[Footnote f: Co. Litt. 45. 3 Rep. 60.]
2. A STATUTE, which treats of things or persons of an inferior rank, cannot by any _general words_ be extended to those of a superior. So a statute, treating of "deans, prebendaries, parsons, vicars, _and others having spiritual promotion_," is held not to extend to bishops, though they have spiritual promotion; deans being the highest persons named, and bishops being of a still higher order[g].
[Footnote g: 2 Rep. 46.]
3. PENAL statutes must be construed strictly. Thus a statute 1 Edw.
VI. having enacted that those who are convicted of stealing _horses_ should not have the benefit of clergy, the judges conceived that this did not extend to him that should steal but _one horse_, and therefore procured a new act for that purpose in the following year[h]. And, to come nearer our own times, by the statute 14 Geo. II. c. 6. stealing sheep, _or other cattle_, was made felony without benefit of clergy.
But these general words, "or other cattle," being looked upon as much too loose to create a capital offence, the act was held to extend to nothing but mere sheep. And therefore, in the next sessions, it was found necessary to make another statute, 15 Geo. II. c. 34. extending the former to bulls, cows, oxen, steers, bullocks, heifers, calves, and lambs, by name.
[Footnote h: Bac. Elem. c. 12.]
4. STATUTES against frauds are to be liberally and beneficially expounded. This may seem a contradiction to the last rule; most statutes against frauds being in their consequences penal. But this difference is here to be taken: where the statute acts upon the offender, and inflicts a penalty, as the pillory or a fine, it is then to be taken strictly: but when the statute acts upon the offence, by setting aside the fraudulent transaction, here it is to be construed liberally. Upon this footing the statute of 13 Eliz. c. 5. which avoids all gifts of goods, &c, made to defraud creditors _and others_, was held to extend by the general words to a gift made to defraud the queen of a forfeiture[i].
[Footnote i: 3 Rep. 82.]
5. ONE part of a statute must be so construed by another, that the whole may if possible stand: _ut res magis valeat, quam pereat_. As if land be vested in the king and his heirs by act of parliament, saving the right of A; and A has at that time a lease of it for three years: here A shall hold it for his term of three years, and afterwards it shall go to the king. For this interpretation furnishes matter for every clause of the statute to work and operate upon. But
6. A SAVING, totally repugnant to the body of the act, is void. If therefore an act of parliament vests land in the king and his heirs, saving the right of all persons whatsoever; or vests the land of A in the king, saving the right of A: in either of these cases the saving is totally repugnant to the body of the statute, and (if good) would render the statute of no effect or operation; and therefore the saving is void, and the land vests absolutely in the king[k].
[Footnote k: 1 Rep. 47.]
7. WHERE the common law and a statute differ, the common law gives place to the statute; and an old statute gives place to a new one. And this upon the general principle laid down in the last section, that "_leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant_." But this is to be understood, only when the latter statute is couched in negative terms, or by it"s matter necessarily implies a negative. As if a former act says, that a juror upon such a trial shall have twenty pounds a year; and a new statute comes and says, he shall have twenty marks: here the latter statute, though it does not express, yet necessarily implies a negative, and virtually repeals the former. For if twenty marks be made qualification sufficient, the former statute which requires twenty pounds is at an end[l]. But if both acts be merely affirmative, and the substance such that both may stand together, here the latter does not repeal the former, but they shall both have a concurrent efficacy. If by a former law an offence be indictable at the quarter sessions, and a latter law makes the same offence indictable at the a.s.sises; here the jurisdiction of the sessions is not taken away, but both have a concurrent jurisdiction, and the offender may be prosecuted at either; unless the new statute subjoins express negative words, as, that the offence shall be indictable at the a.s.sises, _and not elsewhere_[m].
[Footnote l: Jenk. Cent. 2. 73.]
[Footnote m: 11 Rep. 63.]
8. IF a statute, that repeals another, is itself repealed afterwards, the first statute is hereby revived, without any formal words for that purpose. So when the statutes of 26 and 35 Hen. VIII, declaring the king to be the supreme head of the church, were repealed by a statute 1 & 2 Ph. and Mary, and this latter statute was afterwards repealed by an act of 1 Eliz. there needed not any express words of revival in queen Elizabeth"s statute, but these acts of king Henry were impliedly and virtually revived[n].
[Footnote n: 4 Inst. 325.]
9. ACTS of parliament derogatory from the power of subsequent parliaments bind not. So the statute 11 Hen. VII. c. 1. which directs, that no person for a.s.sisting a king _de facto_ shall be attainted of treason by act of parliament or otherwise, is held to be good only as to common prosecutions for high treason; but will not restrain or clog any parliamentary attainder[o]. Because the legislature, being in truth the sovereign power, is always of equal, always of absolute authority: it acknowleges no superior upon earth, which the prior legislature must have been, if it"s ordinances could bind the present parliament. And upon the same principle Cicero, in his letters to Atticus, treats with a proper contempt these restraining clauses which endeavour to tie up the hands of succeeding legislatures. "When you repeal the law itself, says he, you at the same time repeal the prohibitory clause, which guards against such repeal[p]."
[Footnote o: 4 Inst. 43.]
[Footnote p: _c.u.m lex abrogatur, illud ipsum abrogatur, quo non eam abrogari oporteat._ _l._ 3. _ep._ 23.]
10. LASTLY, acts of parliament that are impossible to be performed are of no validity; and if there arise out of them collaterally any absurd consequences, manifestly contradictory to common reason, they are, with regard to those collateral consequences, void. I lay down the rule with these restrictions; though I know it is generally laid down more largely, that acts of parliament contrary to reason are void. But if the parliament will positively enact a thing to be done which is unreasonable, I know of no power that can control it: and the examples usually alleged in support of this sense of the rule do none of them prove, that where the main object of a statute is unreasonable the judges are at liberty to reject it; for that were to set the judicial power above that of the legislature, which would be subversive of all government. But where some collateral matter arises out of the general words, and happens to be unreasonable; there the judges are in decency to conclude that this consequence was not foreseen by the parliament, and therefore they are at liberty to expound the statute by equity, and only _quoad hoc_ disregard it. Thus if an act of parliament gives a man power to try all causes, that arise within his manor of Dale; yet, if a cause should arise in which he himself is party, the act is construed not to extend to that; because it is unreasonable that any man should determine his own quarrel[q]. But, if we could conceive it possible for the parliament to enact, that he should try as well his own causes as those of other persons, there is no court that has power to defeat the intent of the legislature, when couched in such evident and express words, as leave no doubt whether it was the intent of the legislature or no.
[Footnote q: 8 Rep. 118.]
THESE are the several grounds of the laws of England: over and above which, equity is also frequently called in to a.s.sist, to moderate, and to explain it. What equity is, and how impossible in it"s very essence to be reduced to stated rules, hath been shewn in the preceding section. I shall therefore only add, that there are courts of this kind established for the benefit of the subject, to correct and soften the rigor of the law, when through it"s generality it bears too hard in particular cases; to detect and punish latent frauds, which the law is not minute enough to reach; to enforce the execution of such matters of trust and confidence, as are binding in conscience, though perhaps not strictly legal; to deliver from such dangers as are owing to misfortune or oversight; and, in short, to relieve in all such cases as are, _bona fide_, objects of relief. This is the business of our courts of equity, which however are only conversant in matters of property. For the freedom of our const.i.tution will not permit, that in criminal cases a power should be lodged in any judge, to construe the law otherwise than according to the letter. This caution, while it admirably protects the public liberty, can never bear hard upon individuals. A man cannot suffer _more_ punishment than the law a.s.signs, but he may suffer _less_. The laws cannot be strained by partiality to inflict a penalty beyond what the letter will warrant; but in cases where the letter induces any apparent hardship, the crown has the power to pardon.
SECTION THE FOURTH.
OF THE COUNTRIES SUBJECT TO THE LAWS OF ENGLAND.
THE kingdom of England, over which our munic.i.p.al laws have jurisdiction, includes not, by the common law, either Wales, Scotland, or Ireland, or any other part of the king"s dominions, except the territory of England only. And yet the civil laws and local customs of this territory do now obtain, in part or in all, with more or less restrictions, in these and many other adjacent countries; of which it will be proper first to take a review, before we consider the kingdom of England itself, the original and proper subject of these laws.
WALES had continued independent of England, unconquered and uncultivated, in the primitive pastoral state which Caesar and Tacitus ascribe to Britain in general, for many centuries; even from the time of the hostile invasions of the Saxons, when the ancient and christian inhabitants of the island retired to those natural intrenchments, for protection from their pagan visitants. But when these invaders themselves were converted to christianity, and settled into regular and potent governments, this retreat of the antient Britons grew every day narrower; they were overrun by little and little, gradually driven from one fastness to another, and by repeated losses abridged of their wild independence. Very early in our history we find their princes doing homage to the crown of England; till at length in the reign of Edward the first, who may justly be stiled the conqueror of Wales, the line of their antient princes was abolished, and the king of England"s eldest son became, as a matter of course, their t.i.tular prince: the territory of Wales being then entirely annexed to the dominion of the crown of England[a], or, as the statute of Rutland[b]
expresses it, "_terra Walliae c.u.m incolis suis, prius regi jure feodali subjecta_, (of which homage was the sign) _jam in proprietatis dominium totaliter et c.u.m integritate conversa est, et coronae regni Angliae tanquam pars corporis ejusdem annexa et unita_." By the statute also of Wales[c] very material alterations were made in divers parts of their laws, so as to reduce them nearer to the English standard, especially in the forms of their judicial proceedings: but they still retained very much of their original polity, particularly their rule of inheritance, viz. that their lands were divided equally among all the issue male, and did not descend to the eldest son alone.
By other subsequent statutes their provincial immunities were still farther abridged: but the finishing stroke to their independency, was given by the statute 27 Hen. VIII. c. 26. which at the same time gave the utmost advancement to their civil prosperity, by admitting them to a thorough communication of laws with the subjects of England. Thus were this brave people gradually conquered into the enjoyment of true liberty; being insensibly put upon the same footing, and made fellow-citizens with their conquerors. A generous method of triumph, which the republic of Rome practised with great success; till she reduced all Italy to her obedience, by admitting the vanquished states to partake of the Roman privileges.
[Footnote a: Vaugh. 400.]
[Footnote b: 10 Edw. I.]
[Footnote c: 12 Edw. I.]
IT is enacted by this statute 27 Hen. VIII, 1. That the dominion of Wales shall be for ever united to the kingdom of England. 2. That all Welchmen born shall have the same liberties as other the king"s subjects. 3. That lands in Wales shall be inheritable according to the English tenures and rules of descent. 4. That the laws of England, and no other, shall be used in Wales: besides many other regulations of the police of this princ.i.p.ality. And the statute 34 & 35 Hen. VIII.
c. 26. confirms the same, adds farther regulations, divides it into twelve shires, and, in short, reduces it into the same order in which it stands at this day; differing from the kingdom of England in only a few particulars, and those too of the nature of privileges, (such as having courts within itself, independent of the process of Westminster hall) and some other immaterial peculiarities, hardly more than are to be found in many counties of England itself.
THE kingdom of Scotland, notwithstanding the union of the crowns on the accession of their king James VI to that of England, continued an entirely separate and distinct kingdom for above a century, though an union had been long projected; which was judged to be the more easy to be done, as both kingdoms were antiently under the same government, and still retained a very great resemblance, though far from an ident.i.ty, in their laws. By an act of parliament 1 Jac. I. c. 1. it is declared, that these two, mighty, famous, and antient kingdoms were formerly one. And sir Edward c.o.ke observes[d], how marvellous a conformity there was, not only in the religion and language of the two nations, but also in their antient laws, the descent of the crown, their parliaments, their t.i.tles of n.o.bility, their officers of state and of justice, their writs, their customs, and even the language of their laws. Upon which account he supposes the common law of each to have been originally the same, especially as their most antient and authentic book, called _regiam majestatem_ and containing the rules of _their_ antient common law, is extremely similar that of Glanvil, which contains the principles of _ours_, as it stood in the reign of Henry II. And the many diversities, subsisting between the two laws at present, may be well enough accounted for, from a diversity of practice in two large and uncommunicating jurisdictions, and from the acts of two distinct and independent parliaments, which have in many points altered and abrogated the old common law of both kingdoms.
[Footnote d: 4 Inst. 345.]
HOWEVER sir Edward c.o.ke, and the politicians of that time, conceived great difficulties in carrying on the projected union: but these were at length overcome, and the great work was happily effected in 1707, 5 Anne; when twenty five articles of union were agreed to by the parliaments of both nations: the purport of the most considerable being as follows:
1. THAT on the first of May 1707, and for ever after, the kingdoms of England and Scotland, shall be united into one kingdom, by the name of Great Britain.
2. THE succession to the monarchy of Great Britain shall be the same as was before settled with regard to that of England.
3. THE united kingdom shall be represented by one parliament.
4. THERE shall be a communication of all rights and privileges between the subjects of both kingdoms, except where it is otherwise agreed.
9. WHEN England raises 2,000,000_l._ by a land tax, Scotland shall raise 48,000_l._
16, 17. THE standards of the coin, of weights, and of measures, shall be reduced to those of England, throughout the united kingdoms.
18. THE laws relating to trade, customs, and the excise, shall be the same in Scotland as in England. But all the other laws of Scotland shall remain in force; but alterable by the parliament of Great Britain. Yet with this caution; that laws relating to public policy are alterable at the discretion of the parliament; laws relating to private rights are not to be altered but for the evident utility of the people of Scotland.
22. SIXTEEN peers are to be chosen to represent the peerage of Scotland in parliament, and forty five members to sit in the house of commons.
23. THE sixteen peers of Scotland shall have all privileges of parliament: and all peers of Scotland shall be peers of Great Britain, and rank next after those of the same degree at the time of the union, and shall have all privileges of peers, except sitting in the house of lords and voting on the trial of a peer.
THESE are the princ.i.p.al of the twenty five articles of union, which are ratified and confirmed by statute 5 Ann. c. 8. in which statute there are also two acts of parliament recited; the one of Scotland, whereby the church of Scotland, and also the four universities of that kingdom, are established for ever, and all succeeding sovereigns are to take an oath inviolably to maintain the same; the other of England, 5 Ann. c. 6. whereby the acts of uniformity of 13 Eliz. and 13 Car.
II. (except as the same had been altered by parliament at that time) and all other acts then in force for the preservation of the church of England, are declared perpetual; and it is stipulated, that every subsequent king and queen shall take an oath inviolably to maintain the same within England, Ireland, Wales, and the town of Berwick upon Tweed. And it is enacted, that these two acts "shall for ever be observed as fundamental and essential conditions of the union."
UPON these articles, and act of union, it is to be observed, 1. That the two kingdoms are now so inseparably united, that nothing can ever disunite them again, but an infringement of those points which, when they were separate and independent nations, it was mutually stipulated should be "fundamental and essential conditions of the union." 2. That whatever else may be deemed "fundamental and essential conditions,"
the preservation of the two churches, of England and Scotland, in the same state that they were in at the time of the union, and the maintenance of the acts of uniformity which establish our common prayer, are expressly declared so to be. 3. That therefore any alteration in the const.i.tutions of either of those churches, or in the liturgy of the church of England, would be an infringement of these "fundamental and essential conditions," and greatly endanger the union. 4. That the munic.i.p.al laws of Scotland are ordained to be still observed in that part of the island, unless altered by parliament; and, as the parliament has not yet thought proper, except in a few instances, to alter them, they still (with regard to the particulars unaltered) continue in full force. Wherefore the munic.i.p.al or common laws of England are, generally speaking, of no force or validity in Scotland; and, of consequence, in the ensuing commentaries, we shall have very little occasion to mention, any farther than sometimes by way of ill.u.s.tration, the munic.i.p.al laws of that part of the united kingdoms.
THE town of Berwick upon Tweed, though subject to the crown of England ever since the conquest of it in the reign of Edward IV, is not part of the kingdom of England, nor subject to the common law; though it is subject to all acts of parliament, being represented by burgesses therein. And therefore it was declared by statute 20 Geo. II. c. 42.
that where England only is mentioned in any act of parliament, the same notwithstanding shall be deemed to comprehend the dominion of Wales, and town of Berwick upon Tweed. But the general law there used is the Scots law, and the ordinary process of the courts of Westminster-hall is there of no authority[e].