During the earlier part of the Revolutionary War most of the states had some kind of provisional government. The case of Ma.s.sachusetts may serve as an ill.u.s.tration. There, as in the other colonies, the governor had the power of dissolving the a.s.sembly. This was like the king"s power of dissolving parliament in the days of the Stuarts.
It was then a dangerous power. In modern England there is nothing dangerous in a dissolution of parliament; on the contrary, it is a useful device for ascertaining the wishes of the people, for a new House of Commons must be elected immediately. But in old times the king would turn his parliament out of doors, and as long as he could beg, borrow, or steal enough money to carry on government according to his own notions, he would not order a new election. Fortunately such periods were not very long. The latest instance was in the reign of Charles I, who got on without a parliament from 1629 to 1640.[9] In the American colonies the dissolution of the a.s.sembly by the governor was not especially dangerous, but it sometimes made mischief by delaying needed legislation. During the few years preceding the Revolution, the a.s.semblies were so often dissolved that it became necessary for the people to devise some new way of getting their representatives together to act for the colony. In Ma.s.sachusetts this end was attained by the famous "Committees of Correspondence." No one could deny that town-meetings were legal, or that the people of one township had a right to ask advice from the people of another township. Accordingly each township appointed a committee to correspond or confer with committees from other townships. This system was put into operation by Samuel Adams in 1772, and for the next two years the popular resistance to the crown was organized by these committees. For example, before the tea was thrown into Boston harbour, the Boston committee sought and received advice from every township in Ma.s.sachusetts, and the treatment of the tea-ships was from first to last directed by the committees of Boston and five neighbour towns.
[Footnote: 9: The kings of France contrived to get along without a representative a.s.sembly from 1614 to 1789, and during this long period abuses so multiplied that the meeting of the States-General in 1789 precipitated the great revolution which overthrew the monarchy.]
[Sidenote: Provincial Congress]
In 1774 a further step was taken. As parliament had overthrown the old government, and sent over General Gage as military governor, to put its new system into operation, the people defied and ignored Gage, and the townships elected delegates to meet together in what was called a "Provincial Congress." The president of this congress was the chief provincial executive officer of the commonwealth, and there was a small executive council, known as the "Committee of Safety."
[Sidenote: Provisional governments; "governors" and "presidents."]
This provisional government lasted about a year. In the summer of 1775 the people went further. They fell back upon their charter and proceeded to carry on their government as it had been carried on before 1774, except that the governor was left out altogether. The people in town-meeting elected their representatives to a general a.s.sembly, as of old, and this a.s.sembly chose a council of twenty-eight members to sit as an upper house. The president of the council was the foremost executive officer of the commonwealth, but he had not the powers of a governor. He was no more the governor than the president of our federal senate is the president of the United States. The powers of the governor were really vested in the council, which was an executive as well as a legislative body, and the president was its chairman. Indeed, the t.i.tle "president" is simply the Latin for "chairman," he who "presides" or "sits before" an a.s.sembly. In 1775 it was a more modest t.i.tle than "governor," and had not the smack of semi-royalty which lingered about the latter. Governors had made so much trouble that people were distrustful of the office, and at first it was thought that the council would be quite sufficient for the executive work that was to be done. Several of the states thus organized their governments with a council at the head instead of a governor; and hence in reading about that period one often comes across the t.i.tle "president," somewhat loosely used as if equivalent to governor. Thus in 1787 we find Benjamin Franklin called "president of Pennsylvania," meaning "president of the council of Pennsylvania."
But this arrangement did not prove satisfactory and did not last long.
It soon appeared that for executive work one man is better than a group of men. In Ma.s.sachusetts, in 1780, the old charter was replaced by a new written const.i.tution, under which was formed the state government which, with some emendations in detail, has continued to the present day. Before the end of the eighteenth century all the states except Connecticut and Rhode Island, which, had always been practically Independent, thus remodelled their governments.
[Sidenote: Origin of the Senates.]
These changes, however, were very conservative. The old form of government was closely followed. First there was the governor, elected in some states by the legislature, in others by the people. Then there was the two-chambered legislature, of which the lower house was the same inst.i.tution after the Revolution that it had been before. The upper house, or council, was retained, but in a somewhat altered form. The Americans had been used to having the acts of their popular a.s.semblies reviewed by a council, and so they retained this revisory body as an upper house. But the fashion of copying names and t.i.tles from the ancient Roman republic was then prevalent, and accordingly the upper house was called a Senate. There was a higher property qualification for senators than for representatives, and generally their terms of service were longer. In some states they were chosen by the people, in others by the lower house. In Maryland they were chosen by a special college of electors, an arrangement which was copied in our federal government in the election of the president of the United States. In most of the states there was a lieutenant-governor, as there had been in the colonial period, to serve in case of the governor"s death or incapacity; ordinarily the lieutenant-governor presided over the senate.
[Sidenote: Likenesses and differences between British and American systems.]
Thus our state governments came to be repet.i.tions on a small scale of the king, lords, and commons of England. The governor answered to the king, with his dignity very much curtailed by election for a short period. The senate answered to the House of Lords except in being a representative and not a hereditary body. It was supposed to represent more especially that part of the community which was possessed of most wealth and consideration; and in several states the senators were apportioned with some reference to the amount of taxes paid by different parts of the state.[10] When New York made its senate a supreme court of appeal, it was in deliberate imitation of the House of Lords. On the other hand, the House of Representatives answered to the House of Commons as it used to be in the days when its power was really limited by that of the upper house and the king. At the present day the English of Commons is a supreme body. In case of a serious difference with the House of Lords, the upper house must yield, or else new peers will be created in sufficient number to reverse its vote; and the lords always yield before this point is reached. So, too, though the veto power of the sovereign has never been explicitly abolished, it has not been exercised since 1707, and would not now be tolerated for a moment. In America there is no such supreme body. The bill pa.s.sed by the lower house may be thrown out by the upper house, or if it pa.s.ses both it may be vetoed by the governor; and unless the bill can again pa.s.s both houses by more than a simple majority, the veto will stand. In most of the states a two-thirds vote in the affirmative is required.
[Footnote 10: See my _Critical Period of American History_, p.
68.]
QUESTIONS ON THE TEXT.
1. The dissolution of a.s.semblies and parliaments:--
a. The governor"s power over the a.s.sembly in the colonies.
b. The king"s power over parliament in England.
c. The danger of dissolution in the time of the Stuarts.
d. The safety of dissolution in modern England.
e. The frequency of dissolution before the Revolution.
2. Representation of the people in the provisional government of Ma.s.sachusetts:--
a. The committees of correspondence.
b. Their function, with an ill.u.s.tration from the "tea-ships."
c. The provincial congress.
d. The committee of safety.
e. The return to the two-chambered legislature of the charter.
3. Executive powers in the provisional government of Ma.s.sachusetts;--
a. The foremost executive officer.
b. Where the power of governor was really vested.
c. Why the name of president was preferred to that of governor.
d. The example of Ma.s.sachusetts followed elsewhere.
e. The end of provisional government in 1780.
4. The council transformed to a senate:--
a. The principle of reviewing the acts of the popular a.s.sembly.
b. The borrowing of Roman names.
c. The qualifications and service of senators.
d. The lieutenant-governor.
5. Our state governments patterned after the government of England:--
a. The governor and the king.
b. The Senate and the House of Lords.
c. The House of Representatives and the House of Commons.
d. Some differences between the British system and the American.
Section 3. _The State Governments._
[Sidenote: Later modifications.]
During the present century our state governments have undergone more or less revision, chiefly in the way of abolishing property qualifications for offices making the suffrage universal, and electing officers that were formerly appointed. Only in Delaware does there still remain a property qualification for senators. There is no longer any distinction in principle between the upper and lower houses of the legislature. Both represent population, the usual difference being that the senate consists of fewer members who represent larger districts. Usually, too, the term of the representatives is two years, and the whole house is elected at the same time, while the term of senators is four years, and half the number are elected every two years. This system of two-chambered legislatures is probably retained chiefly through a spirit of conservatism, because it is what we are used to. But it no doubt has real advantages in checking hasty legislation. People are always wanting to have laws made about all sorts of things, and in nine cases out of ten their laws would be pernicious laws; so that it is well not to have legislation made too easy.
[Sidenote: The suffrage.]
The suffrage by which the legislature is elected is almost universal.
It is given in all the states to all male citizens who have reached the age of one-and-twenty. In many it is given also to _denizens_ of foreign birth who have declared an intention of becoming citizens.
In some it is given without further specification to every male _inhabitant_ of voting age. Residence in the state for some period, varying from three months to two years and a half, is also generally required; sometimes a certain length of residence in the county, the town, or even in the voting precinct, is prescribed. In many of the states it is necessary to have paid one"s poll-tax. There is no longer any property qualification, though there was until recently in Rhode Island, Criminals, idiots, and lunatics are excluded from the suffrage. Some states also exclude duellists and men who bet on elections. Connecticut and Ma.s.sachusetts shut out persons who are unable to read. In no other country has access to citizenship and the suffrage been made so easy.
[Sidenote: Separation between legislation and the executive.]
A peculiar feature of American governments, and something which it is hard for Europeans to understand, is the almost complete separation between the executive and the legislative departments. In European countries the great executive officers are either members of the legislature, or at all events have the right to be present at its meetings and take part in its discussions; and as they generally have some definite policy by which they are to stand or fall, they are wont to initiate legislation and to guide the course of the discussion. But in America the legislatures, having no such central points about which to rally their forces, carry on their work in an aimless, rambling sort of way, through the agency of many standing committees. When a measure is proposed it is referred to one of the committees for examination before the house will have anything to do with it. Such a preliminary examination is of course necessary where there is a vast amount of legislative work going on. But the private and disconnected way in which our committee work is done tends to prevent full and instructive discussion in the house, to make the ma.s.s of legislation, always chaotic enough, somewhat more chaotic, and to facilitate the various evil devices of lobbying and log-rolling.
In pointing out this inconvenience attendant upon the American plan of separating the executive and legislative departments, I must not be understood as advocating the European plan as preferable for this country. The evils that inevitably flow from any fundamental change in the inst.i.tutions of a country are apt to be much more serious than the evils which the change is intended to remove. Political government is like a plant; a little watering and pruning do very well for it, but the less its roots are fooled with, the better. In the American system of government the independence of the executive department, with reference to the legislative, is fundamental; and on the whole it is eminently desirable. One of the most serious of the dangers which beset democratic government, especially where it is conducted on a great scale, is the danger that the majority for the time being will use its power tyrannically and unscrupulously, as it is always tempted to do. Against such unbridled democracy we have striven to guard ourselves by various const.i.tutional checks and balances. Our written const.i.tutions and our Supreme Court are important safeguards, as will be shown below. The independence of our executives is another important safeguard. But if our executive departments were mere committees of the legislature--like the English cabinet, for example--this independence could not possibly be maintained; and the loss of it would doubtless entail upon us evils far greater than those which mow flow from want of leadership in our legislatures.[11]
[Footnote 11: In two admirable essays on "Cabinet Responsibility and the Const.i.tution," and "Democracy and the Const.i.tution," Mr. Lawrence Lowell has convincingly argued that the American system is best adapted to the circ.u.mstances of this country. Lowell, _Essays on Government_, pp. 20-117, Boston, 1890.]
We must remember that government is necessarily a c.u.mbrous affair, however conducted.
The only occasion on which the governor is a part of the legislature is when he signs or vetoes a bill. Then he is virtually in himself a third house.[12] As an executive officer the governor is far less powerful than in the colonial times. We shall see the reason of this after we have enumerated some of the princ.i.p.al offices in the executive department. There is always a secretary of state, whose main duty is to make and keep the records of state transactions. There is always a state treasurer, and usually a state auditor or comptroller to examine the public accounts and issue the warrants without which the treasurer cannot pay out a penny of the state"s money. There is almost always an attorney-general, to appear for the state in the supreme court in all cases in which the state is a party, and in all prosecutions for capital offences. He also exercises some superintendence over the district attorneys, and acts as legal adviser to the governors and the legislature. There is also in many states a superintendent of education; and in some there are boards of education, of health, of lunacy and charity, bureau of agriculture, commissioners of prisons, of railroads, of mines, of harbours, of immigration, and so on. Sometimes such boards are appointed by the governor, but such officers as the secretary of state, the treasurer, auditor, and attorney-general are, in almost all the states, elected by the people. They are not responsible to the governor, but to the people who elect them. They are not subordinate to the governor, but are rather his colleagues. Strictly speaking, the governor is not the head of the executive department, but a member of it. The executive department is parcelled out in several pieces, and his is one of the pieces.
[Footnote 12: The state executive.]
[Sidenote: The governor"s functions: 1. Advisor of legislature. 2.
Commander of state militia. 3. Royal prerogative of pardon. 4. Veto power.]
The ordinary functions of the governor are four in number. 1. He sends a message to the legislature, at the beginning of each session, recommending such measures as he would like to see embodied in legislation. 2. He is commander-in-chief of the state militia, and as such can a.s.sist the sheriff of a county in putting down a riot, or the President of the United States, in the event of a war. On such occasions the governor may become a personage of immense importance, as, for example, in our Civil War, when President Lincoln"s demands for troops met with such prompt response from the men who will be known to history as the great "war governors." 3. The governor is invested with the royal prerogative of pardoning criminals, or commuting the sentences p.r.o.nounced upon them by the courts. This power belongs to kings in accordance with the old feudal notion that the king was the source or fountain of justice. When properly used it affords an opportunity for rectifying some injustice for which the ordinary machinery of the law could not provide, or for making such allowances for extraordinary circ.u.mstances as the court could not properly consider. In our country it is too often improperly used to enable the worst criminals to escape due punishment, just because it is a disagreeable duty to hang them. Such misplaced clemency is pleasant for the murderers, but it makes life less secure for honest men and women, and in the less civilized regions of our country it encourages lynch law. 4. In all the states except Rhode Island, Delaware, Ohio, and North Carolina, the governor has a veto upon the acts of the legislature, as above explained; and in ordinary times this power, which is not executive but legislative, is probably the governor"s most important and considerable power. In thirteen of the states the governor can veto particular items in a bill for the appropriation of public money, while at the same time he approves the rest of the bill. This is a most important safeguard against corruption, because where the governor does not have this power it is possible to make appropriations for unworthy or scandalous purposes along with appropriations for matters of absolute necessity, and then to lump them all together in the same bill, so that the governor must either accept the bad along with the good or reject the good along with the bad. It is a great gain when the governor can select the items and veto some while approving others. In such matters the governor is often more honest and discreet than the legislature, if for no other reason, because he is one man, and responsibility can be fixed upon him more clearly than upon two or three hundred.
Such, in brief outline, is the framework of the American state governments. But our account would be very incomplete without some mention of three points, all of them especially characteristic of the American state, and likely to be overlooked or misunderstood by Europeans.
[Sidenote: In building the state, the local self-government was left unimpaired.]
_First_, while we have rapidly built up one of the greatest empires yet seen upon the earth, we have left our self-government substantially unimpaired in the process. This is exemplified in two ways: first, in the relationship of the state to its towns and counties, and, secondly, in its relationship to the federal government. Over the township and county governments the state exercises a general supervision; indeed, it clothes them with their authority. Townships and counties have no sovereignty; the state, on the other hand, has many elements of sovereignty, but it does not use them to obliterate or unduly restrict the control of the townships and counties over their own administrative work. It leaves the local governments to administer themselves. As a rule there is only just enough state supervision to harmonize the working of so many local administrations. Such a system of government comes as near as possible toward making all American citizens partic.i.p.ate actively in the management of public affairs. It generates and nourishes a public spirit and a universal acquaintance with matters of public interest such as has probably never before been seen in any great country.
Public spirit of equal or greater intensity may have been witnessed in small and highly educated communities, such as ancient Athens or mediaeval Florence, but in the United States it is diffused over an area equal to the whole of Europe. Among the leading countries of the world England is the one which comes nearest to the United States in the general diffusion of enlightened public spirit and political capacity throughout all cla.s.ses of society.
[Sidenote: Instructive contrast with France.]
A very notable contrast to the self-government which has produced such admirable results is to be seen in France, and as contrasts are often instructive, let me mention one or two features of the French government. There is nothing like the irregularity and spontaneity there that we have observed in our survey of the United States.
Everything is symmetrical. France is divided into eighty-nine _departments_, most of them larger than the state of Delaware, some of them nearly as large as Connecticut, and the administration of one department is exactly like that of all the others. The chief officer of the department is the prefect, who is appointed by the minister of the interior at Paris. The prefect is treasurer, recruiting officer, school superintendent, all in one, and he appoints nearly all inferior officers. The department has a council, elected by universal suffrage, but it has no power of a.s.sessing taxes. The central legislature in Paris decides for it how much money it shall use and how it shall raise it. The department council is not even allowed to express its views on political matters; it can only attend to purely local details of administration.