[Footnote 806: "Let us trample religion underfoot, that the victory gained over it may place us on an equality with heaven" (book i.). See Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. x. ch. xxiv. pp.
453,454 (Bohn"s edition); Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things," bk. i.
l. 54-120.]
[Footnote 807: Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things," bk. vi. l. 51-60.]
To "expel these fancies from the mind" as "inconsistent with its tranquillity and opposed to human happiness," is the end, and, as Lucretius believes, the glory of the Epicurean philosophy. To accomplish this, G.o.d must be placed at an infinite distance from the universe, and must be represented as indifferent to every thing that transpires within it. We "must beware of making the Deity interpose here, for that Being we ought to suppose _exempt from all occupation_, and perfectly happy,"[808]--that is, absolutely impa.s.sible. G.o.d did not make the world, and he does not govern the world. There is no evidence of design or intelligence in its structure, and "such is the faultiness with which it stands affected, that it can not be the work of a Divine power."[809]
Epicurus is, then, an unmistakable Atheist. He did not admit a G.o.d in any rational sense. True, he _professed_ to believe in G.o.ds, but evidently in a very equivocal manner, and solely to escape the popular condemnation. "They are not pure spirits, for there is no spirit in the atomic theory; they are not bodies, for where are the bodies that we may call G.o.ds? In this embarra.s.sment, Epicurus, compelled to acknowledge that the human race believes in the existence of G.o.ds, addresses himself to an old theory of Democritus--that is, he appeals to dreams. As in dreams there are images that act upon and determine in us agreeable or painful sensations, without proceeding from exterior bodies, so the G.o.ds are images similar to those of dreams, but greater, having the human form; images which are not precisely bodies, and yet not deprived of materiality which are whatever you please, but which, in short, must be admitted, since the human race believes in G.o.ds, and since the universality of the religious sentiment is a fact which demands a cause."[810]
[Footnote 808: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. x.
ch. xxv.; Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things," bk. i. l. 55-60.]
[Footnote 809: Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things," bk. v. l. 195-200.]
[Footnote 810: Cousin"s "Lectures on the History of Philosophy," vol. i.
p. 431.]
It is needless to offer any criticism on the reasoning of Epicurus. One fact will have obviously presented itself to the mind of the reflecting reader. He starts with atoms having form, magnitude, and density, and essays to construct a universe; but he is obliged to be continually introducing, in addition, a "_nameless something_" which "remains in secret," to help him out in the explanation of the phenomena.[811] He makes life to arise out of dead matter, sense out of senseless atoms, consciousness out of unconsciousness, reason out of unreason, without an adequate cause, and thus violates the fundamental principle from which he starts, "_that nothing can arise from nothing_."
EPICUREAN PSYCHOLOGY.
In the system of Epicurus, the soul is regarded as corporeal or material, like the body; they form, together, one nature or substance.
The soul is composed of atoms exceedingly diminutive, smooth, and round, and connected with or diffused through the veins, viscera, and nerves.
The substance of the soul is not to be regarded as simple and uncompounded; its const.i.tuent parts are _aura_, heat, and air. These are not sufficient, however, even in the judgment of Epicurus, to account for _sensation_; they are not adequate to generate sensible motives such as revolve any thoughts in the mind. "A certain fourth nature, or substance, must, therefore, necessarily be added to these, _that is wholly without a name_; it is a substance, however, than which nothing exists more active or more subtile, nor is any thing more essentially composed of small and smooth elementary particles; and it is this substance which first distributes sensible motions through the members."[812]
[Footnote 811: As, _e.g._, Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things," bk.
iii. l. 260-290.]
[Footnote 812: Id., ib., bk. iii. l. 237-250.]
Epicurus is at great pains to prove that the soul is material; and it can not be denied that he marshals his arguments with great skill.
Modern materialism may have added additional ill.u.s.trations, but it has contributed no new lines of proof. The weapons are borrowed from the old a.r.s.enal, and they are not wielded with any greater skill than they were by Epicurus himself, I. The soul and the body act and react upon each other; and mutual reaction can only take place between substances of similar nature. "Such effects can only be produced by _touch_, and touch can not take place without _body_."[813] 2. The mind is produced together with the body, it grows up along with it, and waxes old at the same time with it.[814] 3. The mind is diseased along with the body, "it loses its faculties by material causes, as intoxication, or by severe blows; and is sometimes, by a heavy lethargy, borne down into a deep eternal sleep."[815] 4. The mind, like the body, is healed by medicines, which proves that it exists only as a mortal substance.[816] 5. The mind does not always, and at the same time, continue _entire_ and _unimpaired_, some faculties decay before the others, "the substance of the soul is therefore divided." On all these grounds the soul must be deemed mortal; it is dissolved along with the body, and has no conscious existence after death.
[Footnote 813: Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things," bk. iii. l.
138-168.]
[Footnote 814: Id., ib., bk. iii. l. 444-460.]
[Footnote 815: Id., ib., bk. iii. l. 438-490.]
[Footnote 816: Id., ib., bk. iii. l. 500-520.]
Such being the nature of the soul, inasmuch as it is material, all its knowledge must be derived from sensation. The famous doctrine of perception, as taught by Epicurus, is grounded upon this pre-supposition that the soul is corporeal. "The e?d??a ?p?????a?--_imagines, simulacra rerum, etc_., are, like pellicles, continually flying off from objects; and these material "likenesses," diffusing themselves everywhere in the air, are propelled to the perceptive organs." These images of things coming in contact with the senses produce _sensation_ (a?s??s??). A sensation may be considered either as regards its object, or as regards him who experiences it. As regards him who experiences it, it is simply a pa.s.sive affection, an agreeable or disagreeable feeling, pa.s.sion, or sentiment (t? p????). But along with sensation there is inseparably a.s.sociated some knowledge of the object which excites sensation; and it is for this reason that Epicurus marked the intimate relation of these two phenomena by giving them a.n.a.logous names. Because the second phenomenon is joined to the first, he calls it ?pa?s??s??--_perception_.
It is sensation viewed especially in regard to its object--_representative sensation_, or the "sensible idea" of modern philosophy. It is from perception that we draw our general ideas by a kind of prolepsis (p???????) an antic.i.p.ation or laying hold by reason of that which is implied in sensation. Now all sensations are alike true in so far as they are sensations, and error arises from false reasoning about the testimony of sense. All knowledge is purely relative and contingent, and there is no such thing as necessary and absolute truth.
The system of Epicurus is thus a system of pure materialism, but not a system of materialism drawn, as a logical consequence, from a careful and unprejudiced study of the whole phenomena of mind. His openly avowed design is to deliver men from the fear of death, and rid them of all apprehension of a future retribution. "Did men but know that there was a fixed limit to their woes, they would be able, in some measure, to defy the religious fictions and menaces of the poets; but now, since we must fear eternal punishment at death, there is no mode, no means of resisting them."[817] To emanc.i.p.ate men from "these terrors of the mind," they must be taught "that the soul is mortal, and dissolves with the body"--that "death is nothing to us, for that which is dissolved is devoid of sensation, and that which is devoid of sensation is nothing to us."[818] Starting with the fixed determination to prove that
"Death is nothing, and naught after death,"
he will not permit any mental phenomena to suggest to him the idea of an incorporeal spiritual substance. Matter, under any form known to Epicurus, is confessedly insufficient to explain sensation and thought; a "nameless something" must be _supposed_. But may not "that principle which _lies entirely hid, and remains in secret_"[819]--and about which even Epicurus does not know any thing--be a spiritual, an _immaterial_ principle? For aught that he knows it may as properly be called "_spirit_" as matter. May not _sensation_ and _cognition_ be the result of the union of matter and spirit; and if so, may not their mutual affections, their common sympathies, be the necessary conditions of sensation and cognition in the present life? A reciprocal relation between body and mind appears in all mental phenomena. A certain proportion in this relation is called mental health. A deviation from it is termed disease. This proportion is by no means an equilibrium, but the perfect adaptation of the body, without injury to its integrity, to the purposes of the mind. And if this be so, all the arguments of materialism fall to the ground.
[Footnote 817: Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things," bk. i. l. 100-118.]
[Footnote 818: Diogenes Laertius, Maxim 2, in "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. x. ch. x.x.xi.]
[Footnote 819: Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things," bk. iii. l.
275-280.]
The concluding portion of the third book, in which Lucretius discourses on _death_, is a mournful picture of the condition of the heathen mind before Christianity "brought life and immortality fully to light." It comes to us, like a voice from the grave of two thousand years, to prove they were "without hope." To be delivered from the fear of future retribution, they would sacrifice the hope of an immortal life. To extintinguish guilt they would annihilate the soul. The only way in which Lucretius can console man in prospect of death is, by reminding him that he will _escape the ills of life_.
""But thy dear home shall never greet thee more!
No more the best of wives!--thy babes beloved, Whose haste half-met thee, emulous to s.n.a.t.c.h The dulcet kiss that roused thy secret soul, Again shall never hasten!--nor thine arm, With deeds heroic, guard thy country"s weal!-- Oh mournful, mournful fate!" thy friends exclaim!
"One envious hour of these invalued joys Robs thee forever!--But they add not here, "_It robs thee, too, of all desire of joy_"-- A truth, once uttered, that the mind would free From every dread and trouble. "Thou art safe The sleep of death protects thee, _and secures From all the unnumbered woes of mortal life!_ While we, alas! the sacred urn around That holds thine ashes, shall insatiate weep, Nor time destroy the eternal grief we feel!"
What, then, has death, if death be mere repose, And quiet only in a peaceful grave,-- What has it thus to mar this life of man?"[820]
[Footnote 820: Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things," bk. iii. l.
906-926.]
This is all the comfort that Epicureanism can offer; and if "the wretch still laments the approach of death," she addresses him "with voice severe"--
"Vile coward! dry thine eyes-- Hence with thy snivelling sorrows, and depart!"
It is evident that such a system of philosophy outrages the purest and n.o.blest sentiments of humanity, and, in fact, condemns itself. It was born of selfishness and social degeneracy, and could perpetuate itself only in an age of corruption, because it inculcated the lawfulness of sensuality and the impunity of injustice. Its existence at this precise period in Grecian history forcibly ill.u.s.trates the truth, that Atheism is a disease of the heart rather than the head. It seeks to set man free to follow his own inclinations, by ridding him of all faith in a Divinity and in an immortal life, and thus exonerating him from all accountability and all future retribution. But it failed to perceive that, in the most effectual manner, it annihilated all real liberty, all true n.o.bleness, and made of man an abject slave.
STOICISM.
The Stoical school was founded by Zeno of Citium, who flourished B.C.
290. He taught in the Stoa Poecile, or Painted Porch; and his disciples thence derived the name of Stoics. Zeno was succeeded by Cleanthes (B.C.
260); and Cleanthes by Chrysippus (B.C. 240), whose vigorous intellect gave unity and completeness to the Stoical philosophy. He is reported to have said to Cleanthes,--"Give me your doctrines, and I will find the demonstrations."[821]
[Footnote 821: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. vii.
ch. vii.]
None of the writings of the early Stoics, save a "Hymn to Jupiter," by Cleanthes, have survived. We are chiefly indebted to Diogenes Laertius[822] and Cicero[823] for an insight into their system. The Hymn of Cleanthes sheds some light on their Theology, and their moral principles are exhibited in "The Fragments" of Epictetus, and "The Life and Meditations" of Marcus Aurelius.
[Footnote 822: "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. vii.]
[Footnote 823: "De Fm.," and "De Natura Deorum."]
The philosophy of the Stoics, like that of the Epicureans, was mainly a philosophy of life--that is, a _moral_ philosophy. The manner in which they approached the study of morals, and the principles upon which they grounded morality, were, however, essentially different.
The grand object of Epicurus was to make the current of life flow on as comfortably as possible, without any distracting thoughts of the past or any disturbing visions of the future. He therefore starts with this fundamental principle, that the true philosophy of life is to enjoy one"s self--the aim of existence is to be happy. Whatever in a man"s beliefs or conduct tends to secure happiness is _right_; whatever awakens uneasiness, apprehension, or fear, is _wrong_. And inasmuch as the idea of a Divine Creator and Governor of the universe, and the belief in a future life and retribution, are uncomfortable thoughts, exciting superst.i.tious fears, they ought to be rejected. The Physics and the Psychology of Epicurus are thus the natural outgrowth of his Morality.
Zeno was evidently a more earnest, serious, and thoughtful man. He cherished a n.o.bler ideal of life than to suppose "man must do voluntarily, what the brute does instinctively--eschew pain, and seek pleasure." He therefore seeks to ascertain whether there be not some "principle of nature," or some law of nature, which determines what is right in human action--whether there be not some light under which, on contemplating an action, we may at once p.r.o.nounce upon its intrinsic _rightness_, or otherwise. This he believes he has found in the _universal reason_ which fashioned, and permeates, and vivifies the universe, and is the light and life of the human soul. The chief good is, confessedly, to live according to nature; which is to live according to virtue, for nature leads us to that point.... For our individual natures are all part of the universal nature; on which account, the chief good is to live in a manner corresponding to one"s own nature, and to universal nature; doing none of those things which the common law of mankind (the universal conscience of our race) forbids. _That common law is identical with_ RIGHT REASON _which pervades every thing, being the same with Jupiter_ (?e??), _who is the regulator and chief manager of all existing things_.[824] The foundation of the ethical system of the Stoics is thus laid in their philosophy of nature--their Physiology and Psychology. If, therefore, we would apprehend the logical connection and unity of Stoicism, we must follow their order of thought--that is, we must commence with their
PHYSIOLOGY.
Diogenes Laertius tells us that the Stoics held "that there are two general principles in the universe--the _pa.s.sive_ principle (t? p?s???), which is matter, an existence without any distinctive quality, and the _active_ principle (t? p?????), which is the reason existing in the pa.s.sive, that is to say, G.o.d. For that He, being eternal, and existing throughout all matter, makes every thing."[825] This Divine Reason, acting upon matter, originates the necessary and unchangeable laws which govern matter--laws which the Stoics called ?????
spe?at????--generating reasons or causes of things. The laws of the world are, like eternal reason, necessary and immutable; hence the e?a????--the _Destiny_ of the Stoics, which is also one of the names of the Deity.[826] But by Destiny the Stoics could not understand a blind unconscious necessity; it is rather the highest reason in the universe. "Destiny (e?a????) is a connected (e??????) cause of things, or the reason according to which the world is regulated."[827]