[Footnote o: Com. Journ. 28 Mar. 1642.]
[Footnote p: _Ibid._ 7 Sept. 1644.]
[Footnote q: _Ibid._ 21 Mar. 1649.]
[Footnote r: _Ibid._]
[Footnote s: Scobell. 358.]
[Footnote t: Com. Journ. 9 Jun. 1657. Scobell. 511.]
[Footnote u: Com. Journ. 17 Dec. 1660.]
[Footnote w: _Ibid._ 22 Dec. 1660.]
[Footnote x: _Ibid._ 16 Apr. 1735.]
[Footnote y: _Ibid._ 26 Feb. 1734.]
[Footnote z: _Ibid._ 28 Mar. 1764.]
V. A FIFTH branch of the perpetual revenue consists in the stamp duties, which are a tax imposed upon all parchment and paper whereon any legal proceedings, or private instruments of almost any nature whatsoever, are written; and also upon licences for retailing wines, of all denominations; upon all almanacks, newspapers, advertis.e.m.e.nts, cards, dice, and pamphlets containing less than six sheets of paper.
These imposts are very various, according to the nature of the thing stamped, rising gradually from a penny to ten pounds. This is also a tax, which though in some instances it may be heavily felt, by greatly increasing the expence of all mercantile as well as legal proceedings, yet (if moderately imposed) is of service to the public in general, by authenticating instruments, and rendering it much more difficult than formerly to forge deeds of any standing; since, as the officers of this branch of the revenue vary their stamps frequently, by marks perceptible to none but themselves, a man that would forge a deed of king William"s time, must know and be able to counterfeit the stamp of that date also. In France and some other countries the duty is laid on the contract itself, not on the instrument in which it is contained: but this draws the subject into a thousand nice disquisitions and disputes concerning the nature of his contract, and whether taxable or not; in which the farmers of the revenue are sure to have the advantage. Our method answers the purposes of the state as well, and consults the ease of the subject much better. The first inst.i.tution of the stamp duties was by statute 5 & 6 W. & M. c. 21. and they have since in many instances been encreased to five times their original amount.
VI. A SIXTH branch is the duty upon houses and windows. As early as the conquest mention is made in domesday book of fumage or fuage, vulgarly called smoke farthings; which were paid by custom to the king for every chimney in the house. And we read that Edward the black prince (soon after his successes in France) in imitation of the English custom, imposed a tax of a florin upon every hearth in his French dominions[a]. But the first parliamentary establishment of it in England was by statute 13 & 14 Car. II. c. 10. whereby an hereditary revenue of 2_s._ for every hearth, in all houses paying to church and poor, was granted to the king for ever. And, by subsequent statutes, for the more regular a.s.sessment of this tax, the constable and two other substantial inhabitants of the parish, to be appointed yearly, were, once in every year, empowered to view the inside of every house in the parish. But, upon the revolution, by statute 1 W.
& M. st. 1. c. 10. hearth-money was declared to be "not only a great oppression to the poorer sort, but a badge of slavery upon the whole people, exposing every man"s house to be entered into, and searched at pleasure, by persons unknown to him; and therefore, to erect a lasting monument of their majesties" goodness in every house in the kingdom, the duty of hearth-money was taken away and abolished." This monument of goodness remains among us to this day: but the prospect of it was somewhat darkened when, in six years afterwards, by statute 7 W. III.
c. 18. a tax was laid upon all houses (except cottages) of 2_s._ now advanced to 3_s._ _per_ house, and a tax also upon all windows, if they exceed nine, in such house. Which rates have been from time to time varied, (particularly by statutes 20 Geo. II. c. 3. and 31 Geo.
II. c. 22.) and power is given to surveyors, appointed by the crown, to inspect the outside of houses, and also to pa.s.s through any house two days in the year, into any court or yard to inspect the windows there.
[Footnote a: Mod. Un. Hist. xxiii. 463. Spelm. Gloss. _t.i.t. Fuage_.]
VII. THE seventh branch of the extraordinary perpetual revenue is the duty arising from licences to hackney coaches and chairs in London, and the parts adjacent. In 1654 two hundred hackney coaches were allowed within London, Westminster, and six miles round, under the direction of the court of aldermen[b]. By statute 13 & 14 Car. II. c.
2. four hundred were licensed; and the money arising thereby was applied to repairing the streets[c]. This number was increased to seven hundred by statute 5 W. & M. c. 22. and the duties vested in the crown: and by the statute 9 Ann. c. 23. and other subsequent statutes[d], there are now eight hundred licensed coaches and four hundred chairs. This revenue is governed by commissioners of it"s own, and is, in truth, a benefit to the subject; as the expense of it is felt by no individual, and it"s necessary regulations have established a competent jurisdiction, whereby a very refractory race of men may be kept in some tolerable order.
[Footnote b: Scobell. 313.]
[Footnote c: Com. Journ. 14 Feb. 1661.]
[Footnote d: 10 Ann. c. 19. --. 158. 12 Geo. I. c. 15. 33 Geo. II. c.
25.]
VIII. THE eighth and last branch of the king"s extraordinary perpetual revenue is the duty upon offices and pensions; consisting in a payment of 1_s._ in the pound (over and above all other duties) out of all salaries, fees, and perquisites, of offices and pensions payable by the crown. This highly popular taxation was imposed by statute 31 Geo.
II. c. 22. and is under the direction of the commissioners of the land tax.
THE clear neat produce of these several branches of the revenue, after all charges of collecting and management paid, amounts annually to about seven millions and three quarters sterling; besides two millions and a quarter raised annually, at an average, by the land and malt tax. How these immense sums are appropriated, is next to be considered. And this is, first and princ.i.p.ally, to the payment of the interest of the national debt.
IN order to take a clear and comprehensive view of the nature of this national debt, it must first be premised, that after the revolution, when our new connections with Europe introduced a new system of foreign politics, the expenses of the nation, not only in settling the new establishment, but in maintaining long wars, as princ.i.p.als, on the continent, for the security of the Dutch barrier, reducing the French monarchy, settling the Spanish succession, supporting the house of Austria, maintaining the liberties of the Germanic body, and other purposes, increased to an unusual degree: insomuch that it was not thought advisable to raise all the expenses of any one year by taxes to be levied within that year, lest the unaccustomed weight of them should create murmurs among the people. It was therefore the policy of the times, to antic.i.p.ate the revenues of their posterity, by borrowing immense sums for the current service of the state, and to lay no more taxes upon the subject than would suffice to pay the annual interest of the sums so borrowed: by this means converting the princ.i.p.al debt into a new species of property, transferrable from one man to another at any time and in any quant.i.ty. A system which seems to have had it"s original in the state of Florence, _A.D._ 1344: which government then owed about 60000_l._ sterling; and, being unable to pay it, formed the princ.i.p.al into an aggregate sum, called metaphorically a _mount_ or _bank_, the shares whereof were transferrable like our stocks, with interest at 5 _per cent._ the prices varying according to the exigencies of the state[e]. This laid the foundation of what is called the national debt: for a few long annuities created in the reign of Charles II will hardly deserve that name. And the example then set has been so closely followed during the long wars in the reign of queen Anne, and since, that the capital of the national debt, (funded and unfunded) amounted in January 1765 to upwards of 145,000,000_l._ to pay the interest of which, and the charges for management, amounting annually to about four millions and three quarters, the revenues just enumerated are in the first place mortgaged, and made perpetual by parliament. Perpetual, I say; but still redeemable by the same authority that imposed them: which, if it at any time can pay off the capital, will abolish those taxes which are raised to discharge the interest.
[Footnote e: _Pro tempore, pro spe, pro commodo, minuitur eorum pretium atque augescit._ Aretin. See Mod. Un. Hist. x.x.xvi. 116.]
BY this means the quant.i.ty of property in the kingdom is greatly encreased in idea, compared with former times; yet, if we coolly consider it, not at all encreased in reality. We may boast of large fortunes, and quant.i.ties of money in the funds. But where does this money exist? It exists only in name, in paper, in public faith, in parliamentary security: and that is undoubtedly sufficient for the creditors of the public to rely on. But then what is the pledge which the public faith has p.a.w.ned for the security of these debts? The land, the trade, and the personal industry of the subject; from which the money must arise that supplies the several taxes. In these therefore, and these only, the property of the public creditors does really and intrinsically exist: and of course the land, the trade, and the personal industry of individuals, are diminished in their true value just so much as they are pledged to answer. If A"s income amounts to 100_l._ _per annum_; and he is so far indebted to B, that he pays him 50_l._ _per annum_ for his interest; one half of the value of A"s property is transferred to B the creditor. The creditor"s property exists in the demand which he has upon the debtor, and no where else; and the debtor is only a trustee to his creditor for one half of the value of his income. In short, the property of a creditor of the publick, consists in a certain portion of the national taxes: by how much therefore he is the richer, by so much the nation, which pays these taxes, is the poorer.
THE only advantage, that can result to a nation from public debts, is the encrease of circulation by multiplying the cash of the kingdom, and creating a new species of money, always ready to be employed in any beneficial undertaking, by means of it"s transferrable quality; and yet productive of some profit, even when it lies idle and unemployed. A certain proportion of debt seems therefore to be highly useful to a trading people; but what that proportion is, it is not for me to determine. Thus much is indisputably certain, that the present magnitude of our national inc.u.mbrances very far exceeds all calculations of commercial benefit, and is productive of the greatest inconveniences. For, first, the enormous taxes, that are raised upon the necessaries of life for the payment of the interest of this debt, are a hurt both to trade and manufactures, by raising the price as well of the artificer"s subsistence, as of the raw material, and of course, in a much greater proportion, the price of the commodity itself. Secondly, if part of this debt be owing to foreigners, either they draw out of the kingdom annually a considerable quant.i.ty of specie for the interest; or else it is made an argument to grant them unreasonable privileges in order to induce them to reside here.
Thirdly, if the whole be owing to subjects only, it is then charging the active and industrious subject, who pays his share of the taxes, to maintain the indolent and idle creditor who receives them. Lastly, and princ.i.p.ally, it weakens the internal strength of a state, by antic.i.p.ating those resources which should be reserved to defend it in case of necessity. The interest we now pay for our debts would be nearly sufficient to maintain any war, that any national motives could require. And if our ancestors in king William"s time had annually paid, so long as their exigences lasted, even a less sum than we now annually raise upon their accounts, they would in the time of war have borne no greater burdens, than they have bequeathed to and settled upon their posterity in time of peace; and might have been eased the instant the exigence was over.
THE produce of the several taxes beforementioned were originally separate and distinct funds; being securities for the sums advanced on each several tax, and for them only. But at last it became necessary, in order to avoid confusion, as they multiplied yearly, to reduce the number of these separate funds, by uniting and blending them together; superadding the faith of parliament for the general security of the whole. So that there are now only three capital funds of any account, the _aggregate_ fund, and the _general_ fund, so called from such union and addition; and the _south sea_ fund, being the produce of the taxes appropriated to pay the interest of such part of the national debt as was advanced by that company and it"s annuitants. Whereby the separate funds, which were thus united, are become mutual securities for each other; and the whole produce of them, thus aggregated, is liable to pay such interest or annuities as were formerly charged upon each distinct fund; the faith of the legislature being moreover engaged to supply any casual deficiences.
THE customs, excises, and other taxes, which are to support these funds, depending on contingencies, upon exports, imports, and consumptions, must necessarily be of a very uncertain amount; but they have always been considerably more than was sufficient to answer the charge upon them. The surplusses therefore of the three great national funds, the aggregate, general, and south sea funds, over and above the interest and annuities charged upon them, are directed by statute 3 Geo. I. c. 7. to be carried together, and to attend the disposition of parliament; and are usually denominated the _sinking_ fund, because originally destined to sink and lower the national debt. To this have been since added many other intire duties, granted in subsequent years; and the annual interest of the sums borrowed on their respective credits is charged on and payable out of the produce of the sinking fund. However the neat surplusses and savings, after all deductions paid, amount annually to a very considerable sum; particularly in the year ending at Christmas 1764, to about two millions and a quarter. For, as the interest on the national debt has been at several times reduced, (by the consent of the proprietors, who had their option either to lower their interest or be paid their princ.i.p.al) the savings from the appropriated revenues must needs be extremely large. This sinking fund is the last resort of the nation; on which alone depend all the hopes we can entertain of ever discharging or moderating our inc.u.mbrances. And therefore the prudent application of the large sums, now arising from this fund, is a point of the utmost importance, and well worthy the serious attention of parliament; which has thereby been enabled, in this present year 1765, to reduce above two millions sterling of the public debt.
BUT, before any part of the aggregate fund (the surplusses whereof are one of the chief ingredients that form the sinking fund) can be applied to diminish the princ.i.p.al of the public debt, it stands mortgaged by parliament to raise an annual sum for the maintenance of the king"s houshold and the civil list. For this purpose, in the late reigns, the produce of certain branches of the excise and customs, the post-office, the duty on wine licences, the revenues of the remaining crown lands, the profits arising from courts of justice, (which articles include all the hereditary revenues of the crown) and also a clear annuity of 120000_l._ in money, were settled on the king for life, for the support of his majesty"s houshold, and the honour and dignity of the crown. And, as the amount of these several branches was uncertain, (though in the last reign they were generally computed to raise almost a million) if they did not arise annually to 800,000_l._ the parliament engaged to make up the deficiency. But his present majesty having, soon after his accession, spontaneously signified his consent, that his own hereditary revenues might be so disposed of as might best conduce to the utility and satisfaction of the public, and having graciously accepted the limited sum of 800000_l._ _per annum_ for the support of his civil list (and that also charged with three life annuities, to the princess of Wales, the duke of c.u.mberland, and the princess Amalie, to the amount of 77000_l._) the said hereditary and other revenues are now carried into and made a part of the aggregate fund, and the aggregate fund is charged with the payment of the whole annuity to the crown of 800000_l._ _per annum_[f]. Hereby the revenues themselves, being put under the same care and management as the other branches of the public patrimony, will produce more and be better collected than heretofore; and the public is a gainer of upwards of 100000_l._ _per annum_ by this disinterested bounty of his majesty. The civil list, thus liquidated, together with the four millions and three quarters, interest of the national debt, and the two millions and a quarter produced from the sinking fund, make up the seven millions and three quarters _per annum_, neat money, which were before stated to be the annual produce of our _perpetual_ taxes; besides the immense, though uncertain, sums arising from the _annual_ taxes on land and malt, but which, at an average, may be calculated at more than two millions and a quarter; and, added to the preceding sum, make the clear produce of the taxes, exclusive of the charge of collecting, which are raised yearly on the people of this country, and returned into the king"s exchequer, amount to upwards of ten millions sterling.
[Footnote f: Stat. 1 Geo. III. c. 1.]
THE expences defrayed by the civil list are those that in any shape relate to civil government; as, the expenses of the houshold; all salaries to officers of state, to the judges, and every of the king"s servants; the appointments to foreign emba.s.sadors; the maintenance of the royal family; the king"s private expenses, or privy purse; and other very numerous outgoings, as secret service money, pensions, and other bounties: which sometimes have so far exceeded the revenues appointed for that purpose, that application has been made to parliament to discharge the debts contracted on the civil list; as particularly in 1724, when one million was granted for that purpose by the statute 11 Geo. I. c. 17.
THE civil list is indeed properly the whole of the king"s revenue in his own distinct capacity; the rest being rather the revenue of the public, or it"s creditors, though collected, and distributed again, in the name and by the officers of the crown: it now standing in the same place, as the hereditary income did formerly; and, as that has gradually diminished, the parliamentary appointments have encreased.
The whole revenue of queen Elizabeth did not amount to more than 600000_l._ a year[g]: that of king Charles I was[h] 800000_l._ and the revenue voted for king Charles II was[i] 1200000_l._ though it never in fact amounted to quite so much[k]. But it must be observed, that under these sums were included all manner of public expenses, among which lord Clarendon in his speech to the parliament computed that the charge of the navy and land forces amounted annually to 800000_l._ which was ten times more than before the former troubles[l]. The same revenue, subject to the same charges, was settled on on [Transcriber"s Note: duplicate word] king James II[m]: but by the encrease of trade, and more frugal management, it amounted on an average to a million and half _per annum_, (besides other additional customs, granted by parliament[n], which produced an annual revenue of 400000_l._) out of which his fleet and army were maintained at the yearly expense of[o]
1100000_l._ After the revolution, when the parliament took into it"s own hands the annual support of the forces, both maritime and military, a civil list revenue was settled on the new king and queen, amounting, with the hereditary duties, to 700000_l._ _per annum_[p]; and the same was continued to queen Anne and king George I[q]. That of king George II, we have seen, was nominally augmented to[r] 800000_l._ and in fact was considerably more. But that of his present majesty is expressly limited to that sum; and, by reason of the charges upon it, amounts at present to little more than 700000_l._ And upon the whole it is doubtless much better for the crown, and also for the people, to have the revenue settled upon the modern footing rather than the antient. For the crown; because it is more certain, and collected with greater ease: for the people; because they are now delivered from the feodal hardships, and other odious branches of the prerogative. And though complaints have sometimes been made of the encrease of the civil list, yet if we consider the sums that have been formerly granted, the limited extent under which it is now established, the revenues and prerogatives given up in lieu of it by the crown, and (above all) the diminution of the value of money compared with what it was worth in the last century, we must acknowlege these complaints to be void of any rational foundation; and that it is impossible to support that dignity, which a king of Great Britain should maintain, with an income in any degree less than what is now established by parliament.
[Footnote g: Lord Clar. continuation. 163.]
[Footnote h: Com. Journ. 4 Sept. 1660.]
[Footnote i: _Ibid._]
[Footnote k: _Ibid._ 4 Jun. 1663. Lord Clar. _ibid._]
[Footnote l: _Ibid._ 165.]
[Footnote m: Stat. 1 Jac. II. c. 1.]
[Footnote n: Stat. 1 Jac. II. c. 3 & 4.]
[Footnote o: Com. Journ. 1 Mar. 20 Mar. 1688.]
[Footnote p: _Ibid._ 14 Mar. 1701.]
[Footnote q: _Ibid._ 17 Mar. 1701. 11 Aug. 1714.]
[Footnote r: Stat. 1 Geo. II. c. 1.]
THIS finishes our enquiries into the fiscal prerogatives of the king; or his revenue, both ordinary and extraordinary. We have therefore now chalked out all the princ.i.p.al outlines of this vast t.i.tle of the law, the supreme executive magistrate, or the king"s majesty, considered in his several capacities and points of view. But, before we intirely dismiss this subject, it may not be improper to take a short comparative review of the power of the executive magistrate, or prerogative of the crown, as it stood in former days, and as it stands at present. And we cannot but observe, that most of the laws for ascertaining, limiting, and restraining this prerogative have been made within the compa.s.s of little more than a century past; from the pet.i.tion of right in 3 Car. I. to the present time. So that the powers of the crown are now to all appearance greatly curtailed and diminished since the reign of king James the first: particularly, by the abolition of the star chamber and high commission courts in the reign of Charles the first, and by the disclaiming of martial law, and the power of levying taxes on the subject, by the same prince: by the disuse of forest laws for a century past: and by the many excellent provisions enacted under Charles the second; especially, the abolition of military tenures, purveyance, and preemption; the _habeas corpus_ act; and the act to prevent the discontinuance of parliaments for above three years: and, since the revolution, by the strong and emphatical words in which our liberties are a.s.serted in the bill of rights, and act of settlement; by the act for triennial, since turned into septennial, elections; by the exclusion of certain officers from the house of commons; by rendering the seats of the judges permanent, and their salaries independent; and by restraining the king"s pardon from operating on parliamentary impeachments. Besides all this, if we consider how the crown is impoverished and stripped of all it"s antient revenues, so that it greatly depends on the liberality of parliament for it"s necessary support and maintenance, we may perhaps be led to think, that the ballance is enclined pretty strongly to the popular scale, and that the executive magistrate has neither independence nor power enough left, to form that check upon the lords and commons, which the founders of our const.i.tution intended.
BUT, on the other hand, it is to be considered, that every prince, in the first parliament after his accession, has by long usage a truly royal addition to his hereditary revenue settled upon him for his life; and has never any occasion to apply to parliament for supplies, but upon some public necessity of the whole realm. This restores to him that const.i.tutional independence, which at his first accession seems, it must be owned, to be wanting. And then, with regard to power, we may find perhaps that the hands of government are at least sufficiently strengthened; and that an English monarch is now in no danger of being overborne by either the n.o.bility or the people. The instruments of power are not perhaps so open and avowed as they formerly were, and therefore are the less liable to jealous and invidious reflections; but they are not the weaker upon that account.
In short, our national debt and taxes (besides the inconveniences before-mentioned) have also in their natural consequences thrown such a weight of power into the executive scale of government, as we cannot think was intended by our patriot ancestors; who gloriously struggled for the abolition of the then formidable parts of the prerogative; and by an unaccountable want of foresight established this system in their stead. The entire collection and management of so vast a revenue, being placed in the hands of the crown, have given rise to such a mult.i.tude of new officers, created by and removeable at the royal pleasure, that they have extended the influence of government to every corner of the nation. Witness the commissioners, and the mult.i.tude of dependents on the customs, in every port of the kingdom; the commissioners of excise, and their numerous subalterns, in every inland district; the postmasters, and their servants, planted in every town, and upon every public road; the commissioners of the stamps, and their distributors, which are full as scattered and full as numerous; the officers of the salt duty, which, though a species of excise and conducted in the same manner, are yet made a distinct corps from the ordinary managers of that revenue; the surveyors of houses and windows; the receivers of the land tax; the managers of lotteries; and the commissioners of hackney coaches; all which are either mediately or immediately appointed by the crown, and removeable at pleasure without any reason a.s.signed: these, it requires but little penetration to see, must give that power, on which they depend for subsistence, an influence most amazingly extensive. To this may be added the frequent opportunities of conferring particular obligations, by preference in loans, subscriptions, tickets, remittances, and other money-transactions, which will greatly encrease this influence; and that over those persons whose attachment, on account of their wealth, is frequently the most desirable. All this is the natural, though perhaps the unforeseen, consequence of erecting our funds of credit, and to support them establishing our present perpetual taxes: the whole of which is entirely new since the restoration in 1660; and by far the greatest part since the revolution in 1688. And the same may be said with regard to the officers in our numerous army, and the places which the army has created. All which put together gives the executive power so persuasive an energy with respect to the persons themselves, and so prevailing an interest with their friends and families, as will amply make amends for the loss of external prerogative.
BUT, though this profusion of offices should have no effect on individuals, there is still another newly acquired branch of power; and that is, not the influence only, but the force of a disciplined army: paid indeed ultimately by the people, but immediately by the crown; raised by the crown, officered by the crown, commanded by the crown. They are kept on foot it is true only from year to year, and that by the power of parliament: but during that year they must, by the nature of our const.i.tution, if raised at all, be at the absolute disposal of the crown. And there need but few words to demonstrate how great a trust is thereby reposed in the prince by his people. A trust, that is more than equivalent to a thousand little troublesome prerogatives.
ADD to all this, that, besides the civil list, the immense revenue of seven millions sterling, which is annually paid to the creditors of the publick, or carried to the sinking fund, is first deposited in the royal exchequer, and thence issued out to the respective offices of payment. This revenue the people can never refuse to raise, because it is made perpetual by act of parliament: which also, when well considered, will appear to be a trust of great delicacy and high importance.