "When refutation had done its utmost, and all the points of difficulty and objection had been fully brought out, the dialectic method had accomplished its purpose; and the affirmation which remained, after this discussion, might be regarded as setting forth the truth of the question under consideration;"[577] or in other words, _when a system of error is destroyed by refutation, the contradictory opposite principle, with its logical developments, must be accepted as an established truth_.
[Footnote 576: Confutation is the greatest and chiefest of purification.--"Sophist," -- 34.]
[Footnote 577: Article "Plato," Encyclopaedia Britannica.]
By the application of this method, Plato had not only exposed the insufficiency and self-contradiction of all results obtained by a mere _a posteriori_ generalization of the simple facts of experience, but he demonstrated, as a consequence, that we are in possession of some elements of knowledge which have not been derived from sensation; that there are, in all minds, certain notions, principles, or ideas, which have been furnished by a higher faculty than sense; and that these notions, principles, or ideas, transcend the limits of experience, and reveal the knowledge of _real being_--t? ??t?? ??--_Being in se_.
To determine what these principles or ideas are, Plato now addresses himself to the _a.n.a.lysis of thought_. "It is the glory of Plato to have borne the light of a.n.a.lysis into the most obscure and inmost region; he searched out what, in this totality which forms consciousness, is the province of reason; what comes from it, and not from the imagination and the senses--from within, and not from without."[578] Now to a.n.a.lyze is to decompose, that is, to divide, and to define, in order to see better that which really is. The chief logical instruments of the dialectic method are, therefore, _Division_ and _Definition_. "The being able to _divide_ according to genera, and not to consider the same species as different, nor a different as the same,"[579] and "to see under one aspect, and bring together under one general idea, many things scattered in various places, that, by _defining_ each, a person may make it clear what the subject is," is, according to Plato, "dialectical."[580]
[Footnote 578: Cousin"s "Lectures on the History of Philosophy," vol. i.
p. 328.]
[Footnote 579: "Sophist," -- 83.]
[Footnote 580: "Phaedrus," ---- 109, 111.]
We have already seen that, in his first efforts at applying reflection to the concrete phenomena of consciousness, Plato had recognized two distinct cla.s.ses of cognitions, marked by characteristics essentially opposite;--one of "_sensible_" objects having a definite outline, limit, and figure, and capable of being imaged and represented to the mind in a determinate form--the other of "_intelligible_" objects, which can not be outlined or represented in the memory or the imagination by any figures or images, and are, therefore, the objects of purely rational conception. He found, also, that we arrive at one cla.s.s of cognitions "_mediately_" through images generated in the vital organism, or by some testimony, definition, or explication of others; whilst we arrive at the other cla.s.s "_immediately_" by simple intuition, or rational apperception. The mind stands face to face with the object, and gazes directly upon it. The reality of that object is revealed in its own light, and we find it impossible to refuse our a.s.sent--that is, it is _self-evident_. One cla.s.s consisted of _contingent_ ideas--that is, their objects are conceived as existing, with the possibility, without any contradiction, of conceiving of their non-existence; the other consisted of _necessary_ ideas--their objects are conceived as existing with the absolute impossibility of conceiving of their non-existence.
Thus we can conceive of this book, this table, this earth, as not existing, but we can not conceive the non-existence of s.p.a.ce. We can conceive of succession in time as not existing, but we can not, in thought, annihilate duration. We can imagine this or that particular thing not to have been, but we can not conceive of the extinction of Being in itself. He further observed, that one cla.s.s of our cognitions are _conditional_ ideas; the existence of their objects is conceived only on the supposition of some antecedent existence, as for example, the idea of qualities, phenomena, events; whilst the other cla.s.s of cognitions are _unconditional_ and _absolute_--we can conceive of their objects as existing independently and unconditionally--existing whether any thing else does or does not exist, as s.p.a.ce, duration, the infinite, Being _in se_. And, finally, whilst some ideas appear in us as _particular_ and _individual_, determined and modified by our own personality and liberty, there are others which are, in the fullest sense, _universal_. They are not the creations of our own minds, and they can not be changed by our own volitions. They depend upon neither times, nor places, nor circ.u.mstances; they are common to all minds, in all times, and in all places. These ideas are the witnesses in our inmost being that there is something beyond us, and above us; and beyond and above all the contingent and fugitive phenomena around us. Beneath all changes there is a _permanent_ being. Beyond all finite and conditional existance there is something _unconditional_ and _absolute_.
Having determined that there are truths which are independent of our own minds--truths which are not individual, but universal--truths which would be truths even if our minds did not perceive them, we are led onward to a _super-sensual_ and super-natural ground, on which they rest.
To reach this objective reality on which the ideas of reason repose, is the grand effort of Plato"s dialectic. He seeks, by a rigid a.n.a.lysis, clearly to _separate_, and accurately to _define_ the _a priori_ conceptions of reason. And it was only when he had eliminated every element which is particular, contingent, and relative, and had defined the results in precise and accurate language, that he regarded the process as complete. The ideas which are self-evident, universal, and necessary, were then clearly disengaged, and raised to their pure and absolute form. "You call the man dialectical who requires a reason of the essence or being of each thing. As the dialectical man can define the essence of every thing, so can he of the good. He can _define_ the idea of the good, _separating_ it from all others--follow it through all windings, as in a battle, resolved to mark it, not according to opinion, but according to science."[581]
[Footnote 581: "Republic," bk. vii. ch. xiv.]
_Abstraction_ is thus the process, the instrument of the Platonic dialectic. It is important, however, that we should distinguish between the method of _comparative_ abstraction, as employed in physical inquiry, and that _immediate_ abstraction, which is the special instrument of philosophy. The former proceeds by comparison and generalization, the latter by simple separation. The one yields a contingent general principle as the result of the comparison of a number of individual cases, the other gives an universal and necessary principle by the a.n.a.lysis of a single concrete fact. As an ill.u.s.tration we may instance "the principle of causality." To enable us to affirm "that every event must have a cause," we do not need to compare and generalize a great number of events. "The principle which compels us to p.r.o.nounce the judgment is already complete in the first as in the last event; it can change in regard to its object, it can not change in itself; it neither increases nor decreases with the greater or less number of applications."[582] In the presence of a single event, the universality and necessity of this principle of causality is recognized with just as much clearness and certainty as in the presence of a million events, however carefully generalized.
[Footnote 582: Cousin"s "The True, the Beautiful, and the Good," pp. 57, 58.]
Abstraction, then, it will be seen, creates nothing; neither does it add any new element to the store of actual cognitions already possessed by all human minds. It simply brings forward into a clearer and more definite recognition, that which necessarily belongs to the mind as part of its latent furniture, and which, as a law of thought, has always unconsciously governed all its spontaneous movements. As a process of rational inquiry, it was needful to bring the mind into intelligible and conscious communion with the world of _Ideas_. These ideas are partially revealed in the sensible world, all things being formed, as Plato believed, according to ideas as models and exemplars, of which sensible objects are the copies. They are more fully manifested in the const.i.tution of the human mind which, by virtue of its kindred nature with the original essence or being, must know them intuitively and immediately. And they are brought out fully by the dialectic process, which disengages them from all that is individual and phenomenal, and sets them forth in their pure and absolute form.
But whilst Plato has certainly exhibited the true method of investigation by which the ideas of reason are to be separated from all concrete phenomena and set clearly before the mind, he has not attempted a complete enumeration of the ideas of reason; indeed, such an enumeration is still the grand desideratum of philosophy. We can not fail, however, in the careful study of his writings, to recognize the grand Triad of Absolute Ideas--ideas which Cousin, after Plato, has so fully exhibited, viz., the _True_, the _Beautiful_, and the _Good_.
PLATONIC SCHEME OF IDEAS
I. _The idea of_ ABSOLUTE TRUTH or REALITY (t? ??????--t? ??)--the ground and efficient cause of all existence, and by partic.i.p.ating in which all phenomenal existence has only so far a reality, sensible things being merely shadows and resemblances of ideas. This idea is developed in the human intelligence in its relation with the phenomenal world; as,
1. _The idea of_ SUBSTANCE (??s?a)--the ground of all phenomena, "the being or essence of all things," the permanent reality.--"Timaeeus," ch.
ix. and xii.; "Republic," bk. vii. ch. xiv.; "Phaedo,"---- 63-67, 73.
2. _The idea of_ CAUSE (a?t?a)--the power or efficiency by which things that "become," or begin to be, are generated or produced.--"Timaeus," ch.
ix.; "Sophist," -- 109; "Philebus," ---- 45, 46.
3. _The idea of_ IDENt.i.tY (a?t? t? ?s??)--that which "does not change,"
"is always the same, simple and uniform, incomposite and indissoluble,"--that which const.i.tutes personality or self-hood.--"Phaedo," ---- 61-75; "Timaeus," ch. ix.; "Republic," bk. ii.
ch. xix. and xx.
4. _The idea of_ UNITY (t? ??)--one _mind_ or intelligence pervading the universe, the comprehensive conscious _thought_ or _plan_ which binds all parts of the universe in one great whole (t? p??)--the principle of _order_.--"Timaeus," ch. xi. and xv.; "Republic," bk. vi. ch. xiii.; "Philebus," ---- 50-51.
5. _The idea of the_ INFINITE (t? ?pe????)--that which is unlimited and unconditioned, "has no parts, bounds, no beginning, nor middle, nor end."--"Parmenides," ---- 22, 23.
II. _The idea of_ ABSOLUTE BEAUTY (t? ?a???)--the formal cause of the universe, and by partic.i.p.ation in which all created things have only so far a real beauty.--"Timaeus," ch. xi, "Greater Hippias," ---- 17, 18; "Republic," bk. v. ch. 22.
This idea is developed in the human intelligence in its relation to the organic world; as:
1. _The Idea of_ PROPORTION or SYMMETRY (s?et??a)--the proper relation of parts to an organic whole resulting in a harmony (??s??), and which relation admits of mathematical expression.--"Timaeus," ch. lxix.; "Philebus," -- 155 ("Timaeus," ch. xi. and xii., where the relation of numerical proportions to material elements is expounded).
2. _The idea of_ DETERMINATE FORM (pa??de??a ????t?p??)--the eternal models or archetypes according to which all things are framed, and which admit of geometrical representation.--"Timaeus," ch. ix.; "Phaedo," --112 ("Timaeus,"
ch. xxviii.-x.x.xi., where the relation of geometrical forms to material elements is exhibited).
3. _The idea of_ RHYTHM (?????)--measured movement in time and s.p.a.ce, resulting in melody and grace.--"Republic," bk.
iii. ch. xi. and xii.; "Philebus," -- 21.
4. _The idea of_ FITNESS or ADAPTATION (???s???)--effectiveness to some purpose or end.--"Greater Hippias," -- 35.
5. _The idea of_ PERFECTION (te?e??t??)--that which is complete, "a structure which is whole and finished--of whole and perfect parts."--"Timaeus," ch. xi., xii., and xliii.
III. _The idea of_ ABSOLUTE GOOD (t? ??a???)--the final _cause_ or _reason_ of all existence, the sun of the invisible world, that pours upon all things the revealing light of truth.
The first Good[583] (_summum bonum_) is G.o.d the highest, and Mind or Intelligence (????), which renders man capable of knowing and resembling G.o.d. The second flows from the first, and are virtues of mind. They are good by a partic.i.p.ation of the chief good, and const.i.tute in man a likeness or _resemblance_ to G.o.d.--"Phaedo," ----110-114; "Laws," bk. i.
ch. vi., bk. iv. ch. viii.; "Theaetetus," ---- 84, 85; "Republic," bk. vi.
ch. xix., bk. vii. ch. iii., bk. x. ch. xii.[584]
[Footnote 583: "Let us declare, then, on what account the framing Artificer settled the formation of the universe. He was GOOD;" and being good, "he desired that all things should as much as possible resemble himself."--"Timaeus," ch. x.]
[Footnote 584: "At the utmost bounds of the intellectual world is the _idea of the Good_, perceived with difficulty, but which, once seen, makes itself known as the cause of all that is beautiful and good; which in the visible world produces light, and the orb that gives it; and which in the invisible world directly produces Truth and Intelligence."--"Republic," bk. vii. ch. iii.]