The negroes were becoming conscious of their power and were inclined to demand a larger share of the offices than the carpet-baggers wanted to give them. Some of the negroes were desirous of voting with the whites.
Negro leaders were aspiring to judgeships, to the state Senate, to be postmasters, to go to Congress. Even now the party was held together only by the knowledge that it would be destroyed if divided.[2106]
In 1868 Governor Smith and other Radical leaders, convinced that they were permanently in power, secured the pa.s.sage of a law providing for the gradual removal of disabilities imposed by state law. The same year a complete registration had been made for the purpose of excluding the leading whites. After disabilities were removed, so far as state action was concerned there was no advantage to Radicals in a registration of voters. On the other hand, it threatened to become a powerful aid to the Democrats, who began to attend the polls and demand that only registered voters be allowed to cast ballots, thus preventing repeating.
Consequently, as a preparation for the first general election in the fall of 1870, the legislature pa.s.sed a law forbidding the use of registration lists by any official at any election. No one was to be asked if he were registered. No one was to be required to show a registration certificate.
The a.s.sertion of the would-be voter was to be taken as sufficient. And it was made a misdemeanor to challenge a voter, thus interfering with the freedom of elections. After this a negro might vote under any name he pleased as often as he pleased. This election system was in force until 1874, when the Democrats came into power.[2107]
To the Forty-first Congress in 1869 returned only one of the former carpet-bag delegation, C. W. Buckley. Two so-called Democrats were chosen, two scalawags, and a new carpet-bagger. P. M. Dox, one of the Democrats, was a northern man who had lived in the South before the war, who was neutral during the war; and after the war he posed as a "Unionist."
Congressional timber was scarce on account of the test oath and the Fourteenth Amendment, so Dox secured a nomination. His opponent was a negro, which helped him in north Alabama. The other Democrat, W. C.
Sherrod, who was also from north Alabama, had served in the Confederate army. His opponent was J. J. Hinds, one of the most disliked of the carpet-baggers. Robert S. Heflin, one of the scalawags, was from that section where the Peace Society flourished during the war. At first a Confederate, in 1864 he deserted and went within the Federal lines.
Charles Hays, the other scalawag, became the most notorious of the Reconstruction representatives in Congress. He was a cotton planter in one of the densest black districts and managed to stay in Congress for four years. He is chiefly remembered because of the Hays-Hawley correspondence in 1874. Alfred E. Buck of Maine had been an officer of negro troops. He served only one term and after defeat pa.s.sed into the Federal service. He died as minister to j.a.pan in 1902. This delegation was weaker in ability and in morals than the carpet-bag delegation to the Fortieth Congress.
[Ill.u.s.tration: ELECTION OF 1870 FOR GOVERNOR.]
In the fall of 1870 Governor Smith was a candidate for reelection against Robert Burns Lindsay, Democrat. The hostility of Smith to carpet-baggers weakened the party. The ticket was not acceptable to the whites because Rapier, a negro, was candidate for secretary of state. The genuine Unionists were becoming ultra Democrats, because of the prominence given in their party to former secessionists like Parsons, Sam Rice, and Hays, and to negroes and carpet-baggers. Lindsay was from north Alabama, which supported him as a "white man"s candidate." The negroes had been taught to distrust scalawags, as being little better than Democrats. Smith was asked why he ran on a ticket with a negro. He replied that now that was the only way to get office. He also called attention to the fact that in north Alabama the Democrats drew the color line, and called themselves the "white man"s party," while in the black counties they made an earnest effort to secure the negro vote. The Union League, through Keffer, sent out warning that whatever would suit "Rebels" would not suit "union men,"
who must treat their "fine professions as coming from the Prince of Darkness himself," and that if Lindsay were elected, the "condition of union men would be like unto h.e.l.l itself." Smith and Senator Warner said that the Democrats would repudiate railroad bonds, destroy the schools, and repeal the Amendments and the Reconstruction Acts. In the white counties the Radical speakers were generally insulted, and soon the white districts were given up as permanently lost. The Black Belt alone was now the stronghold of the Radicals. Strict inspection here prevented the negroes from voting Democratic, as some were disposed to do. Negroes in the white counties voted for Democrats with many misgivings. An old man told a candidate, "I intend to vote for you; I liked your speech; but if you put me back into slavery, I"ll never forgive you." Federal troops were again judiciously distributed in the Black Belt and in the white counties when there was a large negro vote. As a result the election was very close, Lindsay winning by a vote of 76,977 to 75,568.
Ex-Governor Parsons, who had now become a Radical, advised Smith not to submit to the seating of Lindsay, but to force a contest, and meanwhile to prevent the vote from being counted by the legislature. So, by injunction from the supreme court, the Radical president of the Senate, Barr, was forbidden to count the votes for governor. But the houses in joint session counted the rest of the votes, and E. H. Moren, Democrat, was declared elected lieutenant-governor. A majority of the House was anti-Radical. The old Senate, refusing to cla.s.sify, held over. As soon as Moren was declared elected, Barr arose and left, followed by most of the Radical senators, saying that he was forbidden to count the vote for governor.
Moren at once appeared, took the oath, and the joint meeting not having been regularly adjourned, he ordered the count for governor to proceed. A few Radical senators had lingered out of curiosity, and were retained.
Thus Lindsay was counted in, and at once took the oath of office. By the advice of Parsons, Smith, though willing to retire, refused to give place to Lindsay. The Radical senators recognized Smith; the House recognized Lindsay. Smith brought Federal troops into the state-house to keep Lindsay out, and for two or three weeks there were rival governors. Finally Smith was forced to retire by a writ from the carpet-bag circuit court of Montgomery.[2108]
Lindsay was born in Scotland and educated at the University of St.
Andrews. He lived in Alabama for fifteen years before the war, opposed secession, and gave only a half-hearted support to the Confederacy. As he said: "I would rather not tell my military history, for there was very little glory in it.... I do not know that I can say much about my soldiering."[2109] Lindsay was a scholar, a good lawyer, and a pure man, but a weak executive. In this respect he was better than Smith, however, who was supported by a unanimous Radical legislature. Under Lindsay the Senate was Radical and the House doubtful. The Radical auditor held over; Democrats were elected to the offices of treasurer, secretary of state, attorney-general, and superintendent of public instruction. W. W. Allen, a Confederate major-general, was placed in command of the militia and organized some white companies.
The Democratic and independent majority of the House had some able leaders, but many of the rank and file were timid and inexperienced.
Several thousand of the best citizens were still disfranchised. There were too many young men in public office, half-educated and inexperienced. In the House there were only fourteen negroes. So far as the legislature was concerned, there would be a deadlock for two years. The Radicals would consent to no repeal of injurious legislation, and thus the evil effects of the laws relating to schools, railroads, and elections continued.
Governor Lindsay tried to bring some order into the state finances, but the Democrats were divided on the subject of repudiating the fraudulent bond issues, while the Radicals upheld all of the bond stealing. Lindsay was blamed by the people for not dealing more firmly with the question, but, as a matter of fact, he did as well as any man in his position could do.
One cause of weakness to the administration was the fact that some of the attorneys for the railroads were prominent Democrats who insisted upon the recognition of the fraudulent bonds. These attorneys were few in number, but they caused a division among the leaders. The selfish motive was very evident, though for the sake of appearance they talked of "upholding the state"s credit," "the fair name of Alabama," etc. It is difficult to see that their conduct was in any way on a higher plane than that of the carpet-baggers, who issued the bonds with intent to defraud. In order to protect themselves they mercilessly criticised Lindsay.
Most of the local officials held over from 1868 to 1872; in by-elections it was clearly shown that the Radicals had lost all except the Black Belt, where they continued to roll up large majorities, but even here they were losing by resignation, sale of offices, Ku Kluxing, and removal. The more decent carpet-baggers were leaving for the North; the white Radicals were distinctly lower in character than before, having been joined by the dregs of the Democrats while losing their best white county men. Lindsay made many appointments, thus gradually changing for the better the local administration. Owing to the peculiar methods by which the first set of officials got into office, the local administration was never again as bad, except in some of the black counties, as it was in 1868-1869. As the personnel of the Radical party ran lower and lower, more and more Democrats entered into the local administration. But in spite of the fact that they secured representation in the state government, they were unable to make any important reforms until they gained control of all departments. The results of one or two local elections may be noticed. In Mobile, which had a white majority, the carpet-bag and negro government was overthrown in 1870. Though prohibited by law from challenging fraudulent voters, the Democrats intimidated the negroes by standing near the polls and fastening a fish-hook into the coat of each negro who voted.
The negroes were frightened. Rumor said that those who were hooked were marked for jail. Repeating was thus prevented; many of them did not vote at all. In Selma the Democrats came into power. Property was then made safe, the streets were cleaned, and the negroes found out that they would not be reenslaved. Governor Lindsay endeavored to reform the local judicial administration by getting rid of worthless young solicitors and incompetent judges, but the Radical Senate defeated his efforts. He was unable to secure any good legislation during his term, and all reform was limited to the reduction of administration expenses, the checking of bad legislation, and the appointment of better men to fill vacancies.[2110]
To the Forty-second Congress Buckley, Hays, and Dox were reelected. The new congressmen were Turner, negro, Handley, Democrat, and Sloss, Independent. Turner had been a slave in North Carolina and Alabama and had secured a fair education before the war. He had at first entered politics as a Democrat, and advised the negroes against alien leaders. To succeed Warner, George Goldthwaite, Democrat, was chosen to the United States Senate.
In 1872 the Democrats nominated for governor, Thomas H. Herndon of Mobile, who was in favor of a more aggressive policy than Lindsay. He was a south Alabama man and hence lost votes in north Alabama. David P. Lewis, the Radical nominee, was from north Alabama and in politics a turncoat.
Opposed to secession in 1861, he nevertheless signed the ordinance and was chosen to the Confederate Congress; later he was a Confederate judge; in 1864 he went within the Federal lines; in 1867-1868 he was a Democrat, but changed about 1870. He was victorious for several reasons: the administration was blamed for the division in the party and for not reforming abuses; Herndon did not draw out the full north Alabama vote; the presidential election was held at the same time and the Democrats were disgusted at the nomination of Horace Greeley; Federal troops were distributed over the state for months before the election, and the Enforcement Acts were so executed as to intimidate many white voters. The full Radical ticket was elected. All were scalawags, except the treasurer.
In a speech, C. C. Sheets said of the Radical candidates, "Fellow-citizens, they are as pure, as spotless, as stainless, as the immaculate Son of G.o.d."[2111]
[Ill.u.s.tration: ELECTION OF 1872 FOR GOVERNOR.]
In both houses of the legislature the Democrats had by the returns a majority at last. The Radicals were in a desperate position. A United States Senator was to be elected, and Spencer wanted to succeed himself.
He had spent thousands of dollars to secure the support of the Radicals, and a majority of the Radical members were devoted to him. Most scalawags were opposed to his reelection, but it was known that he controlled the negro members, and to prevent division all agreed to support him. But how to overcome the Democratic majorities in both houses? Parsons was equal to the occasion. He advised that the Radical members refuse to meet with the Democrats and instead organize separately. So the Democrats met in the capitol and the Radicals in the United States court-house, as had been previously arranged. The Senate consisted of 33 members and the House of 100. The Democrats organized with 19 senators and 54 members in the House, all bearing proper certificates of election, and each house having more than a quorum. At the court-house the Radicals had 14 senators and 45 or 46 representatives who had certificates of election. There were 4 negroes in the Senate and 27 in the House. In neither Radical house was there a quorum; so each body summoned 5 Radicals who had been candidates, to make up a quorum. It was hard to find enough, and some custom-house officials from Mobile had to secure leave of absence and come to Montgomery to complete the quorum.
The regular (Democratic) organization at the capitol counted the votes and declared all the Radical state officials elected. Lewis and McKinstry, lieutenant-governor, accepted the count and took the oath and at once recognized the court-house body as the general a.s.sembly. Lindsay had recognized the regular organization, but had taken no steps to protect it from the Radical schemes. The militia was ready to support the regular body, but Lewis was more energetic than Lindsay. He telegraphed to the nearest Federal troops, at Opelika, to come; when they came, he stationed them on the capitol grounds. He proposed to the Democrats that they admit the entire Radical body, expelling enough Democrats to put the latter in a minority. Upon their refusal, he told the court-house body to go ahead with legislation. Some of the Radicals--one or two whites and four or five negroes--were dubious about the security of their _per diem_ and showed signs of a desire to go to the capitol. These were guarded to keep them in line, and were also paid in money and promises of Federal offices. The weak-kneed negroes were shut up in a room and guarded, to keep them from going to the capitol.
Spencer was determined to be elected and would not wait for the trouble to be settled. On December 3, 1872, the court-house Radicals chose him to succeed himself. The next thing was to prevent the regular a.s.sembly from electing a Senator who might contest. Two of that body had died; one or two were indifferent and easily kept away from a joint session; others were called away by telegrams (forged by the Radicals) about illness in their families; three members were arrested before reaching the city; one member was drugged and nearly killed. By such methods a quorum was defeated in both houses at the capitol until December 10, when the absent members came in, and F. W. Sykes was chosen to the United States Senate.
Meanwhile Lewis and the Radical members had appealed to President Grant to be sustained. By his direction United States Attorney-General Williams prepared a plan of compromise skilfully designed to destroy the Democratic majority in the House and produce a tie in the Senate. Lewis was a.s.sured that the plan would be supported by the Federal authorities. The plan was as follows: (1) Both bodies were to continue separate organizations until a fusion was effected. (2) On a certain day, both parties of the House were to meet in the capitol, and in the usual manner form a temporary organization--but the Democrats whose seats were contested but who had certificates of election were to be excluded, while the Radical contestants were to be seated. This would give a Radical majority. Then the contests were to be decided and a permanent organization formed. (3) In the same way the Senate was to be temporarily organized, the regularly elected Democrats being excluded, while their contestants were seated, except in the case of the Democratic senator from Conecuh and Butler, who was to sit but not to vote. By this arrangement there was a bare chance that the Democrats might secure a majority of one in the Senate. (4) As soon as the fusion was thus made, the permanent organization was to be effected. Nothing was said about the legality of past legislation by each body, but the understanding was that all was to be considered void.
Meanwhile Lewis had tried to obtain forcible possession of the capitol, but Strobach, the sheriff whom he sent, was arrested by order of the House and imprisoned until he apologized. The Democrats were plainly informed that the "gentle intimations of the convictions of the law officer of the United States" would be enforced by the use of Federal troops, and there was nothing to do but give way. The plan was put into operation on December 17.
In the House contests the Democrats lost their majority, as was intended.
In the Senate they lost all except one by the plan itself. To unseat Senator Martin from Conecuh would be a flagrant outrage. So his case went over until after Christmas. The Democrats elected the clerks, doorkeepers, and pages. The Radicals still kept up their separate organization, not meaning to abide by the fusion unless they could gain the entire legislature. During the vacation Lieutenant-Governor McKinstry wrote to Attorney-General Williams asking if the Federal government would support him in case he himself should decide as to the rightful senator from Conecuh. He explained that a majority of the committee on elections was going to report in favor of Martin, Democrat, who held the certificate of election. Further, he said that if the Senate were allowed to vote on the question, the Democratic senator would remain seated. He proposed to decide the contest himself upon the report made, and not allow the Senate to vote. Williams was now becoming weary of the conduct of the Radicals; he told McKinstry that the course proposed was contrary to both parliamentary and statute law, and said that Federal troops would not be furnished to support such a ruling. Moreover, he expressed strong disapproval of the course of the Radicals in keeping up their separate organization contrary to the plan of compromise. He ordered the marshal not to allow the Federal court-house to be used by the Radicals, but the marshal paid no attention to the order.
After the holidays the Democrats and anti-Spencer Radicals hoped to bring about a new election for Senator. On February 11, 1873, Hunter of Lowndes, a Radical member of the House, proposed that the legislature proceed to the election of a Senator. Parsons, the speaker, refused to entertain the motion and ordered Hunter under arrest. McKinstry refused to consider the Senate as permanently organized until Martin was disposed of, fearing a joint session. The Radical solicitor of Montgomery secured several indictments against Spencer"s agents for bribery, and summoned several members of the legislature as witnesses. Parsons ordered Knox, the solicitor, and Strobach, the sheriff, to be arrested for invading the privileges of the House. Next, Hunter, who had been arrested for proposing to elect a Senator, had Parsons arrested for violation of the Enforcement Acts in preventing the election of a Senator. Busteed, Federal judge, discharged Parsons "for lack of evidence."
In the Senate the Radicals matured a plan to get rid of Martin. A caucus decided to sustain McKinstry in all his rulings. It was known that Edwards, a Democratic senator, wanted to visit his home. So Gla.s.s, a Radical senator, proposed to pair with him, and at the same time both get leave of absence for ten days. Edwards and Gla.s.s went off at the same time, in different directions. A mile outside of town, Gla.s.s left the train, returned to Montgomery, and went into hiding. Now was the time.
The reports on the Martin contest were called up. A Democrat moved the adoption of the majority report in favor of Martin; a Radical moved that the minority report be subst.i.tuted in the motion. The Democrats were voting under protest because they wanted debate and wanted Edwards, one of the writers of the majority report, to return. In order to move a reconsideration, Cobb, a Democrat, fearing treachery, voted with the Radicals; Gla.s.s appeared before his name was reached, broke his pair, and voted; McKinstry refused to entertain Cobb"s motion for a reconsideration, and though the effect of the voting was only to put the minority report before the Senate to be voted upon, McKinstry declared that Martin by the vote was unseated and Miller admitted. The temporary Radical majority sustained him in all his rulings, and thus the Democrats lost their majority in the Senate. The whole thing had been planned beforehand; McKinstry had arms in his desk; the cloak-rooms were filled with roughs to support the Radicals in case the Democrats made a fight; the Federal troops were at the doors in spite of what Williams had said. McKinstry now announced that the Senate was permanently organized and the schism healed.
Gla.s.s was expelled by the Masonic order for breaking the pair. Spencer was safe, since the Republican Senate at Washington was sure to admit him.
In the course of the contest Spencer had spent many thousands of dollars in defeating dissatisfied Radical candidates for the legislature and in purchasing voters. The money he used came from the National Republican executive committee, from the state committee, and from the government funds of the post-office at Mobile and the internal revenue offices in Mobile and Montgomery. More than $20,000 of United States funds were used for Spencer, who, after his election, refused to reimburse the postmaster and the two collectors, who were prosecuted and ruined. Every Federal office-holder was a.s.sessed from one-fifth to one-third of his pay during the fall months for campaign expenses. They were notified that unless they paid the a.s.sessments their resignations would be accepted. Spencer refused to pay the bills of a negro saloon-keeper who had, at his orders, "refreshed" the negro members of the legislature. But of those who voted for Spencer in the Radical "legislature" more than thirty secured Federal appointments. Of other agents about twenty secured Federal appointments.
One of them, Robert Barbour, was given a position in the custom-house at Mobile with the understanding that he would not have to go there. His pay was sent to him at Montgomery.
As a preparation for the autumn presidential contest, Spencer worked upon the fears of Grant and secured the promise of troops, though he had some difficulty. His letters are not at all complimentary to Grant. Finally he wrote, "Grant is scared and will do what we want." The deputy marshals manufactured Ku Klux outrages and planned the arrest of Democratic politicians, of whom scores were gotten out of the way, for a week or two, but none were prosecuted. There was no election of Senator other than that of Spencer by the irregular body and that of Sykes by the regular organization at the capitol, neither of which took place on the day appointed by law. The Senate admitted Spencer on the ground that Governor Lewis had recognized the court-house aggregation. Sykes contested and of course failed; the Senate refused for several years to vote his expenses, as was customary. In 1885, Senator h.o.a.r secured $7,132 for Spencer as expenses in the contest. In 1875 the Alabama legislature, Radical and Democratic, united in an address to the United States Senate, asking that Spencer"s seat be declared vacant.[2112]
Under Lewis the Radical administration went to pieces. The enormous issues of bonds, fraudulent and otherwise, by Smith and Lewis which destroyed the credit of the state; ignorant negroes in public office; drunken judges on the benches; convicts as officials; teachers and school officers unable to read; intermarriage of whites and blacks declared legal by the supreme court; the low character of the Federal officials; constant arrests of respectable whites for political purposes; use of Federal troops; packed juries; purchase and sale of offices; defaulters in every Radical county; riots instigated by the Radical leaders; heavy taxes,--all these burdens bore to the ground the Lewis administration before the end of its term. The last year was simply a standstill while the whites were preparing to overthrow the Radical government, which was demoralized and disabled also by constant aid and interference from the Federal administration.
[Ill.u.s.tration: DEMOCRATIC AND CONSERVATIVE LEADERS.
GOVERNOR R. M. PATTON.
GENERAL JAMES H. CLANTON. Organizer of the present Democratic Party in Alabama.
GOVERNOR GEORGE S. HOUSTON.
GOVERNOR R. B. LINDSAY.
MAJOR J. R. CROWE, now of Sheffield, Ala., one of the founders of the Ku Klux Klan at Pulaski, Tenn.]
Lewis appointed a lower cla.s.s of officials than Smith had appointed, among them many ignorant negroes for minor offices. Carpet-baggers and scalawags were becoming scarce. The white counties under their own local government were slowly recovering; the formerly wealthy Black Belt counties were being ruined under the burden of local, state, and munic.i.p.al taxation.[2113]
To the Forty-second Congress Alabama, now ent.i.tled to eight representatives, sent four scalawags, Pelham, Hays, White, and Sheets; one negro, Rapier; and three Democrats or Independents, Bromberg, Caldwell, and Gla.s.s; carpet-baggers were now at a discount; scalawags and negroes wanted all the spoils.
In the spring of 1874 the whites began to organize to overthrow Radical rule. They were firmly determined that there should not be another Radical administration. In the Radical party only a few whites were left to hold the negroes together. Some of the negroes were disgusted because of promises unfulfilled; others were grasping at office; the Union League discipline was missed; "outrages" were no longer so effective. The Radicals had no new issues to present. The state credit was destroyed; the negroes no longer believed so seriously the stories of reenslavement; the northern public was becoming more indifferent, or more sympathetic toward the whites. The time for the overthrow of Radical rule was at hand.
SEC. 2. SOCIAL CONDITIONS DURING RECONSTRUCTION
In previous chapters something has been said of social and economic matters, especially concerning labor, education, religion, and race relations. Some supplementary facts and observations may be of use.
The central figure of Reconstruction was the negro. How was his life affected by the conditions of Reconstruction? In the first place, crime among the blacks increased, as was to be expected. Removed from the restraints and punishments of slavery, with criminal leaders, the negro, even under the most African of governments, became the chief criminal. The crime of rape became common, caused largely, the whites believed, by the social equality theories of the reconstructionists. Personal conflicts among blacks and between blacks and whites were common, though probably decreasing for a time in the early "70"s. Stealing was the most frequent crime, with murder a close second. During the last year of negro rule the report of the penitentiary inspectors gave the following statistics:--
================================================ CRIMESWHITESNEGROES ---------------------------------------------- Murder1143 a.s.sault221 Burglary and grand larceny15199 Arson14 Rape06 Other felonies214------------------ Total31287 ================================================
Thus 1 white to 16,936 of population was in prison for felony; 1 black to 2294; felonies, 1 white to 8 blacks; misdemeanors, 1 white to 64 blacks.
In Montgomery jail were confined about 12 blacks to 1 white. These statistics do not show the real state of affairs, since most convictions of blacks were in cases prosecuted by blacks. To be prosecuted by a white was equivalent to persecution--so reasoned the negro jury in the Black Belt. Under the instigation of low white leaders, the negroes frequently burned the houses and other property of whites who were disliked by the Radical leaders. Several attempts, more or less successful, were made to burn the white villages in the Black Belt; hardly a single one wholly escaped. For several years the whites had to picket the towns in time of political excitement. The worst negro criminals were the discharged negro soldiers, who sometimes settled in gangs together in the Black Belt. More charges were made of crimes by blacks against whites, than by whites against blacks. Most criminals did not go to prison after conviction. The Radical legislature pa.s.sed a law allowing the sale of the convict"s labor to relatives. A good old negro could buy the time of a worthless son for ten cents a day and have him released.
The marriage relations of the negroes were hardly satisfactory, judged by white standards. The white legislatures in 1865-1866 had declared slave marriages binding. The reconstructionists denounced this as a great cruelty and repealed the law. Marriages were then made to date from the pa.s.sage of the Reconstruction Acts. Many negro men had had several wives before that date. They were relieved from the various penalties of desertion, bigamy, adultery, etc. And after the pa.s.sage of these laws, numerous prominent negroes were relieved of the penalties for promiscuous marriages. Divorces became common among the negroes who were in politics.